Debated in Parliament on 14 Sep 2021.
Resumption of Debate on Question [13 September 2021], "That the Bill be now read a Second time." – [Minister for Law].
Question again proposed.
Ms Hany Soh.
Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. I would, first, like to declare that I am a practising lawyer.
As per the hon Justice Lee Seiu Kin in his opening speech at the launch of the Law Society’s Technology Roadshow in 2017, he shared his view that the world today is faced with "more frequent and unpredictable disruptions", and "Technology holds the promise of greater productivity and effectiveness. We must seize the opportunity to leverage this to higher quality legal services and cost savings for law firms, and ultimately, for the clients and society at large.” I agree wholeheartedly with his Honour.
One of the major components of this Courts Reform Bill is set to empower the Courts to conduct proceedings more flexibly by leveraging on the use of technology.
My speech today will, therefore, focus on the potential impact of this digital transformation and explore possible ways to utilise this transformation to reduce the costs of litigation and enhance convenience for Court users.
Over the past few years, we have begun to see a gradual modernisation of the legal industry: from law firms going paperless with the adoption of cloud-based data management systems to smaller set-up firms moving away from traditional law firm premises and towards contemporary co-working spaces, with shared meeting rooms and lounges.
The COVID-19 pandemic has undoubtedly accelerated the pace of digital transformation. By now, most of the workforce, including lawyers, have become familiar with the concept of working from home in compliance with safe distancing measures. Many client interviews as well as Court hearings are now conducted virtually, which has allowed more flexibility for lawyers in terms of their daily working schedules while managing other personal obligations.
One of my fellow members of the Bar shared with me that she had initially thought of giving up breastfeeding her baby after returning to work from maternity leave, but she has since been able to continue doing so due to the work-from-home arrangement. Another of my peers also remarked that remote working has provided him with more opportunities to spend more quality time and attend to the needs of his aged parents.
This reform Bill reaffirms remote working as part of the new norm. But whilst the adoption of newer technology to conduct legal matters is the way forward, it is prudent to take heed of the downsides that come along with it as well, such as the loss of in-person communication.
Before the start of the pandemic, it was not uncommon for lawyers to bump into our peers in places such as the Court’s Bar Room or the waiting area outside the Courts’ Pre-Trial Conference chambers. For years, these ad hoc meetings have helped to foster the productive discussions concerning the day’s pressing agendas, or aid in the gathering of fresh perspectives on a particular subject. It has also served as an informal way of maintaining connections amongst those in the legal industry.
In contrast, most correspondence these days occurs online via video-link meetings and emails, and even the actual Court hearings are isolated virtual spaces where lawyers are each segregated into their own waiting areas, unable to see or hear those who may be waiting for their own hearings to proceed.
Aside from the lack of social interaction brought about by this new norm, the rigidness of the virtual hearings has their shortcomings.
The currently used video-link platform tends to begin its sessions without prior warning and regard for the attendee’s presence, which means that lawyers, aside from signing in for their session, do not have knowledge of the current status of the Courts, unless otherwise informed by the Court on when their hearing is likely to begin.
[Mr Speaker in the Chair]
Worse still, in the event of delays – which may sometimes last for longer than 30 minutes at a time – the litigant-in-person or lawyer is forced to sit and wait in front of their computer at all times, unable to visit the restroom or make proper use of the downtime for other obligations.
To address these issues, I understand from Minister’s earlier speech that features on the existing E-Litigation system will be further improvised. In this regard, I would like to propose whether the Ministry can facilitate, after taking into account the feedback of users from the Courts as well as members of the Bar, to tap on the expertise of GovtTech in improving the features of the E-Litigation system or creating a new virtual Court platform that is equipped with an integrated chat function and a dynamic queue system.
With these features, one would be able to know when their case is slated to be heard upon logging in. With an SMS alert system for the queue, users can manage their waiting time more effectively and efficiently. A private message function will enable users to communicate with the Court’s admin clerk on the possibility of jumping the queue due to the need to be present for another Court matter soon.
The chat function would also allow the ability to see other counsel who may be online at the same time and to chat or start a video call with them. This would return some measure of communication between lawyers whereby counsel can take the opportunity while waiting, to explore settlement terms.
Although most hearings are now online affairs that require the relevant parties to attend in separate locations, many clients still prefer to do so at their lawyers’ office premises. This is common, particularly for the mediation sessions conducted by the Family Justice Courts, where the client still prefers the physical presence and in-person support from their lawyers to ease their anxieties.
This arrangement is typically not a problem for medium or large-sized firms, as they have multiple meeting rooms with adequate space at their office to accommodate the lawyer and their client. For smaller law firms, however, the realities of limited work spaces and meeting rooms represent a significant challenge in addressing similar needs for their clients.
In light of the disadvantages faced by lawyers practising in sole proprietorships or small partnerships, I would like to ask if the Ministry can look into offering some assistance schemes that enable the affected law firms to purchase the necessary equipment to attend such virtual hearings and whether the Courts can provide more spaces that will allow small law firm practitioners to communicate with their clients in person whilst adhering to safe distancing measures.
