Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill

Thank you, Sir. Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

This Bill covers two aspects.

First, dealing with Online Hostile Information Campaigns – we call them HICs – conducted by foreign parties. I will refer to that as the HIC part.

And the second part dealing with foreign interference through local proxies. The second part, I will refer to it as the Politically Significant Persons, or PSP part.

The second part is about slightly more than half of this Bill. There is existing law, the Political Donations Act (PDA), and we have ported over the existing PDA and updated it. Members of Parliament will be familiar with the PDA. So, it is the PDA which has been brought into the PSP part of the Bill, with updating.

I will set out the reasons for this Bill, deal with some of the concerns that have been raised and deal with the proposed amendments by the Workers' Party. My colleagues, Ministers of State Desmond Tan and Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim, will take the Members through the detailed provisions of the Bill.

First, on the PSP part of the Bill. The philosophy is that our politics is for Singaporeans to deal with. We can argue, disagree, but, ultimately, it is for us to decide.

If I can quote what the former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director James Comey told the House Intelligence Committee in March 2017, "One of the things we radiate to the world is the importance of our wonderful, often messy, but free and fair democratic system and the elections that undergird it. And so, when there is something by a foreign nation state to mess with that, to destroy that, to corrupt that, it is very, very serious and threatens what is America." The very idea of America.

We do not put it in the same grandiose terms but Singapore is important for us and we take the same approach. We say it is not for the Americans to tell us what to do, as they have tried, and it is not for anyone else to tell us what to do either.

This was expressed in 1973 in the President's speech and expressed in law through the PDA, which sets out rules for interactions with foreigners for election candidates, election agents and political associations.

The PSP part, as I said, is based on existing legislation, the PDA, ported over.

Over the years, subversion has become an even more serious issue. Modern ease of communications, increased interactions and travel have made it inevitable that traditional spying and subversion increases in scope and intensity. This is happening in Singapore and elsewhere.

Just to give some examples from the last few years.

In 2017, an Australian former senator apparently received donations from an individual with connections to the People's Republic of China (PRC) government. He then advocated for China's position on the South China Sea.

A former chairman of a European Union foreign friendship group was sponsored flights and hotel stays by a foreign government and, subsequently, voiced views that supported that government's policies on various issues.

In 2019, leaked documents revealed that the Russian government was allegedly planning to provide financial and public relations assistance to the election campaign of German politician Markus Frohnmaier, who was known to be very outspoken in favour of ending sanctions and recognising Russia's annexation of Crimea.

This has also happened in Singapore. Members would be familiar with the expulsion of academic Huang Jing in 2017 for collaborating with foreign intelligence agents. It was an attempt to influence senior decision-makers in Government.

Moving on to the HIC part of the Bill. The reasons are straightforward.

Spying and subversion in another country are age-old. Using spies, agents, locals and useful idiots is all part of subversion.

As technology developed, the subversion increased and adapted new technology: phone tapping, cameras, recording, microfilming and so on.

Now, technology has evolved again. The Internet has created a powerful new medium for subversion. Countries are actively developing attack and defence capabilities as an arm of warfare equal to and more potent than the land, air and naval forces. It is often seen as the fourth arm of service.

The Gerasimov Doctrine, named after the Russian chief of staff, identifies issues of "protest potential" in another country, uses information operations to polarise that society and incite public disorder and keeps the target country in a constant state of turmoil. Aggressors can more easily achieve their political and military outcomes.

New communication tools facilitate non-kinetic forms of attack and make these harder to detect.

For example, bots and digital ads can easily be bought to spread harmful information. Foreign actors can blend their activities with other authentic online users, which give readers a false sense of reality.

We have an annex that sets out more details of the Gerasimov Doctrine, the new communications tools and HIC tactics used by foreign state actors. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, can I ask for the distribution of a folder which contains annexes A to I that I am going to refer to? And we distribute them together, so that it is easier.

Yes, please. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 2.]

May I proceed as the annexes are being distributed?

Yes, please.

If Members were to look at annex A, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, they refer to the Russians developing a military doctrine for the Internet age.

The doctrine took tactics developed by the Soviets, blended them with strategic military thinking about total war and laid out a theory of modern warfare. It specifies that its objective is to achieve an environment of permanent unrest and conflict within an enemy state. It includes harnessing the protest potential of the population of a target country, deepening the divisions within that, increasing hostility among different groups and getting them to distrust institutions.

With this doctrine, the rules of war have changed. Non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals without using the force of weapons, including utilising a range of actors and tools, hackers, the media, businessmen, information leaks and misinformation, are all part and parcel of new warfare.

The Russians are said to have done this. We have no way of verifying that. The following examples, which I will refer to, are based on reports.

Ukraine is said to have suffered extensive intervention. Russia allegedly deployed this doctrine for many years.

One example. During the 2014 protests, sensitive fault lines were targeted to paint the Ukrainian government as a fascist, racist, xenophobic junta. They claimed that Jews were being terrorised and beaten and asserted that local Jewish leaders were appealing to international bodies for help. They tried to weaken the resolve of the armed forces and the population to build popular support for Crimea to join Russia. Eventually, of course, we know Crimea was annexed.

Czech Republic. Our 2018 Parliamentary Select Committee received evidence that Russia had targeted extremists and fringe politicians to spread propaganda, undermine support for Ukraine and cause one-quarter to one-third of the Czech population to believe that the Ukrainian government was fascist. And it resulted in the Czech government being unable to support the Ukrainians. So, the HICs managed to change Czech foreign policy.

Netherlands. During the Dutch Referendum on the EU-Ukraine FTA, Russians pretended to be Ukrainians, inflamed local debates, supported by online disinformation campaign involving fake stories about Ukraine and Dutch voters, eventually, voted against the FTA.

Annex B sets out some of the details. If Members were to see annex B, page 8 refers to Ukraine – look at item 3 of page 8. Item 4, the use of tools. Page 10, paragraph 6, the consequences as a result of the campaign. Page 11, the interference in Czech Republic, paragraph 2 sets out how it has been successful, that 53% of the Czechs believed there is propaganda both for and against a foreign country in the Czech public space and therefore, they cannot trust anything. That is another objective that people try and achieve: make you distrustful of everything. And page 12, interference in Netherlands. The box sets out the reference to the FTA referendum.

More recently, Russia was allegedly engaged in campaigns to erode trust in the EU’s COVID-19 strategy and to spread scepticism of Western-developed vaccines. As I said earlier, Russia is repeatedly mentioned. I am repeating what others have said and Singapore does not take a position on this.

Countries other than Russia are also said to have been using these strategies.

In May 2019, a disinformation network was traced to Iran. This comprised fake persons who sought to influence US policymakers and also reporters and academics to carry their views. Some of these were, eventually, published in legitimate publications. Annex C sets out more details of reports that have identified Iran as a foreign state actor.

In December 2020, the BBC reported on a vast 15-year global disinformation campaign to serve one particular country’s interests. This campaign spread over at least 116 countries, more than half of the world's countries, and targeted members of the European Parliament as well as the United Nations. It involved the use of stolen accounts and at least 750 fake media outlets, which were amplified with the help of a legitimate foreign wire service. So, you can see the use of legitimate news organisations.

In February 2021, the social media analysis firm, Graphika, released a report on a propaganda coordinated network in favour of one country called “Spamouflage Dragon”, using a mixture of bots, fake accounts, stolen accounts and so on to push and amplify videos and media targeting issues, such as the safety of Western-made vaccines and discrediting the United States.

A 2020 study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that there has been a significant increase worldwide in foreign interference. Between 2015 and 2020, at least 38 Elections and six Referendums were impacted.

The international media regularly names Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. I do not know whether these countries, in fact, did what they are said to have done. But few doubt that they have the capabilities. It is notable that the US and other Western countries are not mentioned, generally, in these reports because they are Western media reports. But anyone sensible will know that the United States, UK and Western countries have similar or, perhaps, in the case of the United States, even superior capabilities. Really, there are no angels in this game.

The Washington Post reported on 11 February 2020 that a Swiss encryption communications provider had sold devices to more than 120 countries. That company was, actually secretly owned by CIA and German Intelligence. They had rigged the devices to read the encrypted communications of all the countries, 120 odd countries, that had bought the system. Reading secret, most confidential communications, of their own allies and, of course, adversaries.

The story was then released years after, after everything has been done and closed. The Washington Post wrote up the exposé based on a CIA internal history of the operation in 2004. So, CIA history was in 2004; the Washington Post released the story in 2020. And they also based it on an internal oral history project by German intelligence in 2008. But everything was kept under wraps, until simultaneously published by the Washington Post and a German broadcaster on 11 February 2020.

So, it has all the hallmarks of a deliberate, planned leak. Members might recall that at about the same time, a bit before that, but through that period, the US government was very seriously warning everyone about the dangers of relying on technology from China. So, basically, without embarrassment, this leak came out saying we did it, and now be careful about the Chinese. Have the Americans actually stopped? We can only guess. But it has now got to be taken as a given that this sort of thing will be done regularly and everyone will face this.

It has become very easy and inexpensive to do. The Select Committee in 2018 heard one million Instagram "Likes" cost US$18; to get 100 Twitter follower likes or re-tweets costs 34 US cents; and to organise a street protest in the US through online costs about US$200,000. These details are in annex D. It also gives examples of HICs targeting democratic processes, if you look at annex D.

And it is a cottage industry as well because there are reports of an active Macedonian disinformation industry. Young Macedonians have Internet access, some basic training to create fake news websites. In the final weeks of the 2016 US Presidential Elections, over 140 "fake news" US politics websites were traced to Macedonia, and these overtook mainstream news producers in their share of election stories shared on Facebook. The details are in annex E.

Singapore – A few days ago, the French Military School Strategic Research Institute published a Report on Influence Operations. Singapore was among the countries featured as case studies. The report noted that there were several factors which made Singapore vulnerable: our size, hyper-connectivity, multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The report said we were resilient through a counter-narrative of our Singaporean identity and by our swift reactions against hate speech. It concluded that we, along with Sweden, were one of the best prepared states in the fight against information manipulation and hybrid threats in general.

I am not so sanguine as the people who wrote this report. Our racial and religious mix is easily exploitable by different countries and we see a steady build-up of different narratives which is being very cleverly done. It is not obvious propaganda but it conditions people to think in certain ways, particularly on foreign policy issues, often appealing to a larger racial identity beyond the Singaporean identity.

In my view, this is one of the most serious threats we face. Our population, and I think most Members of Parliament, are not really aware of this.

Singapore has been subjected to attacks in recent times, both cyber attacks as well as cyber manipulation.

In the cyber attack in 2018, hackers targeted SingHealth’s databases and stole the particulars of 1.5 million patients, including the Prime Minister's data.

Cyber manipulation, I will give a couple of examples. During a period of tension with another country between 2016 and 2017, we experienced a coordinated HIC that attempted to undermine our foreign policy position. Online commentaries and videos were uploaded by social media accounts which had lain dormant for many years. Many of these were in Mandarin and targeted our Chinese-speaking population. These contents were also widely circulated via chat apps and aimed to influence sentiments among Singaporeans.

In another case, during a period of bilateral tension with a country in 2018, we saw a large spike in online comments critical of Singapore and many came from anonymous accounts. They sought to give an artificial impression of widespread objection to Singapore’s position.

I will say, so far, these have been relatively low level except for the strategic move, the attempts to condition our people's thinking, which are going on.

Before I deal with some of the substantive points of this Bill, let me also deal with the issue of timing.

Some have said there have been no discussions, why is this Bill being put through so quickly?

Have there been no discussions? We have been talking about this very seriously for more than three years; extensively. The Select Committee heard extensive evidence in 2018 on this. The evidence, the reports that I have been referring to so far in the various annexes, most of them come from the evidence given in 2018 to the Parliamentary Select Committee.

I would like to refer Members to annex F. It sets out the discussions that have taken place and the summary of the testimonies given at the Select Committee. Twenty different types of evidence – persons, organisations, including experts, gave evidence on the seriousness of the foreign threat. I will touch on some of the evidence that was given at the Select Committee.

Disinformation expert, Mr Ben Nimmo, testified on the Internet Research Agency (IRA)'s various tactics, said to be controlled by Russia, tactics to boost support for Mr Trump, as he then was, and opposition to Mrs Clinton during the 2016 US Presidential Elections and to widen the divide in the US between the Black Lives Matter movement and the Police.

Dr Kevin Limonier, a French cybersecurity expert, spoke of an alleged Russian HIC that tried to sway the 2017 French Presidential Elections using a combination of state media, social media platforms and bots, including by attempting to spread leaked emails on the eve of the election to discredit the Macron campaign.

Experts also highlighted that Singapore has been targeted and is especially vulnerable when race and religion are used as an issue of protest potential.

Dr Shashi Jayakumar said that it would be a mistake to assume that foreign HICs were not already happening.

Dr Gulizar Haciyakupoglu gave testimony behind closed doors, because of the sensitivity, and said there were indicators of information warfare being practised against Singapore.

Dr Liew Kai Khiun highlighted the barrage of comments by seemingly Myanmar-based user accounts on social media news portals of Singapore’s mainstream news networks. These were inflammatory, with Islamophobic tones, and incited backlash from Singaporean Muslims.

Dr Michael Raska highlighted that foreign states could engage in information operations that target our fault lines as a means of asymmetric warfare, given Singapore’s traditional military strength.

This is an important point that I will ask Members to take note of. I once heard our then Defence Minister, Dr Tony Tan, describe our defence strategy in the following terms. Singapore’s defence strategy is predicated on the superiority of our military in the region. Our conventional military strength has got to be clearly superior; and it is clearly superior.

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is very well-regarded both in the region and globally for its professionalism, technological edge and the interoperability of our systems – what Mr Lee Kuan Yew said, the vision of a "poisoned shrimp". But what that means, as Dr Raska pointed out, is that the Internet becomes a particularly attractive theatre for our adversaries who would seek to do us harm. I will ask Members of Parliament to register this point, in particular, because our conventional military superiority, ironically, means we become an even bigger target online.

This topic was also quite extensively referenced in the Select Committee Report and discussed several times in Parliament. And if you look at annex F(2), that sets out the discussions that had taken place in Parliament. There were Parliamentary Questions and answers that emphasised our vulnerability. The Select Committee recommended that measures be taken and we have said in Parliament that legislation will be considered and legislation will be necessary. I had made speeches in the Committee of Supply (COS) 2019 as well as COS this year, and made it clear that legislation was needed.

You can also refer to my speech at a major international conference in September 2019, pages 26 and 27. I did, at that point, referenced Mr PJ Thum and Ms Han. I will come back to this, but I made it clear that legislation is going to be needed. That conference was held in Singapore on 25 September 2019, with 10 international and local speakers, experts.

Prof Allan Rock, a former Canadian Cabinet Minister at that conference, noted that tools of interference were well-known: dissemination of false information, hacking and leaking. And he said governments have got to take this seriously and take counter measures that protect the electoral system and candidates, political parties and voters from information manipulation.

This topic of foreign interference has been extensively covered in the media as well. That is set out in annex F(3). If you look at the headlines on some of them, it says, "Stronger laws planned to combat foreign interference" and "Singapore to have legislation to combat increased risk of foreign interference."

Annex F(4) shows – and I am giving a small sample of extensive studies internationally – Brookings Institute, RAND Institute and the Council for Foreign Relations have all commissioned and published studies. So, this topic has been extensively discussed and debated for over three years.

The other comments made: it is a very long Bill. Members of Parliament are used to lengthy Bills, you understand the structure, you understand which are the key provisions, you understand the Explanatory Statement, you take a view and then you go through all the provisions again, look at the accompanying statements, infographics and get a better sense.

As I have said, more than half of this Bill is based on PDA, which Members will or should be familiar with. The rest on HIC, and it is set out fairly comprehensively.

I think the threat of foreign interference and its seriousness are not disputed by most people. Most people also agree that something needs to be done. So, this is the context in which we are moving this Bill.

Before we go into the Bill, it is useful to first consider the current powers to deal with subversion.

Today, assume a person X is suspected of being a foreign agent or acting for a foreign agency against Singapore's interests. Such a suspected foreign agent can be detained without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Investigations can be conducted. Section 20 of the CPC allows the Police to ask anyone in Singapore, individuals as well as companies, for information. Not just under SA, under any legislation if there are investigations. Ask anyone in Singapore, individuals as well as companies for information and require them to produce any document or item for investigation.

So, under current laws, suppose there is an online campaign and there is a basis to believe that this is foreign agency or entity-inspired and it is prejudicial to our national security, then investigations can be conducted under ISA. Information, including the writer's identity, will have to be made available under CPC. The writer and anyone else suspected of subversion can be detained. Any challenge will be heard by the ISA Tribunal, not by the High Court. And it is not public, unless the ISD decides to make it so. This applies equally, whether the subversion is done online or in the physical world.

One of the pieces of misinformation that are being put out is that the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, or FICA, would now allow the Government to get any information and that this is a new power. Section 20 of CPC has been used all these years and it is in broad terms to get any information for investigations.

When we talk about powers, the powers to detain, to investigate, I will refer to them as "Substantive Powers".

The powers to enforce, like requiring the taking down of material, I will refer to them as "Executory Powers".

There are several Executory Powers now available, including under the Broadcasting Act, which allow the Government to deal with objectionable content in the Internet space. It allows for directions to be issued to broadcasting licensees and for content to be taken down or blocked.

The Telecommunications Act gives powers to allow for directions to be issued to telecommunications licensees in the public interest, including the stopping, delaying and censoring of messages.

The Public Order Act allows the Government to regulate physical assemblies and processions. The Commissioner of Police may deny permits for such events that are "directed towards a political end" and involve foreign entities or individuals.

So, the issues of what directions might call the "protest potential" are regulated in the physical world. Logically, similar rules should apply in the online space.

The current Political Donations Act requires those that are directly involved in our political processes, be they political parties, election candidates and their agents, to declare their political donations. The Act prohibits the receipt of foreign funding and has a cap on anonymous donations.

So, I have taken the House through the current legal landscape. What does FICA add to the current powers?

Take the example I gave earlier, say, X is acting for a foreign agency. He has an agenda to subvert our political process, subvert our sovereignty and he conducts an online campaign.

Today, as I have explained, action will be taken under the ISA. And bear in mind that foreign agencies will often use legitimate-looking fronts. Annex G sets out the examples of such legitimate-looking fronts.

If FICA is passed, then we can proceed under FICA if we can show that online communications activity has been prepared or planned, by or on behalf of a foreign principal, and it is in the public interest to give one or more directions.

Example of directions that can be issued include for a communicator to take down his content, for an Internet intermediary to take down the content and for an Internet intermediary to suspend or terminate the account. The person can also be arrested and prosecuted if an offence of clandestine foreign interference is made out. But under FICA, there is no detention without trial.

Public interest is defined as including activities "directed towards a political end". This is taken from the Public Order Act to prohibit foreigners from organising or taking part in public assemblies directed towards such ends, and FICA applies this definition to the online space.

The Executory Powers under FICA are more calibrated. I referred earlier to the Broadcasting Act and directions can be issued. Under the Telecommunications Act, directions can be issued to telecommunications licensees. And, in both Acts, there are limits to judicial review.

So, what in the HIC part of FICA goes further than the current laws? Mainly, in extraterritorial application. Because it now explicitly includes global platforms which are often vectors for HICs. So, that updates the analogue powers for the Internet age. For example, in the analogue world, you have the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) and the Broadcasting Act. They provide powers to proscribe foreign newspapers and broadcasting services. The digital equivalent under FICA is a Proscribed Online Locations App Removal. In the analogue world, the Broadcasting Act provides the power to order a TV station to carry a message. The digital equivalent under FICA is a must-carry direction, issued to communicator, social media services.

I will ask Members to refer to annex H which has two charts.

First, Chart 1, and this is quite important. If you look at Chart 1, the existing powers are in light green and the updated powers under FICA are in darker green. So, on the left, what is headed "Substantive Powers". Today, you see the existing powers of investigation and of arrest and detention, in light green. It can be seen that FICA is an update to ensure that our laws can deal with online HICs, by allowing for disclosure of information by global platforms, and new offences which have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt in Court for perpetrating HICs in a clandestine way. If you look at the top right-hand side, it shows how existing laws cover foreign interference via traditional media – the Broadcasting Act and the NPPA. And the bottom right, the light green boxes show how online, there are powers to intervene under the Broadcasting Act and the Telecommunications Act. What FICA does, in the dark green boxe, are targeted and more calibrated directions.

If you look at Chart 2, the existing PDA is in green; FICA in pink or red. On the left, the green box shows what PDA provides today. All the measures in that box apply to gazetted political associations. Under FICA, at the first instance, the only measure that applies to a designated PSP is in the first red box in the second column which is annual declaration of donations. If there is heightened threat of foreign interference, then, the other red boxes can be applied by the Competent Authority.

To use another example, suppose we discover that a Singapore company has been secretly hired by a foreign intelligence agency to put out memes and videos on social media and to spread the view that a particular ethnic group is persecuted. And the aim, let us say, is to drive a wedge between ethnic groups in Singapore. What would we do today? The company’s officers can be detained under the ISA. Other laws can also, potentially, be used. This can be reviewed if their detention is under the ISA by the ISA Tribunal. There is no judicial review except in relation to compliance with procedural requirements under the Act.

Where the content crosses the threshold of other laws like the Penal Code, of course, criminal investigations can be initiated. The CPC comes in – that will allow any information about the company's activities or that of its staff to be obtained. And there is a legal obligation for the information to be provided by anyone in Singapore when the Police ask for it, including Internet companies. And these actions can be pre-emptive.

Under FICA, directions can be issued to tech companies to disable access to the content or restrict those accounts from view of end users in Singapore, if the thresholds are met. These can stem the HIC without having to block the entire platform.

Social media platforms can also be asked to provide information to support an investigation into an HIC. Today, if this data resides abroad, we cannot do so, under the CPC.

The Government would also have the option of charging the company and its officers under FICA for clandestine foreign interference and prosecuting them in open Court. So, that deals with the HIC part of FICA.

There has been some degree of misrepresentation on FICA, that this Bill seeks to curtail normal interactions with foreigners. That is not true. Singapore depends for its success and vitality on being open, and a government that seeks to close down that will lead Singapore to ruin.

I actually want the House to see how our approach compares that with the US and Australia.

In the US, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), it covers people and organisations that are under the control of a foreign government or organisations or persons outside of the United States. Under the US' FARA, a "foreign principal" is defined very broadly, and any political activity that is designed to influence government decision-making on behalf of a foreign principal will require or trigger registration.

For instance, take something that we take as normal. An American citizen meeting a US Congressman and advocating for his company's product. If the company was a foreign company, an MNC, that will trigger registration. So, the American provision is quite broad. That scenario will not meet the thresholds for designation of PSPs under FICA.

On the HIC part and how it applies, I will deal with it later.

Let us also look at Australia. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS) covers government-related entitles and individuals who have arrangements with foreign principals or undertake certain activities on behalf of foreign principals. Under Australia's FITS, any activity by a former Commonwealth politician would trigger the threshold for registration. So, you could be an ex-Minister or an ex-Member of Parliament of any political party and, if you did this, it will trigger.

