Singapore's Justice System

Mr Speaker, Sir, before I start, I would like to declare that I am a lawyer in private practice.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Chief Justice, in his speech, at the Opening of the Legal Year in 2020, suggested three principles ought to guide the redesign of our justice system.

The first of the principles he spoke of was the principle of accessibility which he said and I quote, "should be understood in terms of closing the justice gap, which is a metaphor for the problem of unequal access to justice."

He said that there are three dimensions to this justice gap. One, a physical gap, that is to say the physical distance between an individual and the institutions of justice. Two, a resources gap which deters the individual from seeking legal recourse due to concerns over cost. Three, a literacy gap which follows from lack of awareness about one's legal rights and remedies. He said that the justice system that seeks to minimise the level of injustice in society must necessarily be interested in closing each of these gaps, thereby enhancing and equalising access to justice.

The issue of resources gap has been much talk about and is a continuing work in progress. Despite recent Government efforts to increase access for civil legal aid to the Legal Aid Bureau, many still do not qualify despite the exemplary efforts of many volunteer lawyers under the CLAS scheme and the Law Society pro bono schemes. Beyond the rendering of pro bono advice, many still cannot find someone to represent them in legal proceedings on pro bono basis or the quoted fees of other lawyers may be unaffordable. My colleague the hon Ms He Ting Ru has already touched on this point too.

The Chief Justice did not elaborate on the term physical gap. How an average Singaporean thinks of our Judges is important. He or she must of course be learned in law and also in the area of specialisation that he or she is known for. Beyond pure commercial law and particularly in areas like criminal and family law, the ability of Judges to understand and empathise with the different challenges faced by litigants of different socio-economic backgrounds is critical and can, in my view, bridge this physical gap.

For the next part next part of my speech, I will be talking about Judges selection and training in the State Courts.

The hon High Court Judge reviewing Parti Liyani's appeal found that the trial Judge in the State Courts was wrong in applying the legal and evidential burdens of proof. The case generated much attention. While in the interest of justice, it was right and good that the High Court has allowed the appeal in favour of Ms Parti Liyani. We cannot always merely rely on appeals to High Court, righting a wrong done in the Lower Court.

To this end, we should strive for even higher standards in all our Courts and, in particular, in the context of the State Court Judges and Magistrates as they are, after all, critical gatekeepers of justice. They need to be carefully chosen, have a strong and right sense of mission and have the training and disposition to carry the torch of justice for those whose lives have been entrusted to them.

On the issue of selection, the issue of age and maturity of our judicial officers in the State Courts, has been raised in this House on at least two occasions.

In 2010, during the debate for the Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Bill, my colleague the hon Ms Sylvia Lim, had asked that then Senior Minister of State of Law Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee, about requirement that in order for a person to be appointed as a Magistrate, one need only have held a relevant law degree for one year. At that time, the powers of Magistrate, including power sentencing has already increased over the years. Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee had, some years before, expressed similar concern about whether young Deputy Registrar and Magistrate could be able to dispense justice and apply the law appropriately without, and I quote the former Senior Minister of State, "The wisdom that comes from experience in dealing with matters of the world."

Having to defend the policy, in reply to the issues raised by Ms Sylvia Lim, Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee sought to assure the House that despite the low minimum requirements, the practice was to appoint judicial officers who exceeded the minimum threshold of one year.

In a current version of section 10 of the State Courts Act, there is now the provision at section 10(2) requiring a Magistrate to be a qualified person for not less than three years. However a person can still be a point under section 10(3) if the Chief Justice deems that he is suitable for the appointment even though he has been qualified for between one and three years.

Notwithstanding previous assurances that past appointments have been made for persons who have exceeded the minimum threshold, is it now the time to review the minimum requirement of one or even three years under section 10? Would it be prudent now to stipulate higher minimum seniority requirements for judicial officers, especially those handling criminal cases as Magistrates and District Judges? Perhaps, to have someone more senior like eight to 10 years of post-qualification experience.

In my view, it is extremely important to convince the public that Judges understand the lives of ordinary people and people of different stratas of society. How should we work towards that? While I am not advocating that we re-introduce the system of jury here, we must understand why some countries continue to cling onto their jury systems – because it is of fundamental importance to them that decisions on life and liberty are made by juries, composed of members of the public from a cross-section of the population.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the issue of whether to have a separate dedicated Judicial Service in the State Courts have been raised in the past and more recently in wake of Ms Parti Liyani's case. Currently, the Legal Service Commission chooses legal officers will be posted from the Ministries or the AGC into the State Court Judiciary and then out again.

In 2014, the Prime Minister did announce the system of greater specialisation among legal officers so that at the middle ranks, officers can be posted either the legal or judicial branches and remain there for some years to hone their experience. While this is a positive move, it still leaves the more junior officers open to posting in and out judicial branch. The posting could also be to and from postings of DPP or Senior DPP.

The Law Minister share his views earlier with us on this issue during the Ministerial Statement. But I am still of the view that it may still be worthwhile for the proposed review that we are proposing to still consider this issue of whether we should have a more specialised or dedicated judicial track at the State Court level, encompassing Magistrates and District Judges, and discontinuing inter-services posting or rotation with other branches of the legal service, particularly with AGC. This may be preferable to the current system to provide more distance between Prosecutors and those working as Magistrates and Judges.

For example to avoid having AGC colleagues, some of them being more senior colleagues, arguing cases before them, knowing that they may well be posted back to AGC again in future. Up till now, judicial officers or AGC staff often regard themselves as working for the legal service. It is perhaps time to discard this nomenclature and have a dedicated judicial service set apart from the rest of the legal service. As the familiar administrative law saying goes, "Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done."

When State Court judicial officers are subject to inter-services postings or rotation, I also wonder whether at the moment sufficient time is given for any judicial officer due to be posted to clear his or her cases without compromising the justice and interest of the parties involved. At the onset, when trial dates are fixed, frequently, it may be difficult to dictate the actual length of hearing days required. Many litigants may require more trial days as the cross-examination may take more time than expected. What happens when the posting is due soon and a trial may possibly not be completed in time? Can or does the judicial officers seek a delay in his or her posting, in the interests of the justice of the litigants of the case? If this can be done, the proceedings can still continue fairly for all parties without any pressure on time. Cross-examination does not need to be rushed.

Spending more time as a judicial officer, coupled with the right training which can be provided by institutions, such as the Singapore Judicial College, can help to mitigate against factors, such as lacking life experience or lacking sufficient understanding of people from different socio-economic stratas of our society as well as any unwitting misunderstanding or prejudices.

Talking about training of judicial officers, it is good to know that training is already being increasingly prioritised. The Singapore Judicial College is a development in the right direction. Set up five years ago, it is reassuring to see a unified training champion for the Supreme and the State Courts. It conducts various programmes, including induction programme for newly appointed Judges and judicial officers. In addition to the hard skills in law administration, there are courses focused on enhancing the experience of the public, such as effective engagement of litigants who are unrepresented.

I also note from its Annual Report that the Judicial College has embarked on forthcoming research on litigants-in-person and access to justice in an adversarial system, a topic which is of high importance.

That said, lawyers still observe lopsidedness in cases where the accused person is unrepresented. For example, at sentencing hearings, the Prosecutor could be arguing for a particular sentence and submit bundles of authorities for the Judges' consideration. The poor unrepresented accused person will not know how to react to the submission and frequently just ask for leniency. The unrepresented accused person has no clue what he should expect in respect of the sentence. He or she is likely to get, except maybe some gratuitous information fed to him by the IO. He cannot distinguish the authorities submitted by the Prosecutor and would not even be able to rebut the Prosecutor if there is any mistake in applying the authorities to the facts of the case. This common example exemplifies both the resources gap and the literacy gap which the Chief Justice has talked about.