Over the years, I understand that the Government, along with the Law Society of Singapore, has come up with several initiatives, such as the "Tech-celerate for Law", being subsidy assistance schemes that aim to help defray costs for law practices, particularly smaller firms, and enable them to remain competitive.
However, these schemes have so far focused mainly on helping law firms to obtain, what I would call, the “software”, such as online data management, databases and establishing online presence through marketing portals. In this context, would the Ministry be looking into more ways to help these smaller law firms gain access to the equipment or “hardware” with the aid of these same schemes, so that they can fully transition into the digital era without transferring the cost of such implementation on their clients? In Mandarin please.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] To many, litigation is a costly and time-consuming process. I support the recommendations made in this reform Bill, such as simplifying Court terminology across our statute books, to ensure that our laws are accessible to the public and easy to understand; as well as leveraging on technology for Court process with a view to reducing the costs of litigation. Parties that can benefit from the reform include those SMEs whose financial situation is affected by the pandemic; they can leverage on digital platforms to save time and money to resolve disputes.
Apart from that, I hope the Ministry can further consider reviewing and reducing the Court filing and hearing fees. These improvements will be very helpful for those litigants who have financial difficulties, and victims who are wrongly accused.
(In English): Mr Speaker, it is my opinion that in order to enhance access to justice, the relevant stakeholders will have to look into and work on the three "hows".
Firstly, how we can make the law easier to understand for a layperson; secondly, how we can simplify the Court process to avoid unnecessary wastage of time and resources; and finally, how to achieve cost efficiency by acting on the first two points.
But the last point is, more often than not, the primary concern, because affordability of the costs to be incurred is often the paramount consideration for litigants when contemplating whether or not to pursue a matter further in the interest of justice.
I am hopeful that the implementations to be rolled out subsequent to the passing of this Courts Reform Bill aims to address these points. I stand in support of Bill.
Mr Sharael Taha.
12.45 pm
Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. The amendments will enable legal proceedings to be more accessible to everyone by simplifying the language used in Court and support our overall digital transformation plans, keeping our legal system efficient and ready to meet the evolving needs of society in the future. I am in support of these amendments. However, I would like to raise three clarifications.
Firstly, simplification of words used in Court must not compromise on common understanding of terms; secondly, there are potential implications of simpler language and accessibility of the legal system; and, finally, clarity on when remote hearings are allowed should be considered.
Firstly, while it is laudable that we want legal proceedings to be more accessible to the public, we must ensure that words, especially new words used, should be properly defined. There should be a clear definition of terms such that all those involved in the proceedings are clear of their meanings such that it is not open to different interpretations and, subsequently, become a point of contention in the proceedings.
An illustration is the use of the word "claimant" instead of "plaintiff". The word "claimant" is used in many contexts, such as a claimant in insurance claims or, in the US, a claimant for welfare or tax benefits. "Plaintiff" is more widely used in the Courts. It may be the case where it is just not possible to simplify legal terminologies and to change for the sake of accessibility may prove to be detrimental to the due process of law.
Secondly, with easier access to the Courts and better understanding of legal terms and proceedings, laypersons may seek to defend themselves in Court. Unless the person is well-read in Singapore law and familiar with due legal processes, the desire to defend oneself in Court may, ultimately, prove detrimental.
In the recent case of the individual publicly known as the "MBS badge lady”, the defendant's initial attempt to represent herself in Court was met with various challenges. Subsequently, her family had to step in, engaging a lawyer to finally represent her in Court.
While we want our legal system to be more accessible, we should also be careful not to develop the mindset of engaging legal representation only after attempts at self-representation had resulted in getting themselves into a deeper legal predicament.
Another cause for concern is the public's misunderstanding of our legal system. This is in light of our exposure to the American legal system and, lately, even the Korean legal system, from popular media.
Obviously, there are differences between our legal systems. However, members of the public sometimes misunderstand that and expect our legal proceedings to be similar. The Miranda warning, for example, is used in the American system, where a citizen's right to remain silent is read to the person being arrested. However, in our legal system, remaining silent could draw adverse inferences.
Importantly, our changes should be recognised internationally as we are well accepted as a leading global dispute resolution hub. We cannot afford to make changes at the expense of the rest of the world's legal fraternity not understanding us. We must avoid changes that make our legal system overly localised as we are too small a country to change the norms and nomenclature of the international legal fraternity.
Lastly, while we understand the need to have remote Court hearings and sentencing during the pandemic, we must be very clear, during normal circumstances, as to when we could allow remote hearings.
We cannot discount the fact that in some cases, it is important for the judge to be able to physically see the plaintiff or defendant and even witnesses, as it allows the judge to assess their demeanour and to see if the person is being prompted to respond. All these may have an impact on the eventual sentencing and, hence, should not be taken lightly.