Singapore, under FICA, the PSP part only covers Defined and Designated PSPs. So, a much, much narrower group. Why have we taken this approach? Because we are not the US; we are not Australia; we are Singapore; we are an international hub. Interactions with international counterparts, business people, siting of MNCs in Singapore – all of these are vital for us.

In this Bill, action can be taken in respect of HIC if the following conditions are satisfied.

Internet activity by or on behalf of a foreign principal and public interest in Singapore is affected. I am paraphrasing, but, in essence.

A PSP designation is possible if the activities are directed towards a political end and it is in the public interest that countermeasures should be applied. So, one of the key points for both areas is the phrase "Public Interest".

The definition of "Public Interest" includes the requirement of "proportionality", which the Minister or Authority will have to consider in arriving at a decision. The "Public Interest" test imports a built-in requirement of proportionality for the Minister before deciding on a Part [3] direction.

The definition of "Public Interest" refers to "necessary or expedient"; that is clause 7. So, if a decision has to be made on the basis of "necessary or expedient", you have got to look at the facts carefully and the actions you want to take must be proportional.

Take an example. Two academics, one of them foreign, collaborate on a paper on LGBT issues. It will be difficult to say it is necessary or expedient to issue Directions under FICA and, really, try explaining that to a Supreme Court Judge, who will chair the Tribunal, that it is necessary or expedient.

The vast majority of collaborations, linkages will not meet the required conditions. And they will also not meet the requirement of proportionality.

As an aside – and this has been raised by Member of Parliament Assoc Prof Jamus Lim – if a foreigner writes articles on controversial issues using his own name, or is clearly stated to be a foreigner, people can assess the value, credibility and weight, and it is generally unlikely to be necessary or expedient to issue directions. But it depends on the facts. If there is a basis to believe that he is doing so, for example, as part of a hostile campaign, or is acting for a foreign agency, with the intent of causing damage to Singapore, then directions could be given, subject to the test of proportionality. And if he disagrees, he can appeal to the Tribunal.

Likewise – and, again, I think this arises from Assoc Prof Lim's proposed amendments – if the Economist or New York Times publishes the articles, it would not be possible to invoke FICA. However, if there is more to it, if a foreign newspaper is being used as part of a campaign targeting Singapore, that may be different. But again, it comes back to proportionality, the nature of the actions, the likely effect, the likely intent, several other factors.

Newspapers – it does not mean, automatically, they are all kosher. They have often been used as a front for such activities, which is why I put annex G in. Legitimate newspapers, newswires have all been used as fronts. So, you cannot give a carte blanche exception but it is most unlikely that many of these would be a front unless we have very clear other evidence.

If some deception is involved in the campaign, if a foreigner hides his identity or masquerades as a local, we could, under FICA, give orders for them to be transparent, just disclose who you are, so that people can judge for themselves.

Collaboration and partnership with a foreign person, by itself, is not the trigger. You have to go further and look at the facts. As I said, is there a hostile campaign, is there damage to Singapore, is there a foreign agency involved, what is the extent of possible damage? These are non-exclusive factors nor must they all be present or any one of them present. You really got to look at the facts, assess based on what you know and assess the proportionality as well.

I have referred to proportionality. I said this is my view. But this is what the Government has been advised by AGC and that is one of the reasons for my view. I am capable of forming my own views but we go by the advice of AGC. And this is the intent behind the legislative approach which we are setting out clearly for reference, so that if this Bill becomes law, and if it needs to be interpreted, it will be interpreted in the light of what the Government has said is the legislative intent and how the phrases are intended to cover these things.

It has been suggested by some that case law means that the test of proportionality cannot be applied. The advice I get from AGC is that it is different for this legislation because we are making clear the legislative intent for this specific Bill. I have made similar points in respect of other legislation as well, as part of the Second Reading speech.

I will, in this context, invite Members to look at annex I. Sorry, I made a mistake. Annex I is not in a hard copy. Sir, with your permission, it will be emailed directly to Members in soft copy. Part of annex I is there but the part that I wanted to refer to, we did not have time to put that in.

One suggestion was open non-clandestine collaboration between Singaporeans and any ordinary private foreign citizen to improve any aspect of our laws and public policies constitutes foreign interference, notwithstanding the absence of any foreign state manipulation or foreign funding.

Let me put it this way. On the one side, if there is manipulation with a foreign agency involved, I think everyone will agree, it is quite clear. On the other side, there is foreign collaboration, bona fide work, everyone will agree that cannot be. And then, there is the in-between. There could be a group of foreigners working with Singaporeans, exchanging viewpoints, writing papers and so on, we have indicated that that would not be covered. How does that become necessary or expedient? How is the test of proportionality satisfied?

But, supposing, the group comes together and the motive is to effect a change; or take a different example, there is money involved or, let us say, there is materiality, and the entire focus is political change; then, again, Members of Parliament will say that is a very different kettle of fish. Or, for that matter, the range of public policy issues that are currently or which may in the future become subject to political debates, where there is legitimate reason for concerned Singaporeans to collaborate with international experts, researchers, NGOs; on the face of it, that would not be covered. But if it changes along the lines of what I have said earlier, then there is a case for looking at it carefully.

So, one has got to look at the facts, test materiality.

Another point that has been made is that presenting research at overseas conferences, writing for international journals, multi-authored book projects, publishing in and reviewing for prestigious academic presses, participating in international collaborative research projects, partaking of fellowships, visiting appointments, training programmes, participation in international funding opportunities, any of these may be subsidised or fully funded by foreign universities, foundations and states. None of that, on the face of it, as it is described, will fit within FICA, for the reasons I have already explained. But if there is a step-up to try and turn the person into an agent of influence, or there is an orchestrated campaign, then, again, it becomes different.

So, some of these doomsday scenarios, that FICA is going to close off foreign collaborations, if that is correct, we, as a Government, must have suddenly gone mad. Because in a country like Singapore, which depends so much on the flow of ideas and international collaboration, is that even thinkable? The difficulty we face at MHA, and which many other countries face when dealing with this foreign interference issue, is that out of 10,000 interactions, one might be the sort that we are interested in, where there is an attempt to interfere.

Foreign agencies, and even non-agency, NGOs, others, will try and present a legitimate front. So, the language has got to be broad enough to cover that: that what is apparently normal but it is actually not normal.

And it is not only the classic foreign state agency subversion sort of thing. It could be foreign associations, NGOs, even individuals, who want to change our laws, for example. So, you got to look carefully at what they are doing, what are all the factors taken in overall, using the proportionality test, what sort of issue are they focusing on, what is the possible impact, is there funding involved, but with the central guiding principle that Singaporeans should primarily decide on issues of importance to ourselves.

If you turn specifically to academics, questions have been raised about their collaborations with non-Singaporeans. They collaborate, create, partner, pursue their research interests professionally. No HIC, it does not come within FICA.

So, the Bill will not affect the vast amount of academic work that is being done. We value the intellectual output, collaborations, exchange of ideas, the work our academics do. And they need to link with the rest of the world; for work, bona fide and professional work, not affected; it is important for Singapore.

But in some situations, there are academics who go into a different realm around the world and they are dealt with, like we did with Huang Jing.

There is another thread to some of the points made, underlying all of these explanations and illustrations, that the Government's position and explanations are good but the powers can be abused, they can be used for a wrong purpose. The worry is that the Government will abuse its power and shut down legitimate cooperation because it does not like it.

So, there are two points here. One, the powers that are necessary to deal with the threat. Second, the possibility of abuse of these powers. So far, I have explained why the powers are necessary and why these powers are no greater – in fact, less so – than powers that already exist, and is more calibration for the Internet age. So, bearing that in mind, I will deal separately, later, with abuse of powers.

The fundamental principle is the intention – and we do not believe that legislation prevents bona fide exchange of ideas.

Can a government abuse the power? Any government can abuse this power and any power. So, we will come to that and what should be the checks and balances for that.

There have also been others, beyond these concerns, who have been actively trying to put out misinformation about the Bill. Chief amongst them are Mr PJ Thum and Ms Kirsten Han. Thum and Han, as I said in 2019, in the conference, take money from George Soros. Some of you may recall, Soros' Open Society Foundations (OSF) has a history of getting involved in the domestic politics of sovereign countries.

In 2018, ACRA rejected Thum and Han's attempt to register a company funded by OSF to organise "democracy classroom" sessions in Singapore. They have set up an organisation called New Naratif, which receives significant foreign funding. New Naratif organised a series of "Democracy Classrooms" focusing on Malaysia and that was supported by the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

Make no mistake about it. We will say no to that in Singapore. You can organise democracy classrooms. We have no issues. Anyone can organise, anyone can criticise the current state of democracy, but it cannot be funded by Soros or the US Embassy or any other Embassy. The nature of activity and who the funding is from will have to be considered in this context.

I will say a bit more about Thum and Han before I go on to discuss their objections. Thum wants our Independence Day to be 16 September, which is Malaysia Day. He regrets that Singapore separated from Malaysia. On several occasions, he has publicly said that Singapore should become part of Malaysia again and celebrate Independence on 16 September. Thum and Han and some other activists met with Dr Mahathir on 30 August 2018. They asked Dr Mahathir to bring democracy to Singapore. I suppose Malaysian style democracy.

Han described a social movement as "the work that goes into potentially one day having 500,000 people on the streets." She has also said, "When the government says foreigners should not influence domestic affairs, or foreigners should not bring their country's politics into Singapore, we should push back on that as well, because why not, because solidarity is important." Her view is that Malaysians can influence our politics. She says so openly.

I believe, I have not seen it, but I assume the Petition that the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) is presenting in Parliament is one that is inspired by Ms Han. So, I would like to know whether they agree with this statement that Singaporeans should push back and say foreigners should be able to influence domestic affairs in Singapore.

So, Members can see why the two of them are very concerned that FICA will focus on foreign funding and have been mounting their own disinformation campaign.

Han has been posting on social media extensively – I am told, over a hundred tweets, posts and so on – organised a petition, sent around email templates for people to write to their Members of Parliament. Thum has, meanwhile, written a commentary calling this Bill a "stealth coup" by me. Basically, that I am personally going to take over Singapore and all my colleagues have to be very concerned. I suppose a coup means that I take over from the Prime Minister. A coup in Singapore. The Prime Minister needs to be very concerned too.

It requires a turn of mind, completely at odds with reality and living in fantasy, to think of a coup in Singapore.

Mr Thum forgets that if there is this fear that I am going to mount a coup, then I or any Minister for Home Affairs has far more powers under other legislation: the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Criminal Law Temporary Provisions Act (CLTPA), the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Act (MRHA), including the powers of detention. FICA, in contrast, is a toy gun. It gives powers to give directions.

So, Members can see there is no limit to the absurdities and fantasies that some will put out and an Oxford education, in itself, does not immunise one from spouting such nonsense.

But I can see that they are concerned. Han has said, in arguing against this Bill, that it is difficult to get money for these causes in Singapore, so foreign funding is necessary.

So, you can see. If Singaporeans are excited about it, interested, they will contribute. But because they will not contribute, I need foreign funding.

Mr Terry Xu has joined Han in starting the petition, which some groups have signed up to. I am not sure how many of these groups know what Thum and Han's objectives are. We will look at the Petition that is being put up in Parliament by the PSP. I think Members can look at it in the context of who inspired them and how today's PSP is completely aligned, it appears, with what Thum and Han want to achieve.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the points raised in the Petition, assuming it is the same petition that we see online, I have dealt with most of them, I am dealing with them, we can debate the points today and I would say Parliament can fully consider and debate the points today. There is no need to do it at another session.

Mr Terry Xu, as many of us know, and as I said in my September 2019 speech at the conference, uses Malaysian and other foreign writers to write incendiary articles on Singapore without bylines and without identification. The articles include a call for Singaporean civil servants to march on the streets like their Hong Kong counterparts.

So, you read the articles and what would readers think? These are from local writers writing about Singapore in these terms. But the articles are often by foreign writers who are paid to write these stories. The more incendiary, the better.

Mr Xu and others can continue to do this even after FICA. But a direction can be given to them to make it clear that the article is by a foreigner.

We all want transparency, right? So, it would be useful for Singaporeans to know whether the writer of the article is local or foreign. FICA will allow us to issue a transparency directive requiring that Singaporeans be told upfront who the article is written by and what nationality the author has.

Sir, moving on to a slightly different topic. For HIC directions, appeals go to an independent reviewing tribunal, which has the power to overrule the Minister. The tribunal is headed by a Supreme Court judge. Appeals are made to this tribunal and not the Court so as to protect sensitive information that may be relied on to make a decision.

For example, we may determine foreign interference based on a tip-off or sensitive information shared by a foreign counterpart security agency. The consequences of a leak would be very serious. Most Singaporeans understand the need for this legislation.

Sir, I will now deal with the proposed amendments put forward by some Members of the Workers' Party.

The Workers' Party has stated that they believe in the "legitimate need to counter malign acts of foreign interference". They also realise the "Purposes" provision of the Bill is important – that is, clause 2 – and obviously so.

So, with your permission, Mr Speaker, may I distribute a second folder which contains annexes J to L that I am going to refer to now.

Please do. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 3.]

If I may carry on while it is being distributed, Sir?

Yes, please.

It is to be welcomed that the Workers' Party has set out what they disagree with in the Bill. They are, looking at the amendments, in agreement with most of the Bill. And the details are in annex J.

Their disagreement with the Bill can be itemised into five categories. Two of the categories are somewhat process-related.

The first one is by Mr Leon Perera. He has put in suggested amendments to clauses 47, 48, 78, 79, 81, 84 and 85. He wants the Government to maintain a public registry of all individuals and entities designated as PSPs and persons with declared involvement in foreign "policy" organisations. Now, I would say the Bill does not use the term foreign "policy" organisation. I assume he was referring to a foreign "political" organisation instead.

He also wants the Government to make publicly available the following information: (a) all reportable arrangements; (b) all transparency directives, disclosures, reports and explanations for these decisions; and (c) all directives to PSPs to end their affiliation with a foreign principal or to prohibit foreign volunteers.

It is unclear to us why he only wants to make public these two stepped-up countermeasures and did not include the other stepped-up countermeasures on prohibition of donations and foreign memberships.

The Bill, in clause 116, states that we may make public any designation and the issuance of any stepped-up countermeasures on PSPs and transparency directives issued.

The media had asked us about this previously and we said while the Bill says "may", our intention though was to make public the designations and stepped-up countermeasures on PSPs, as well as the directives to counter a HIC. Our response was carried in the mainstream media on 25 September.

Mr Leon Perera wants to have this as an obligation for the countermeasures that they have identified.

The Government can agree to this. We will make public all designations, stepped-up countermeasures on PSPs, transparency directives and HIC directives, except the technical assistance requirements (TADs) because that would be in the course of investigations and we do not want to tip off hostile actors about the investigations that are going on.

There is one issue on the suggestion to make public the names of citizens involved in foreign political and legislative organisations. A substantial number of these citizens may not be PSPs. This reporting requirement under clause 79 applies to non-PSPs, ordinary citizens.

If they are a member of, say, the Russian Communist Party, we want to know. They may not be PSPs in Singapore. There are also other communist parties. If they are a member of the Cuban Communist Party, we also want to know. Likewise, if they are a member of the UK's Conservative Party.

It could become quite wide and we have to be mindful when making disclosures relating to this group. We are studying that particular issue, whether we should make all these non-PSP reports public.

Our previous intention was "no". We should let them have their privacy on this. Reporting to the Government is enough. But given that Mr Leon Perera has raised it, we will relook at that particular point and, if we agree with him, we could make that amendment at a future point in time but not now.

Mr Leon Perera also wants a list of all reportable arrangements. I do not think that is necessary. The Bill sets out clearly the conditions where an arrangement is reportable, for example, when the PSP is obliged to act in accordance with the instructions of a foreign principal.

The second category where the Workers' Party wants to make some amendments, Mr Gerald Giam wants to add the following to categories of PSPs: members of Central Executive Councils or equivalent of registered political parties in Singapore, senior public servants holding office of Deputy Secretary (DS) or above or equivalent, board members or chief executives of a Statutory Board or a Government company listed in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. I will come back to this.

The third category of amendments, Mr Giam wants to amend the definition of what amounts to "directed towards a political end".

The fourth category of amendments is to clause 17. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wants to remove the phrase "likely to be" from "is or likely to be prejudicial"; and he proposes similar edits to clause 18. He also wants to amend clause 17(2) to remove a caveat.

The fifth category of amendments, the Bill provides for challenges to some Directions issued by the Minister to be dealt with by a Tribunal, headed by a Supreme Court Judge. Ms He Ting Ru wants this to be dealt with by the High Court, rather than a Tribunal headed by the Supreme Court.

So, I will now turn to the specific amendments proposed and set out our views.

On Mr Leon Perera's amendments on clauses 47, 48, 78, 79, 81, 84 and 85, we can agree to several of them. I have set out my position.

On Mr Gerald Giam's amendment to clause 14 on amending the definition of PSP. Now, once you are designated as a PSP, there is a baseline set of obligations. Declaration of foreign affiliations, declaration of migration benefits, anonymous donations cap of $5,000, declaration of donations of $10,000 or more from permissible donors, no foreign volunteers and so on. So, if you take a CEC member or equivalent, we can agree to this. We can add them today at the Committee stage.

I will seek to move a set of amendments to the Bill during the Committee stage of proceedings and for these to be debated alongside the other proposed amendments filed by the other Members of Parliament on the Bill.

Insufficient notice has been given for these amendments from my Ministry necessarily, because we are dealing with amendments in turn proposed by Mr Leon Perera and Mr Gerald Giam.

So, I will be seeking your consent, Sir, Mr Speaker, as well as the general assent of Members present to waive notice. Copies of these proposed amendments will be distributed to this House so that Members can read them ahead.

Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I ask the Clerks to distribute the proposed amendments?

Please do. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 4.]

May I continue, Sir?

Yes, please.

On the CEC members, one of the reasons why we left it out is that we did consider CEC members as well as branch secretaries to be included. But we left it out because on the side of the PAP to comply with this, it is not going to be difficult because all except two of the CEC members are PSPs anyway. So, the obligations are more onerous for the other registered political parties because many, in some cases, none, of the CEC members are PSPs. But as I said, we can agree to it if that is what Mr Gerald Giam wants.

Mr Giam also wants DS and officers above the DS level to be included as PSPs. What is the status of DSes and Permanent Secretaries (PSes) and what rules are they subject to? They are all subject to various tight rules and requirements which are tighter than FICA requirements on PSPs. They have to hold valid security clearance throughout their appointment. They have to make annual declarations, including on investments, ownership, financial embarrassment, declarations on a variety of matters, going well beyond what PSPs have to do.

They have to declare all gifts and entertainment and they cannot work for other employers or engage in trade or business without explicit permission. They can be directed to cease outside activities or divest investments if there is any conflict. A list of their key obligations is set out in annex K.

The rules for PSPs are not as tight. PSPs cannot accept anonymous donations over $5,000, which really means they can accept anonymous donations under $5,000 and they can also accept above $5,000 from identified persons. Any DS or PS who accepts that will not remain in service for much after that, and they would be subject to severe disciplinary action if they contravene any of the rules.

Politicians and others who may be PSPs play by different rules, compared to senior civil servants. If we impose on PSPs the rules that senior civil servants are under, I think it will be very difficult.

Ministers are also subject to strict rules, except that political donations are possible.

Mr Giam and Mr Pritam Singh would be aware of these requirements, having both been public servants themselves in the past. I also do not think it is appropriate to classify them as PSPs. These senior civil servants are non-political, so, we cannot agree to this proposal.

Mr Gerald Giam also wants to include board members, chief executives (CEs) of Statutory Boards, CEs of Fifth Schedule companies.

CEs of Statutory Boards, as public officers, are subject to the same rules as DSes and above, and the points I have already made apply equally to them.

As for Board Members, it would not be feasible to automatically define them as PSPs. It is preferable to use powers of designation instead.

On board members. They will often have foreign members. You ask them to declare all donations received in home countries, migration benefits, all their foreign affiliations? It does not make sense. If we went out and asked not just these companies, but any other listed company, ask them if it will be feasible to impose these requirements on their foreign directors, they will tell you it is too onerous. They will have difficulties getting good people.

And if you take banks and you impose these obligations on the Schedule companies, but you do not impose these obligations on their competitors who might be in the same business, then you make it difficult for the Schedule companies to get good people.

It is the same for Fifth Schedule companies. So, leave it to the companies to choose people of integrity and our security agencies need to be alert. Not just about them, but other directors of major companies in Singapore. So, these additional proposals are impractical from a market point of view.

Now, I move to clause 8 as proposed by Mr Gerald Giam. He wants to amend the definition of “directed towards a political end in Singapore”.

The context is HIC directions can be issued if there is online communications activity where material is published in Singapore, it is undertaken by or on behalf of a foreign principal, and it is in the public interest to issue a direction, such as to prevent foreign interference directed towards a political end.

And for a PSP to be designated, that person or entity’s activities must be directed wholly, or in part, towards a political end; and the Competent Authority must additionally assess that it is in the public interest for countermeasures to be applied.

So, changing this definition will affect how we can act against foreign interference. The meaning of “directed towards a political end” in the Bill has seven parts. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I display a slide with the definition on screen, please?

Yes, please. [Slides were shown to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 5.]

The first five, I think it is not the easiest to read. I think it is also in the Schedule that I have handed out, after annex M. Pages 1 and 2 with what is proposed to be struck out.

For those of us who cannot read this slide,

the first five are: (a) to promote the interests of a political party, or a politically significant entity, in Singapore; (b) to seek to influence the outcome of any election or referendum; (c) to seek to influence Singapore Governmental decisions, including by trying to influence the public; (d) to seek to influence any aspect of proceedings of key public institutions, including Parliament, Presidential Council for Minority Rights, and so on; (e) to seek to bring about changes of the law or otherwise influence the legislative process.

So, Mr Gerald Giam accepts all of this as legitimate, meaning legitimate for the purpose of defining what is "directed towards a political end", and that these are necessary. But he wants to remove the last two paragraphs.

Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I ask for slide 2 that highlights these changes to be put up?

Yes, please.

Again, it is in page 1, after annex M of the handout that has been given.

Mr Gerald Giam wants to remove two sub-clauses, first of which reads: "(f) to seek to influence public opinion on a matter which, in Singapore, is a matter of public controversy; (g) to seek to influence any aspect, or to promote or oppose political views, or public conduct relating to activities that have become the subject of a political debate in Singapore."

This is a little difficult to understand. Let me explain.

Members will recall that I have said a number of times that there are three conditions for a HIC direction and two for a PSP designation.

For HIC directions, to refresh Members' memory, there has to be online activity where material is published in Singapore, it has to be done on behalf of a foreign principal and public interest in Singapore is likely to be affected.

For a PSP designation, the person's or entity's activities must be directed wholly or in part towards a political end; and the Competent Authority must additionally assess that it is in the public interest for countermeasures to be applied.

With Mr Gerald Giam's proposal, if an issue is only within (f) or (g), then no counter-HIC directions can be issued and no PSP designation is possible.

To put it in the form of an example, in other words, his position is that we should not stop foreigners from interfering to shape public opinion on matters of public controversy; or to influence public views on a political debate, and this is so, regardless of whether deception is involved.