While working on improving access, we should also consider how we can enhance the ability of our Judges to reduce the effect of disadvantages faced by such unrepresented accused persons in their experiences in Court. Many of the accused persons who are unrepresented comes from the poorer and less educated strata of our society. These people rely on our judicial officers to mete out decisions and sentences, which will not only be fair to them according to the alleged crimes they are charged for but also bear in mind the handicap they may suffer from not having representation at a time of hearing. To this end, research and training should also include checking against any inadvertent prejudice against the poor or less educated, if that is not already done.

It has also been pointed out in an article and titled "Wrongful convictions in Singapore: A general survey of risk factors", dated 2010 Singapore Law Review by Chen Siyuan and Eunice Chua, and this is reported in Singapore Law Reform Review 28 at pages 98 to 122, that there has been reported cases where Judges made wrong assumptions on witnesses' abilities to recall facts and should be trained accordingly. A local Singapore case involving a previous Chief Justice was, in fact sight, cited.

Indeed, I would exhort the Singapore Judicial College to continue to enhance its training for Judges in the State Courts in the areas I have talked about, which in my respectful view, will certainly help to reduce any physical gap, using the term as mentioned by the Chief Justice, and to further enhance our justice system.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the hon Ms Sylvia Lim has called for a Constitutional review by a Supreme Court Judge, and I humbly submit that that the suggestions in my speech should also be included in such a review to make our justice system even better. I support the Motion.

Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Motion. Sir, Singaporeans pledge to build a democratic society based on justice and equality. I believe Ms Parti Liyani's case has evoked such strong and widespread reactions because justice and equality are instinctive values that all Singaporeans believe in and cherish deeply.

Ms Sylvia Lim's Motion identifies fairness and independence as cornerstones of our criminal justice system. Where prosecutorial decisions and processes are concerned, justice demands fairness and independence both in reality and in perception. It is a trite saying in law that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.

I will speak on two topics today. One focuses on fairness and the other focuses on independence.

I will first speak on the Prosecution's duty of disclosure and propose that its common law disclosure obligations be codified in the Criminal Procedure Code or CPC. Thereafter, I will speak on the bifurcation of the Attorney-General's roles, so that they are held by two persons and not one.

First, the prosecution's duty of disclosure. Sir, the matter of non-disclosure by the prosecution of evidence that is favourable to the defence has been the subject of much judicial attention this year. Before getting to this year's cases, let me give some background.

This House passed amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code in 2010, which included formalisation of the criminal case disclosure conference procedure. Before that, there was no statutory framework for discovery in criminal matters in the State Courts. Prosecutors had overwhelming evidence in their hands compared to the defence. For example, on many occasions, a previously withheld statement of the accused would be sprung on the defence during trial to impeach the accused's credibility, forcing the defence to throw its litigation strategy out of the window.

After the framework for criminal discovery was enshrined into law, one Member of Parliament in this House said that this was akin to the criminal justice system "moving out of the dark ages". But I would say that we were still in some shadows as the CPC amendments did not require the prosecution to disclose material such as witnesses' statements that might help the defence.

This changed in 2011 with the Court of Appeal's judgment in Muhammad bin Kadar and another versus Public Prosecutor – hereinafter, referred to as Kadar – where the Court ruled that the prosecution must disclose to the defence any credible and relevant unused material that would be favourable to the defence's case. This was an excellent development making serious inroads into rebalancing the asymmetries of evidence between the prosecution and the defence.

However, what I wish to highlight from Kadar is this. In Court, the prosecution ran the argument that it should have an exclusive and unquestionable right to access evidence and unilaterally decide whether the material was credible and relevant based on its own bona fide exercise of subjective discretion. The Court rejected this argument, saying that such a procedure would provide an unacceptably low level of accountability.

In addition, the prosecution conceded that while it had an ethical duty to produce any witness before the Court including evidence inconsistent to its case, it argued that it had no legal duty to do so, citing a judicial precedent in Selvarajan James versus Public Prosecutor. In that case, the then-Chief Justice Yong Pung How ruled that it was not for the Court but for Parliament to impose disclosure requirements on the prosecution.

Mr Speaker, I have mentioned these arguments of the prosecution, so that this House and members of the public can appreciate one aspect of the evolution of Singapore's adversarial criminal justice system in the recent past. Even so, the starting point is one of tremendous asymmetries of information between the prosecution and the defence, with the system structurally weighted in favour of the former.

Almost 10 years after Kadar, it is apposite to ask how deeply the prosecution's common law disclosure obligations have been internalised in our criminal justice system. In Ms Parti Liyani's case, the lack of forthrightness of the DPPs in informing the trial court about the serviceability of the DVD player makes a similar point about fairness in our adversarial system. Crucially, however, it raises the public's eyebrows about our prosecutorial culture. That is all I will say about Ms Parti Liyani's case as her application against the DPPs and, specifically, their conduct in this matter, is pending.

With that background, let me move on to this year's cases on the prosecution's disclosure obligations. Tellingly, the year thus far has seen a number of judgments that, at first blush, reveal troubling aspects to the prosecution's approach to disclosing statements to the defence in spite of the almost decade-old Kadar judgment.

One significant case was Public Prosecutor versus Wee Teong Boo, hereinafter referred as Wee Teong Boo. In that case, the accused, a doctor, was convicted of outrage of modesty and sexual assault. He faced a total of 10 years' imprisonment. On appeal, he was acquitted. In its judgment released in June this year, the Court of Appeal ruled that the prosecution did not make available to the defence documents that would have established clear and material inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence. The Court of Appeal decided that the delay in disclosing one document in particular, prejudiced Dr Wee, even as the prosecution ran the argument that that document was actually irrelevant to the case.

In Wee Teong Boo, the Court of Appeal restated the prosecution's obligation to disclose material, as this can assist the Court in determining the truth. The Court reminded the prosecution of its overarching duty of fairness, in addition to a duty to the Court and the public, to ensure that only the guilty are convicted. The Court referred to a 1916 English judgment, which referred to public prosecutors as "ministers of justice", even as the Court of Appeal confirmed that it is neither the prosecutor's duty to secure a conviction at all costs nor, quoting Kadar's case, to timorously discontinue proceedings the instance some weakness is found in the case.

Sir, I wish to stress that non-disclosure by the prosecution is not synonymous – it is not synonymous with suppression of evidence. But non-disclosure revelations in cases like Wee Teong Boo risk crystallising such a public perception. Furthermore, judicial decisions on failures of the prosecution to meet disclosure requirements can easily cause the public to lose trust in the Attorney-General's Chambers and by extension, the criminal justice system.

To that end, the Court of Appeal's decision in Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad versus Public Prosecutor, also released this year, has expanded the Kadar disclosure obligations even further. For example, Kadar did not require the release of statements that were neutral or adverse to the defence, but the Court in Nabill ruled that as the statements of material witnesses would in most cases be limited, and that all statements including those neutral or adverse to the defence should be released to the defence as a matter of routine. Nabill points to a clear recognition by the Court of Appeal of the central role of disclosure by the prosecution in a fair and just criminal justice system.

Yet another case was reported in the mainstream media only last week. In this on-going case, a defence lawyer argued that the conviction of an accused person ought to be ruled unsafe because the prosecution did not disclose material evidence. The Defence in this particular case had earlier filed a criminal motion in the High Court. At this hearing, the prosecution also accepted there had been a breach of its disclosure obligations under Kadar and Nabill, and that the trial judge had erred in concluding that a statement in question was not liable to be disclosed.

These cases bring me to my suggestion to this House that the prosecution's disclosure obligations should be codified in the Criminal Procedure Code.