Hence, we must be very clear as to when we can utilise remote Court hearings and not compromise the legal process for the sake of conveniences afforded by the use of technology.
We must also be mindful to not be perceived as being too cold or inhumane when employing remote hearings. As an example, the remote sentencing of Punithan Genasan where he was handed the death penalty via Zoom in May 2020 was understandable at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in normal circumstances, it may seem very detached and procedural for capital punishment to be meted out via Zoom.
Mr Speaker, Sir, in summary, the amendments will enable legal proceedings to be more accessible to everyone by simplifying the language used in the Courts and also support our overall digital transformation plans, keeping our legal system efficient and ready to meet the evolving needs of society in the future. Notwithstanding the clarifications above, Sir, I support the Bill.
Minister K Shanmugam.
12.50 pm
Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Members who spoke in support of the Bill. Let me address their questions now.
First, on the protocols for proceedings via video-link.
Mr Louis Ng asked whether the way that live video proceedings are conducted can be standardised. He mentioned the need to maintain the security and integrity of Court proceedings.
The specific ways for participation in remote hearings are published in the Registrar's circulars and set out on the Courts' websites. The specific protocol that applies may vary, depending, for example, on the type of case and the litigants involved.
On the security and integrity of proceedings, the Courts have protocols in place. We will take the point and emphasise this to the Courts.
Mr Murali Pillai asked how conversations between accused persons in prison and their counsel joining in from another location will be kept confidential and how accused persons will continue to have access to lawyers during remote proceedings.
The Singapore Prison Service (SPS) has a set of purpose-built video-link facilities. In the course of a remote hearing, over Zoom or tele-presence, SPS will facilitate the private consultation sessions between accused persons and their lawyers. These can be done through the telephone, a virtual breakout room on Zoom or a separate cubicle with a Zoom session between the accused person and his lawyer.
Mr Desmond Choo expressed concern with the rise of deepfake technology and the impersonation of parties or witnesses.
The actions mentioned by Mr Choo are, of course, criminal offences. In terms of safeguards, the Courts are considering adopting new identification technologies. They are planning for them under the National Digital Identity project.
Ms Hany Soh proposed the creation of a virtual Court platform with an integrated chat function and a dynamic queue system and she explained the benefits of it.
The Courts are working on several improvements that are aligned with Ms Soh's suggestions.
First, there will be a new queue management system. It will allow the judge to re-sequence parties according to some specified criteria. There may also be a forecast of the number of cases which are pending, which can be made visible to all.
Second, the Courts are also enhancing the SG Courts app to allow for formal "on the record" discussions between lawyers and the Court.
Ms Soh has also asked about assistance schemes for smaller law firms to defray the cost of purchasing virtual hearing equipment. She has also asked whether filing fees can be reviewed and whether the Courts are able to provide more spaces for practitioners to communicate with their clients in-person.
She did mention that MinLaw has been working on initiatives to help law firms, especially the smaller ones, ramp up their use of technology. These efforts include Tech-celerate for Law and Tech Start for Law, as Ms Soh has pointed out.
We will build on these to further help law firms adopt technology and transit to remote hearings. This will also help with their transition onto the electronic Court systems.
Major initiatives that law firms can look forward to will be a Legal Tech Platform which will enable, in an affordable way, law practices and lawyers to work anytime, anywhere.
This is a matters management tool designed specifically around legal workflows. My Ministry is actively working on this.
We aim to integrate the platform with commonly used technology solutions like practice management solutions, document management solutions, communication tools like WhatsApp and Microsoft Teams and Government systems like LawNet, eLitigation and ACRA that lawyers commonly interact with.
This platform will be a one-stop shop to help lawyers access key functions from such solutions and systems more seamlessly.
We aim to introduce the platform to the industry in phases, starting from the first quarter of 2022.
We are also putting together an Industry Digital Plan, which will provide a step-by-step guide for lawyers to assess their own digital readiness and provide information on the technology solutions commonly used by lawyers, which will be mapped to different stages of digital maturity.
The industry digital plan will be launched in tandem with the legal technology platform.
On Ms Hany Soh's question about defraying hardware costs, generally, the Government does not favour any particular group, say, lawyers and so on, to buy equipment for their practices. But we made an exception last year because of COVID-19. We worked to provide 80% funding support for all SMEs, including law firms, to procure laptops and commonly used software, such as Microsoft Office.
On the provision of physical space, there are already many spaces within existing courthouses which lawyers can utilise to meet with their clients.
As for filing fees, we agree. Filing fees should be reasonable. We will pass the feedback onto the Courts.
Moving on to paper hearings, Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim sought clarifications on paper hearings. Let me take each of his questions in turn.
First, whether parties can opt in for paper hearings. If parties prefer the matter to be heard on paper, they can inform the Court. The Court, ultimately, has the final say but it will take this into account when considering whether to proceed with a paper hearing.