There are numerous scenarios that could fall under limbs (f) and (g) that may not be covered by one of the other limbs.

For example, promoting some types of solidarity among members of one race or nationality, with the aim that this can eventually help them to have negative feelings towards other races, or promoting some types of religious piety, with the aim that, eventually, they may take different views on matters of political debate in Singapore.

If we believe that is being done, for example, at the direction of a foreign intelligence agency, with the ultimate purpose of creating divisions within Singapore, should we not be able to act?

If an intel agency in another country regularly pays someone in Singapore to write about these matters or support the policies of the Workers' Party, or the PAP, and gradually deepen divisions, enhance the "protest potential", as General Gerasimov might have said, that would not be covered. Frankly, Sir, that goes against common sense.

When we had the debates on CECA, were we not having a political discussion? Under Mr Gerald Giam's proposal, any foreigner trying to influence such a debate in Parliament would be covered by FICA. But any foreigner trying to influence the wider public on the same topics will not be covered when that discussion takes place outside, unless it can be shown that that was done in order to influence Government policy.

But Members would have seen from the examples that I have put in the annexes on foreign influence, influencing public opinion is a key aspect of foreign manipulation. Realms and realms of examples, and look at the modus referred to in paragraphs 200 to 206 of the Select Committee report – I do not have it here but Members can check it out – where the Select Committee report says "...Russians built up internet presence in the US to influence..." and this has been done regularly in other countries.

As an example, the Guardian reported that YouTubers, bloggers and influencers in France and Germany were offered money by a PR agency with apparent connections to another state to spread falsehoods about COVID-19 vaccines. For example, "death rate among the vaccinated with Pfizer is almost three times higher than those vaccinated by AstraZeneca." They were asked to "act like you have the passion and interest in this topic" and avoid using the words "sponsored". They were instructed that "the material should be presented as your own independent view".

Sir, I would say it is not logical, if you look at this: we agree that (a) foreigners should not influence; and (c) is wrong, we should not allow foreigners to influence or seek to influence Singapore Government decisions; (e) is wrong and should not be allowed. But foreign-inspired subversion on (f) and (g) are okay.

But, if you look at (a) "to promote the interest of a political party" and if you look at (g) "to influence or seek to influence any aspect or to promote or post political views or public conduct relating to activities that have become the subject of a political debate in Singapore", you can do (a) in a different way under (g), that was what I meant earlier. And you could argue I was doing (g) and not (a).

So, foreign-inspired subversion on (f) and (g) are not okay and this is exactly what the Gerasimov Doctrine seeks to exploit. It seeks to identify issues of “protest potential”, use info operations to polarise society, incite public disorder along these issues and keep the target country in a constant state of turmoil.

Or, take another example, the Explanatory Statement to the Bill. Say, there is a humanitarian crisis in Country Z, it becomes a hot political topic in Singapore. Country Z then sets up Company Y, in Singapore in a bid to sway public opinion. Company Y pretends to be a private local trading enterprise. But it is really just a front for Country Z to influence Singaporeans. To do this, Company Y sets up multiple personas online. It puts out many commentaries online, pretending to be "a freelance journalist" or "experts" in foreign politics, trying to manipulate Singaporeans to take a particular view of the matter. This is taken from real-world happenings.

With the deletions that Mr Gerald Giam has proposed, such conduct may fall outside of FICA, unless it can be referred back to one of the earlier limbs. I think it is not acceptable for us to allow such foreign interference and allow such manipulation of Singaporeans. Eventually, it will weaken our society. The shareholders of the sham company may even get paid for their actions and there would be no offence and no Part 3 directions can be issued, however pervasive the online campaign.

You will also have situations, where (f) and (g) may overlap with the other limbs. Limb (c): "influencing governmental decisions" is defined in section 9 to include influencing the public on a process in respect of the Government decision. If this is a matter of public controversy, then it will overlap with (f). As I said earlier, insofar as (g) covers the influence of political views, this may overlap with matters under (a) which promote the interests of a political party; or (e) which aims to bring about changes in the law.

In this context, let us also look at the exemptions proposed by Member Assoc Prof Jamus Lim. He proposes to exempt "any activity undertaken by Singaporeans to exercise their right to discuss politics by expressing their own views on political matters, unless they are agents of a foreign principal".

Second, he proposes to exempt "an activity undertaken by foreign individuals or foreign publications reporting or commenting on Singapore politics, in an open, transparent and attributable way, even if their comments may be critical of Singapore or the Government". Both proposals are modelled on my Ministry's press release of 13 September 2021, which was issued after the First Reading of the Bill, where we set out the powers under the Bill and explained that it will not apply to these two situations, in the context of clause 120.

It is unnecessary to write this in. It is not covered by the Act. I have said this in Parliament, the MHA statement has stated it and the Explanatory Statement to the Bill, clause 120, explains this. Sometimes, there may be a need to, but you cannot regularly be writing into legislation both what is covered and now also what else is not covered. Because the above two situations are not the only ones not covered; many other issues are also not covered. We clarified those in the press statement because people may have had these questions in mind.

Let me move to clause 17, which is clandestine publishing and this is proposed by Member Assoc Prof Jamus Lim – and I should say it as an aside, the Prime Minister is back, he missed the part about the coup and taking over his powers. But I am sure he will read them.

Clause 17 is now sought to be amended. The current wording is that: "the offence is committed if A publishes in Singapore, he does this on behalf of a foreign principal and A has reason to believe that what is published is likely to be prejudicial to Singapore's interests, in one of various ways and he does this covertly and deceptively". Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wants to remove the phrase "is likely to be".

Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I ask the Clerk to display slide No 3, which contains this amendment.

Please do.

Again, for those who cannot read it, you can look at the handout in the grey file that has been handed out.

This proposed amendment will narrow the mental state. The phrase, "is likely to be", is sought to be struck out. If this edit goes through, the prosecution must then prove that a person knew that it would likely be prejudicial. Taking one step back, I would say we are using a slide rule here to try and measure and assess people who are going to come with bazookas. This will not work in the real world. Even more so, when it comes to clandestine foreign interference. Any decent intelligence service would know how to cover its tracks, conceal its linkages and disavow knowledge.

So, under these proposed amendments, someone could take money from a neighbouring country, attack us, publish allegations against the Police or SAF or other institutions, cause unhappiness and unrest amongst our local ethnic communities. This can be done covertly and not disclose that he is taking money. Yet, if the proposals are accepted, the person cannot be charged in Court because the prosecution has to show that the person knew or had reason to believe that his actions would be prejudicial. The person could claim, for example, that he did not realise that his post would be picked up by others and shared around. He did not know it would be prejudicial and he had no reason to believe so. This is so, even if we can prove that he took money from a foreign agency to put up the posts with the purpose of damaging Singapore. It is really like taking knives to a gunfight.

Common sense is, if you had reason to believe that your actions are likely to prejudice Singapore's interests and you are acting for a foreign agency, you are acting covertly, secretly, it should be an offence.

I make broadly the same points for the proposed amendments to clauses 18, 40 and 75.

Related to this, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim wishes to amend clause 17(2), to remove a caveat that "Y does not need to have in mind a particular foreign country or foreign principal in order to be considered to have committed an offence". This, similarly, narrows the mental state for the offence and means that the prosecutor must prove that the person is acting for a specific foreign principal and it is impractical for the reasons I had already given.

As matter of principle, knowledge that there is "a foreign principal" and "acting on his behalf" should suffice, even if the person does not know which foreign principal it is. It does not matter whether you are acting for country X, Y or Z as long as you know you are acting for some country.

If I may move to clause 20, also the amendment proposed by Assoc Prof Jamus Lim. The current wording is that the Minister may authorise directions where, in the opinion of the Minister, those conditions for HIC are satisfied. The Member wants to remove the phrase "or is suspected of being or having been undertaken".

In practice, suspicion of links to a foreign principal would likely arise from a lead, an intelligence tip-off or other kinds of tip-off. If there is such a suspicion, security agencies would probe further, gather data, try to corroborate the information, ascertain if the lead is reliable and they would require triangulation from different sources.

If you recall the earlier example of a state that apparently worked through a PR agency to get social media influencers to discredit vaccines, people eventually got suspicious due to a combination of indicators: suspicious instructions from the company to mask that they were being paid to push their messages; the company claimed to be based at an address in London, but turned out not to be registered there; company management from Moscow; online presence that disappeared once people started raising suspicions. None of these indicators, on their own, proves a conclusive link to a foreign principal. But, collectively, they paint a suspicious picture.

So, if a foreign publication strongly attacks a Government policy and a local person is actively helping them and pushes out that content while accepting donations from them and taking effort to conceal the funding, consistently, over time, circumstances look suspicious, but nothing can be done if we cannot prove that the person was actually acting on behalf of a foreign principal. I think we must be able to act on reasonable suspicion, which is a threshold well-established in law.

Under FICA, the Government would be able to take some measures: issue directions to take down the harmful content, or a must-carry direction to inform the public that a HIC is going on and these are executory in nature. Thresholds above do not relate to an offence. If the person receiving the direction is aggrieved, he can appeal to the Tribunal.

Clause 21, Assoc Prof Lim wants to add in the phrase "rely on actionable intelligence”. So, we now call this agency to come and prove the actionable intelligence or we get documents and produce them? There is a process. You cannot just produce a document. And added on to that, Assoc Prof Lim and his colleagues want this to be in Court. How do you even prove these documents? How do you put any foreign intelligence agents on the stand? What is actionable intelligence?

In the real world, tip-offs come from intelligence agencies, from certain activities, associations, sometimes, it can be definitive, a "smoking gun", but in the vast majority of cases, it is less definite. Links to a foreign state could be through ownership, funding, other associations. It requires a piecing together of different data points.

I can tell Assoc Prof Lim from experience, if ever we said that we are going to refer what they said to us publicly, immediately they will disavow all knowledge and, thereafter, they will refuse to have contact with us. That is the real world. So, we need to be practical, not theoretical in this, with an understanding of how intelligence operations work.

There is another problem which lawyers will understand – what is the legal standard for actionable intelligence? It will replace "suspects or has reason to believe", which is a concept which lawyers know and is well-defined; at least, there is case law. You have replaced that with "actionable intelligence".

Essentially, the tribunal will have the right to consider the information available, which the Government makes available, and decide whether the conclusion that the Government has come to was justified.

Let me now move to the final set of amendments.

Clause 104, an amendment proposed by Ms He Ting Ru. She wants to replace the tribunal with proceedings in the High Court. This is in respect of appeals against our counter-HIC directions, any Part 3 direction or declaration as a Proscribed Online Location.

The question is, should the appeals relating to HIC Directions go to Court and should there be public hearings? In a Court process, the Government may be required to set out its case in public, months in advance of the trial, documents have to be exchanged, witnesses must be available to give evidence, there will be cross examination and then the Judge decides.

Going back to my earlier example, assume we get an intel tip-off. Foreign agency tipping us off about someone, which has happened even quite recently, and which then led to us exercising powers under the Internal Security Act. There are no documents. Will we be able to get the foreign intel contact to come to Court? As I said, they will just not hear us. We would not even get a response and that will be the end of the cooperation.

If we think the tip-off has some merit, we do our own investigations and then issue Directions. If the person is not happy, he appeals to the tribunal. The tribunal members have the same immunity and protection as High Court judges. They will consider any appeal brought under section 92.

Let me give you another example. Some countries – I am not saying we do – but some countries have human assets in other countries. Let us say the information is obtained through such a human asset. You want to reveal that in Court? Depending on the country that the human asset is in, he may not live for very long after that. And even if he lives, he would not be free.

One could ask: can you have the case in-camera in Court? That would not solve the problem.

You have to file the evidence in Court. A lot of parties get to see the file. Some of this information, frequently, is often known only to two to three persons who need to know, even within the security agency. The Minister does not get to see it or know about it, unless it is necessary to brief the Minister.

Let me give you a simple illustration of the real world by referring to a case that is before the Courts now, which is not anywhere in the category of cases we are now talking about in terms of sensitivity.

There is a case pending, an application by 17 prisoners awaiting capital punishment. They are making an application against the Attorney-General. They seek various reliefs against the Attorney-General. Various allegations have been made which the AGC considers to be completely scurrilous and without basis and being made to simply throw mud and stirred. That is the AGC's view.

They are represented by a local lawyer. The hearing is in chambers. The lawyers will know the hearing is in chambers. It has not been published yet. Details of the affidavits, everything cannot be published. But details of the plaintiffs' affidavits appeared in a Malaysian news portal within a month of the application being filed and the allegations relate to, well, I was going to say there were very strong racial undertones. In fact, they are about race.

Someone wanted to make these assertions in Court and then make sure they were published outside, which AGC considers absolutely scandalous. The info should not have been made public. It is a possible breach of rules. The lawyer claims that his “instructing solicitor” is from Malaysia, for one of the plaintiffs. So, now you investigate and even if you take action for breach of the rules, the info is public.

In this case, the info is not security-sensitive.

But let us say you have highly secret intel information. First of all, does it make sense to hand it over to the very person who is a suspect or to his lawyers? And how do you have a Court process?

So, the theory has to fit the practice.

That is why we thought long and hard, and then, said let us have a Tribunal headed by a Supreme Court Judge who can overrule the Minister. The Courts still have a role to play and that is in the Explanatory Statement. They will ensure procedural compliance, proper exercise of jurisdiction, but they will not review the merits, other aspects of executory decisions taken under the Bill.

As the House considers this, we must also look at this in the context of some other pieces of legislation we have in Singapore and what our approach to governance is. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, may I display a slide which compares different legislation.

Yes, please. [A slide was shown to hon Members.]

We have legislation that provide for tribunals and limit the Courts power of judicial review to achieve a variety of different objectives. And, so far, Singapore has been successful in this balancing exercise. Let me explain.

The starting point is always Rule of Law. It is fundamental, both for the well-functioning of society and to build a modern, economically vibrant society. At the same time, we recognise the normal judicial process is not best suited for specific matters; that is an exercise that requires careful consideration. Let me give a few examples. This is in annex L.

If you look at the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), the Minister can issue Restraining Orders. They are considered by the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, which, in turn, makes its recommendations to the President to confirm, vary or cancel the order. All orders and decisions of the President and the Minister, and the recommendations of the Council, are final and not subject to judicial review.

During the Second Reading of MRHA, I explained that where religious issues are concerned, the trial process may not be the best way to deal with it. It can deepen the fault lines, encourage martyrdom and inflame tensions even more.

The Restraining Orders can impose a significant restraint on normal freedoms. The Restraining Order can restrain the person from addressing orally or in writing any congregation, require the person to stop communication activity, stop contributing to any religious publication, and restrain the person from holding office in an editorial board or committee of a religious publication.

The Orders can be made against religious groups, to prohibit a group from receiving donations from specific or all foreign donors; require the entire governing body of the group to be Singapore Citizens; or require the group to suspend or remove specific foreigners from office. So, you can see the underlining philosophy there again – concern is foreign influence.

In some ways, these Orders are more serious than what can be made under FICA. The religious groups were initially concerned. We talked to them, we explained how our powers can be exercised and they understood and they accepted.

Second, if we look at the Land Acquisition Act. This is your house, you are living there. You could be living there all your life. The Government can acquire under the Land Acquisition Act. Any appeal against the Collector’s awards have to be heard by an Appeals Board.

Good reason: we learnt from the experience of other countries. A small country: we decided if we want to reshape and develop Singapore, the Government must have the power to acquire land quickly, develop it and not be tied up with the normal litigation process. In fact, the inspiration and one of the places we looked at was India, and when it was taken, the then Prime Minister decided the constitutional protection for land which is in the Indian Constitution should be removed from our Constitution.

So, a person's property can be acquired and it is the tribunal that decides on the value.

The approach to land acquisition, the policy on land acquisition, underpins our entire public housing policy, HDB policy. It underpins our entire industrial land policy and many other aspects, just based on this unorthodox approach.

If you look at the Immigration Act, section 39A, no judicial review for any decision made by the Minister or Controller under the Immigration Act, save in relation to procedural compliance.

If you look at the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act, financial penalties can be imposed, other Orders can be made, appeal is to an Appeals Board, chaired by a person qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court. May not even be a Judge. A person qualified to be a Judge. And the Appeals Board determines its own procedures and its decision is final.

Decisions of the Controller relating to the issuance or cancellation of work passes, variation of its conditions, these are not subject to judicial review, save in relation to procedural compliance.

The Internal Security Act (ISA) has been instrumental in ensuring our safety and security. It provides for detention without trial, on Executive Order. Singaporeans understand and accept the ISA. It allows us to pick up would-be terrorists, pre-emptively.

In 2017, we picked up a 22-year-old kindergarten teacher. Young and our first female detainee. Do we wait until she does something, perhaps to the kindergarten children? She went through rehab and is now released.

In any other country, she could not have been picked up and there are countries where she could have been picked up, but I am referring to the countries that we normally refer to. If she is not picked up and she goes overseas to one of the war zones, she might well not be alive today. But now, she has the prospect of carrying on with her life and achieve her full potential.

In the last couple of years, amongst those picked up were two teenagers. One wanted to carry out a knife attack in a mosque and the other wanted to carry out a knife attack in a synagogue. Do we wait until they actually attack? What would be the harm to our social fabric? So, the ISA has helped us avoid the bad incidents and hypocrisies we see elsewhere.

Recall the incident in New Zealand on 3 September 2021 where an extremist stabbed shoppers at the supermarket. You wake up in the morning, you go the supermarket. Suddenly, someone comes and stabs you. The attacker was known to the security agencies. He was under surveillance since 2016 because of his support for the Islamic State ideology. But under New Zealand's laws, he could not be picked up. There have been other similar cases in the UK and in France. Annex M sets out the details.

The global security think- tank GLOBSEC examined 22 terror incidents in France since 2012 and noted that nearly 80% of the people behind those attacks had been on a terror watchlist and 97% had been on the radar of authorities. With the ISA, 97% of those incidents could have been avoided and many lives saved. This included Said and Cherif Kouachi, who were career criminals who killed 12 people in January 2015 in the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris.

If you turn to the US, President Obama took office in 2008. He campaigned on the promise to close down Guantanamo Bay or Gitmo. He did not do so during the eight years of his Presidency. One reason: closing Gitmo could mean that several of these hardcore detainees could be moved to the United States and many Americans were opposed to that idea. To date, what we can check – we may be wrong – is that only one Gitmo prisoner has been transferred to the US for prosecution in the federal courts. We may be wrong about the exact number but I think it is a very low number.

What is the theory? The theory, and the Americans have been preaching this to us on the ISA, there must be due process, you must not have detention without trial and the State Department will tell us and publish a list. But when it comes to the US, there is due process in the US. They have all these hardened criminals, terrorists picked up from around the world. So, they put them in Gitmo, which is in Cuba, and then they say, well, since this is outside of the US, the US due process laws do not apply, and therefore, we can detain them without trial and they do not get the benefit of US due process. On top of that, basically, Members know about the atrocities that were committed on the prisoners.

Which is why I said we look at the world as it is and we avoid hypocrisies. We deal with it in a practical way. Doctors look at the ISD detainees. Justices of Peace go there, see them. We give them religious rehabilitation. We do not throw away the keys. And, after a while, many of them are released, when they are rehabilitated. We do not allow ideology to stand in the way of doing right for society when that ideology does not make sense. The ideology must be to do what is right for Singaporeans.

If you go to the CLTPA, it also provides for detention without trial. And I am well aware that the Workers' Party has a different view both on the ISA and the CLTPA, though I do not know what will be the substance of the provisions they will replace the ISA with. But anyway, and, therefore, it may be difficult for them to philosophically agree with this. But I am setting out the approach the Government has taken.

The CLTPA provides for detention without trial. It is a practical approach by then Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Evidence will often not be available; people too frightened to give evidence. In fact, we inherited this from the British and then changed it. People will be too frightened to give evidence. In the longer term, more harm to society, by leaving gangsters out in society. So, better to give to the Executive these powers to deal with some types of pernicious criminals. It has helped to keep our society safe.

If we had stuck to the approach of looking at everything on the basis only of the rights of the persons accused in the way that, say, the US or UK looks at it, and without balancing the rights of the society, we will not have the safe and crime-free society we have today. And the rights of the accused or detainees, both under the ISA and CLTPA, are protected. They are dealt with by tribunals.

So, the question for this House is: how do we view the risks of foreign interference? How do we place the risks in the context of the other legislation that I have referred to? Would it be possible to deal with these issues of foreign interference through a normal Court process? Often, we do not even name the countries involved. Can you imagine naming one of our neighbours in Court? Or a larger country? When we asked Huang Jing to leave, we did not say who he was acting for. Why?

The foreign policy and national security implications are too serious. The US can name any country that it wishes. But we are a price taker in this business of international relations. Also, how do you have a Court process without leaks?

So, if you look at what can be done through Executive Order under FICA, directives can be issued for greater transparency. The Government might ask some to disassociate themselves from foreigners if there is an increased threat of foreign interference, but we should compare that against Land Acquisition, against the Orders that can be made under other legislation that I have referred to. And also, it is not as if it is either a Court process or nothing. There is a tribunal, fully empowered, headed by a Supreme Court Judge, and they can consider any appeal brought under section 92.

On a separate point, generally, in legislation, the usual rules for judicial review limit review of the Courts to reasonableness, legality and propriety. That has been so in POFMA as well as in other legislation.

Members can see, therefore, various pieces of legislation have conferred the Government with generally-worded discretion. Philosophically, the Government has seen that as part of good governance to ensure our laws are effective so that the Government can act when it needs to. You need checks and balances, but the checks must be suited to the task and balanced against the risks.

What are the risks? There are risks with giving any government any power, whether or not it is appealable to a Court. There are always risks. It is a degree of risk. There are also risks in not giving power. The real issue is what powers should you give. What are the risks? And what are the risks in not giving the powers?

The risk here, which underlies some of the concerns that have been raised and some of the illustrations because the Government says these illustrations do not come within FICA and then you will say, what if the Government abuses its power. I referred to it briefly earlier. And what if the Government interferes with perfectly normal collaboration with a foreigner? it will be an abuse of power. But what if the Government abuses its power?

So, you have to weigh the risks of a rogue Government doing that versus a rogue foreign interference. The latter, is a far greater risk.

The risk of a rogue government abusing its power. First of all, what is the power, compared with the powers in other legislation? Second, it can be looked at by a tribunal headed by a Supreme Court Judge. All the decisions published, people can see and assess themselves. And, ultimately, people have the final say in a highly literate population like Singapore. A final say of both public opinion and public opinion expressed through elections. People in Singapore would not stand for a rogue government.

The risk of not giving the power or requiring a Court process, in the context of the risks I have outlined, will severely compromise the Government's ability to deal with the real risk of foreign interference which has actually happened.

I, like some of those who could have made comments, and I am sure everyone here, wish that there is a world where the Government has the power to act and, at the same time, there is a complete check against abuse. If we can find that formula, we will gladly take that because that is ideal. But there is no such formula.