Mr Speaker, a question that stands out is that since there is case law, why would Parliament need to legislate the prosecution's disclosure obligations? The prosecution in its submissions in Nabill paradoxically makes the argument for legislation. Tellingly, in that case, the prosecution submitted that it may not, despite acting in good faith, fully appreciate the defence that the accused intends to run and, as such, the prosecution admitted that it might, and I quote, "inadvertently fail to disclose statements which might tend to support the defence". The Court of Appeal considered this position as, I quote, "an intolerable outcome".

Sir, I believe the prosecution made its point in earnest and the status quo is something for this House to contemplate upon deeply. In my view, Mr Speaker, it is precisely because of the very prospect of inadvertent non-disclosure that Parliament has to legislate forthwith to prevent possible future miscarriages of justice because of non-disclosure.

The inadvertent failure, and I stress, not failure, but inadvertent failure to disclose by the prosecution may be better appreciated if we remember the adversarial nature of our criminal justice system. Some defence counsel and deputy public prosecutors can be far more adversarial than others, and this structure reality and such human factors are potentially a barrier against more consistent standards of the prosecution's disclosure obligations.

Separately, the judgments in Kadar and Nabil require that the prosecution actively considers, on an on-going basis, its disclosure requirements. In view of the human factors alluded to earlier, can consistent standards of disclosure represent a reasonable expectation of the prosecution's obligations, as it would naturally be more substantively focused on its own case, especially during a trial?

I make this point not to run down the prosecution or imply that they are likely to fall short in their disclosure obligations more often than not. But even so, Mr Speaker, a perhaps overly sanguine expectation of consistent disclosure standards combined with the reality of inadvertent non-disclosure, as admitted by prosecutors today, make it entirely plausible that we could see more future cases of non-disclosure that prejudice the defence, if a decisive legislative move is not made.

At minimum, an amendment to the CPC to codify the prosecution's disclosure requirements, as established in Kadar and Nabill, would send a powerful signal that prioritises proactive and early disclosure by the prosecution at the pre-trial stage when the case for the prosecution is filed. This would imbibe greater confidence into the criminal justice system by virtue of far fewer miscarriages of justice arising from non-disclosure.

Mr Speaker, I would like to advance this matter further with two suggestions. First, if the Ministry is minded to consider a legislative amendment to the CPC, it would be worthwhile to seek the inputs of the Criminal Bar and the Attorney-General's Chambers on the ambit of documents and other material that should be made available to the defence, in the interest of justice.

In 2010, the Minister argued against criminal disclosure by stating that disclosure of witness statements went against public policy considerations. Kadar and Nabill have changed this position. It would be worthwhile to review the extent of disclosure that would serve the ends of justice.

In my opinion, Sir, more disclosure in criminal matters cannot be a bad thing. It would allow the Court to have a fuller picture of the circumstances of an alleged crime, with all the relevant evidence marshalled and admitted before the Court from both sides before deciding whether to convict or acquit an accused. Such a regime could also contribute to a more efficient justice system with defence lawyers in a better position to advise on the prospects of success at trial. A decision by the defence to plead guilty early, for example, would save the prosecution time. More disclosure could also lower the prospect of cracked trials where the accused pleads guilty shortly after trial begins, but after significant time and resources have already been spent by the prosecution in trial preparation.

My second suggestion goes to levelling the playing field for the defence, not for its own sake but to further the interests of justice. The fact today is that even if the prosecution discloses to the defence witnesses statements that could help the accused person's case, the defence still has a problem. Under section 259 of the CPC, statements of witnesses are not admissible in Court unless specific conditions have been met. I have been reliably informed that in cases where the prosecution adheres to its disclosure obligations, it objects to the admission of a disclosed witness statement favourable to the defence during trial, as it is entitled to do under section 259.

Simply put, the prosecution's position is that if the defence wants to use the contents of a favourable statement, it should get the witness to give evidence in Court, so that the evidence can be tested. From a legal point of view, this is a sound argument. In practice though, it is not as simple as it sounds for the defence. Before calling a witness, defence counsel would, understandably, want to interview that witness. But what if the witness refuses to cooperate with the defence? The option is open to subpoena the witness but the defence may not want to subpoena a witness if it has not had a chance to interview the witness, to assess the probative value of putatively favourable evidence against its prejudicial effect.

As it stands today, even with a favourable witness statement in hand, the defence is effectively playing Russian roulette should it choose to subpoena a witness without being fully apprised of the facts and circumstances that led to the making of what the prosecution regards as a favourable statement. In extremis, an unwilling witness may turn hostile on the stand.

To achieve greater fairness before trial, my suggestion is that arrangements should be made for defence counsel to be given the option to interview witnesses, whose statements are helpful to the defence, in a police station. This ought to be considered, so as to reassure witnesses, and for the defence to clarify their statements before trial. Thereafter, the defence can decide whether to call the witness to Court.

The counter-argument against allowing the defence to interview witnesses is that the authorities and the prosecution should not be burdened with such a request. After all, in civil cases, the same considerations come into play for counsel. The difference, Sir, is precisely that. The difference is that we are not speaking of civil cases here. In criminal matters, the requirement for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the demands of natural justice and the importance of getting at the truth of a matter in Court, notwithstanding the adversarial system, requires higher thresholds of fairness than in civil cases. A system that contributes to a thorough evaluation of the evidence, not just for the prosecution but the defence as well, would strengthen the rule of law.

As reforms to the criminal justice system are an on-going process, I hope the Government can look into the matter of codifying the prosecution's disclosure requirements and the extent to which what further disclosure requirements are to be made in the name of fairness and to achieve the ends of justice.

Sir, I move on now to my second topic which is on the role of the Attorney-General. In order that there be greater independence in the criminal justice system that can be readily seen by the public, the Workers' Party calls upon the Government to split the office of the Attorney-General or AG into two roles of the public prosecutor and the Government's legal advisor.

What we are proposing is not new. The Workers' Party called for the splitting of roles of the AG in our 2020 election Manifesto. This was also raised by Ms Sylvia Lim at the Committee of Supply Debate this year on the Attorney-General's Chambers.

Additionally, this was proposed by no less than a former nominated Member of this House, Prof Walter Woon, who served as the fifth Attorney-General of Singapore. He persuasively argued for such a separation in an opinion piece published in The Straits Times in September 2017. But we raise this matter again for the Government to reconsider its position and consider how the current system can be improved, and it is timely to raise this again in light of this Motion.

In support of my call, I will make three points. First, there are gaps and blind spots in the current prosecutorial structure; second, improvements should be made to strengthen the system both in reality, as well as in public perception; and third, there are no robust reasons, I would offer, for all the roles of the Attorney-General to be held in one person.

My first point is that there is a weakness in our prosecutorial structure. Our current structure has two key characteristics that taken together, represent an area where the system can be strengthened.

One, the AG is entrusted with two roles. The first is that of being the Government's legal advisor and the second is that of public prosecutor. As the Government's lawyer, the AG takes charge of three areas: legislation, international affairs and civil matters involving the Government, including lawsuits. As public prosecutor, the AG is to prosecute without fear or favour. Two, the AG has absolute discretion as to whether and who to prosecute. Each of these characteristics may or may not be a weakness in itself. But it is the combination of both these two characteristics that can compromise the systems foundation in some cases.

As the Government's legal advisor, the AG's duty is to protect the interests of the Government. As the public prosecutor, the AG represents the public and must prosecute without fear or favour, even if it means damaging the reputation of the government of the day, or prosecuting Ministers or even the Prime Minister.