Second, on the benefits of paper hearings. It, obviously, saves costs and time, provided the matter can be dealt with through a paper hearing.
Third, Mr Zhulkarnain asked whether there can be a fast track for the case management of paper hearings. That, really, has got to depend on each case, its nature, complexity and how prepared parties are for a speedier management of the case.
Fourth, Mr Zhulkarnain asked about paper hearings in criminal proceedings. In the context of remote hearings, Mr Sharael Taha also underscored the need to be mindful of the human aspect in criminal matters. So, we have to make sure the use of paper or asynchronous hearings do not undermine the accused's right to be heard.
This Bill protects the accused's right to be heard. The Courts will exercise the discretion to conduct paper or asynchronous hearings judiciously.
Mr Murali Pillai also raised a query on how the Courts will ensure that litigants-in-persons (LIPs) are not disadvantaged by remote or paper hearings.
LIPs who have concerns with using remote technology or with a paper hearing can notify the Courts. LIPs will be encouraged to take advantage of remote or paper hearing processes but, ultimately, it is an option for them.
If a litigant does not have the equipment or Internet connectivity, he can, of course, come to Court to use in-Court facilities that do cater for remote hearings.
The Courts have published detailed guidelines on the conduct of remote hearings. Users may also reach out to the Courts to get help.
Dr Shahira Abdullah mentioned that under the amendments to the Administration of Justice Protection Act, litigants and lawyers will now be prohibited from making their own non-official audio transcripts of Court proceedings.
The amendments under this Bill do not change the underlying position today. Today, it is already contempt of the Court to record physical Court proceedings. The amendments simply update the provisions so that unauthorised recordings of remote Court proceedings will likewise be in contempt.
Mr Louis Ng asked a number of questions.
One, on the scope of the Court's powers to order parties to attempt amicable resolution. An attempt at amicable resolution may be appropriate where strict legal remedies may not necessarily address the underlying concerns and interests of parties or where litigation is not cost effective.
Second, where parties have gone through formal processes, such as mediation, neutral evaluation, settlement negotiations with exchange of draft settlement agreements, these are all likely to constitute clear attempts at amicable resolution.
Third, Mr Louis Ng asked how the Court will ensure that parties will make good faith attempts at amicable resolution and what would be the consequences of non-compliance with the Court's direction to attempt such amicable resolution. Mr Desmond Choo also sought clarification on whether the Court will consider the intentions of the parties before exercising the powers.
The short answer to Mr Louis Ng's question is that it is not easy to ensure good faith negotiations. But in deciding whether to order parties to attempt amicable resolution, the Courts will take into account all the facts before them, including whether any of the parties have refused to attempt to resolve the dispute by amicable resolution, and why. Where necessary, the Courts may require the parties or their counsel to explain why the matter cannot be settled amicably.
Mr Louis Ng asked whether Registrars will be required to undergo training in mediation and other alternative dispute resolution processes (ADR), and whether there will be a minimum requirement that must be met and who the Court-appointed mediators will be.
In the State Courts, mediation may be conducted by specially-trained District Judges or Court Volunteer Mediators. The District Judges are experienced trial judges. They have extensive experience in mediation and other ADR processes, and they undergo continuous training in ADR.
As for Court Volunteer Mediators, they must minimally be an Associate Mediator with the Singapore Mediation Centre with at least three years of mediation experience. Alternatively, they should minimally hold a Level 3 qualification as a Singapore International Mediation Institute Accredited Mediator.
For the Supreme Court, a Registrar conducting ADR, or a Court-appointed mediator, will similarly be trained in the particular ADR processes.
Mr Louis Ng asked if there are plans to set up an equivalent of the State Courts' Court Dispute Resolution Cluster in the Supreme Court. Given the nature of the disputes and the value of the claims filed in the Supreme Court, there are no immediate plans to do so.
Lastly, on Mr Louis Ng's question on how MinLaw supports the growth of private mediation service providers, MinLaw's role is to ensure a conducive environment for our dispute resolution ecosystem to thrive. We work closely with mediation service providers, such as Singapore Mediation Centre (SMC), Singapore International Mediation Centre (SIMC) and so on, to ensure that their service offerings address the different user needs and complement the Court-based dispute resolution mechanisms.
We also have the Singapore International Mediation Institute (SIMI). It looks at accreditation and mediation standards to support professionalising mediation.
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked about security for costs in the context of an application for freestanding interim relief. A defendant may apply for security for the defendant's costs of the action, on the basis that the applicant has no nexus or assets in Singapore.
On vessel arrests, these fall outside the scope of freestanding interim relief that the General Division can grant. This is consistent with the UK position.
Mr Zhulkarnain sought clarification regarding the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC)'s jurisdiction. He asked when the action, and the counterclaim taken as a whole, would still maintain an international and commercial character. The assessment cannot be a purely quantitative one. The Court will have to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, assess whether the counterclaim, third-party proceedings change the nature or substance of the action in such a way that the action, seen as a whole, no longer maintains an international or commercial nature.