Then, we have to, first of all, admit that there are trade-offs whichever route you take. If you go to Court, there are trade-offs; if you have a tribunal, there are trade-offs. And I agree that, with a rogue government, there is a risk of abuse, as I have said, not just of this power but several other powers; and not just the Executive powers but also even powers which can be looked at or appealed to the Courts. Just as there is a risk of an order made under MRHA against preachers on religious groups that we do not agree with, or detentions under the CLTPA, or land acquisition.

In many countries, the population would not support this kind of land acquisition powers because it only leads to some very wealthy Ministers or not much public benefit. But in Singapore, the population trusted the Government and Singapore has developed in a way which could not even have been dreamt about in 1965. Along the way, we have had to make these choices in a number of areas, as I have shown to Members. And over time, people have seen how our approach proved to be good for the majority of people.

And over the same period, Singapore's reputation for Rule of Law, its judicial system, legal system, institutions, both in and outside of the legal field, were all enhanced and they were built up.

So, I say to this House: this law gives the Government a set of tools that can help. It is not a complete defence against foreign interference but they can help.

The Bill represents the best balance that we can find between dealing with the risks and providing checks against abuse.

Ms He Ting Rualso proposes to remove the immunity provision in clause 119. The reason for this suggestion is not clear. We recently amended the Police Force Act to provide that no liability shall lie personally against any enforcement officer who acts in good faith and with reasonable care in the execution of the Act or any other written law. That is clause 119. This provision simply extends the same protection to a competent authority or an authorised officer who assists a Police Officer in the execution of powers under the Act.

Sir, in conclusion, I have articulated the need for the Bill and addressed the misconceptions that have surfaced in the past few days. This Bill is a calibrated piece of legislation that enables us to act surgically against threats that have come and continue to loom over us. Mr Speaker, I beg to move. [Applause.]

Question proposed.

Minister of State, Faishal Ibrahim.

Mr Speaker, the Minister for Home Affairs has explained the outline and reasons for the Bill. I support the principles of the Bill as outlined by the Minister and would like to advocate the importance of having such a law to deal with hostile information campaigns (HICs).

I will discuss Parts 2 and 3 provisions pertaining to HICs.

Foreign actors have leveraged digital technologies to carry out HICs. We have observed that these tend to be deliberate and coordinated attempts to use information to manipulate public opinion and harm a country’s interest. In addition, they are often clandestine and seek to mislead the public under false pretences.

This Bill does so by providing a set of offences and empowering the Government to issue directions to counter HICs.

The new offences in Part 2 of the Bill are aimed at acts of foreign interference by covert means using electronic communications. Clause 10 defines electronic communications activity as the communication or distribution of any information or material through means of SMS, MMS, a social media service, a relevant electronic service or an Internet access service.

Clause 17 introduces the offence of clandestine foreign interference by electronic communications activity. There are three elements.

First, the person acts on behalf of a foreign principal, or on behalf of a person acting on behalf of a foreign principal. He undertakes electronic communications activity that results in or involves publishing in Singapore any information or material.

Second, any part of the person’s undertaking or electronic communications activity is covert or involves deception.

Third, the person knows or has reason to believe that the electronic communications activity or the information or material published in Singapore is against Singapore’s public interest.

The offence clearly deals with persons covertly and knowingly acting against the public interest on behalf of a foreigner. The mere fact that communications were private, for example, an online video call between two people, would not make them covert.

For an offence to be made out, there must be an element of secrecy or a lack of transparency surrounding the person’s conduct. For example, a Singaporean is paid by a foreign intelligence agency to publish a number of articles criticising Singapore’s foreign policy towards that country. He does so but presents it in his personal capacity as a citizen without disclosing his links to the foreign agency. This would be considered covert.

Clause 17 does not cover Singaporeans acting on their own accord or foreigners making open and attributable comments. Nor does it cover unintentional acts.

For example, an article by a foreigner who openly declares his identity, published in a foreign publication, such as the Economist or the Wall Street Journal, would not be an offence under FICA. The same applies to foreign political observers or political commentators publishing on a social media platform or a blog, if they make no attempt to mislead Singaporeans as to who they are.

A Singaporean shares an online video propagated as part of a foreign HIC on his social media account. However, he does so unwittingly and was not aware that the content is part of a HIC nor did he receive any support or instruction from a foreign principal. The Singaporean also has not committed an offence.

Clause 18 introduces a separate aggravated offence of clandestine foreign interference of a target using electronic communications activity. This offence would apply if a few conditions are fulfilled.

First, a person undertakes electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign principal.

Second, the person does so to influence another person to undertake activity or engage in conduct in Singapore that is prejudicial to Singapore’s public interest.

Third, in doing so, the person does not disclose his links to the foreign principal.

This is an aggravated offence because it involves a greater degree of duplicity in targeting another person to act against Singapore’s public interest. Such acts are calculated and more likely even harder to detect, and, consequently, have the potential to cause greater harm. The offence thus carries higher penalties commensurate with the greater harm.

Clause 19 introduces an offence of preparing or planning for the above offences and clause 115 clarifies that these offences will have extra-territorial application.

These offences will be investigated by the Police. For offences involving SAF installations, assets and personnel, Police will work with SAF.

The Bill contains customised powers for the Government to act against HIC content online. Part 3 of the Bill empowers different directions: (a) to obtain information about HICs before they happen; (b) to detect and prevent HICs taking place; and (c) should they occur here, to contain the HIC.

As the Minister has stressed, the basic architecture of our counter-HIC measures is that directions can be issued only when the Minister assesses that all of the following three conditions in clause 20 are met: (a) online communications activity is undertaken, or suspected to be undertaken, by or on behalf of a foreign principal; (b) the online communications activity results in content that is published in Singapore; and (c) it is in the public interest to issue that direction.

Clause 7 sets out non-exhaustive illustrations of what would cross the public interest threshold. For example, in the interest of the security of Singapore, to protect public health or public finances, to prevent incitement of feelings of enmity among different groups in Singapore, or to prevent foreign interference directed towards a political end, which would include interfering in our domestic politics.

These illustrations reflect the context of HICs. They are not meant to constrain the interpretation of public interest found in other laws, which should be read in their respective contexts.

To improve the Government’s ability to investigate potential HICs, clause 36 introduces the Technical Assistance Direction to request various forms of assistance from social media services, relevant electronic services, hosting services, Internet access service providers and proprietors of online locations. The intent is for these parties to provide information or data that is useful in investigating if there is an ongoing HIC and the source of the HIC content, in particular, whether it originates from a foreign source.

This information includes basic subscriber information that is provided when accounts are set up, such as IP addresses, or aggregated geolocation data. It is not MHA's intent to demand assistance that is not reasonably practicable or information beyond what is necessary. Nor will we demand information for purposes beyond investigating a suspected HIC.

Technical Assistance Directions are subject to a non-disclosure requirement to prevent tipping off a suspect of an ongoing investigation and prevent any unauthorised external party from undermining investigations. Recipients can specify that they received the direction but cannot disclose the substance of the direction. Breaches of any non-disclosure requirement constitutes an offence under clause 46.

Other Part 3 directions are designed to provide targeted powers for the Government to contain the propagation of HICs and mitigate the harms caused.

Clause 32 introduces the Must Carry Direction that will require the recipient to publish, post, display or include a message about the HIC content in a manner prescribed by Regulations. The intent of such directions is to warn the public that the content is part of a HIC. There are four classes of directions for different recipients.

A Class 1 Must Carry Direction can be issued to the communicator of the HIC content to publish a mandatory message.

A Class 2 direction can be issued to relevant electronic services and social media services to publish a mandatory message with respect to specified information or material, or identical copies of it. For example, if a foreign state-run media outlet posts videos on social media and these videos are part of a HIC campaign, then the Government may issue a Class 2 direction to the social media platform, to require the platform to publish a notification tagged to the video to notify the public that this video is part of a HIC campaign.

A Class 3 direction requires providers of social media services, relevant electronic services, telecommunications services, newspapers or licensed broadcasting services to publish a general notice to end users in Singapore. It is not necessary for HIC content to have been communicated on the service in order for a direction to be issued. This class of directions is intended to alert Singaporeans that a HIC is ongoing.

A Class 4 direction requires proprietors of Proscribed Online Locations to put up a notice about its proscribed status so that any visitors to the online location are aware that it is a HIC vector.

There are two directions to remove specific HIC content from being accessible by end users in Singapore.

Clause 30 introduces the Stop Communication (end-user) Direction, which will require communicators to take down information or material that is published in Singapore and to stop publishing similar material in Singapore; and clause 31 introduces the Disabling Direction, which will require relevant electronic services and social media services to take down specific content from the view of Singapore end users.

Clause 34 introduces the Account Restriction Direction, which can be issued to relevant electronic services and social media services and is intended to prevent specific accounts from communicating with Singapore end users.

Clause 35 introduces the Service Restriction Direction, which can be issued to relevant electronic services, social media services and Internet access service providers to stem the virality of HICs and restrict Internet service functionality respectively. Each Service Restriction Direction will specify the actions required of the recipient. For example, restricting a certain function of their service, preventing harmful content from being actively recommended to end users in Singapore, or slowing down or stopping Internet access. MHA will work with the industry on how such directions are to be operationalised and identify reasonable and practicable interventions, given the potential significant impact on the services.

Clause 37 introduces the App Removal Direction to stop the further distribution of an app to Singapore end users, if the app is being used to spread HIC content. This can be issued only if at least one direction that is not a Technical Assistance Direction or another App Removal Direction had been issued with respect to that app.

Clause 24 provides for the Minister to declare an online location as a Proscribed Online Location or POL, if one Part 3 direction, other than the Technical Assistance Direction, has been issued. Once proscribed, it is an offence to operate this POL, provide support to it or have advertising dealings with it. Clauses 39 to 41 give effect to these restrictions. To ensure that the public is aware of its POL status, a Class 4 Must Carry Direction can be issued to require the owner to put up a notice about its proscribed status. The intent of this POL regime is, hence, to reduce the impact of the POL by: firstly, reducing its visibility via advertising; secondly, warning Singaporeans to the threat posed by the POL; and thirdly, cutting off its revenue streams and preventing it from profiting from its operations.

We also need to be able to take action against non-compliance of directions. Clause 33 introduces the Access Blocking Direction. There are two classes.

Class 1 can be issued to Internet access service providers to disable access by every end user in Singapore to the website or service that had not complied with the direction.

Class 2 can be applied to Internet access service providers, relevant electronic services and social media services to disable access to a POL if paid content on the POL is published in Singapore or the POL fails to comply with the Must Carry (Class 4) Direction to notify Singaporean users about its POL status.

Clause 38 introduces the Disgorgement Direction. This can be issued to any Singaporean, resident in Singapore or locally registered entity that has supported the HIC and it will require them to return to the foreign source any funding or material support provided.

Non-compliance with these directions will be an offence under clause 45. If charged, parties may raise the defence that it was not reasonably practicable to do more than what was done or that there were no better practicable means of complying, for example, due to technical impossibility.

Mr Speaker, HICs can cause devastating harm, including erosion of the country's sovereignty, undermining of social cohesion and loss of public trust. The Minister has provided a detailed account and these cases are well-publicised. In addition, threat actors are improving their tactics all the time.

Therefore, we cannot wait for harms to occur before taking action because severe damage may already be done. Should there be credible information about a potential HIC threat, the Government must be able to act to prevent it.

Our authorisation thresholds must, therefore, be calibrated to allow certain directions to be issued even before any harmful communications have commenced. Clause 21, therefore, provides for two specific directions – Technical Assistance Direction and Account Restriction Direction – to be authorised before harmful communications activity has taken place.

Let me illustrate how we intend to use these levers.

Take the following scenario, which is illustrative but not exhaustive. It is not hypothetical because we have seen this modus operandi in HICs conducted against other countries.

On a social media service, a set of accounts amasses followers by first posting popular content on lifestyle matters, such as cute animal videos or funny memes. There are multiple accounts and the accounts act in coordination. For example, account A actively tries to increase account B's visibility by sharing its content and so on.

At the opportune moment, such as election season or during a period of tension with another country, these accounts start to pivot to social and political commentaries, hoping to sway how Singaporeans vote or react to a foreign policy issue.

Assuming this happens here and our monitoring agencies detect these accounts gaining traction. We can issue a Technical Assistance Direction to investigate the origin of such accounts.

If we have sufficient reason to believe that these are foreign accounts and are planning to undertake an HIC against Singapore, we can issue Account Restriction Directions to prevent them from propagating their HIC content to end-users in Singapore.

Mr Speaker, MHA has studied international cases and reviewed testimony from the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods to come up with these directions. Let me reiterate that MHA will use these powers judiciously and will calibrate our actions based on the specifics of each case.

In assessing whether a HIC is afoot, the primary determinant is the behaviour of the actor involved and the entities behind the content. It is clear, therefore, that Singaporeans who are simply expressing their own views or engaging in the political process on their own accord are not covered and neither will the vast majority of communications involving foreigners, be it journalism or academia or online advocacy.

MHA has also consulted the major stakeholders on the operationalisation of these directions and will continue doing so, to take into account the industry's constraints, from the technical to the legal, as we work together to counter HIC threats on their platforms.

I have set out the clear conditions that must be met before directions can be issued and the defences inscribed in the Bill. I will now set out the avenues for appeal.

This Bill will provide the right of appeal to recipients of counter-HIC directions and proprietors of POLs. Appeals will be heard by a reviewing tribunal.

Clause 23 clarifies that recipients of counter-HIC directions and proprietors of POLs must first apply to the Minister to reconsider the Part 3 direction. Should the Minister reject the application, the appealing party may then appeal to a reviewing tribunal, which is constituted under Part 8 of the Bill.

The appeal to the tribunal must be submitted within 30 days from the outcome of the Minister's reconsideration. This tribunal can then dismiss the appeal, confirm the direction appealed against or revoke the direction. Decisions would be determined by the tribunal and are final. These are set out in clause 97.

The Minister has explained the reasoning behind the reviewing tribunal. The difficulty that confronts us is the suitability of making the Courts serve as an oversight body for decisions taken under the Bill, which involve issues of national security, defence and foreign policy and information from intelligence sources, not necessarily only of our agencies. Our own Courts have said that they have limits in these areas.

The reviewing tribunal structure thus recognises the need for checks and balances while protecting sensitive intelligence that is relied upon to counter a HIC. The tribunal, in fact, goes further than judicial review in some ways in that it is able to assess the initial decision on its merits, whereas the Court in judicial review proceedings focuses only upon the legality of the administrative decision.

Mr Speaker, allow me to continue my speech in Malay.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech on Pg xxx.] Mr Speaker, we are facing a severe and evolving threat of foreign interference, which can be carried out online through HICs or through local proxies involved in our political processes, also known as Politically Significant Persons or PSPs. The Minister and I have outlined the threat of HICs, and Minister of State Desmond Tan will speak on the threat of PSPs. It is clear that we need to take steps to counter it.

We have been discussing these issues in Singapore over the last three years. At least 18 representors spoke on the threat of foreign interference at the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods in 2018. There was a major conference in 2019, and discussions at our Committee of Supply (COS) debates. So, this is not a Bill that has come in haste.

This Bill does not significantly increase the substantive powers from existing laws, such as the Internal Security Act, Criminal Procedure Code, Broadcasting Act and Telecommunications Act. In fact, a significant portion of the Bill is simply the Political Donations Act ported over.

So, what the Bill does is to provide more targeted and calibrated levers against HICs, which are narrower than existing powers, such as in the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Act. I have brought the House through these levers and provided some illustrations of how we intend to use them in a judicious and proportionate manner.

In addition, this Bill ports over the requirements for PSPs from the Political Donations Act and introduces a more robust framework of designations and executory powers to deal with interference through PSPs, which Minister of State Desmond Tan will elaborate on.

There are comparable levers and requirements in other foreign jurisdictions.

Let me also reiterate that this Bill does not target Singaporeans participating independently in our domestic political discourse nor the very vast majority of interactions with foreigners. It is primarily concerned with covert and clandestine activities to manipulate our domestic politics and undermine our political sovereignty, and not open, transparent and attributable activities, transactions, relationships or even criticisms. There are also various safeguards, such as clear criteria for offences, clear authorisation thresholds for directions and avenues for appeal.

Mr Speaker, this Government has always taken the firm stance that our domestic politics are for Singaporeans to decide and that we should not allow foreign actors to interfere in them. This Bill ensures that we can continue to take this stance and that Singaporeans can continue to make our own choices on how we should govern our country and live our lives.

Minister of State Desmond Tan.

Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister, I will now take Members through the second part of the Bill that empowers us to counter foreign interference through local proxies.

Despite the proliferation of foreign interference attempts in the digital space, we still see many instances of interference by hostile foreign actors in the physical world through compromising local proxies.

One example that was raised in the Minister's earlier speech took place in Australia, where a former senator received donations from an individual with connections to a foreign government. The former senator then advocated for the foreign country's position on the South China Sea despite it being contradictory to his party's position.

Another example took place in 2015, where Reuters reported that a state-linked company was covertly backing at least 33 radio stations in countries across the Asia Pacific region to form a global network broadcasting news that placed that particular state in a positive light.

Closer to home, Singapore is not immune. In the 1980s, the First Secretary of the United States Embassy in Singapore, Hank Hendrickson, cultivated a group of Singaporean lawyers to join Opposition politics and contest the 1988 General Election. The lawyers were offered funding, and one of them was even offered refuge in the US should he subsequently run into difficulties with the Singapore Government.

We should update our laws to address the new ways that foreign actors can influence local political individuals and entities.

We currently have the Political Donations Act (PDA) that prohibits political associations, as well as election candidates and their agents, from accepting monetary donations from foreign sources.

However, PDA does not cover other individuals who are directly involved in our political processes, such as our Members of Parliament. Also, PDA only covers monetary donations and does not cover other possible vectors of interference, such as through formal affiliation with a foreign organisation and provision of volunteer services by foreigners.

To strengthen our safeguards, this Bill will repeal PDA, bring the existing PDA obligations into this Bill, and introduce some additional countermeasures.

First, let me go through the individuals and entities that this Bill aims to cover.

Clause 14 of the Bill defines individuals and entities, who are formally involved in our political processes, as Politically Significant Persons (PSPs). These are listed in the Bill and are, namely: political parties; Political Office Holders; Members of Parliament, which include elected Members of Parliament, Non-Constituency Members of Parliament and Nominated Members of Parliament; Leader of the House; Leader of the Opposition; election candidates; and election agents.

The Bill also empowers the Competent Authority, a civil servant in MHA appointed by the Minister for Home Affairs, to designate other individuals and entities as PSPs, if certain conditions are met.

Clause 14, read with clauses 47 and 48, empowers the Competent Authority to designate entities and individuals respectively as PSPs if: (a) they are members of foreign political or legislative bodies, or their activities are directed, in part, towards a political end; and (b) the Competent Authority assesses that it is in the public interest that countermeasures be applied.

It is important that we have levers to designate and impose countermeasures on individuals and entities who may be at risk of foreign interference and have exhibited behaviour that points to such risk. It also has the effect of promoting transparency and deterring would-be foreign actors with malicious intent from trying to influence Singapore’s politics through these local proxies.

I will now talk about the different countermeasures that will be imposed on both defined and designated PSPs.

All PSPs will have to comply with a baseline set of obligations and countermeasures.

We will apply the most stringent countermeasures on defined PSPs as they are directly involved in Singapore’s political processes.

For designated PSPs, in the first instance of designation, their obligations only pertain to disclosure. However, clause 88 provides for countermeasures to be stepped-up, if conditions are met, potentially, to the same level as those for defined PSPs.

The countermeasures on PSPs are detailed in Chart 2 that was earlier distributed.

First, let me talk about donations.

Clauses 62 to 65 require all PSPs, both defined and designated, to disclose donations to the Competent Authority. Donations need to be disclosed if they are $10,000 or more. Smaller donations from the same donor that, when aggregated during the same reporting period, amounts to $10,000 or more, also have to be disclosed.

Donations that need to be disclosed do not only cover those that are made in cash. Clause 51 articulates the types of donations that the Bill will cover, including donations made in kind, or the provision of goods and services for a fee below the fair market value.

That said, the Bill does not cover all kinds of donations, only donations that are directed, wholly or in part, towards a political end.

The disclosure requirements do not cover personal gifts, for example, as the intent of the Bill is to safeguard against foreign interference in our domestic politics. Certain other donations or gifts may be handled by other laws.

Defined PSPs are subject to more stringent donation controls. For example, defined PSPs are: (a) prohibited from receiving donations from impermissible donors, such as foreign donors and Singapore Citizens below the age of 21; (b) not allowed to receive $5,000 or more of anonymous donations; and (c) are required to maintain a dedicated bank account to hold their political donations.

Designated PSPs are not subject to these restrictions at the onset of designation. Members will see from the annex that most of these requirements already exist in PDA today.

Influence can also come about through volunteers, apart from donations. Clause 56 prohibits defined PSPs from accepting volunteer labour or services from foreigners. The Bill is not concerned with all types of voluntary services, and only prohibits defined PSPs from accepting voluntary services that relate specifically to the duties and responsibilities of the PSPs in question. For instance, a Member of Parliament cannot allow foreigners to volunteer at Meet-the-People Sessions or any other programmes that are organised by the political parties.

For designated PSPs, there is no prohibition on foreign volunteers in the first instance.

However, if there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clause 85(2)(b), read with clause 88, empowers the Competent Authority to require that the designated PSP report voluntary labour and services that are rendered by foreigners.

Next, disclosure requirements on foreign affiliations. The Bill does not cover all kinds of affiliations. For example, personal friendships or co-workers are not covered by the Bill. The Bill does not restrict association with a foreigner and is not intended to reduce foreign partnerships or businesses.

An example of what the Bill is concerned with is foreign affiliations where the foreign principals are in a position of control over the PSP and the PSP is taking direct instructions from the foreign principal. For example, being an employee of a foreign company would be one such arrangement that will need to be disclosed if you are a PSP. These reportable arrangements are defined in clause 78.

If there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clause 84, read with clause 88, empowers the Competent Authority to require the PSP to terminate its foreign affiliations.

Clauses 78(3) and 78(4) will require defined and designated PSP individuals to declare if they have been granted migration benefits by foreign countries. Examples of migration benefits will include a foreign passport, travel identification documents, an entitlement or privilege or status to work or reside in the foreign country, or an honorary citizenship. The purpose of this declaration is simply for transparency. There would be no stepped-up countermeasures to prohibit the acceptance of migration benefits.

Next, on leadership and membership. The Societies Act already disallows foreigners from being members of political parties. This will continue.

Designated Politically Significant Entities (PSEs), in the first instance, are not prohibited from appointing foreigners to leadership positions or accepting foreign memberships. If there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clause 83, read with clause 88, empowers the Competent Authority to prohibit the PSE from accepting foreigners as members or appointing them as responsible officers within the entity.

There may be instances where the Government will need to act even before we designate an individual or organisation as PSPs. The Bill provides for countermeasures in two of such cases.

First, foreign states may attempt to cultivate Singapore citizens to influence our domestic politics through their involvement in foreign political and legislative bodies. Examples of these would be a foreign political party or political advisory body.

Clause 79 will require Singapore Citizens to declare their involvement in foreign political or legislative bodies.