This duality of roles in one person brings with it a potential conflict of interest for the AG which can create potential for abuse. It is not difficult to imagine cases where the role of the Government's legal advisor conflicts with the role of the public prosecutor. Say the employees of a Government-linked company pay bribes in order to secure contracts overseas. Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, extraterritorial corruption is punishable in Singapore. However, prosecuting these employees which has to be in open court is likely to bring with it negative publicity against the Government of the day in the local and international news media, simply by virtue of the company being Government-linked. And AG might believe in all sincerity that the interests of the Government are better served by not prosecuting the employees, and as public prosecutor, then decides not to prosecute. Clearly, the roles of the Government's legal advisor and the public prosecutor are in conflict.

Another example – say a suspect has been arrested for an offence while in custody. He suffers a serious injury either through a assault or negligence that puts him in hospital. If this suspect is eventually charged in open court, this is likely to bring with it negative publicity against the government of the day in the local and international media. And AG might believe, again in also all sincerity, that the interests of the Government are better protected and better served by making a deal not to prosecute the suspect in return for the suspect not suing the Government in Civil Court. Even if an AG can mentally separate the roles and prosecute regardless of the negative consequences to his client, the Government, the fact is that a conflict exists.

We should have a system where the basis of such conflict should as far as possible not even arise. Mr Speaker, the elephant in the room is that this conflict of interest could go even further and facilitate abuse by a future government. Again, some scenarios are not hard to imagine. Say in the future, a Prime Minister installs an AG who is friendly to him. At the time of the appointment by the President, there is no reason to suspect anything untoward about the AG. Then, the Prime Minister commits serious offences, perhaps acts of corruption. Despite clear evidence, the AG decides not to prosecute the Prime Minister. This could be due to pressure of desire to keep his job, for favours or simply because the Prime Minister and the AG are cronies. Potential abuse and the pressure on prosecutors is not the stuff of fiction, but a real prospect.

Prof Woon in his opinion piece, says that a look at the state of the world shows that the pressure on prosecutors is common. There are too easily available examples or perhaps I should call them cautionary tales. I will not say more except to say that one is a close neighbour and the other is a major country that regularly makes the news because of its President.

Both these countries have had prominent cases of their Attorney-Generals being subject to political pressure. They are both instances of how the system can become compromised rapidly even in countries that pride themselves on the rule of law. Let Singapore not be one such country in future.

I now move to my second point on this subject. What improvements should be implemented to strengthen the independence of the public prosecutor, both in reality and in the perception of the public? I mentioned two characteristics in our system that contribute to the problem – the dual role of the AG, as Government lawyer and public prosecutor, and his absolute discretion in prosecutions. As it is the combination of these two characteristics that contribute to potential conflict, a number of changes can possibly ameliorate the prospects of abuse.

The first and most obvious change is to split the role of Government legal advisor from the role of public prosecutor. Neither role should be subordinate to the other and different offices should be formed. Even if no other change is made, this single change removes the possibility of a conflict of interest when one person performs both roles. Prof Woon says that the prosecutorial function must be held by the Attorney-General as the AG has the necessary stature being second only to the Chief Justice in the hierarchy. He says that the role of being Government legal advisor which involves handling civil matters, international matters and legislation, could be given to the Solicitor-General, for example. The Workers' Party is open to these views.

However, while the splitting of roles takes away conflict of interest, it may not be enough to entrench the independence of the public prosecutor. The second suggestion is for the public prosecutor to be appointed for a fixed term of a relatively significant length. Prof Woon suggests a term of five years. His reason is that this promotes stability in office. The Workers' Party is open to this idea of a five-year term as we believe it not only promotes stability, but also independence. The third suggestion is for the system to eschew to the appointment of an ex-Member of Parliament as public prosecutor. Such an individual can of course be considered for the role of Government legal advisor. And there are two reasons for this.

First, it would be natural for a former elected Member of Parliament to have imbibed the political views of the party he or she used to represent. Even if a public prosecutor who was previously a Member of Parliament does his or her sincere best to be objective, they cannot but help be a product of their previous beliefs, which they perhaps still hold. A public prosecutor who was a Member of Parliament of a political party and steeped in the party's ideology for years, is likely to hold certain beliefs and approach things in certain ways.

Second, if there is no connection between the public prosecutor and the Government in power, this engenders greater faith among the public that the prosecutorial system is fair and conducted without fear or favour. Another aspect to this is that even if a public prosecutor is completely objective and able to divorce himself from his previous political loyalties and beliefs, it is possible that the public may not believe it. This is especially so in light of the internet and the easy accessibility of the Member of Parliament's political views when in party politics. Sir, public confidence in the independence of the system is critical. Even if there is objective independence, is their perceived independence? And insofar, as public confidence and trust is concerned, perception is highly significant.

It is noteworthy that the Attorney-General's Chambers made it a point to release a statement that the Attorney-General, Mr Lucien Wong was not involved in any prosecutorial decisions regarding Ms Parti Liyani, and that he would recuse himself from the review of the case. This is a clear indicator that the Attorney-General's Chambers and the current Attorney-General himself recognised that the public cares about independence and that public perception matters in reinforcing the rule of law.

Sir, the Government made its position known on this matter at the Committee of Supply Debate in 2017 when the then Senior Minister of State for Law, Ms Indranee Rajah responded to a cut on the Attorney-General Chambers by Ms Sylvia Lim. On the matter of the political affiliation of the AG, the Government's position was that in many first-world countries, the AG was a political appointee and that these countries had deemed such a system to be perfectly proper.

However, there are many things that Singapore does differently to deliver effective and robust outcomes in light of unique local circumstances. The political dynamics, competitive political systems, and the limits to political terms, in many first-world countries also operate to represent a check on political appointees.

Ours has been a one-party dominant state for more than half a century. So, the point of an independent public prosecutor free from political links would in fact buttress the rule of law and remain in step with the continued development of an autochthonous legal system.

Of course, Mr Speaker, no matter what is done to entrench independence, there will always be someone who is dissatisfied or will imagine conspiracies. But in law, we invoke a reasonable person who in more misogynistic times, was the reasonable man. What level of independence would satisfy a reasonable person? To this, what I would forward, Mr Speaker, is that the current system can be reviewed and improved against the prospects and perceptions of non-independence.

My final suggestion is a short one. To strengthen the system, the public prosecutor should have criminal justice experience, whether as a prosecutor, defence counsel or judicial officer. Again, public perception that the public prosecutor is qualified for the job is critical. While this may not always be possible in all cases, a commitment to criminal law and a deep desire to understand and master it is critical.

Let me now move on to my third point which is that there are simply no robust reasons for not splitting the roles of the Attorney-General in two. Ms Sylvia Lim raised the splitting of the roles of the Attorney-General at the Committee of Supply Debate for the Attorney-General's Chambers in February 2020. Senior Minister of State for Law, as he was at that time, Minister Edwin Tong responded. Essentially, his reply was that a large proportion of the public has confidence in our justice system; our system is working well, and it has sufficient safeguards. The implied conclusion was that it is not necessary to split the roles. At no point did Minister Tong say either why it is a bad idea to split the AG's roles or why it is preferable for the roles of the AG to be held by the same person.

The Workers' Party understands that policy-making and in this case, amending the Constitution often involves trade-offs and crucially an eye into the future about how a law or policy will serve situations that had not been originally envisaged and can last the test of time. However, I would argue that there are no negative trade-offs in splitting the roles of the Attorney-General into the public prosecutor and the Government's legal advisor. From the perspective of justice and independence, there is only upside. The only reason I can think of for the roles of the AG to be held by one person is that somehow, we lack sufficient legal talent in Singapore to find two people to fill the roles of the Government's legal advisor and public prosecutor.