Mr Zhulkarnain also asked about the consolidation of proceedings under SICC and whether similar considerations would apply if one proceeding is in a different Court from SICC. The consolidation of proceedings under SICC may require different considerations, as parties would have already commenced separate proceedings. If proceedings are not before the same Court, but a party believes that an application for consolidation is necessary, then a transfer application should be taken out to bring the proceedings before the same Court, before applying for any consolidation.
Mr Zhulkarnain also pointed out the joinder of a non-consenting party to SICC proceedings, and spoke about the enforcement of an SICC judgment in a foreign jurisdiction. It is possible for a party to be joined to existing proceedings before SICC without that party's consent; just like it is possible for a party to be joined to existing proceedings before the High Court or the State Courts without that party's consent. There are rules on how that takes place. But, of course, the requirements for proper service on that party will still apply.
With regard to enforcement, the enforcement of a SICC judgment against a party, who has been properly served, but has not submitted to SICC's jurisdiction, will be similar to the enforcement of a judgment issued by the General Division of the High Court against a party that has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the General Division.
As with any judgment of the General Division of the High Court, an SICC judgment is likely to be enforceable in major commercial jurisdiction and many other regional ones. There are standard laws on how this takes place.
Mr Pritam Singh, Ms Shahira Abdullah, Mr Zhulkarnain and Mr Murali Pillai have raised a number of queries regarding the Attorney-General (AG)'s right to intervene. Let me make some broad points before addressing the specific queries.
First, as my colleague Minister Edwin Tong mentioned in Parliament yesterday, the statutory framework is based on the established role of the AG. He is the Guardian of the public interest. This has been recognised by our Courts as well as by Members who have spoken on this Bill and previously. The proposed amendments are consistent with that principle.
The Court of Appeal, for example, has noted that the AG intervenes on a non-partisan basis. He is disinterested in the interests of the parties to the litigation. The issues that he raises most logically, must have a discernible impact beyond the specific parties and the specific dispute before the Court.
Second, it is important to understand the context in which this proposal arises. Let us say you have a civil case between two parties. Prima facie, nothing to do with the state, or the public. But in the course of the dispute or from the pleadings, or in the course of the arguments, issues arise which, potentially, are detrimental to the public interest.
For example, the AG has intervened on the applicable legal test for negligence in relation to the provision of medical advice, in the case of Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin, between two parties. But the test that is laid out by the Courts on what amounts to negligence will impact on future claims on the basis of medical negligence. So, it will impact both patients and doctors, and they cannot come forward and intervene in this case. The only party who can do so in the public interest is the AG. So, this relates to the provision of medical advice.
To take another example, the AG has intervened on the nature and scope of professional and ethical duties. For example, in Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore, on what duties are owed by lawyers in making claims for costs. In such cases, it is sensible, obvious, that the AG must have a right to intervene, to protect the public interest and put forward arguments. Ultimately, of course, it is up to the Courts to decide on the validity of the arguments.
So, the amendments provide for the right of the AG to intervene for that purpose but, ultimately, the Court decides on the merits of the substantive case. The AG's presence assists the Court and also informs the Court of the possible broader implications on the public interest.
Third, the AG's application to intervene is only an intermediate step in the dispute. Broadly, there is a two-stage process. At the first stage, the Court will check to ensure that the AG has set out adequate details, the basis, grounds for his request to be added as a party. Only if the Court is satisfied that the AG has explained the reasons for his intervention sufficiently, then the Court will grant permission for the AG to intervene. Of course, that is prima facie.
If anyone wishes to oppose the AG's intervention, then they may apply to set aside the Court's permission.
This brings us to the second stage, which will involve the AG and the other parties, because the first stage is ex parte. At this stage, the parties can raise any concerns they might have about the AG's addition to the proceedings. If any party objects to the intervention, the Court will assess whether the permission that has been granted to the AG should now be reversed.
The Court's assessment will be made based on the interests of justice. It can take into account and balance various considerations, including the possible inconvenience, costs to a party, if AG is added; and the potential benefits if AG is allowed to join the proceedings, to add his perspectives on the matter.
Any Court will proceed on the basis that the AG is a Guardian of the public interest, and if he comes to Court and says there is an important matter of public interest here, it is, generally, not assumed that the AG is being frivolous. There must be a serious point and it is a matter of public interest. When someone comes in, particularly the AG, to put forward the arguments, the Court knows that it will be of tremendous assistance to the Court. Ultimately, how it decides is for the Court, but the Court gets tremendous assistance from the AG.