MHA recognises that there may be innocuous instances where Singaporeans living abroad join foreign political bodies, such as Singaporean students joining foreign political parties while they are studying abroad, out of their own personal interests. However, this can, nonetheless, still pose a threat, as such Singaporeans may be cultivated, approached or influenced, even unknowingly, and, subsequently, made use of to affect our local politics. As such, it is necessary to require them to disclose their involvement in such bodies for transparency purposes.

Second, based on our experience of seeing foreign writers masquerading as local writers in penning articles relating to Singaporean political matters, we felt that it was important for Singaporeans to be aware of the origin of such articles and perspectives.

If there is an increased risk of foreign interference, clauses 80 to 82 will allow the Competent Authority to issue a transparency directive to direct any newspaper, media outlet which includes online media, or any defined or designated PSP that publishes matters on political issues relating to Singapore, to disclose the particulars of any foreign author or foreign principal for whom or at whose direction the article or programme is published, if the article or programme is a political matter concerning Singapore.

To be clear, this will only apply to entities that are issued with the transparency directives.

There is no fixed expiry date for the designation and countermeasures imposed on PSPs. This approach is the same as that under PDA.

But the process is transparent when we designate PSPs.

Clause 49 of the Bill states that when we designate a politically significant person or entity, the Competent Authority must, without delay, give the individual or entity notice of the designation.

Moreover, if a PSP wishes to challenge its designation for the stepped-up countermeasures imposed on it, it may submit an application for the Competent Authority’s reconsideration or an appeal to the Minister for Home Affairs.

Clause 102 allows the Minister to consult an advisory body before arriving at a determination on the merits of the appeal.

Unless a Singaporean or entity is acting as a foreign agent or working with foreigners to affect our public interest, they will not be covered. Academic research, business partnerships, creative collaborations, cultural exchanges – such interactions will not be designated. An employee working for an American tech firm that is openly advocating for American technology as part of their business will not be designated as there is no public interest in doing so. It is also not within the Bill’s intent to prevent local NGOs from freely working with foreign businesses on their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) projects. The Bill also does not seek to stop businesses and organisations from building overseas partnerships or soliciting for overseas business, networking with foreigners, going to conferences or seminars, or engaging in cultural exchanges.

These types of activities and dealings will not be constrained in any way by the proposed Bill. It will be business as usual as we know it for the vast majority of Singaporeans and residents in Singapore.

Allow me to give an example of how the PSP measures will apply.

Let us take a case of a Singapore-registered entity which has been actively commenting on Singapore’s politics in advocating a potentially divisive social issue. The Competent Authority has reason to believe that the entity may be receiving support from a foreign state-linked agency. This entity may be designated by the Competent Authority as a PSE.

To ensure transparency of its activities, the PSE will have to submit donation and foreign affiliation disclosures in the very first instance.

This is, in fact, less stringent than PDA of today. Under PDA, if an entity is designated as a political association, the controls are the same as those imposed on a political party. This includes not being allowed to receive foreign funding and a cap on anonymous donations.

If the Competent Authority assesses that there is a heightened threat of foreign interference, the PSE may be issued with stepped-up countermeasures.

For example, if the PSE is suspected to be receiving funding from the foreign agency to organise a petition against the Government calling for a change in our laws on the issue that the group is advocating for, the Competent Authority may issue a directive prohibiting the PSE from receiving foreign donations.

If the PSE is affiliated with a foreign group which is suspected to be taking instructions from a foreign state, the Competent Authority may direct the PSE to end its affiliation with the foreign group. If the PSE has been publishing articles related to Singapore politics, it may also be issued with a transparency directive to disclose the nationalities of contributors of the articles.

Finally, it is useful to highlight that a substantial portion of the Bill that deals with local proxies was ported over from PDA. Where it is new, it is meant to address the gaps. Our approach is also narrower than the Australian or US approach.

Mr Speaker, allow me to now speak and conclude in Chinese.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech on Pg xxx.] Mr Speaker, Sun Tzu's Art of War has a saying, "it is better to win the heart of people than to capture the city." This saying encapsulates why we need a Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill.

Historical thinkers have warned us against overlooking psychological defence in warfare. As the saying goes, "the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." In today's context, the best strategy in warfare is to win the war without the firing of a single bullet.

History is full of such examples. One such example is Ukraine, which is said to have suffered extensive intervention during the 2014 Crimean status referendum, where sensitive societal fault lines were targeted by a hostile information campaign orchestrated by the Russians to build popular support for Crimea to join Russia. This, eventually, led to the annexation of Crimea.

If we were to allow foreign interference in our domestic politics, Singapore may similarly be subject to such divisive forces. This may result in us losing our autonomy and becoming a vassal state of a foreign power, or a puppet of foreign forces. This is certainly not the desirable outcome.

The PAP Government has always taken a firm stand that our domestic politics are for Singaporeans to decide and that we should not allow foreign actors to interfere in them.

However, this is easier said than done. Being a small open economy and a multicultural society, Singapore is highly susceptible to foreign interference. To ensure that we keep step with the evolving tactics of hostile actors, it is timely for us to update our laws to address the threat of foreign interference.

In addition, I must point out that, contrary to what some commentators have been saying about FICA, the Bill is not intended to target businesses, academic institutions, trade associations, clan associations or other cultural, religious, community or charity groups in their legitimate dealings with foreigners. Singaporeans will still be free to express their views. In fact, the Government's wish is that, with FICA, Singaporeans will be able to freely voice their opinions on Singaporean matters and not the perspective of others.

I want to remind the public that the foreign interference threat is an invisible one, and the threat that the passage of FICA aims to mitigate is one that is hard to guard against because it insidiously targets our world view. And once these perspectives are allowed to fundamentally alter our belief systems, it will be too late for us to take remedial action.

The Bill provides Singapore with the basic levers to defend ourselves, but we hope FICA will raise Singaporeans' awareness about the threat of foreign interference, so that we will not, unwittingly, become vehicles for hostile foreign actors to undermine our national interest. My wish is for Singaporeans to commit to working together to ensure that our affairs will be for Singaporeans only to decide.

(In English): Mr Speaker, this Government has taken a firm stance against foreign interference since our Independence. This Bill ensures that Singaporeans retain the freedom to decide how we should govern our country, how we should live our lives.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Speaker, I rise to speak on the Bill. Before I begin, I do not recall coming across a Bill that is understood in such diametrically opposing ways by, on the one hand, some members of the public, including at least two Senior Counsels, many civil society activists, former Nominated Members of Parliament and journalists, and by the Executive on the other.

This anomaly in our public discourse regarding this Bill is significant and it bears deep reflection on how our laws are made and communicated to the public before they are passed in this House.

Sir, my speech has four parts. One, is a summary of the amendments filed by the Workers' Party's Members of Parliament; two, is on how exceptional executive power requires robust judicial oversight to ensure accountability; three, is on how the Government should have sought public feedback on this Bill; and four, is on how the Government has been largely muted as to the non-legislative measures to combat foreign interference and why this needs to be corrected urgently.

Let me first summarise the amendments proposed by the Workers' Party's Members of Parliament who will explain the substantive basis of their amendments in their respective speeches.

Ms He Ting Ru, Mr Leon Perera, Mr Gerald Giam and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim filed amendments to the Bill on 27 September 2021 by 4:30 pm, which is the deadline for filing any amendments to Bills for this particular Sitting. The thrust of the amendments is in four areas: accountability, fairness, transparency and effectiveness.

The first area is accountability. The Government must be accountable when it implements this law and uses executive power against individuals and entities. There should be robust oversight of executive action by the Supreme Court. This must be the default position for parliamentary democracy that recognises the centrality of the separation of powers under our Constitution.

The second area is fairness. The law must more precisely scope the extent of executive powers to minimise the prospect of abuse of power. Phrases, such as "is likely to" and "where the Minister suspects" create low thresholds of proof that could be unfairly used against entities and individuals if power is in the wrong hands. While the Bill targets foreign interference, Singaporeans are the central focus and it is important that their constitutional rights are respected.

The third area is transparency. There has to be greater clarity and transparency on the entities and individuals affected by this Bill. I note in this regard that MHA has made a statement in the middle of last week – I think there have been a few statements and comments made by the Ministry – that it will publish details of designated persons or entities, but the point is, surely, this should have been made more explicit in the Bill.

The fourth area is effectiveness. The Workers' Party has no objection to the additional requirements that are ported to this Bill in connection with the porting over of the Political Donations Act into FICA. However, we do question whether the list of Politically Significant Persons is far-reaching enough. I note the Minister's comments in his Second Reading speech. But the point is our Civil Service has a significant footprint in the success of Singapore, with its central role in influencing Government policy. As key nodes in decision-making, civil servants from Deputy Secretary upwards, in our view, should be designated like Politically Significant Persons.

As MHA's press release on the First Reading of the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill shows, the danger of elite capture is an insidious threat. It would be unwise to assume that only politicians, civil society activists and journalists are vectors for foreign influence. To this end, it would be important for the public to understand that the Government did not think it necessary to designate such individuals as PSPs in the original Bill. I will leave Member of Parliament Gerald Giam to speak more on this subject.

Of the four areas of amendments, foremost is accountability of the Executive, because, without that, fairness in scoping powers and greater transparency are but shadow puppets.

This is why the second part of my speech is on how exceptional executive power requires the strongest of oversight to ensure accountability.

Mr Speaker, the starting position of the Workers’ Party is that the ubiquity of the threat of foreign interference and its low-cost ecosystem, particularly online, is neither a figment of the imagination, nor can it be wished away. It follows that the Government must have powers and, in some cases, even potentially intrusive powers, to intervene in the appropriate case. However, if we accept that such broad-ranging, broadly defined powers should be legislated to deal with foreign interference, then this House must ensure the legislation of equally robust oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse of power.

If a poll were to be conducted among ordinary Singaporeans on concepts like the separation of powers doctrine and its centrality to our system of Government, such a poll, I would hazard, would likely elicit quizzical looks. One can hazard a guess that not a small number of our citizens would be unsure of how important such principles are to our political system.

Let me add a historical dimension. Members of this House may have noticed a compact wooden bookcase at one end of the Parliament library. This bookcase and a number of books on parliamentary and constitutional subjects were presented by the UK’s House of Commons to the then-Speaker of Parliament P Coomaraswamy on 16 November 1966 to mark Singapore becoming the 22nd nation of the Commonwealth to gain Independence.

This House passed a resolution recognising the receipt of these gifts on 5 December that year. One of the famous books in this bookcase is the Law of the Constitution by Albert Dicey where that hallowed phrase central to the separation of powers in all parliamentary democracies is found, and I quote: "Powers, however extraordinary, which are conferred by or sanctioned by statute, are never unlimited, for they are confined by the words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the interpretation put upon the statute by the judges." Unquote.

The separation of powers doctrine and its close relationship with the rule of law was affirmed in the recent Court of Appeal judgment in Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v PP. The Court of Appeal observed that the separation of powers is, and I quote, "embodied in the Singapore Constitution by virtue of Article 23 (which vests the executive authority in the President and the Cabinet), Article 38 (which vests the legislative power in the President and Parliament) and Article 93 (which vests the judicial power in a system of the Courts)."

The Court of Appeal also observed, and I quote again, "any society that prides itself in being governed by the rule of law, as our society does, must hold steadfastly to the principle that all power has legal limits, and the rule of law demands that the Courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power."

In stark contrast, the Bill before us today envisages the creation of a Reviewing Tribunal within the Executive branch with quasi-judicial powers with regard to the right of appeal against authorisation for Part 3 directions, or against the decisions of a Competent Authority. Clause 99 appears to go so far as to completely displace natural justice from the oversight process as drafted in the Bill. One of its paragraphs states that the Rules may enable or require a Reviewing Tribunal to hear or consider any proceedings or appeal without the person who brought the appeal having been given full particulars of the reasons for any conduct which is the subject of the proceedings or appeal.

Many members of the public have read it carefully and I would forward that it shocks the sensitivities of many, and it goes some way to explain how this Bill has been framed and understood by the public since its First Reading three weeks ago.

Mr Speaker, the Workers' Party rejects such an appeal mechanism. We propose an amendment of clause 104 to allow, first, for an appeal to the Minister and, thereafter, to the High Court with full judicial scrutiny. Of course, there is a provision for a private hearing where national security is at risk. Workers’ Party Member of Parliament for Sengkang GRC He Ting Ru will go through these amendments.

Mr Speaker, the books presented to Speaker Coomaraswamy in 1966 and their subject matter may only be familiar to a small class of Singaporeans. But ask Singaporeans, generally, about checks and balances and a clear majority would agree that they are important for Singapore. Power and responsibility must be divided, to empower each branch of Government, and ensure the exercise of power is not unlimited.

Which brings me to the third part of my speech on how the Government should have sought public feedback on the Bill.

Mr Speaker, there has been considerable disquiet in some quarters at the speed at which this Bill has been presented to Parliament. In March this year, at the Committee of Supply debates, Deputy Speaker Christopher de Souza enquired what MHA would do to deter foreign influence in Singapore’s domestic affairs.

The Second Minister for Home Affairs, hon Mrs Josephine Teo, addressed the query and announced that legislative levers may be needed. I quote, "Given the recent experience of other countries, we need to consider further measures to guard against foreign subversion of politically significant individuals and entities. For example, what levels of transparency in funding support and leadership are appropriate and for whom."

More significantly, the Minister then went on to say, and I quote, "The public has a big part in this to shape proposals and to give the eventual safeguards their stronger support. It is the only way we can effectively deter bad foreign actors from exploiting our vulnerabilities."

Let me say that again. "The public has a big part in this to shape proposals and to give the eventual safeguards their stronger support."

In the six months between Minister Josephine Teo's statement and the First Reading of this Bill, the Government did not hold any public consultation on this Bill and nor can it be said that the public played a big part in shaping this Bill.

This omission contradicts the position on record of the Second Minister for Home Affairs, which was to lean on the public to shape the Bill, which must surely include its safeguards.

In March this year, in his Adjournment Motion on Judicial Review and ousted clauses like clause 104 of this Bill, the hon Member for Bukit Batok and Government Parliamentary Committee (GPC) Chair for Home Affairs and Law, Mr Murali Pillai, stated that it was important for each generation of political leaders and the people to find their own equilibrium of what our people would accept without question.

This is a position I accept and welcome.

The hon Member then quoted his party Secretary-General's speech at the 36th PAP Party Conference held in November last year, when Prime Minister Lee said that Singaporeans have expressed the desire to have greater checks and balances, and that the PAP Government must change and respond to these desires and expectations.

Taking the words of the Minister and the GPC Chair together, it is wholly incongruous for the Government to accept that the public of today desires greater checks and balances, then omits to seek public feedback on a Bill that does away with substantive judicial review.

Mr Speaker, I believe I would not be too far off in speculating that if the public had been surveyed on this Bill, most Singaporeans would have readily supported the use of executive power to curb foreign influence.

However, I am also sure that, if asked, most Singaporeans would be in favour of our Courts acting as a check to ensure that executive power is exercised lawfully, appropriately and fairly.

Mr Speaker, in the national language.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, there has been some disquiet among certain quarters about the speed at which this Bill has been tabled in Parliament. In March this year, during the Committee of Supply (COS) debates, Deputy Speaker Christopher De Souza asked MHA about the measures that will be taken to prevent foreign interference in domestic affairs.

The Second Minister for Home Affairs replied by highlighting the need for legislative levers. She said, "Given the recent experiences of other countries, we need to consider further measures to guard against foreign subversion of politically significant individuals and entities. For example, what levels of transparency in funding, support and leadership are appropriate? For whom?"

More importantly, she also said, "The public has a big part in this to shape proposals and to give the eventual safeguards their strongest support. It is the only way we can effectively deter bad foreign actors from exploiting our vulnerabilities."

In the period of six months from Mrs Josephine Teo's statement at this year's Committee of Supply, to the First Reading of this Bill last month, the Government has not conducted any public consultation about this Bill, or obtained public feedback as it is usually done. This is very different from the statement made by the Second Minister for Home Affairs in Parliament, which intended to take heed of the views of the general public when drafting this Bill and its assurances.

In the same month, March this year, the Member for Bukit Batok, Mr Murali Pillai quoted a speech by the Secretary-General at the 36th PAP Party Conference. Referring to the Prime Minister's speech, he said that Singaporeans have expressed a desire to re-examine our basic assumptions, try new approaches and have greater checks and balances. This was preceded by the hon Member's statement that it is important for each generation of leaders and people to find their own equilibrium of what people would accept without question, under what circumstances and towards what ends. This is a position that I accept.

Looking at this as a statement by a Minister and a PAP member, it can be said to be highly contradictory if the Government acknowledges the desire of the people for more checks and balances but avoids public consultations on a Bill that will surely limit the civil rights of the Singaporeans, if it is passed by this Chamber and misused by the government of the day.

(In English): Mr Speaker, the fourth part of my speech is on how the Government has been comparatively muted on the non-legislative measures to deal with foreign interference. Such measures should include educating the public to resist malignant information efforts and how to be vigilant against such interference that is commonly effected through business clans and cultural conduits, where the prospects of plausible deniability are high.

Sir, this Bill is the final instalment in the series of legislative changes that arose out of the work of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods. It was to be expected from the Committee's report that legislation would be used to address the problems identified. What is more difficult to grasp is the comparative lack of public knowledge on the non-legislative levers to address foreign interference.

The Select Committee went through these non-legislative measures in a significant way. There have been a number of recommendations but the Government's response appears to have been focused on POFMA and, now, FICA.

The S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) published a policy report in April this year on countermeasures against foreign influence. This has been circulated to Members by Parliament Library staff.

The report said that to combat foreign interference, it is critical to build resilience, or, in our Total Defence parlance, psychological defence – by raising awareness about information manipulation in both the Government as well as amongst the public.

The paper noted that foreign campaigns to sway public opinion during the 2017 presidential campaign in France were unsuccessful. This was because the French government created awareness about information manipulation, built strong central organisations to counter disinformation and undertook a strategy to push counter narratives that blunted the effects of disinformation, such as focusing public attention on the perpetrators.

Coming back to the Singapore Government's approach, the examples raised about foreign interference focused largely on long past attempts, such as the Singapore Herald and Eastern Sun episodes and the Hendrickson affair.

In a Straits Times article on 25 September, there were references to the impounding of SAF Terrex vehicles in Hong Kong and to reports of China's soft power efforts in Singapore through clan and business associations. This begs the question: how will this Bill, in particular, if enacted, address such examples of alleged foreign interference?

The Straits Times, our newspaper of record, does not make this very clear. What must Singaporeans do to heighten our sensitivity to such interference? And how is this Government ensuring that the message flows to the masses and new generations of Singaporeans, including new citizens, given that Singapore's destiny as an immigrant nation is almost certain?

At best, the messaging is a bit unclear.

In her Committee of Supply speech, Minister Josephine Teo spoke of a curious spike in 2018 and 2019 of online comments critical of Singapore, many from anonymous accounts, when there was a bilateral spat with Malaysia.

This spike in online chatter sought to give the artificial impression that there were significant and fundamental objections to Singapore's position. This episode was also covered in the 25 September Straits Times story.

Mr Speaker, this was a highly opportune moment to share the nature of the threat and to engage in a conversation with the public on foreign interference. But beyond these scanty details, no further clarity and communication on foreign interference have followed.

More fundamentally, how does the Government distinguish between a genuine groundswell of sentiment and a dedicated hostile information campaign?

I note that the MHA press release of the First Reading of the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill dated 13 September 2021 anonymised this example, although it was clear that the MHA press release was referring to the same episode highlighted by Minister Josephine Teo in her parliamentary speech.

Sir, the Government has placed such a high priority on combating foreign interference to the extent of introducing a Bill which, in some important ways, has no substantive judicial safeguards. But what does it say about the Government when it takes an arguably unclear approach to non-legislative responses?

Surely, non-legislative responses that promote a more participatory and educated citizenry would inoculate the population in a whole-of-society way far better against foreign interference.

This is an area I believe the Government needs to look into in a deliberate fashion across all levels of society. It is my argument that the Government needs to work with the public in a far more participative way so as to strengthen the resolve of the population against foreign interference. This apparent lack of integration of legislative and non-legislative measures to address foreign interference, in my view, is a critical omission in our public discourse on this subject.

The conclusion of the RSIS paper is prescient insofar as the discussions we have undertaken today and, more importantly, the public response to this Bill.

I quote the RSIS paper, "The manner of application of these countermeasures must be fair and necessary both in terms of process and perception without perpetuating the image of an Orwellian state. Singapore must not appear to be taking sides in geopolitical rivalries or using foreign interference as a pretext to clamp down on local political discourse and responsible activism. Ultimately, Singapore's survival depends on both its foreign policy principle of neutrality and reputation of openness to global trade, talent, investment and ideas."

As things stand, particularly on the grounds of perception and fairness, this Bill falls short. That is why the four Workers' Party Members of Parliament have filed amendments to this Bill.

Mr Speaker, let me conclude. Public feedback should have been sought on this Bill. The Government failed to do so and does not appear minded to postpone this debate.

There is an opportunity to commit the Bill to a Select Committee for public input and to review oversight mechanisms, amongst others. The Government should not close the door on this.

What is more perplexing is that we know that the Government had been mulling the introduction of this Bill for many months. Why was it so difficult to undertake a period of public consultation before it was tabled for First Reading?

The Government must also take immediate steps to implement non-legislative measures to tackle foreign interference, such as education and engagement of the public. Hopefully, the Government will introduce such measures with the same alacrity with which it introduced this Bill.

Finally, the most critical issue today is the high level of Executive power introduced by this Bill, which demands that there must be strong oversight mechanisms, namely, our Courts.

I call on the Members of this House to seriously consider the proposed amendments and ask yourself whether you would want these amendments in place if the PAP was not in power. The amendments are in the best interest of Singapore and Singaporeans, regardless of who is in charge now or in the future. Say "Aye" to all the 44 amendments proposed by the Workers' Party.

Mr Louis Ng.

Sir, foreign influence is the norm in Singapore. Whether you are reading the news, watching a TV show or doing your job, there is no escaping the influence of foreign ideas, foreign innovations and foreign interests.

This is the reality we, as a cosmopolitan and small nation, have no choice but to embrace.

Today's Bill aims to push against this tide. It gives the Government new powers, first, to deem individuals and groups as politically significant and, second, to monitor and restrict these people's activities. The goal is to reduce foreign disruption of our domestic politics.

I agree that we should be concerned about such disruptions and I believe most people are. But at the same time, it is essential to be fair and transparent in how we restrict the activities of fellow Singaporeans. Designing and imposing restrictions the wrong way can itself worsen the trust and stability of our domestic politics.

With the goal of ensuring fairness and transparency, Sir, I have four points of clarification to make.

My first point is on the consultation process for this Bill. Some residents have shared their concerns with me on this and it would be good for the Minister to clarify some of their doubts.

Can the Minister share the consultation process for this Bill and whether it has integrated productive feedback from the consultation into this proposed law? Can the Minister also share how does the Ministry decide how much public consultation to hold for any proposed legislation?

Sir, there were also some concerns about the interval between the First and Second Readings of the Bill. Some felt that the interval was too short and, again, it will be good for the Minister to provide some clarifications on this as well.