However, that is unlikely to be the case. Right now, in the Attorney-General's Chambers, there is an Attorney-General, two Deputy Attorney Generals, the Solicitor-General and a Deputy Solicitor-General. While the Deputy Solicitor-General heads the Legislation Division, there is also a Chief Counsel who leads the Civil Division and the Director-General who heads the International Affairs Division.

Mr Speaker, those are my three points for this topic of splitting the role of the AG. There is weakness in the current structure and improvements should be made to strengthen the system. There are also no robust reasons for all the AGs' roles to be held by one person and to that end, I support Ms Sylvia Lim's call for this issue of the splitting of the Attorney General's roles to be reviewed by a Constitutional Commission.

Mr Speaker, let me conclude this way. Let us think of our justice system as a house which has served as a family home. The house may have stood firm for decades and the occupants may have lived safely, but there is a flaw in the foundations. If a future occupant of that house uses it in a way that it was not meant to be used, for example, like for commercial storage or is a restaurant, the foundations may give way, harming all the occupants of the house. There is no reason why we cannot fix the foundations or at the very least strengthen it now.

In doing so, we can move the needle on justice and independence in our legal system and in doing so leave a more secure justice system that reinforces the rule of law in Singapore for our next generation. I support the Motion in the name of Ms Sylvia Lim.

Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Motion. Notwithstanding my exchanges with the Minister for Home Affairs just now, I would like to state my case again for an open and independent inquiry into Parti Liyani's case for further consideration by the Government.

Mr Speaker, the Progress Singapore Party’s stance is very clear. We think that the wide implications of the lapses in the criminal justice system in the Parti Liyani case warrant an open and independent inquiry.

I do not think it is unfair to say that there were lapses in all three major institutions of our criminal justice system – the Police, the prosecution and the State Courts.

We were extremely fortunate that Ms Liyani’s counsel Mr Balchandani had an unwavering conviction to ensure that justice was done, and the High Court caught those errors and reversed them, thus preventing a miscarriage of justice.

While it is of absolute importance that both MHA and AGC conduct their own internal investigations, it is frankly not enough.

There are three main points of concern with merely conducting an internal review. Firstly, it is not unreasonable to say that most would want to paint the best picture of the situation when it is your organisation on the line. Are they independent enough to be completely objective in their review?

Secondly, systemic issues are not going to be caught by piece-meal internal investigations since they are conducting micro and not macro level investigations. An independent inquiry would be able to examine the entire criminal justice process across all the three major institutions to ensure that systemic problems, where identified, are acknowledged by the various institutions and considered for improvement to the system.

I would like to draw the House’s attention to an example of an independent inquiry and that was the Committee of Inquiry or COI into the MRT breakdowns of 2011. In the wake of the two consecutive breakdowns in December 2011, then Minister for Transport Lui Tuck Yew convened the COI which ran in parallel to SMRT and LTA’s own internal investigations as concerns were raised about possible systemic shortcomings.

I quote the former Minister, “LTA and SMRT have also started their own separate internal investigations. This is to be expected. Both parties clearly have the duty and responsibility to find out what went wrong, especially for those areas that they are accountable for… The COI on the other hand is an independent party appointed by the MOT and will also look into the larger systems issues beyond that which SMRT and LTA will cover in their respective probes”.

Compared to the MRT case, the systemic failure in the Parti Liyani case needed even more coordination in order to be addressed because it is not restricted to one Ministry but also involved the AGC and the State Courts.

Thirdly, it is appropriate to reiterate that justice must not only be done, but it must also be seen to be done. An internal review by the relevant agencies alone, is unlikely to assuage those doubts amongst our citizens, nor that justice was seen to be done.

Singaporeans like to know why a simple theft case involving an underprivileged in our society has taken four long years to see the light of day. The time and resources required in our criminal justice process means that the odds are stacked heavily against the underprivileged in our society. How can we improve the access to justice for these people?

Although the legal process is based on evidence, Singaporeans are also looking for answers as to why there was little compassion shown to the underprivileged in our society.  Especially in this case, both parties were on opposite ends of society, one party living in the highest echelons of society and the other the complete opposite.

In his appeal judgment, Justice Chan Seng Onn has also raised some questions about the plaintiffs’ motive in filing their Police report. So it is not just the lack of compassion but there is also a perception of favouritism among some segments of Singaporeans, where the rich and powerful can directly or indirectly enjoy the power of the state to their benefit.

This has to to addressed seriously.  As Han Fook Kwang put it, “People can accept huge differences in wealth, say, between a business tycoon and his servant. This is the reality of a capitalist society like Singapore. But they will revolt if, on top of this wealth gap, there is a privilege and entitlement divide that separates the elites from the masses.”

Convening an independent inquiry with hearings that are open to the public, or live-streamed, would go a long way to show our citizens that justice is being done. Mr Speaker, Chinese please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The Singapore Progressive Party calls on the Government to set up an independent committee of inquiry as soon as possible for further investigation if there are systemic problems in our criminal justice system.

Internal investigation by the various criminal justice agencies are not enough to restore people's confidence in the impartiality of the Judiciary.

Singaporeans do not understand why a seemingly simple theft case involving a person belonging to the vulnerable group took more than four years to see the light of the day. The effect that there are so much resources are needed to go to Court means that our judicial system is unfair to the disadvantaged group. We have to give the disadvantaged a fairer chance.

Despite the fact that the law is based on procedures and evidence, it is difficult for Singaporeans to understand why our legal system is almost completely unsympathetic towards the disadvantaged groups. In particular in the Liyani's case, parties are at an extreme opposite of the society, with one party at the highest echelon of society and the other at the lower end.

In his judgment, High Court Judge Chan Seng Onn also expressed doubts about the motive of the plaintiff in reporting the case. This had led many to suspect that our system is only lacking in compassion but also that the rich and powerful may use the power of the State to seek welfare for themselves.

So, we must do all we can to dispel these doubts.

As Han Fook Kwang said that people can accept huge welfare between a business tycoon and his servant because it is reality in Singapore, a capitalist country. But if there is a gap of privileges beyond this welfare between the rich and the poor which separates the elites from the people, then the people will definitely revolt.

The best way to dispel any doubt is to set up independent committee of inquiry and broadcast the proceedings live. This will prove to our people that our country will uphold justice.

(In English): Mr Speaker, I support the Motion.

Mr Speaker, Sir, fairness, access and independence should be affirmed as cornerstones of Singapore's justice system. In pursuing these goals, we should address shortcomings and blind spots in our current institutional matrix of laws, regulations, policies and practices relating to justice.

Sir, I should focus my speech on only one recommendation that I would argue would advance significantly towards that goal – creating the office of an ombudsman.

The Workers' Party has advocated for setting up the office of an independent ombudsman in our GE 2015 and 2020 manifestos. In its GE 2011 Manifesto, the Workers' Party proposed the establishment of an independent Police Complaints Commission for some of the same reasons.

Sir, an ombudsman would function as an independent office to investigate complaints about administrative decisions or actions of a public agency, including delay, rudeness, negligence, arbitrariness, inconsistency, oppressive behaviour or unlawfulness.

Parti Liyani's case has raised the question of wider access to the criminal justice system and avenues of redress on the part of those with lesser means. An ombudsman would provide access to an independent public office with remit and resources to investigate potential wrongdoing, errors, lapses or weaknesses in the conduct of public officials.

The office of the ombudsman would be open to Singaporeans of all backgrounds and income profiles.

The remit of the ombudsman in our proposal would extend to the conduct of all public servants, including the Police and the prosecution service. In so far as the Police are concerned, this role has parallels with that of independent Police Complaints Commission's or councils found in other jurisdictions, such as the UK and Hong Kong.

However, the ombudsman would not have the authority to investigate complaints against the Judiciary so as to protect the vital tenets of judicial independence from any potential or inappropriate external interference.