Mr Pritam Singh asked if this is a shift in the common law position. He has asked why not we just stick with the existing position, why do we need a new framework. The common law position does allow AG to intervene. For example, in the case of ARW v Comptroller of Income Tax, the Appellant was a private company, which applied for specific discovery of internal documents belonging to IRAS. So, this is a taxpayer, I believe, who sought documents from IRAS, but it goes beyond that to a broader principle of when you can apply for documents against a Government agency. Whether it should be allowed or it should not be allowed is a matter for the Court. Whether such a principle should apply to all public departments in the context of a private civil dispute, albeit against IRAS, is a matter of public interest. The AG should be entitled to put forward his position why it is or it is not in the public interest to make a particular order. And that is for the Courts to decide.
So, the AG applied to intervene to make representations on the issue of public interest privilege under the Evidence Act. Application for intervention was filed in the High Court. The company resisted the application. There was dispute on the addition of the AG to the proceedings. It was resolved by the Court of Appeal 20 months later.
The Court of Appeal allowed the AG to intervene, affirmed the AG's position as Guardian of public interest and it further held that if the AG does not intervene despite taking the view that there are issues of the public interest, then the AG would, in fact, be in dereliction of his public duty.
All that is good, but 20 months have been lost. Taking into account what the Court of Appeal had said and the fact that you do not want these things to be unnecessarily delayed, I will say this to Members. As in the cases cited, parties to civil litigation are often seeking to interpret the rules in their own favour. If they succeed, sometimes, it is the man in the street who will pay the bill, ultimately, if it is against the public interest. The AG is intervening to protect the man in the street – the common man.
We are moving to enact a clear statutory framework for the AG's right to intervene, to lend certainty to this area of law, so that parties can proceed expeditiously to the substantive issues in the case.
As I have said, the addition of AG to the proceedings is a procedural step. It does not mean that either of the original parties has somehow "lost" or "won" the original lawsuit, though I can understand, they may not like what the AG is going to say. In that sense, they would prefer if the AG is not present, but that is not the way hearings and arguments should go.
Mr Pritam Singh has cited various statutes which expressly provide for the AG's right to intervene: Charities Act, Industrial Relations Act. And he is right. In those pieces of legislation, the AG has an unqualified entitlement to intervene in the specified categories of proceedings. It is broadly similar principles, but unqualified. Here, the proposal is that even the addition itself, the parties can oppose if they wish; then, the Court has got to decide after hearing both sides.
Let me now turn to some of the specific queries. Mr Murali Pillai had a suggestion that the AG's role as Guardian of the public interest be codified in the Constitution. As mentioned, the AG's role as Guardian of the public interest has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in a number of cases. It has also been recognised by this House yesterday by Mr Murali Pillai and Mr Pritam Singh. My Ministry will study this suggestion whether we should put it in the Constitution the AG's established role in this respect, taking into account how this area of law and the jurisprudence develop.
Mr Pritam Singh asked if the amendments are intended as a contingency or whether there are new areas of public interest that the Government is concerned about.
I am not sure what Mr Pritam Singh is concerned about; or that we always think ahead and are planning something else that he is concerned about. The short answer is, the amendments say what they say on the face of it. They are meant to lend clarity to the procedure for the AG to intervene and to minimise satellite litigation and delays. But it is not going to be possible to predict how other areas of laws in which such interventions may be required in the future, might take place. And what questions of public interest may arise, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Mr Zhulkarnain also asked whether there will still be a need for AG to intervene if a party to the proceedings can put forth an opposing view to the Court.
The AG's role is not to put forward supporting or opposing views but to represent the public interest and what, in his view, is best stated in terms of the public interest, whereas the views of parties to the proceedings will obviously be influenced by their respective interests. And, sometimes, there cannot be a substitute for the non-partisan views of the AG. The parties to a civil litigation are not there to advance public interest. They are there to advance or forward their own case. Sometimes, it is necessary that somebody else is there to protect the public interest.
Mr Zhulkarnain also asked whether the Court can instead invite the AG to make submissions as an independent counsel under the Legal Profession Act. The role of an independent counsel is to address the Court on specific issues of law, at the invitation of the Court. Whereas the AG's submissions on issues of public interest may well go beyond specific issues of law. Unlike an independent counsel, the AG will be deemed a party to the proceedings if he is added on. And when he intervenes as Guardian of the public interest, like other parties, he will be able to make applications, file affidavits and will also have the right of appeal.
Mr Murali Pillai asked whether the AG has a duty of full and frank disclosure, since he will be making an ex parte application when applying for permission of the Court to intervene. The AG will have a duty to disclose properly his grounds for intervention to the Court.
Dr Shahira asked who should bear the costs where the parties choose not to appeal the Court's decision but the AG decides to do so. These are properly matters for the Courts. The Courts, generally, understand that the AG does not act frivolously, vexatiously or egregiously in pursuing the public interest, but, ultimately, it is a matter of discretion for the Courts.
Mr Sharael Taha and Dr Shahira spoke in support of the terminology amendments. Laws must be clear and easy to understand. The new rules of Court will contain a clear list of definitions upfront. Dr Shahira had highlighted the differences in terminology amendments that will apply across the Courts and said that this might cause confusion. For the Family Justice Courts (FJC), the rules are being reviewed and will be revamped in due course. The terminology changes will be effected with the revamp and the majority of which are aligned with other Courts.