My second point is on what it means to act with covertness, deception or concealment. This Bill makes it an offence to undertake clandestine electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign principal. The emphasis here is on "clandestine".

Subsection 1(d) of section 17 requires that the person's action is "covert or involves deception". Similarly, subsection 1(d) of section 18 requires that the person's action "conceals from or fails to disclose" their relationship with a foreign principal. Can the Minister shed light on how an organisation can avoid being considered as having been covert, deceptive or otherwise opaque? If they receive a grant from a foreign principal, would it suffice to state on their website with the dollar amount received, the name of the grant -maker and the terms of the grant?

Would they need to print this material on all marketing material? Would it need to be in their Facebook posts and their Twitter profile?

We should expect transparency and honesty. But this expectation is only fair if we make clear what reasonable compliance looks like. Will MHA release guidelines and illustrations that can help facilitate compliance by good faith actors?

My third point is on the appeals process in this Bill. Section 48 allows individuals the opportunity to be heard before being designated as a politically significant individual. The exception is when the Competent Authority considers it not practicable or desirable to do so.

Can the Minister elaborate on when it would not be practicable or desirable for individuals to have the opportunity to be heard? It seems odd that an individual might be denied even the chance to present their side of the story.

In addition, will the individual receive written reasons to explain decisions made by the Ministry and by the Competent Authority?

There are three scenarios where written reasons should be provided: one, when the Ministry designates an individual as politically significant; two, when the Competent Authority decides that it is not practicable or desirable to hear an individual before they get designated as politically significant; and three, when the Minister determines an appeal under section 101.

Providing written reasons to the politically designated person in all three scenarios would make clear that our process is transparent and fair.

My fourth and final point is on Reviewing Tribunals. Can the Minister share more about the considerations that the Cabinet should take into account when recommending the appointment of members of the Reviewing Tribunal? What is the profile of members envisioned for appointment to the Reviewing Tribunal?

This is important to clarify, as members of the Reviewing Tribunal may themselves be politically significant or otherwise at a heightened risk of hostile foreign influence.

In addition, section 99 allows the Minister to prescribe the practices and procedures for proceedings and appeals before a Reviewing Tribunal. Can the Minister share if these practices and procedures will be derived from the Rules of Court, practices and procedures for Court proceedings? Will these practices and procedures follow the same principles for a fair hearing in the Rules of Court, practices and procedures for Court proceedings? Finally, when the Reviewing Tribunal determines an appeal under section 97, will the Reviewing Tribunal provide written reasons for their decisions?

Sir, in conclusion, I do stand in support of the Bill. I believe there is a strong need to tackle foreign disruptions of our domestic politics but, at the same time, there needs to be safeguards in place and it is essential that we are fair and transparent in how we restrict the activities of fellow Singaporeans.

Mr Speaker, the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) is strongly against foreign interference in our country's affairs. But the PSP cannot support the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, which I shall refer to as FICA, in its current form because of the insufficient evaluation by both parliamentarians and members of the public of its far-reaching implications. So, PSP calls upon the Government to delay the passing of the Bill, hold public consultations and appoint a Select Committee to scrutinise the Bill closely.

The Minister has just got through two hours in this Chamber on the possible amendments. These are exactly what should have been done in Select Committee. Is it realistic or fair to expect parliamentarians to understand the pros and cons of the amendments in just a few hours of debate?

So, our recommendation is based on three considerations.

One, for such an important Bill, it should not be rushed through Parliament, disregarding proper legislative processes and the feelings of Singaporeans suffering under a worsening COVID-19 crisis.

Two, countering foreign interference is an ongoing task and sufficient resources have already been deployed to it. Do we need to restrict our citizens' freedom further to achieve better outcomes?

Three, is it wise to pass a legislation giving extensive power to a Minister without any judicial oversight? The possibility of abuse cannot be ruled out.

FICA is a complex Bill with 127 sections over 249 pages and the content difficult to make sense of, even for senior lawyers. In spite of that, the Bill was only tabled at the last Parliamentary Sitting on 13 September, barely three weeks ago and we are already rushing through its passage today. Many Members of this House are probably not adequately prepared for a thorough debate today.

It is difficult to understand why the Government is trying to rush the passage of this Bill or why the debate on this Bill cannot be postponed by three to six months to allow for proper scrutiny and consultation involving a wide range of stakeholders.

Just earlier this year, the Government established a two-month-long public consultation process for the Copyright Bill. The POFMA Bill also went through a long consultation, lasting more than a year and, in addition, through a Select Committee, before it was passed into law.

So, where is the Select Committee for FICA which, arguably, should be held to even greater scrutiny in light of the removal of judicial supervision of the Government's usage of FICA's powers and our citizens' constitutional rights?

We should also delay the reading of this Bill because we should be now focusing our resources and attention on the worsening COVID-19 situation in our country. The number of infections has shot up exponentially and there are more and more distressed situations amongst many of us Singaporeans. This is a time when Members of Parliament should be busy helping constituents get through the many challenges in their lives due to the current COVID-19 crisis, instead of being distracted to mull through and digest this draconian Bill.

On the other hand, the Government is not new to dealing with foreign interference for which it has been well-equipped to deal with after many years of experience.

PSP recognises that foreign interference had existed in the past and will continue to exist. But countering foreign interference is an ongoing task and this Government already has substantial resources to deal with it. As I said, do we need to restrict our citizens' freedom further to achieve better outcomes?

We deploy substantial resources to national security every year. For FY2021, we are spending $15 billion on defence; $6.5 billion on home affairs and $0.5 billion on foreign affairs, all for the purpose of upholding and protecting our sovereignty. This makes a total of $22 billion accounting for more than a quarter of our operating Budget.

There are also tough laws in place to deal with internal security and public issues.

To start with, we have the Internal Security Act (ISA) which was passed in 1960 when we were still part of Malaysia. The Court of Appeal's ruling that the ISA was subjected to judicial review was already overruled in a legislative amendment in 1988, giving the Government wide powers in administering the ISA. Incidentally, Malaysia had repealed its ISA in 2012 while our ISA is still in force.

Then, we have the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) since 1975, which is designed to ensure there is no foreign control on Singaporean newspapers and limits the circulation of foreign printed media. There is also the Broadcasting Act 1994 which requires online sites discussing Singapore's political issues to register for a licence with conditions covering foreign funding and interference.

The NPPA and Broadcasting Act allowed the Government to have almost monopoly control over the narrative on major policies and issues through the mainstream media. That was until the rise of social media as a strong alternative platform from around 2010. As a result, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) came into being in 2019 to allow the Government to tackle the spread of fake news and false information online.

Between the ISA, NPPA, Broadcasting Act and POFMA, this Government already has extensive powers to deal with any internal security threat, manage public opinion and prevent the spread of false information online. So, is there a need to give this Government further powers to deal with foreign interference at the expense of our citizens' constitutional rights?

As there is no urgency but ample reasons why we should delay the Bill, we should then make best use of the opportunity to evaluate the implications of FICA properly.

We understand all that has been said about combating foreign interference. But we cannot ignore the basic principles of democracy, which is not based on a benevolent ruler but on separation of powers and checks and balances. A law like FICA, which ignores those principles, ought to be considered carefully and over a long period of deliberation.

Just look at some of the frightening implications on people, on an accused person under FICA. It is possible that you may inadvertently commit an offence because the definition of an offence is broad and vague. There is no need to give you a reason to arrest you and, if evidence is offered later, the Government does not need to reveal the source, and detention is non-bailable. You cannot choose your own legal Counsel and can be tried in absence. And to cap it all, there is no judicial review for all the actions that are taken against you. Thus, FICA appears even worse than the Internal Security Act.

There are many more provisions and, to me, all sounded like a joke for someone living in a modern democratic society, based on the rule of law. FICA can be described in Singlish. This also called law? Or, in more accurate English, tyranny in the name of law. Mr Speaker, in Chinese, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] My Singapore compatriots, FICA, in name, is a law to prevent foreign interference, but, actually, it is a tiger in sheep's skin and may severely infringe on our democratic and civil rights.

National security is, of course, something that we are very concerned about and we also support giving the Government enough resources to deal with it. For example, in Financial Year 2021, $22 billion was allocated to maintain domestic and external security, accounting for a quarter of the total Budget. Through the Internal Security Act, the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, the Broadcasting Act and POFMA, the Government has, basically, controlled threats to domestic security, public opinion and the transmission of fake news online.

Hence, FICA is really a law that is unnecessary. It gives the Government the power to deal with citizens who hold dissenting views. We should learn from history, such as the lessons of militarism in Japan and Germany. Every time a government moves towards authoritarianism, it can bring about disastrous consequences for the country. The country needs checks and balances between the Government and the people in order to have lasting peace and stability.

FICA is a law that could suppress public opinion and civil rights. We must guard against it. Do not think that FICA has nothing to do with our everyday life. This is because without freedom of speech, even discussions on employment and livelihood issues could be restricted. Therefore, PSP feels that the Bill should be postponed to give the people and the Special Committee sufficient time to scrutinise it thoroughly.

(In English): Mr Speaker, the excessive controls of FICA over civil rights would not stop a determined foreign state from conducting foreign interference. While our capable security agencies and diplomatic channels are dealing with it, the best defence against foreign interference is not more laws to control our own people but to raise the awareness of our people towards national security threats. Hence, the anti-terrorist awareness campaign, SGSecure, which is aimed at all Singaporeans, is a wise move.

Like what the Leader of the Opposition has commented just now, this Government should be more proactive in educating Singaporeans on what is online foreign interference, so that every citizen can be its eyes and ears. Accordingly, we should not have laws to restrict and control Singaporeans' interaction with foreigners. But we should encourage more interactions so that we know first-hand if there are developments of concern to the interest of Singapore.

Mr Speaker, all things said, and to reiterate, is it wise to hastily pass a legislation giving extensive power to a Minister without judicial oversight? I, as do many Singaporeans, urge you and all Members of this House, to delay the passing of this Bill and allow for public consultations and the appointment of a Select Committee to scrutinise the Bill. You have the power to do so, Mr Speaker, under Standing Order No 68. It can be done.

And how each Member votes on this Bill will represent his or her legacy to the present and future generations of Singaporeans. All Singaporeans are watching you. A yes vote means the Member is willing to sacrifice the rule of law, which is the foundation of all democratic nations. For the sake of Singapore and Singaporeans, Mr Speaker, I urge you again to exercise your power, under Standing Order No 68 to refer the Bill to a Select Committee.

Sir, I oppose the Bill. Singaporeans deserve better. And I just received a message from a Singaporean through my handphone which says, "I want freedom of information. I don't want FICA."

Ms He Ting Ru.

Mr Speaker, we have today, before us, a mere 21 days after its First Reading, a 249-page wide ranging Bill which grants sweeping powers to the Minister and the Competent Authority to counteract foreign influence in our polices and direction. As my Workers' Party colleagues will point out, we believe in giving relevant authorities clearly defined and effective tools to counter actual acts of foreign interference. Our objections, however, are raised in both the drafting of wide-ranging powers, the problems with oversight mechanisms and also the way the Bill has been presented.

Outside this Chamber, Singaporeans are just starting a second week of yet another set of tightened COVID-19 rules while navigating a system of confusing quarantine and testing programmes and regulations, scrambling to adapt to more home-based working and learning. Our healthcare workers are strained and we have resorted to activating SAF to assist the system that was overwhelmed only one month after we further loosened restrictions.

Most of us are also receiving numerous requests for assistance from residents in dealing with the confusion of Quarantine Orders, the new Home Recovery Programme and also with pressing economic hardship suffered because of the latest round of tightened restrictions.

And in the midst of many Singaporeans being preoccupied with such pressing concerns, this Bill has been tabled and put up for Second Reading within three weeks with no public consultations nor Select Committees convened for the purposes of scrutinising the powers that it gives the Minister. This is in stark contrast to POFMA, where a cross-party Select Committee convened public hearings over eight days, which saw 79 individuals and organisations testify. I also note that the Bill is 168 pages longer than the POFMA Bill and contains, on the face of it, even broader powers which should, logically, mean that more scrutiny must be given before it is passed.

I would therefore, like to seek clarification from the Minister about why the pressing need to forge ahead with this Bill now.

While I reiterate that the Workers' Party agrees that appropriate measures need to be put in place to counter the threat of foreign interference, we would like to understand what is the real and imminent threat that Singapore faces that warrants such a rush in passing the Bill. How many instances of suspected foreign interference have there been in each of the last 10 years? And more crucially, why are the specific powers and tools contained under the Bill so urgently required by the Minister and various Competent Authorities that would mean the Bill needs to be rushed ahead and passed into law without further delay at this particular juncture?

I also want to stress that this Bill is not an obscure one that, once passed, will have minimal impact on the lives of Singaporeans. Already, we have seen numerous voices from a Senior Counsel, various NGOs, Singaporean academics, including a senior research fellow at IPS, speaking up to voice their grave concerns not only at the speed at which the Bill is to be passed, but also about the substantive provisions contained in the Bill. There is a fear from many that in the rush to pass the Bill to counter foreign interference, we may be throwing the baby out with the bath water and end up catching many legitimate and innocent people, entities and projects in the dragnet. A fear that has been repeated by numerous voices including those of, in particular, my colleagues Assoc Prof Jamus Lim's and Mr Gerald Giam's amendments.

The impact of the Bill is not reserved just for the few who are active in politics. The way it has been drafted and passed has the potential to adversely affect ordinary Singaporeans in ways that may not be initially obvious. It is like a trojan horse that appears benign at first, but unravels upon passage in two main ways.

Firstly, any uncertainty will create a chilling effect on political discussion and engagement. As a specific example, the wide discretion allowed by the drafting of the Bill to designate who is a Politically Significant Person (PSP) runs the risk of encouraging many to step away from conversation in the public space to avoid the onerous countermeasures that come with being a designated PSP. This means local content creators, local activists, local academics, their retraction from our public spaces will mean that we will be worse off, and this will dampen the richness of thinking and dialogue on issues that matter to all Singaporeans. It will also be damaging to our standing connection to the global commons, which has recently already been called into question with concerns raised over the closure of Yale-NUS College.

Secondly, many have echoed our fears that this Bill represents power given to the Government which is not subject to the oversight of the Courts. It provides the Minister wide-ranging powers that are largely unfettered, with the only exception being a reviewing Tribunal that has a narrow scope. Could this be a slippery slope that would lead to less checks on how these powers are wielded? And ultimately, in the hands of possible future rogue Ministers and officials, damage Singapore's reputation as an open global business hub where enforcement and application are predictable and certain.

Together with the hasty passage of significant Bills, such as this, with limited or rushed debate, these would risk chilling investment and job opportunities in the process. I must also sound a note of caution. We must ensure that we do not end up being so shrill and fearful of the threat of foreign interference that we end up neglecting an even more insidious threat, one where domestic players could seize an easy opportunity to whip up nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment to further their own political goals, nefarious or otherwise, in the flimsy name of protecting national interest and sovereignty.

We have seen this happening since 2016 in movements and campaigns like Brexit, Pegida and Make America Great Again. There has been a rise of far-right governments from Brazil to central eastern Europe; formerly fringe parties, such as the Front National and the Alternative für Deutschland, have acquired national platforms. All of them have built their success on twisted versions of patriotism and national identity and sovereignty. If similar homegrown ideas and movements are allowed to take root here, whether from the ruling government of the day, opposition parties or otherwise, the damage done to a small society like ours could be catastrophic.

Moving on to the proposed amendments by the Workers' Party, I will speak on those standing in my name, which are amendments to clauses 92 to 104, which fall under Part 8, Oversight Arrangements. These relate to two main points.

First, the rights of appeal; and second, the judicial review of the clause.

I turn, first, to clauses 92 and 93 which deal with the rights of appeal against decisions made under the Act by both the Minister and the Competent Authorities. This section is important as it prescribes the methods and processes in place to protect citizens against an abuse of power by the government of the day. Clause 92 provides for the setting up of a Reviewing Tribunal which comprises three individuals who each has to be Singaporeans and will serve a term of three years. The Government appoints these individuals, and the chair of the tribunal has to be a Supreme Court Judge. There are no other specific requirements in the Bill relating to the remaining two members of the tribunal. The renumeration and expenses of the tribunal are paid for under money provided by Parliament, but the rules for tribunal proceedings are, under clause 99, made by the Minister and are only presented to Parliament after being gazetted.

The tribunal can hear appeals on too narrowly and clearly-defined circumstances for a person issued with a Part 3 direction, that is, a direction to counteract harmful foreign online communications activity of the proprietors of a Proscribed Online Location, which are locations that are declared by the Minister to be purveyors of hostile information content. It is notable that the drafting of this section shows that the draftsperson is able to very narrowly and precisely define parameters when it is desirable to do so.

Additionally, all appellants must have first requested the Minister to reconsider the earlier decision before they can be taken to the tribunal. In particular, it is not clear how, or even whether the tribunal will be able to consider appeals on the substance of the exercise of the Minister's powers to issue Part 3 directions, given that there is no obligation in the Act for the Minister to explain how he exercises his powers of considering Part 3 directions issued by the Competent Authority under the Act.

Also, I note that the tribunal is only empowered to either dismiss the appeal or revoke the decision. It is not within the tribunal's power to make any amendments. Finally, the decision of the Reviewing tribunal is final and there are no further rights of appeal.

Individuals designated a Politically Significant Person under Part 4 or issued directives under Part 5 or 6 around countermeasures for foreign donors and activities that are not donor activities but may involve a foreign principal in Part 6 have no route of appeals through the tribunal. Their only route is through the Minister himself and the Minister's decision is final.

I also note that our proposed deletion of clause 119(2) is a consequential amendment of having deleted the provisions relating to the Reviewing Tribunal.

The Workers' Party's position to the approach taken above is that oversight mechanisms proposed are insufficient to ensure the Act is not abused. First, the Minister is in almost all cases the final decision-maker. Only a limited and very narrowly defined subset of cases are subject to appeal to the Reviewing Tribunal. Second, even the small number of cases which are eligible to appeal to the Reviewing Tribunal, are subject to further restrictions, including the provision under clause 99(b) which states that the Minister may prescribe tribunal rules that enable a Reviewing Tribunal to decline to give the appellant the full particulars of the reasons why a decision was made. This would mean that he would, effectively, be asked to make his appeal partially blindfolded.

In view of this, we propose that in line with the doctrine of the separation of powers, the judiciary is the appropriate organ of state to exercise oversight over the broad powers granted under this Bill. This proposal means that any person who is subjected to a determination order or decision under the Bill has a right of appeal to the judiciary, that is, to the High Court.

The Reviewing Tribunal is clearly not an effective substitute for the Courts. Firstly, the composition of the tribunal is decided by the Government and only one of them is a Supreme Court Judge who is qualified and experienced in scrutinising and determining such appeals.

This is also problematic as the tribunal effectively is appointed by the Cabinet, in what is effectively a check, by the Executive, on an Executive decision. This is a classic case of, in the words of the Leader of the Opposition, “Ownself Check Ownself”. The tribunal is also, unlike the Courts, not part of the Judiciary established under our Constitution, whose independence is also enshrined in our Constitution.

Under our Constitution, judicial power is vested in the Courts. Carving out matters that should be properly determined by the Courts for review by a tribunal that cannot be held to account is deeply problematic.

Additionally, decisions of both the Reviewing Tribunal and the Minister are not subject to correction by any higher authority, especially as the proposed clause 104 purports to oust judicial review on all but procedural grounds. There is also no mention of either the tribunal or the Minister being guided or bound by precedents of previous decisions which are often instructive and valuable.

To address concerns that judicial trials may compromise national security because of the sensitive nature of a matter, our proposed amendment also allows for such hearings to be held in-camera, without the public being allowed to attend, if the Court is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so.

Next, I turn to the proposed clause 104, which is what is known as a judicial review ouster clause. The substance of this clause is that the Government seeks to protect the Minister’s decisions under FICA from review by the Courts. This offends Article 93 of the Constitution, which expressly states that "judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such subordinate Courts as may be provided by any written law for the time being in force".

The ouster clause is a breach of the principle of the separation of powers: the Government should not be using its legislative authority to oust the rightful constitutional oversight of a co-equal institution in the Singapore system.

It means that no decision under FICA should be challenged through the process of judicial review, apart from the very narrow grounds of purely procedural compliance with the Act not being properly followed.

Many of our leading jurists have also expressed their discomfort with ouster clauses. The Court of Appeal has expressed concern in Per Ah Seng that ouster clauses “can be regarded as being incompatible with the rule of law because it should be within the Court’s purview to declare the legal limits of discretionary powers”.

Our former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, too, has suggested that ouster clauses, "may be inconsistent with Article 93 of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power of Singapore in the Supreme Court".

Crucially, for our purposes today, the ouster clause does not allow for the Courts to consider applications for judicial review of decisions taken by the Minister and Competent Authorities on the grounds of illegality and irrationality.

The latter two limbs of judicial review are key in ensuring that, as captured in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs, "All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the Courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power". And we must, as legislators, have the rule of law in mind as we consider the balance of, amongst others, natural justice, national security and the separation of powers as we decide whether or not a judicial review ouster clause should stand.

For illegality, this arises when a decision-maker exercises a power wrongly, or improperly purports to exercise a power that it does not have. The Courts, in their role to check and balance powers granted to bodies, ensure that nobody overreaches and goes beyond the powers given to them. For irrationality, it allows a party to challenge a decision by a public official or body if “it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”.

Disallowing judicial reviews on the grounds of illegality and irrationality takes away an important check on the powers granted to the Government. Imagine, if one day, the Competent Authority designates a six-month-old baby a PSP under Part 4. This decision is final and cannot be set aside if the Minister upholds this upon appeal. It will not be allowed to be set aside on the grounds of irrationality since judicial review on these grounds are not possible! While this situation may be dismissed as outlandish and would never happen, it is theoretically possible under the provisions of the Bill. Stranger things have happened.

While we might say that we have confidence in current policy-makers' intentions and policies, yet, no one can guarantee the conduct of future Ministers and competent authorities and their commitment to acting rationally and legally. In fact, were we not told that the logic for the constitutional amendments surrounding the establishment of the Elected Presidency and, in 2016, changes in the remit of the Council of Presidential Advisers, have to do with putting in safeguards in place against the possibility of irrational or unreasonable behaviour by top decision-makers? Why do these safeguards not apply here, especially as we are granting wide-ranging powers to the Minister?

I wish to also point out that judicial review does not review the merits of cases. Instead, it is a process by which the Courts exercise supervision over decisions made by Ministers and other public officials and bodies to ensure that legal limits are enforced where public power is exercised. It is an important part of the checks and balances to ensure that powers are wielded judiciously by the state.

We cannot repeat enough our position that greater powers need greater oversight and it is, therefore, with this in mind that our proposed amendments do away with the ouster of judicial review.

In other words, we believe that the "sunlight of scrutiny", to use the phrase of our esteemed colleague Mr Murali Pillai, is more crucial than ever in needing to be applied to this Bill and the broad and alarming powers it purports to introduce. This sunlight is what helps both shine a light on malicious foreign activity and, at the same time, assures all of us that we do not need to worry about the over-expansive use of Government powers.