Sir, the idea of creating an office of the ombudsman in Singapore is not new by any means. Let me recount some highlights of past public discussion about the proposal to establish an office of the ombudsman in Singapore. The idea has in fact been debated publicly and in this House on many occasions.

The 1966 Wee Chong Jin Constitutional Commission recommended instituting an ombudsman to ensure an independent check on the acts and decisions of the public sector, apart from the principle of Ministerial responsibility. The Government then responded that it was not rejecting the proposal but that it was not the right time to institute it. This was in the 1960s because citizens had not yet developed a clear understanding of their rights and obligations.

According to then Law Minister, Mr EW Barker, such an institution would be, and I quote, "flooded by complaints by people who do not know what are the limits of his jurisdiction".

In 1990, then Member of Parliament Mr Davinder Singh called for the establishment of the ombudsman, noting that, and I quote, "it is in our interest that we develop a system of accountability, a system which will assure the man in the street that if he has a grievance, he can take it up to a person or a body who has a right or has a power to look into it, look into the files of the Ministry, if necessary, or bring a complaint of shoddy treatment up to the superiors".

In 1994, as has been alluded to earlier today, then backbencher and current Law Minister Mr K Shanmugam also raised it in Parliament, suggesting that an ombudsman, and I quote, "might actually help retain the confidence of people in the system, to have an intermediate institution which can provide for a quick and effective remedy and reserving the final appeal to the minister for extreme cases".

In 2011, then Member of Parliament and now Leader of the Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh, called for the establishment of an ombudsman during the debate on the President's Address, noting that former President, Mr Tony Tan, had revived interest in this during the presidential campaign.

Mr Singh asked a Parliamentary Question in 2012 as to whether the Government will consider whistle blower protection legislation and the institution of a national ombudsman to act as a layer of deterrence against wayward civil servants.

In response, then Deputy Prime Minister Mr Teo Chee Hean stated that there are multiple channels for raising irregularities. Independent bodies, like the Public Service Commission, the Auditor-General's Office and CPIB are involved in the process.

Sir, other Members of Parliament who have spoken in favour of the idea of an ombudsman over the years include Mr Zaqy Mohamad in 2013, my colleague, then Non-Constituency Member of Parliament and now Member of Parliament Mr Dennis Tan in 2016, Non-Constituency Member of Parliament Ms Kuik Shiao-Yin in 2016 and Non-Constituency Member of Parliament Mr Kok Heng Leun in 2017 and myself in 2018.

Sir, there are a number of arguments for an ombudsman in the Singapore context. I shall attempt to summarise these in the following three points.

Firstly, an ombudsman could undertake an inquiry that is independent from and seen to be independent from a public sector agency, which is the subject of a complaint, setting it apart from internal enquiries that occur within Ministries or Statutory Boards, by the quality service department, for example. Having access to such a check would, in fact, bolster the standing of the Public Service.

Secondly, an ombudsman would be equipped with investigative resources and a remit to independently investigate complaints that organisations like the Auditor-Generala's Office and Public Service Commission do not currently have.

Thirdly, an ombudsman may uncover policy gaps or institutional shortcomings that are not related purely to corruption, accounting or corporate governance that are dealt with by the CPIB and Auditor-General's Office, as I argued in Parliament in 2018. The office of the ombudsman could therefore table a review paper every year analysing in aggregate, the cases it had dealt with, describing any systemic patterns discerned and putting forth evidence-driven recommendations for systemic change in how the Public Service interfaces with citizens.

In 2016, during the public discussion on the Constitutional amendment to the elected presidency scheme, scholar Mr Chirag Agarwal published an op-ed essay outlining outlining how an ombudsman could benefit Singapore, and I think it is worth citing that. To paraphrase, he argued firstly, the delivery of public services has become more complex and citizens have become more demanding. Parliament has had to address specific incidents involving Government agencies. An ombudsman should be able to investigate such incidents in the first instance and recommend corrective action where necessary while the Government focuses on developing sound public policy. The Government could then consider any policy recommendations made by the ombudsman in its annual report. Secondly, an ombudsman could also quash unsubstantiated claims and vicious attacks on the Public Service by conducting a transparent and independent investigation into any allegation. And thirdly, the transparency and independence of the ombudsman will help build trust in the Government.

Next, Sir, I would like to consider examples of other jurisdictions that have created the office of an ombudsman or its equivalent.

A 2018 OECD working paper noted that almost 30% of governments have included independent institutions like ombudsman offices to foster a more "open state" which OECD recommendation on the council open government defines as and I quote, "When the executive legislature judiciary independent public institutions and all levels of government recognising the respective roles, prerogatives and overall independence according to their existing legal and institutional frameworks collaborate, exploit synergies and share good practises and lessons learnt among themselves and with other stakeholders to promote transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation and support of democracy and inclusive growth."

Notably, 96% of the ombudsman institutions studied in this report focus on complaints against the public administration and 67% also conduct mediation of such complaints between citizens and the public administration. This is the OECD, the club of more developed economies.

A 2011 report by the Asian Development Bank or ADB noted that most Asian Ombudsman Association or AOA members focus on the following mandates.

One, providing redress for individual complainants. Two, addressing systemic issues to improve public administration. And three, enforcing accountability in government. The ADB report noted that an ombudsman can be established either under the Constitution by statute or administrative regulations. Some relevant Asian AOA member institutions of interests and their legal basis includes the Ombudsman of Indonesia created under presidential issuance decree number 44; the Ombudsman of Hong Kong created under the Ombudsman Ordinance in 1989; Malaysia's Public Complaints Bureau created under administrative circular number 4 in 1971; the Philippines Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution Republic Act.

Sir, I shall highlight for more detailed treatment here, just two examples, Hong Kong and Australia.

Established in 1989, the Ombudsman in Hong Kong monitors public governance. The office strives to improve the quality of public administration and enhance the culture of service through independent objective and impartial investigation into complaints received and by self-initiated studies in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Ombudsman has powers to: firstly, investigate complaints from aggrieved persons about maladministration; secondly investigate complaints against government departments and agencies for non-compliance with a code of access to information; and thirdly, initiate direct investigation into issues of potentially wide public interest and concern.

Next, let me turn to Australia. The office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in Australia safeguards on aims to safeguard the community in its dealings with the Australian government. It is responsible for ensuring that the actions of agencies are fair and responsible by: (a) handling complaints; (b) conducting investigations; (c) performing audits and inspections and (d) encouraging good administration. The office of Commonwealth Ombudsman was created by law in 1976 in Australia. The Act provides that the Ombudsman is to investigate the administrative actions of Australian government departments and agencies. The Ombudsman interestingly is also the law enforcement and ombudsman and can investigate complaints about the actions of the Australian Federal Police or AFP, and about the policies, practices and procedures of the AFP as an agency. If a person is dissatisfied after making a complaint to the AFP, they can make a complaint to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman reports to Parliament, at least annually, on the comprehensiveness and adequacy of the AFP's complaint handling.

Sir, next, I would like to talk about next steps. I have argued for the creation of an office of independent ombudsman in Singapore to investigate complaints against public servants. We propose submitting the idea of creating such an office as an item to be considered in the external review described by my Party Chair and Member of Parliament, Ms Sylvia Lim.

The review process could consider the role such an ombudsman could play in our current eco-system of laws, regulations and practices, in the context of the questions raised by the Parti Liyani's case and taking into consideration and useful lessons from the study of the operating model for an ombudsman in force at other jurisdictions.