However, because of the unique nature of family proceedings, some terminology amendments will be specific to the FJC. For example, the terminology of parties in a divorce. The naming of parties as "applicants" and "respondents" is intended to avoid calling them "claimants" and "defendants". Calling someone a "defendant" sometimes could be seen as pejorative. So, this is really in line with FJC's move towards therapeutic justice.
For the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), the differences are relatively limited. They, generally, relate only to two items. These differences arise as a result of the differences in Court procedure in SICC and the General Division. The procedure in SICC is specifically tailored to facilitate international commercial litigation. We, therefore, do not think that this will give rise to confusion since the respective rules of Court will make clear the procedures that should be used.
On legal representation, public education, building a world-class legal system raised by Mr Sharael Taha, these are issues which my Ministry is working on. And I would say our legal system is, generally, highly regarded.
That, Sir, brings me to the end of my responses to the questions raised. I believe I have answered all the questions raised by Members. And with that, I beg to move, Sir.
Mr Speaker: Clarifications? Mr Pritam Singh.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for addressing some aspects of the speech I made on this Bill. My fundamental interest was to try and understand whether the common law position would change with regard to the two-stage process.
I listened very carefully to Minister Edwin Tong's speech at the Second Reading and when Minister Edwin Tong went through the various clauses that pertain to Part 4 of the Bill, insofar as Part 4 section 4A(4) was concerned, it reads in the Explanatory Statement: "In considering whether to grant permission to intervene, the Court need only be satisfied that the grounds for intervention are adequately set out in the affidavit. The Court is not to examine the merits of those grounds." But the Minister added in his speech the words "at that stage", and my concerns about at what point the merits of the AG's arguments would be assessed by the Court is the subject matter of my query.
Let me go into the specific query. For example, at paragraph 56 of Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore, the Court of Appeal noted that if the Court takes the view that the issues that the AG raised do not pertain to the public interest, it is open to the Court to refuse a cost order in favour of the AG, even if the AG considers his intervention and submissions were warranted in the public interest.
Although this point pertains to costs and not the subject of an order to set aside the order for the AG to intervene as envisaged by clause 488, is it not incongruous for the Court to consider the public interest rationale for the AG's grounds for intervention at one stage of the proceedings, but not at the point of application of leave to intervene as it is the case under the common law today?
There is an expectation that you can assess the public interest grounds when you look at costs but, earlier on, for example, an opposing party applies to intervene to challenge the entry of the AG, the Court cannot look into the merits of public interest grounds. So, my suggestion, number one, is that, is that not incongruous?
To further this point, and I agree with the Minister, AG is to act in a non-partisan way and that is the expectation and it is important that we record that in the Hansard. But in Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore, the Court of Appeal also notes the prospect of an adverse Court order against the AG. And it is actively contemplated, albeit exceptionally.
And there, the Court says, "in cases where the AG has intervened with improper motives such as to deliberately advance the interests of one of the parties to litigation, that would take the AG out of his capacity as a non-partisan advocate of the public interest and into the shoes of a de facto party to the litigation."
This again aligns with the earlier question I had. If the prospect of an AG acting in a partisan manner can be contemplated at one stage of the proceedings – this is the determination of costs – would the Minister not agree that the Courts should be empowered to consider the public interest grounds at the point of the AG's intervention in proceedings?
I think both questions actually come back to one: is it two stages? Is it one stage? Just to be clear, what is being done is nothing new. It is the standard process when there is an ex parte application. When there is an ex parte application, the Courts hear the party making the ex parte application. It has got to be prima facie. And if, on the face of it, it is completely clear that there is no basis, then they will throw it out. But when it moves on to the substantive hearing, these issues will arise in much greater detail. And that is when the Court then goes into it in-depth.
But I think this is fairly standard, it happens all the time. For example, the parties can, as I have said, oppose the AG having been added. And they can raise a number of grounds for the AG having been added. After the AG has been added ex parte, the parties can oppose that procedure and the process. The Court will then consider if such an application is made. If the Court confirms that the AG has been rightly added, then the next step is to deal with the substantive issues, the point or principle that AG makes and how it impacts one or the other parties' arguments or the outcome itself.
Leader of Opposition.
Sir, I appreciate that explanation. I understand the parties can oppose the ex parte application. But what the Bill –
Let me explain. When the ex parte application is made, the Court makes the order for the AG to be added but the parties can then subsequently say, that should not have been done.
So, at the stage where the party says that should not have been done, what the Bill does is to confirm that the Court cannot look into the public interest ground in assessing that application. This is the nub of my concern.
I am suggesting that, in view of the earlier point I made about costs, if the Courts can look into the substantive arguments later on, why not just allow them to do so earlier?