Mr Speaker, the proposed Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) is an important Bill that could, potentially, better equip our nation to face up to the evolving nature of external threats in the 21st century. In particular, the Bill seeks to better protect Singapore from the risks of foreign principal interference in our domestic affairs. This principle of non-interference per se is unobjectionable, and the Workers' Party stands behind the notion that domestic political matters should, indeed, be determined by our own people.

But the proposed language in a number of areas spelled out in the Bill are troubling. In this speech, I will provide justifications for the amendments that the Workers' Party has proposed in my name. These pertain to clauses that leave the scope of foreign interference troublingly vague and, relatedly, proposed an insufficiently steep hurdle for the applicability of the law, one that we believe begins to border on the policing of thought. The common thread among these amendments is that we need to satisfy a reasonable standard of proof and intent when we claim that an individual has acceded to the influence of foreign principals.

Let me begin by stating a few propositions that I believe all in this House will have little difficulty agreeing with. We can all accept that there are threats out there that have to be dealt with. We can all accept that some threats are subtle and, by design, evasive, and, hence difficult to identify and prove with absolute certainty.

And we can all accept that establishing facts, even by the strict legal standards upheld in a Court of law, will seldom be definitive. Memories may be hazy. Claims may be contradictory. Even eyewitnesses could easily differ in what they perceive – or believe to have observed – from an event. Film classics like Rashōmon and Virumaandi, and parables like the Blind Men and the Elephant, remind us that objectivity may be elusive, even in fair, carefully-litigated circumstances.

Consequently, society – and the legal system – have allowed for a comparatively high burden of proof for claims and accusations, which (at the very least) requires a comparatively high probability of an outcome or event being true. We also have well-understood channels of appeal, to allow for the possibility of overturning rules that subsequently turn out to be false positives.

But this does not appear to be the case in a number of clauses in this Bill, notably, the amendments we have proposed to parts of clauses 17 through 18, 40, and 75. Clause 17(1)(c)(iii) of the Bill, for example, will charge an individual with an offence if he or she engages in electronic communications that involve activity that, I quote, “is or is likely to be prejudicial to the friendly relations of Singapore with other countries”.

But what is "likely"? The dictionary definition only states that something that is likely “will probably happen or is expected”; it does not attribute any probability to this likelihood. Statistically, any outcome that has the greater probability of being realised could be anything ranging from 51% to 99%.

Thus, establishing that a given action will amount to an offence will require an estimation of a likelihood. While courts have a long history of attributing just cause based on strong, credible evidence, this is an enormous leap of faith for any single, largely unchecked individual.

Mr Speaker, nobody denies that foreign interference can occur, facilitated by the medium of electronic communications that could be prejudicial to the security, public good, domestic harmony and international relations of Singapore. The desire to draft a law robust enough to capture such possibilities is a sound motivation.

But at the same time, we cannot deny that the vast majority of such communications activity – even when framed in a manner that is potentially incriminating to its sender – could well be innocuous; the frivolous or unfiltered rantings of a troubled mind. Possibilities are insufficient, especially when they call for predictions of an uncertain future.

Were this Bill be passed into law as it stands, we will require not just that our Ministers or relevant Competent Authorities speculate on the likely mindset and possible actions of individuals, but that such individuals themselves possess the ability to predict whether the information they communicate will affect security, public good, domestic harmony or international relations. Experts can barely venture such forecasts successfully, much less an average person.

Finally, it is worth adding that by further requiring, as in clause 17(1)(c) that an individual "knows or has reason to believe", already rules out the possibility of wilful ignorance; piling on the need for this selfsame individual to be speculative is excessive.

In clauses 20 and 21, amendments were proposed to raise the level of proof required: from mere suspicion or belief, to at least some degree of evidence or actionable intelligence. This is justice on the basis of pre-crime, virtually straight out of the film "Minority Report". It is the policing of thought.

As much as I may be a fan of Tom Cruise, Stephen Spielberg and Philip K Dick, "suspicion" or a "reason to believe" does not rise to the level of actual crime, but represents anticipatory action. At its best, it runs the risk of abuse and misuse, short-circuiting the free will of individuals to change their minds before they act. At its worst, it rises to the level of thought policing, pinning on suspects actions that they have yet to be realised. Even conspiracy – a very indirect attribution of potential involvement in illegal activity – requires solid evidence.

To be clear, the world can be an unpleasant place and there may well be instances where the risk of subsequent malicious activity would justify the execution of pre-emptive actions that would preclude the possibility of even more insidious outcomes.

But the threshold for us to engage must, at least, be one where we possess evidence or, as we called for in the amendments to this Bill, actionable intelligence and a reasonable assessment of imminent harm. Short of this, we are relying on gut feeling and instinct to play with people's lives.

One potential objection to this set of amendments is that the Minister or the relevant Competent Authority will always act judiciously and with care. This claims that, bereft of the flexibility to act on their suspicions, we will compromise the ability of our authorities to properly protect our citizens.

But this calls for us to enshrine into law the propensity of a political office holder to always act in the public interest.

This could well be the case today. But would it be always? What if, God forbid, an irresponsible party forms the government or someone in the government goes rogue? We are walking dangerously close to Manchurian Candidate territory here – and I know I am citing a lot of movie references.

The purpose of the law in any society guided by rule of law is to bind the hands of policymakers, regardless of their benefactions, from the most egregious exercises of arbitrary decision-making. Do these specific sub-clauses satisfy that standard or should the language of the law be rendered as clear as possible?

Furthermore, we cannot exclude the possibility that even an entirely well-meaning officeholder may carry suspicions, even firmly held ones, that could well turn out to be erroneous.

In the press release accompanying the First Reading of this Bill, MHA cited the example of "an abnormal spike in online comments critical of Singapore on social media in late 2018 and 2019". Yet, two executives at one major social media platform, Facebook, have publicly stated that it has uncovered no cases of coordinated, inauthentic behaviour by foreigners targeting Singapore since 2017.

Given the apparent contradiction, would MHA share with this House why it believed that social media activity during that period was foreign influence?

The proposed amendments to clauses 17(2) and 18(2) are meant to refine intent. While we agree that clandestine foreign interference may well involve multiple principals, expanding the applicability of the law to include instances where individuals "need not have in mind any particular foreign country or principal" veers uncomfortably into territory where we criminalise those who may have been deceived or misled.

Yet, the explanatory notes of the Bill clearly expressed that covert activities are "not intended to cover circumstances where a person undertakes an activity with no knowledge, awareness or direction from the foreign principal or where the relationship between the person's activities and the foreign principal's interest are merely coincidental".

Indeed, many disinformation campaigns operate via deception. Will we then charge those who have been unwittingly made to operate as pawns of a more sophisticated principal?

Lest we rule out as the domain of the naive and, hence, inapplicable to PSPs, it is useful to remind ourselves of how often even sophisticated experts may end up being duped. Just think of the victims of Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme, the Envy Global nickel investment scam or Elizabeth Holmes' Theranos, currently playing out in US Courts. In the first half of this year, Singaporeans collectively lost a total of $168 million to con-men.

To compound matters, allowing for such possibilities would be extremely costly in terms of resources. Think of the time, energy and resource that would have to be expended to investigate and prosecute cases where it is unclear whether any specific foreign actor is even involved.

It could also give rise to either an excessive number of frivolous accusations or, conversely, inhibit actual victims from stepping up to alert authorities if they suspect they may have been manipulated.

The Workers' Party believes that it is far better to strike the balance between efficiency and accountability by eliminating the most ambiguous language from the law while subjecting cases corroborated by actionable intelligence to judicial scrutiny.

The coincidence of interests, another dimension highlighted as notes, remains poorly excluded by the overall language of the Bill.

Part (iv) of clauses 5 and 48, where we have not proposed amendments, refers to the term "collaboration", which is undefined but as the notes explain, takes on its "ordinary meaning".

While we understand that the purpose is to capture nefarious collaborations, perhaps inspired by the case of former Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy professor Huang Jing, such broad language raises both theoretical and practical concerns.

For starters, there is very little reason why the simple act of working together, the dictionary definition of "collaboration", with a foreign entity need give rise to subservience or, for that matter, even mild influence.

I am certain we all have had colleagues with whom we disliked but, yet, we are forced to work together on projects and would never imagine nor wish to emulate or even learn from. Hence, there is little logical reason why one would link collaboration with influence or, more intrusively, interference.

Moreover, in any collaborative relationship, especially when parties carry equal standing, it is frequently impossible to attribute who actually exerts control.

By a similar token, it would not be unusual for working relationships dealing with public policy to venture into politically sensitive, controversial – this is the wording in the Bill – issues. Think matters, such as climate change, vaccinations, free trade and gender issues, all of which are controversial and often evoke partisan leanings, regardless of whether there may have been any intent to direct such effort towards a political end.

This could have a chilling effect on already guarded national discussions by constraining the ability of our citizens to work with foreigners on matters of national importance so long as they happen to be politically controversial.

Taken together, including the exceedingly vague term "collaborations", into the scope of activities subject to FICA, it becomes inherently problematic.

Is it sufficient for us to claim that casual transparent interactions do not entail collaboration but deep engagement does? How much must one actually work with another before they are deemed to have collaborated?

In his response to Parliamentary Questions filed by then Nominated Members of Parliament Anthea Ong and Walter Theseira on foreign influence, Minister K Shanmugam explained that there is nothing to prevent politicians or political parties from engaging with foreign parties but you cannot take money from them.

To engage, however, includes the possibility of working with and, indeed, even working for somebody else. Surely, it must bother us that we are choosing to define into our laws the possibility of catching, in Minister K Shanmugam's words earlier on, a one in 1,000 chance but glossing over the far greater likelihood of throwing up many, many more false positives.

These theoretical observations are further compounded by the fact that, in practice, Singaporeans routinely collaborate with non-Singaporeans on all manner of critical and non-critical operations.

Top generals conduct joint military exercises on a regular basis and we often send our best civil servants on overseas assignments where they may gather knowledge and experience from citizens of other nations. Our political officeholders are often called to perform global public service, serving on committees in international organisations where they collaborate with high-level officials from other countries.

Mr Speaker, there are additional instances where intent on the part of the alleged agent remains uneasily vague.

For example, clause 5(3) states that activities will be covered as long as "both the person and the foreign principal knew or expected that the person would or might undertake such an activity".

Surely, it is possible that an individual might independently choose to pursue a given course of action, bereft of external influence. Yet, this choice could still be common knowledge.

By a similar token, the definition of foreign principals may be excessively broad. While we do not wish to constrain the Government's ability to act on a wide range of potential actors, the existing definitions of "foreign business" and "foreign political organisation" could encapsulate perfectly innocuous ties.

While we understand that malicious intent is subsequently captured by clauses 5 through 7, exclusionary language, especially for these two very general categories, may be warranted – something to the effect of a sub-clause that explicitly spells out how these entities are engaged in political activities. Alternatively, examples and counter examples could be provided of businesses and political organisations that would be captured or not by said definition.

Mr Speaker, up till now, the proposed amendments we have flagged speak to what we, as a party, believe to be flaws of commission, notably, instances where we believe the Bill overreaches in its attribution of perceived risk, unwarranted suspicion and intentionality behind motivations.

In contrast, the amendments we have proposed for clause 120 are one of omission, namely, the fact that the law fails to incorporate public assurances by MHA. The purpose is to ensure that these assurances are actually written into the law.

This is notwithstanding how clause 105(5) does provide accommodation for this by stating that competent authorities "must not exercise any power under this Act for the purpose of furthering or harming the interest of any particular political party". Yet, there is, simultaneously, language in the Bill that will criminalise the "diminution" of Government.

Given how there is always, by definition, at least one political party in Government, these proposed amendments serve to clarify some of this distinction in the text of the law, not with this current administration or Minister, but, potentially, with future ones.

Ensuring that political speech is legally protected goes beyond guaranteeing that citizens can speak freely about political matters that are near and dear to their hearts.

As a child, I learned how "boh sompah, buay pasah". Children, evidently, intuitively, understand the importance of codification of promises.

The proposed amendments to clause 120 essentially do the same for the guarantees promised by MHA rather than leaving it to the vagaries of enforcement by the government in power.

I shall close, Mr Speaker, with a more general reflection of what FICA could mean for a globalised city state, such as Singapore.

In our Sitting just a mere three weeks ago, we spent enormous amounts of time debating on the merits of economic openness, both historically and for the future of the survival of our nation. This openness comes at a cost, of course, and it is one that we must surely manage.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, if you can wrap up. Half a minute.

Yes, I have 30 seconds, thank you.

This month, as we debate how to manage threats from foreign interference, we must, likewise, not lose sight of the bigger picture, one where our people, companies and policymakers are deeply and inevitably embedded in the rich mesh of cross-border relationships.

I suspect and have reason to believe that FICA, as it is written, is likely to be inadvertently detrimental to our public interest.

Mr Seah Kian Peng.

Mr Speaker, Sir, this is a Bill which guards Singaporeans against interferences and influences which are unseen and mostly unknown.

It does not engage in petty partisan politics. It leaves aside all disagreements among ourselves. It leaves undisturbed poor ideas, ignorant views. It respects the naive and the mistaken. Any harm arising from these are of our own making. After all, it is the mark of all free societies that we take this form of the rough with the smooth.

Accepting these rough edges, we must, therefore, accept that we will continue to make mistakes. There will be those who believe their ideas are good when they are poor.

The Bill is no arbiter in this contest. What it will do is to make sure that all ideas to come into our political arena do so through the front door, through an open political contest and that they cannot sneak in through the back, under technological cover, wearing a false face and pretending to serve the public interest when they are in the back pocket of foreign or private actors.

This Bill stands against those who are knowingly malicious and against those who have been unknowingly used. It is the latest in a long line of efforts to keep Singapore free.

"Freedom" is a word not used lightly in Singapore. The idea of freedom means something specific to a small country in a volatile neighbourhood. It means an often taken-for-granted, but still slightly cherished power to decide our own fate, because this freedom is hard-won and because the battle remains as fierce today, as it did in 1965. We must see what laws can best serve to protect it.

This Bill targets the enemies of this freedom so that we can fully exercise the larger internal freedoms that I spoke of earlier – to ensure that our civil liberties and our political contests remain our own.

Sir, to recognise the hidden hands requires no small skill because the seduction is so slight, the pushes so subtle. We might sometimes think we are exercising free will, when we are mere catspaws.

I speak today with some experience of POFMA, having been a member of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods which was formed in January 2018. So, that is more than three years ago, where we considered 169 written representations and oral evidence from 65 individuals and organisations. Some of these were shared by the Minister earlier in his speech. There were also public hearings held from 14 to 29 March 2018. In fact, it lasted eight days in all. So, when the hon Mr Leong Mun Wai says there was not enough evidence gathered or consultations done, I am not sure what he makes of these 169 written representations and the 65 oral evidence from individuals and organisations.

The issue of foreign interference is a complex and enduring one, made more powerful in recent years by technological platforms. We must be clear that these technologies are not neutral between public good and harm. We cannot leave these untended and expect ordinary citizens, who already have so much cognitive tax in their daily lives, to be inoculated against these malicious campaigns.

Our digital lives have opened many new possibilities, but, along with the sunlight, we have an infestation of lies.

In 2019, then Senior Minister of State for Law Mr Edwin Tong foreshadowed this Bill when he said that the Government was considering legislation against foreign interference. Let me quote him. He said, "Today, information can easily be weaponised by foreign actors, at low cost, and with anonymity and impunity. No country is immune. This is asymmetric information warfare, fought in a theatre and era with no distinction between war and peace. In this battlefield, Singapore, an open, democratic, digitally-connected and diverse country, is especially vulnerable. We are a young country with sensitive fault lines that foreign actors can exploit to foment distrust and ill-will among our various communities."

Sir, at the time, Mr Edwin Tong was responding to a Parliamentary Question. This was again, let me repeat that, 2019. But the stage had already been set a few years earlier.

We have heard these issues discussed deeply at the Select Committee hearings. We have heard evidence from experts during the Select Committee hearings that hostile information campaigns are becoming cheaper to mount and becoming more prevalent. The point of these campaigns is to weaken the target country, turn brother against brother, countrymen against one another, race against race, undermining social cohesion with fights constructed with false sticks and stones.

The Select Committee also received evidence, including through private hearings, that state-sponsored information operations have been carried out against Singapore.

A third foreshadowing of this Bill happened at the Committee of Supply in 2019 and again in 2021. Government Ministers then spoke about how foreign interference laws would need to be introduced and its efforts in tracking the legislative response in other countries.

Fourth, this has been a hot issue discussed among our think tanks and at the Universities – most notably, at the Foreign Interference conference organised by Nanyang Technological University (NTU)'s RSIS in September 2019.

This topic has, certainly, long been on the radar of both the Government and the people. It is not new and certainly does not lack airing or consultation.

So, for those who ask why are we "rushing" through this Bill and ask for more consultation, I hope we realise this Bill has been in the works for some time already, a few years in the making actually, and there has, certainly, been no lack of consultations and feedback.

To the Leader of the Opposition, hon Mr Pritam Singh, who referred to Mr Christopher de Souza's Parliamentary Question in March this year and Second Minister for Home Affairs Josephine Teo's reply, let me remind him that this was at the Committee of Supply 2021 debate. I should reiterate that this process started way before March 2021 and this was also not the first time that MHA has stated the need for such a Bill.

My second point has to do with the signature of our defence against external threats. Unity has been our clarion call since the nation began. Against the call of race, religion and the multiplicity of the Babel Tower of languages, we formed our own tribal instincts.

Today, we have more need than ever for such instincts – this communitarian commitment, which is not natural, but chosen by all of us who have decided to call this place home. This injunction to think beyond oneself, this seeking for things that matter, this Singaporean spirit is one that we must seek to grow and nourish.

We cannot do this if we keep using the infantilising versions of these words of "safety and protection", which can degenerate into nothing more than an entitled demand for special accommodation, for "care” for oneself and a refusal to follow the same rules that apply to everyone else.

To see what true public interest comprises, against a private, self-regarding clamour, we must have space for open, transparent and accountable debates. We must see that all disagreements among ourselves are taken seriously and welcomed, and that it is our joint duty to ensure that such debates reflect our own views, rather than those of outside agents.

This Bill is not a molly-coddle of resources to "protect" and bubble wrap Singaporeans, but a sword, so that we are armed against those who seek to harm us. It is a true countermeasure, a necessary response to attacks – attacks, which I am quite sure, will come. So, the earlier we are prepared for it, the better.

FICA does not increase the reach of the law in substance. It merely provides the adaptor allowing the law to operate in a more targeted and precise manner. In this way, its reach is narrower and would, in fact, increase freedoms.

FICA is not more authoritarian than other similar laws, for example, those in the United States now.

FICA is a sword that stays in its sheath most of the time. It has a high threshold which will not be awakened until activities attack the public interest of Singapore. This Bill gives us the power towards early detection and exposure. We have always relied on this sunlight in the past and we must do so again.

As for the criticism of this Bill from activists and academics, MHA, the Minister himself, have already responded to some of these. As a Member of Parliament in this House, let me say this with ample evidence from our own history – there can be no civil liberties if activists can be bought or sold; and there can be no academic freedom if our Universities are homes for foreign agents. It will be naive to believe that all activists are high-minded patriots, just as it is mere pretence that all academics are cultivating young minds for the good of Singapore.

In the real world, there are active, hostile and intentional actors working against the public interest of Singaporeans. All of us, on both sides of this House, would have failed in our duty if, in the face of such clear and present danger, we stand by and fold our hands. Sir, I support the Bill.

Order. I propose to take the break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 5.45 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 5.25 pm until 5.45 pm.

Sitting resumed at 5.45 pm.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Debate resumed.

Dr Tan Yia Swam.

Mr Speaker, Sir, Members of Parliament, preparing to debate on the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill was a challenge. I am a doctor. I do not know much about espionage other than what I read from newspapers or see in James Bond movies.

I had not intended to speak, until a few doctors and the Singapore Medical Association (SMA) staff approached me privately and separately to raise their concerns. So, how could FICA affect those of us in medicine?

Firstly, many doctors volunteer or lead various NGOs, mostly on medical and humanitarian missions, but also for social goals. Some doctors have patients who are political officeholders in other countries. SMA is part of the Medical Association of South East Asian Nations (MASEAN), Confederation of Medical Associations in Asia and Oceania (CMAAO) and the World Medical Association. SMA also works closely with MOH on local healthcare decisions.

As many of you here would know, Dr Poh Soo Kai was one of the founders of SMA and served as its first Honorary Secretary from 1959 to 1961. He was also arrested and detained without trial during Operation Coldstore in 1963 and under the Internal Security Act in 1976.

I was born in 1980 and grew up without much knowledge of such matters. What is past is history and I do not question it here. My being here now, as a Nominated Member of Parliament and being the current President of SMA, has made the wearing of multiple hats complicated. I state for the record that I speak now, as an individual, to seek clarity on the intent, and the extent of FICA.

I agree that there should never be foreign interference in a country’s politics. As an ordinary citizen, I have remained blissfully unaware of how threats to Singapore have manifested, except for what is reported in mainstream news. Arresting a human agent with proof of radicalisation or obvious threats to the stability of Singapore is easy for us to accept. But in the modern world, it is scary to learn that modern threats can be subtle, through social media, bots, ads, sponsored articles and posts to erode trust in the Government and take advantage of social fault lines and sow discord.

This is a real threat, and we, as a nation, have to learn to defend ourselves against these threats.

Where my opinion differs is how best to tackle it. The Bill grants extensive powers to the Minister to enforce and regulate anyone or any organisation with an online presence, from the content produced down to the operations. While this may scare off the malicious, I am afraid that it may also scare away people who are genuinely interested in improving our nation. How can we recognise the difference between an activist for human rights from one whose motivations are political in nature?

I list three key concerns: one, regulating and restricting the political space further may deter genuine individuals; two, organisations may want, or even need, collaborations and support with other foreign entities to survive and thrive; three, the Minister will be granted extensive discretion, in addition to existing powers under ISA and POFMA.

Section 8 provides a very broad definition of what activities "directed towards a political end in Singapore" means. This is of concern as any organisation engaging in such could be designated a Politically Significant Person under Part 4 of the Bill and will be subject to multiple additional requirements, such as the reporting of foreign donations and being subject to declare, and may be directed to stop taking in foreign volunteers.

This brings me to my first concern that we need to leave some space for people to participate as active citizens in shaping our future. Desiring to influence public opinion or decisions is part and parcel of advocacy. Increasing reporting requirements opens up a small organisation to potentially being targeted and increases the barrier for a citizen who wants to participate and contribute, or just to simply air their views. Ground-up initiatives may think twice.

My next concern is about how Singapore relates to the wider world. The Bill empowers the Minister to direct a person to account for all donations, possibly return donations and even stop taking volunteers who are not Singapore Citizens.

I feel this is unrealistic. Singapore is an open country with organisations forming many collaborations, especially NGOs that might need the scale to ensure that their services are accessible to others. It seems impossible to expect that people should be deterred from seeking sponsorships beyond Singapore and also that volunteers and manpower should only be limited to Singapore Citizens. Singaporeans may, ourselves, shy away from working for NGOs for fear of being unwittingly implicated, real or imagined. I would like to believe that for every malicious person out there, there are way more well-intentioned people who want to support Singapore in its growth, not hinder it.