Sir, there are various models on how an ombudsman could actually operate, found in different jurisdictions around the world. The classical model is that of an office with extensive powers to investigate cases, question witnesses and requisition documents, one where the ombudsman may work towards mediation of conflicts. If no solution can be reached, they will provide recommendations to the relevant administrative unit. That is the classical model. In this model, the office would have no power of coercion and can only apply soft pressure to get the recommendation accepted. The ombudsman would submit an annual activity report to Parliament.

Sir, this is close to the model common in Western Europe and some commonwealth countries, including the UK, Australia, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Hong Kong. So, in other words, the model for an ombudsman could be as follows: the office investigates all complaints using an objective process of fact-finding. The office of the ombudsman would then recommend follow-up action to the public sector agency concerned. If the follow-up action is not undertaken to a satisfactory extent, the ombudsman would have recourse to the Courts or would have other means of recourse, such as publishing its findings, for example. The ombudsman would be appointed by Parliament for a fixed term and would be answerable to Parliament.

The office of the ombudsman could be enshrined in the Constitution in an Article that could also specify the grounds for disqualification. Such an Article on disqualification could be modelled on Article 72 of the Constitution for the Presidential Council for Minority Rights or the mechanism for the removal of Judges under Article 98(3)(iv). I should stress that this is one model for constructing such an office that seems to me to be reasonable but the question of the operating model for an ombudsman warrants far deeper scrutiny before an appropriate model is defined.

Next, Sir, I would like to deal with objections to the idea of an ombudsman.

Currently, the Singapore Government rejection of the notion of an ombudsman seems to be premised on the fact that there are sufficient mechanisms already in place to receive public feedback, safeguard public trust and maintain the integrity of public institutions. I shall attempt to deal with these objections one by one.

First, we have the possibility of internal reviews within Ministries and Statutory Boards. But as I mentioned earlier, these would risk not being seen as independent and thus potentially leave open the possibility of a growing trust and confidence deficit.

Second, we have the citizen's right to sue the Government in Court. However, most citizens in Singapore believe that this avenue of redress comes with considerable, if not, prohibitive cost, in terms of money and time, and they believe this for good reason. Citizens will first have to find a law firm willing to sue the Government and face the AGC as an opponent. Next, if it is a judicial review action, leave of Court to commence such an action must first be obtained and only then can action be brought. Therefore, two sets of legal costs are involved in a judicial review action.

Third, many documents are in the Government's possession and these may be denied to a litigant due to a claim of official secrecy. All these factors, taken together, explain the rarity of such legal action.

Thirdly, we have the Public Service Commission or PSC. However, the PSC is not an investigative body per se and does not possess the resources and expertise to look into complaints against the Public Service to approximate what we see in the office of the ombudsman in, say, Hong Kong and Australia. Moreover, the PSC does have powers to conduct investigations into misconduct by public servants, but only on a complaint by a Permanent Secretary as relates to sections 3 and 4 of the Public Services Disciplinary Proceedings Regulations. This means that PSC cannot conduct investigations and complaints brought by members of the public.

Fourthly, we have REACH but REACH again is not an investigative body that can probe the actions of public servants and provide closure in a way that is seen as independent.

Fifth, we have the Auditor-General's Office or AGO but the work of the AGO is primarily focused on the annual audit of public sector which involves randomly selecting agencies for audit checks on a sample check basis as auditors do. No doubt the AGO can be ordered to conduct off-cycle special audits. In 2016, I obtained a Parliamentary reply to the effect that there have only been two AGO Special Audits ordered by the Government in the past 20 years. The first related to claims made by Opposition Members of Parliament in Parliament about healthcare subsidies in 1996. The second was a request audit of the Workers' Party left Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council in 2014. However, Sir, the AGO is currently not set up to field the broad complaints about public sector lapses, errors or poor quality of service.

Sixth, we have the CPIB but the CPIB only investigates and resolves allegations of malfeasance, corruption and so on, which are potentially criminal offences, not oppressive, unfair or rude behaviour by public servants, for example; or flaws in the complaints handling process, for example.

And seventh, we have Meet-the-People sessions. It has been a hallmark of our system that Members of Parliament write letters of appeal to Government agencies to address the grievances of constituents. But, Sir, these appeals are subsequently addressed by the agencies themselves. The process does not amount to an independent investigation by an external agency, resourced and qualified to do the same. Members of Parliament's letters merely present the perspective of the constituent. There is no independent fact-finding.

Lastly, Sir, let me address the objection that creating an office of the ombudsman will incite a flood of frivolous complaints against public servants, consuming enormous resources and sparking the growth of a complaint culture that may undermine confidence in the Public Service and induce public servants to do their work defensively, as it were.

One can discern echoes of such an argument in the response of former Law Minister, Mr EW Barker to the idea of an ombudsman in the 1960s. Considering this argument more closely, one can see that this is an argument against creating responsive complaints handling processes of any kind rather than being an argument specifically against the institutional form of an ombudsman.

If we are worried about the system being flooded with frivolous complaints, ought we not to similarly abolish Quality Service or QS departments in Ministries, for example? Why does an ombudsman risked triggering a flood whereas these other institutional forms of complaint handling do not?

Moreover, if a flood of complaints is occasioned by the creation of an ombudsman as it were, might that not be proof that there were latent grievances that members of the public hesitated to bring forth reasons of lack of confidence in existing channels of redress? If a reasonable fraction of those latent or pent-up grievances turn out to be legitimate, would addressing them not be a good thing for the quality of justice and fairness in our social fabric?

Thank you, Sir, for letting me participate in this debate. Let me start by trying to deal with some of the points that have been raised. I thank Ms Lim and Ms He for recognising that the criminal justice system, taken in totality, works well – they are not saying the system is broken or ineffective – and that Singapore is a safe place to raise children, and the justice system has been instrumental in achieving that and that our justice system enjoys a good reputation. I think various indices were cited.

So, let me try and deal with specific points but let me start off by saying the speeches I have heard, particularly from the Workers' Party. Now, I will come back to Mr Leong Mun Wai. I hope he is in the Chambers. I do not think he is. Okay. Maybe we will have another discussion.

I would say – with the Workers' Party and the points made – we are on the same page. In many ways, we are pushing at an open door. It is not that any of these principles are new or in some way not thought of or that we are opposed to them. I think in large measure, from the speeches that I heard, you are setting out positions of principle, which we have no problems with, but sitting on the front bench here, we also got to decide how to implement it and how to pay for it. And so, therein comes some of the implementation issues. If I may say, actually, the very first point I will take illustrates that very well.

Legally, I think Ms Lim, Ms He Ting Ru and maybe Mr Dennis Tan talked about the importance of legal aid, particularly for the poor. We cannot be more agreed on this. Of course, we want legal aid for the poor and we do have legal aid for the poor. As I said, CLAS covers 25% of resident households or is intended to.

But I have explained why I do not want to make legal aid mandatory. I explained to you by reference to the UK example – that the moment you make it mandatory, then what happens? People game the system too and people game the system in this way. They will not be able to find lawyers who can do it for the fee that the state is prepared to pay, or an extraordinarily exorbitant fee is required, or lawyers do not come forward. And because you cannot find the lawyer to handle the case, therefore the case gets postponed. And I gave you real-life examples from a first class jurisdiction – UK. This is not a figment of anyone's imagination. You have got to deal with that. I think rather than going the same paths that others have gone and gotten into minefields, we should try and make it work.

I will also share with you – I had it in my original text but I took it out because of the length – the experience of Australia and New Zealand. New South Wales in Australia offers a fully government-funded public defender's scheme. Two thirds of its cases are outsourced to private lawyers. Government expenditure on criminal legal aid has seen a 50% increase from 2015 to 2019. Every time I show these figures, my Finance Minister gives me a look.