I think this simply takes from the principle, Mr Singh, and Members will accept, really, that the AG is a senior Legal Officer, the Guardian of the public interest. If he says that, "I am saying this as a matter of public interest", we do not want an extended argument, trying to delay proceedings by the parties, by saying whether there is or there is no public interest. It should be dealt with on the more substantive points.
If, subsequently, the Court finds that the AG case has got no basis or he contributed in the ways that the Courts have identified in very, very narrow categories, they have powers to deal with it.
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for allowing me to participate in this debate. I thank Minister Shanmugam for answering the queries that I have made previously and directly with you.
I just have one clarification in respect of the documents-only hearing. I agree that it depends on the case and, especially given our current context of a docket system, whether there would be an internal tendency to decide on documents only hearing at the earliest possible opportunity, so that we can save much time and cost for the cases.
As I have said, this is a matter that can be taken up with the Courts. Make the application and then they will have to make a decision. It is difficult for me to set it out in broad terms today.
*Question put, and agreed to.*
*Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.*
*The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr K Shanmugam].*
*Bill considered in Committee.*
[Mr Speaker in the Chair]
Clauses 1 to 12 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13 –
Clause 13. Minister for Law.
Sir, there are two amendments to clause 13, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. As the amendments are related, may I seek your permission to move them together?
Please proceed.
Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the amendments* standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement be moved. The reasons for the amendments have been explained in the speech by Minister Edwin Tong yesterday.
*The amendments read as follows:
[(proc text) (1) In page 22: to leave out “ ”. ” at the end of line 23.*
[(proc text) (2) In page 22: after line 23, to insert —*
[(proc text) “Summary dismissal of applications*
238B.—(1) Any application may, without being set down for hearing, be summarily dismissed by a written order of the Court, certifying that the Court, having perused the application and any accompanying material, is satisfied that the application has been brought without any sufficient ground.
(2) Before summarily dismissing an application, the Court —
[(proc text) (a) must consider the applicant’s written submissions (if any); and*
[(proc text) (b) may, but is not required to, consider the respondent’s written submissions (if any).*
*(3) Where the Court comprises more than one Judge, the decision of the Court to dismiss the application summarily under subsection (1) can only be made by a unanimous decision of all the Judges sitting in (proc text)]
(4) Notice of the dismissal must be served on the applicant.
(5) If, within 14 days after the service on the applicant of a notice of the dismissal of an application by the General Division of the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisionary jurisdiction or the Court of Appeal under subsection (1), the applicant gives to the Registrar of the Supreme Court —
[(proc text) (a) notice of an application for permission to amend the application so as to raise a question of law; and*
[(proc text) (b) a certificate signed by an advocate specifying the question to be raised and undertaking to argue it,*
the Chief Justice (in the case where the application is made to the Court of Appeal) or any Judge sitting in the General Division of the High Court (in the case where the application is made to the General Division of the High Court) may grant permission to the applicant to amend the application accordingly and restore the application for hearing.
(6) In this section —
*“application” means any application under this Code and includes a criminal motion and an application under section 400 or 404, but does not include — (proc text)]
[(proc text) (a) an appeal, an application for permission under section 394H(1), a review application or an application under section 397(1); or*
[(proc text) (b) an application under section 417(1) for an order for review of detention;*
“review application” has the meaning given by section 394F(1).”
Amendments agreed to.
Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 14 to 24 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25 –
Clause 25. Minister for Law.
Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the amendments* standing in my name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement be taken and, again, the reasons for the amendments have been explained yesterday.
*The amendments read as follows:
In page 35: to leave out line 27 to the end of line 13 in page 36, and insert —
“29B.—(1) A District Judge sitting in a Family Court may, on his or her own motion, summarily dismiss any appeal made against a decision of the Registrar relating to civil or quasi criminal proceedings, if the District Judge is satisfied of any of the following:
[(proc text) (a) every issue in the appeal has already been decided by a Family Court or a higher court in an earlier matter in which the appellant was involved, and the appeal therefore has no merit;*
[(proc text) (b) such conditions as may be prescribed by the Family Justice Rules are met.*
(2) Before summarily dismissing any appeal under subsection (1), a District Judge sitting in a Family Court must —
[(proc text) (a) give the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the appeal should not be summarily dismissed; and*
[(proc text) (b) consider any representations of the appellant.*
(3) In this section, “appeal” includes part of an appeal.”
Amendments agreed to.
Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 26 to 229 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Consequent amendments* to be made will be made.
*Consequential amendments:
(1) In page 22, line 3: to leave out “section 238A”, and insert “sections 238A and 238B”
(2) In page 22, line 5: to leave out “section:”, and insert “sections:”
Bill reported with amendments.
Third Reading, what day?
Now, Sir. I beg to move, that the Bill be now read a third time.
May I put one matter on record, Sir. A number of Members have raised questions and even if they did not speak, I have decided to respond, like Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim. He had given his points to me and I made sure that we have responded on the record. Thank you.
I apologise to Mr Zhulkarnain for not calling on him.
Bill read a Third time and passed.