But this requires a lot more trust and faith in the people to do the right thing. This Bill equally asks for a lot of trust and faith in the Minister to do the right thing.

There is great discretion given to the Minister on how to exercise the extensive powers under the Bill. It is a lot of power in one man’s hands. How can we protect it from future abuse? Could it be spread out? Not just to the different branches in the judiciary, but also across the people. Let them call for accountability and transparency in the organisations they work with. Let organisations regulate amongst themselves who are the right people to seek sponsorships or volunteer work from. Let safeguards be what they are: limited protections for the worst case scenario, not pre-emptive strikes against people who may be just trying to do the right thing.

Quoting the MINDEF website, Total Defence involves every Singaporean playing a part, individually and collectively, to build a strong, secure and cohesive nation. The six pillars are military, civil, economic, social, digital and psychological defence. In this digital age, foreign interference is no longer a problem that should only be left to the Government to guard against. Every citizen should be empowered to step up to be vigilant and to hold one another accountable.

I believe that public education is essential. An educated population will be able to better discern right from wrong, facts from myths.

Before this Bill is passed, I ask the Minister to give us some assurance on the appropriate use of FICA, so that ordinary citizens like myself can serve and work for the betterment of Singapore, without undue fear.

Minister of State, Sun Xueling.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Like many Singaporeans, I also desire world peace. Most of us have no quarrel with the rest of the world and try to be kind to others. However, we live in a complicated world. The adage that one does not hurt others, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that others will not seek to hurt us.

Across the span of history, there has always been strife between different countries. Even in relatively peaceful times in the world today, foreign forces do often seek to influence the policies and affairs of other countries for their own political, economic, or military purposes. With the development of science and technology, these interference methods have become more sophisticated, and have the potential to cause significant and destructive impact in a short period of time. I think the comparison made by Mr Leong Mun Wai just now is rather inappropriate. The Nazis were a totalitarian government, whereas ours is an elected government; what the Nazis did was ethnic cleansing, whereas we have been advocating racial harmony all along.

Singapore is a democratic, independent and autonomous country. To have autonomy means to be able to make decisions freely and independently without being coerced or influenced to do so. The Bill before us today is to ensure that Singapore's affairs should be decided by Singaporeans.

However, foreign forces can use various hidden tactics to manipulate our country’s policies, public opinion and exploit existing faut lines amongst our people. As the saying goes "It is easy to dodge a spear from the front, but hard to avoid an arrow from behind." These actions directly jeopardise our ability to make independent and autonomous decisions. To protect our basic rights, we must consider ways to effectively resist foreign interference.

Today, I will give my opinion on the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill.

Singapore's geographical location is a unique one. It exists in a zone that has seen perennial disputes among major and regional powers. Located in the Straits of Malacca, Singapore is an important international waterway connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It operates the most important energy supply line in the world and is, therefore, one of the most strategically significant cities in the Pacific.

Today, with globalisation, Singapore has become an important transportation, trade, financial and information hub in Asia. In today's international environment where competition among major powers is intensifying, Singapore is inevitably a contested space and platform among major powers jockeying for strategic superiority. Holding Singapore under control is tantamount to holding the lifeblood of Asia's transportation, trade, finance, and information.

In recent years, disputes over territorial sovereignty and hegemony in the Pacific have been common and countries involved have been looking to meet their own needs. Against this backdrop and in this complex international environment, other countries will pay attention to the attitudes and propositions held by Singapore and will even influence or interfere through various ways.

Therefore, we must defend our country’s autonomy. Only in this way, can we independently and freely determine our future.

There are various forms of external intervention and the new Bill covers two of them: first, the practice of interfering in internal affairs through local agents; second, hostile information propaganda.

These practices are not mere imaginations, they have been happening in fact. For instance, in 2017, an Australian senator resigned because he was found to have accepted donations from foreigners. He disclosed confidential state information to them and advocated the positions of other countries on sensitive issues of national security.

In Singapore, in December 2018, tense bilateral relations between Singapore and our neighbours became a hot topic. During this period, we noticed a sudden surge in online comments posted on social media from accounts with fake avatars, which were anonymous accounts that did not show the users' real faces. Most of these anonymous comments were critical of Singapore. Clearly, these anonymous users were attempting to create and spread the illusion of popular opposition by our own people to Singapore’s position, at a time of bilateral tension.

Covert foreign intervention efforts can change individuals institutions and even entire societies, in an unnoticed manner. The cohesion of a nation, the fighting spirit of a people, can be corrupted and defeated without a fight.

Let us imagine what would happen, if Singapore allows other countries to interfere in Singapore’s affairs and influence public opinion, and our autonomy was really manipulated by foreign forces.

Singapore would very likely become a puppet at the mercy of foreign countries’ manipulation. Our nation-building philosophy, lifestyle, safety and interests may all be weakened or subverted.

For example, if foreign forces intentionally drive a wedge along racial lines, can our racial harmony be maintained? Would our racial and religious equality still be possible? If foreign forces were to use Singapore’s land and resources to meet the needs of their own countries, could we then continue to protect the interests of our people? If foreign forces try to involve Singapore in geopolitical disputes or become a battlefield for wars between other countries, would our children not also get involved and be sacrificed?

Just now, some Members said that there was no need for a new law to counter foreign interference. I hope that these Members can realise that Singapore’s unique characteristics make us more vulnerable to external interference.

First, Singapore is a multiracial, multireligious and multicultural society. Instigating inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-cultural relations is a likely avenue of intervention by foreign forces. At the same time, people of different races or religions may have stronger cultural and historical ties with some countries. They may have a sense of friendliness or belonging to a certain country or a spiritual leader, which makes it easier for other countries to target these people and make use of them.

Second, Singapore is a very open society and maintains a high Internet penetration rate, which allows other countries to achieve their propaganda purposes through anonymous, fast and efficient information dissemination. Many countries have the technological and financial capability to expertly create misleading information, incite intimidation and sway the minds of men. Through highly paid mercenaries and the use of sophisticated tools, such as software and hackers, they are able to penetrate into our society and sow discord.

Third, Singapore is a small country, which is like a small boat in the sea. If we do not pay attention and endeavour to resist foreign interventions, it will be as if someone is jumping around, and our boat can be easily overturned.

What preventive measures should we take to minimise the risks of foreign intervention?

First, the Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act (FICA) will strengthen existing management measures for politically significant individuals and organisations and also make them public. Since foreign influence is often covert and executed secretly through proxies, the way to deal with it is to be transparent and open.

"Politically significant" mainly refers to political parties, public officials, Members of Parliament and other people who have influence on national policies, as well as those individuals and organisations who are classified as "politically significant." This Bill does not target ordinary people. As such, there is nothing to worry about for most people and entities, as the Bill will not affect their daily activities.

Obviously, political parties, people holding political office, and Members of Parliament are defined as "politically significant". Their actions can directly influence national policies and public opinion. However, we also cannot rule out the possibility that some individuals and organisations whose main activities involve political goals and public interests, may be under the influence of foreign powers and may harm Singapore’s interests. These individuals or organisations may also be listed as "politically significant."

Even if they are listed as "politically significant", they can still accept foreign donations, provided that their source of funding is transparent.

As the saying goes, "One who stands upright does not fear a crooked shadow." Such persons and entities should have nothing to worry about if they do not harm Singapore’s public interest.

Second, the Bill is not intended to prevent individuals, companies, and organisations from establishing international relationships.

Singapore is a global city. We strongly encourage individuals, companies and organisations to participate in international exchanges and international cooperation to make our country more dynamic. I used to work for Business China. It organised cultural exchanges, education and training activities throughout China, Southeast Asia and other regions, reflecting the importance we attach to overseas connections. We continue to encourage companies, associations and social organisations to visit overseas and conduct cooperation projects with other countries.

To do business abroad, our companies will, inevitably, deal with local governments or government-related organisations. The building of such relationships is important. Of course, we should also abide by their local rules when dealing with them.

If a Singaporean businessman interacts with a foreign government or government-related organisation and discusses national policies, that is not an issue. However, if the other part tries to get the businessman to lobby a Singaporean Member of Parliament or asks the businessman to widely spread the other side’s position in Singapore, then the businessman ought to be more vigilant.

In addition, if a Singaporean organisation organises an exchange event and receives sponsorship from a foreign party, the general approach should be to be transparent about the sponsorship in the event materials, so that the process is transparent. Some local individuals may also accept titles granted by overseas governments and institutions. Where these titles directly involve political positions, they would need to be disclosed.

The purpose of this Bill is to prevent foreign interference and protect Singapore’s interest. It does not target personal, business and cultural exchanges outside of these areas.

Third, the Bill will not affect free speech.

True freedom of speech is when people can speak freely without interference. Free speech is undermined if foreign actors use hostile information to manipulate and influence public opinion.

Singaporeans can still express their personal opinions about our politics. For example, if a businessman is dissatisfied with Singapore’s policies and believes that it has affected the industry he is involved in, he is free to express his views and provide feedback to the Government. In this case, the new Bill does not apply.

The Bill is not aimed at personal opinions and is not meant to curb freedom of speech. Its purpose is to ensure transparency of information and create an environment where discussions in the public sphere is free from foreign interference and manipulation.

Fourth, the Bill targets hostile information.

Malicious foreign forces may incite controversial debates in order to sow discord between different groups, sway public opinion towards their intended narrative on sensitive issues, confuse people or weaken the public’s trust in the state’s institutions, thereby undermining the security and stability of the target country.

Hostile information can sometimes involve Singapore’s national defence, security and diplomatic issues through intelligence and other means. Therefore, it is necessary for us to protect sensitive information needed for Government decision-making and we cannot make hasty conclusions through common legal procedures. We must formulate a customised legal framework to protect sensitive information and the individuals who provide the information.

The Bill proposes to establish an independent tribunal to hear appeals. Compared with the High Court, it is more appropriate for appeals to be heard by the tribunal as this includes a Supreme Court judge and others who have expertise in the security and technology sectors. The members of the independent review tribunal have the necessary expertise and security clearances to deliberate on issues concerning our national security.

For issues involving national security, state secrets and diplomatic relations, we should all focus on the broader context.

Singapore is not the first in putting national security matters outside the court system for independent review. For example, in the United Kingdom, the review of investigations by British intelligence agencies is placed in a review court independent of the court system to protect sensitive evidence from being disclosed. Israel also has an appeal procedure hosted by a special court to protect sensitive evidence provided by the state during the review of administrative detention.

The discussions on how to effectively guard against foreign interference have been discussed for quite some time.

One of the two main features of the Bill is to prevent hostile information campaigns. An important means of hostile information campaigns is false information on the Internet. In fact, as early as January 2018, the Government commissioned a Select Committee to study the dissemination of online falsehoods. I was also a member of the committee then. We invited the public to submit feedback and nearly 200 people submitted written feedback. In March 2018, we held an eight-day hearing to listen to public feedback. Among the 65 people who came to the Select Committee hearing, 18 spoke about the use of hostile information campaigns intervening in domestic affairs. For more than three years since, different institutions and scholars have participated in discussions on foreign interference. There have also been frequent discussions in the newspapers. At the same time, other countries are also actively enacting legislation.

After such lengthy discussions, we need to take action. I hope everyone will be united in our efforts to guard against foreign interference.

In the face of foreign interference, it is important that we stick to our principles and put the interests of the Singaporean people first. If we were to learn from the history of other countries, the most important lesson will be to counter foreign interference and extreme ideologies. Singapore, as an independent country, must stay clear-headed, focus on the big picture, learn lessons from history, and resist all forms of foreign interference.

Not only should we stress the importance of personal ethics and responsibility so as not to be used by external forces, but we must also ensure that our Government, social organisations, and individuals will not be tempted or misled by foreign forces to harm our independence and the foundation of our democracy.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have a question for the Minister of State. Is it okay?

Yes, you have a clarification, Mr Leong?

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] My second question is: is there such a principle in law where if you have no intention to commit a crime, then even if the Government introduces harsher laws, it does not concern you. What kind of principle is that?

(In English): Okay, the saying that if you had no plans to be against the law, so the law should not concern you. What reasoning and what principle is that?

Mr Speaker, can I —

I am calling Mr Gerald Giam. Can you make it later?

Mr Speaker, since the FICA Bill was tabled just three weeks ago, we have seen a flurry of criticism by lawyers, NGOs, academics and journalists, with some wondering if it will affect perceptions of Singapore as a global hub. Some of my constituents have written to me expressing their concern with the Bill's over-reach.

These criticisms are not unfounded. They are reflective of the disquiet felt by many. The root of this disquiet is that FICA enacts many broad and sweeping measures in an attempt to prevent Singaporeans from being misled by hostile information campaigns over the Internet. If these draconian measures are not properly limited, they could have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and the exchange of information among Singaporeans.

At the same time, FICA seems to be lacking a sharper approach to deal with real threats that Singapore might face. The Bill does not provide enough countermeasures against elite capture, which is the clandestine foreign lobbying of Singaporeans holding positions of influence. Elite capture can, potentially, have a far more negative impact on public policies than influence campaigns on the general public.

Fundamentally, no legislation can effectively counter foreign interference in our politics by itself. Public education and a freer press are also needed to inoculate our population against these risks.

Let me now elaborate on these three points.

First, on protecting public debate. The definition of public interest in clause 7 includes the prevention of any foreign influence or interference directed towards a political end in Singapore. In turn, clause 8 defines an activity to be directed towards a political end in Singapore if its purpose includes influencing public opinion on a matter of public controversy or if it promotes or opposes views on a subject of a political debate in Singapore.

Public interest is one of the basis for the Minister to authorise Part 3 directions, anticipatory directions, designations of Politically Significant Persons (PSPs) or entities, Technical Assistance Directions or directives regarding donors.

With the inclusion of clause 8F and G, the Bill's interpretation of political end covers an extremely wide variety of policy matters and issues which may be discussed by Singaporeans. Public discussions on these issues, invariably, involve the views and voices of foreigners.

FICA sets a low bar on what constitutes public interest. It empowers the Minister to block public discussions if it is, in his opinion, in the public interest to take action. This gives the Minister for Home Affairs a very wide discretion to authorise Part 3 directions or designate PSPs.

It could stifle genuine political debate by discouraging Singapore Citizens or local non-government organisations (NGOs) from speaking up, even in good faith, for fear of being issued a directive under FICA or designated as a PSP.

While the Government might argue that having a directive issued against, say, a Facebook post, is not a death warrant, it carries a reputational risk to the target of that directive. It would be very unfortunate if an NGO engaged in advocacy work, for example, speaking up on migrant workers' rights, is designated as a politically significant entity.

I note that MHA has tried to give assurances that this type of activity will not be stopped. But these assurances are not in the letter of the law. This is why the Member of Parliament for Sengkang, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, tabled amendments to clause 120, to codify MHA's assurances in this Bill.

I tabled amendments to subsections F and G under clause 8 to be removed. Removing these two subsections will not hinder the Minister from applying the brake on hostile foreign influence operations that could harm Singapore.

Clause 7 already has a list of actions that are contrary to the public interest which the Minister is empowered to authorise Part 3 directions against. These include threats to public health, finances, safety, tranquilly, peace and order as well as incitement of feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different groups of people in Singapore which may endanger the public peace and public order of Singapore.

Let me address the scenarios given by the Minister in his speech earlier.

Setting one race against another or using religion to drive a wedge between religious groups could be considered incitement of feelings of ill-will between different groups of people in Singapore and will already fall under clause 7D. A foreign agent promoting harmful falsehoods, for example, about approved vaccines, could be reined in to protect public health under clause 7B.

In short, our amendments to the Bill will not prevent the Minister from acting against foreigners seeking to do harm to Singapore but they will go some way in preventing genuine political discussions from being stifled either deliberately by the government of the day or, inadvertently, due to their mere presence.

Next, I wish to highlight an area where the Bill does not do enough of, which is preventing elite capture.

While high-profile influence campaigns tend to hog the limelight, clandestine foreign lobbying of individual elites is, by definition, done in secret. The most likely targets of this secret influence operations are our political elites.

Many democracies have countermeasures in place to deal with the risk of such influence operations.

The US has the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) enacted in 1938, which requires agents of foreigners to register or risk prosecution under federal law. These agents must disclose their agreements with foreign principals, report the funding they have received and provide a log of all activities performed on behalf of the foreign principals.

The Singapore Government would be familiar with FARA because agencies like EBD, STB, Temasek Holdings and the Government itself have already been registered as foreign principals. These registrations are transparent to the public and can be downloaded from the FARA website.

Australia has the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act, which has a Registry of Interests. Taiwan has the Sunshine Acts, which require public officers from the President all the way down to the Administrator for Company Registrations and their immediate family members to make public declarations of their assets, which help combat both graft and foreign influence operations.

In addition, most of these democracies provide for independent legislative review through regular select committee hearings.

Policy-making in Singapore is highly concentrated in the top ranks of the Government and the civil service. Many policymakers regularly exchange ideas with one another in informal settings like golf courses and exclusive clubs like the Pyramid Club. These are places where informal discussions on policies may take place well before they are discussed in the media or drafted into law.

Yet, in the Bill, the list of defined PSPs excludes senior public officers. This could make it easier for malign foreign actors to co-opt local elites to use their influence either wittingly or unwittingly for the benefit of foreign powers.

This is why I tabled the amendments to the Bill to add several more classes of people to the list of defined PSPs under clauses 14 and 78.

My proposed additions to the list include Permanent Secretaries (PSes) and Deputy Secretaries (DSes) in Government Ministries.

These officials lead the formulation and drafting of legislation. They are the subject matter experts who provide important policy advice to Ministers almost on a daily basis. The Minister has argued that civil servants are subject to the Instruction Manual and various rules and declaration requirements, which are, cumulatively, stricter than the FICA requirements on PSPs.

This is even more reason to include PSes, DSes and Statutory Board CEOs as PSPs. FICA will provide a stronger layer of public transparency, accountability and oversight without making it more onerous on them. Their names will be made public on the register of PSPs and any foreigner dealing with them will know that they are PSPs and vice versa.

The chairpersons, board members and chief executives of Statutory Boards also have important roles in influencing and implementing Government policies. I cannot agree with the Minister that it is impractical to define this group as PSPs just because some of them are foreigners.

Statutory Boards are not private firms. The fact that many Statutory Board members are foreigners is even more reason to impose transparency requirements so that the public and the Government can be more confident that they are acting in the best interest of Singapore.

Our list also includes the board members and chief executives of Temasek, GIC, MAS and CPF Board. These individuals provide directions on policies and long-term asset allocations that involve hundreds of billions of dollars of our national reserves. Surely, we can all agree that these decisions must be guarded against any malign foreign influence.

All these influential individuals should be subject to the same level of scrutiny of their foreign connections as election agents and candidates, the latter of whom are already on the list of defined PSPs but are much less influential in policy-making.

Lastly, central executive committee members of registered political parties are included because they have a role in setting the policy and political positions that parties take into elections and Parliament.

While this expanded list of defined PSPs does not cover every possible person who can influence policies, it provides for additional scrutiny over interactions between Government elites and foreign principals. It will require them to disclose foreign affiliations, reportable arrangements and migration benefits with foreign principals, all of which have the potential to colour their decisions on domestic and foreign policies, which affect all Singaporeans.

The last part of my speech will focus on the other actions that are essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference and protect our core national interests.

We need to focus much more on public education and avoid over-relying on legislative measures to curb hostile foreign interference. This is a point made by the Leader of the Opposition earlier.

Back in 2019, Minister Chan Chun Sing also said that a discerning electorate is the best defence against foreign influence. I could not agree more.

Given the growing sophistication in the way foreign powers conduct their influence operations, which Minister K Shanmugam has taken us through in his handouts, we need a whole-of-society approach to counter them.

Sustained public education of both the young and old will help remind us that we are a sovereign nation with our own core interests. This requires a consciously planned and sustainable approach so that Singaporeans are aware that other countries have their own agenda and our national interests are not necessarily aligned with theirs.

For example, some countries, to further their own agenda, may insidiously play up their cultural affinity card. They may, for example, appeal to Singaporeans of a particular ethnicity to share with their friends their pride in that country's military and economic progress and they might even chastise their own Government for not showing sufficient deference to them.

This goes against our national interest. Yet, the vectors of this campaign may not even realise it. Issuing directions under FICA to block the transmission of their messages may be like cutting off the head of the mythical hydra. A new head will grow again until these Singaporeans are convinced that they have been deceived.

This is not something that a legislative hammer like FICA can easily achieve. We need more frank and open discussions about the tactics used by foreign powers to influence our population so that Singaporeans will recognise them and will not unknowingly spread foreign propaganda without realising their goals and origins.

As a small country which seeks to be friends with all countries, large and small, it is sometimes inconvenient for the Government to front public discussions and education of this nature. Some countries might bristle at being called out by the Singapore Government and this could impact diplomatic relations.

Academic institutions, NGOs, researchers and even school teachers should step forward to play a greater role in this national effort.

These independent organisations and individuals will have more freedom to educate the public or their students without being seen by foreign powers as Government spokespersons. They can, therefore, be more candid in sharing their views, even in public forums, without Singapore incurring the ire of other countries.

Government agencies, especially MFA, MINDEF and MHA, should regularly engage these groups and individuals in closed-door sessions to share the Government's perspectives on our core interests, but without dictating what they should or should not do.

Many incidents of foreign influence operations in other countries like Australia, Sweden and the US came to light because of investigative reporting by their free press.

A former US National Security adviser resigned after journalists investigated and reported about his contacts with Russia. He was later charged and pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI.

Sweden's ambassador to China was recalled and investigated after the daughter of a Chinese-Swedish bookseller, jailed in China, made a blog post, which was reported in the media revealing that the ambassador had commissioned businessmen to negotiate a sensitive case involving her father without the knowledge of the Swedish ministry of foreign affairs. The ambassador was later prosecuted in Sweden but acquitted due to insufficient proof.

The PAP Government has rejected the notion of the press being the fourth estate which scrutinises the actions of public officials and public institutions in the public interest, calling for accountability for their actions. This could handicap our efforts to weed out hostile foreign influence.

We cannot rely only on legislation or law enforcement or intelligence agencies to stem foreign influence. Given the risk that foreign interference poses to a small and open country like Singapore, we need to use more tools in our arsenal to counter it by drawing on a wider range of intelligence, including research and exposure by the press.

We are made more secure, not less. A free press which invests in investigative journalism can shine the light on shady activities as well as inform and educate the public and policymakers about hostile information campaigns taking place on our shores.

Mr Speaker, the approach taken by FICA amounts to using a sledgehammer to crack one bad nut at the expense of perhaps a dozen good ones. Yet, in the area of preventing elite capture, it falls short, compared to foreign lobbying laws in other countries.

My Workers' Party colleagues and I have proposed some very reasonable amendments to the Bill to prevent over-reach, ensure greater transparency and provide more judicial oversight.

With these amendments, FICA will retain all its teeth to keep foreign interference at bay while assuring Singaporeans that its fangs will not be used unjustly on our own citizens. I appeal to this House to seriously consider these amendments and approve them for the benefit of all Singaporeans and our future as a country.

Leader.