Similarly, when we enhanced CLAS in 2014, we were not in a very difficult budgetary position but we were all projecting for a time when we would be in a difficult budgetary position. I did not want to get into a situation where we will just be required to write bigger and bigger cheques without taking into account public interest.

The reason why any Member here, with a child who is 10 years old, would dare to let their child take public transport is because of our law and order system. That is a very precious privilege. It is a privilege – every lady in this room will be able to take public transport at any time of the day and night. That is a fundamental human right. You will not be able to exercise that in any comparable city, anywhere in the world.

There is a reason for all of that. That is because cases get dealt with properly. Crime is low. We have kept crime low at a relatively low cost to the taxpayer. But I accept we must also help the poor when it comes to legal aid for criminal cases.

Let me tell you about the Australian example – the case of Lloyd Raynay. He was an experienced lawyer accused of murdering his wife, received legal aid in 2013. Cost to taxpayers of his defence was around $2.3 million. Do you believe that that person should get legal aid at that cost in Singapore? I do not think you do. So, we should move away from absolutist positions to say, "How can we make it work?", because we are both on the same side on this argument.

Paul Cohrs was accused of murdering his mother and brother in 2018. Close to $1.5 million dollars in assets. He was offered legal aid because his assets were frozen. Court cases get delayed – I am talking about Australia now – because lawyers refuse to take on legal aid cases. Legal aid rates were considered inadequate; cases being adjourned. Victims and witnesses are having to endure a long wait for justice and preparation by prosecutors and the police wasted.

In 2016, court cases against alleged murderers of underworld figures, Barbaro and Yilmaz, were put off for more than one year because legal aid rates were inadequate for suitable lawyers to take on the lengthy and complex case. The government introduced reforms in 2020 to ensure more sustainable legal aid budgets, including changes in fee structures, introduced fixed-sum lump-sum payments for less serious criminal matters. And guess what? The legal industry opposed it.

New Zealand. Fully government-funded public defender's scheme. The total cost rising by 62% from $101 million in 2006 and 2007 to $164 million in 2018 and 2019. There was an independent review of the system in 2009 led by a senior civil servant. She concluded the system was open to abuse, including lawyers who game the system. I am not suggesting that lawyers will necessarily game the system but you have these experiences elsewhere and you got to be careful about it.

They delayed plea or changed plea part way through the process, maximised legal aid payments. Lawyers demanded or accepted top-up payments from clients. To curb the bill, they expanded the public defender's scheme but that was also opposed by the bar.

We, thankfully, have a relationship with a bar which is more constructive. They do pro bono through CLAS but I have said that we are now considering how we can set up a public defender's office which would be sustainable. So, in principle, there is no issue. The question is – how do you implement it.

Second, I think there was a question of bail. I think Ms Lim wondered if the Bail Court was comatose or still in existence. It is functioning, alive and kicking. It is in the State Courts. Court 4A undertakes the role of the Bail Court. It handles the grant of, or review of, bail. The Court aims to ensure that the bail reviews are dealt with expeditiously, minimise – we are again on the same page – the time spent by accused persons in remand and balance against the need to ensure that the accused persons attend Court or are available when investigations are required.

Since 2018, increasing number of persons in remand are being released on a reduced bail with e-tagging – because we can use technology. Between January and July, more than 180 accused persons have been released on reduced bail with e-tagging. In 2018, I think some Members will recall that the Criminal Procedure Code or CPC was amended to specifically provide for e-tagging and the Police are generally prepared to consider allowing personal bonds in more cases. So, again, on the bail issue, I do not think there is divergence here.

Three, on people who cannot afford to pay fines. I think the situation that Ms Lim highlighted was that some people run up a series of regulatory offences and then they find themselves unable to pay and then have to turn up to Court for these matters.

It is a tough issue when it comes to this because, in principle, you have the laws, you need to enforce them.

I think everybody agrees that you need to enforce them. Because if you have laws and you have fines that can be imposed but if people can break the rules – it can be as simple as parking, if people can park without having to pay the fines and fines will not be collected – then, the system will slowly break down. We cannot have that. We have to impose the fines.

But, then, there are a group of people we all feel sympathetic towards because they cannot pay. The fact that they cannot pay the fines then lead some on to other situations which sort of snowball and we really do not want that. I think that is a situation where other kinds of safety nets will have to come and try and help them. This is where MSF comes in, the local Member of Parliament, or MP, comes in, for situations like that.

But where the agencies come across this, some agencies may be able to handle it but, generally, the agencies are not best placed to go and make distinctions between people – okay, you can pay the fine, you cannot pay the fine. I think we will very soon have a system that is dysfunctional. I think that sort of intervention has got to be an intervention from outside of the regulatory agency. But, in principle, we agree that there must be ways to try and find these people help.

Ms Lim also talked about how AGC sometimes – I am sure this is based on what the criminal bar has said because they have said this to me too – that officers sometimes prefer the most serious charge. I would put it this way. I think in the Parliament, when we debate like this, it is going to be general statements. If you say they should not put the most serious charge, of course, I agree. But we also agree that neither the Parliament nor MinLaw should be directing AGC on what charges are appropriate.

I think the starting point is what the Attorney-General has said at the Opening of Legal Year, which is that the DPPs ought to be told, and have been told, they are ministers of justice. They need to take an overview on this and they need to approach this with fairness. The Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General have regular discussions with the criminal bar. These are issues they can deal with.

Recording of statements – again, I think the starting point is the same. We must get accurate statements. It must be fair to the person being interviewed. It must be something that the person who is interviewed can understand. I do not think it is going to be possible – the Police are not going to be able to record it in the language the witness speaks. But fairness must be there. So, we need to have the right interpreter and we must emphasise to the IOs that – look, it is not a question of getting down and putting it in the way that you want. It has got to be what the person is saying. This is a constant endeavour.

I am sure Ms Lim has, I am sure others have – I have – we have all come across situations where lawyers tell us – well, the statement has been taken in a way that is not quite accurate. They say that. I think you have got to discount some of it because it is seen from a defence's perspective. But it has happened too.

So, this is something, as I said, the golden standard would be if we can have video recording but in my Ministerial Statement, I explained, or in my clarifications, I explained the difficulties that we are having. Not that we do not want to do it. Actually, doing it would help the Police. It is protective of the Police but we cannot do it. We cannot expand it because of the specific resource constraints that I spoke about.

There was a question on the level of legal training of IOs. The Police officers who take on the IO role do take some legal modules on investigative powers, drafting of charges and statement of facts, to understand the Evidence Act, the burden of proof, presumptions, on general law, on general training for trial preparation. None of that is going to make them a lawyer and, I think, again, the real answer is what one of the Members asked me earlier – how quickly can we put the AGC and Police officers together early in the investigations so that there is that legal guidance?

It is a serious resource issue. The size of AGC is small. The size of the Police's IOs is small. To try and put them together to deal with these thousands of cases, is not going to be easy.

Ms Lim said something which I heartily agree with – that the specific Police IO in Ms Liyani's case does not become a scape-goat. I will start out by saying that we do not scape-goat people, but when I come to the Parliament, I cannot shy away from saying what has happened. I cannot shy away from saying that unfortunately – I did say "unfortunately" – he will have to face disciplinary inquiry. In my original statement, I actually said I am personally very sympathetic to the IO.

The Police were very uncomfortable with that because they take the disciplinary inquiry seriously and their view was that if the Minister says that, then it creates difficulties for them. But I am very sympathetic to the IO because we are all looking at this with hindsight and with a huge microscope, day by day.

So, I do say, "Poor chap". But rules are rules. He was there. He did not do it for five weeks. There are certain consequences. He is in an unfortunate situation. But I entirely agree.

Ms Lim also asked about instalment payments for fines. I have said it in the House here. I think we should try when people have difficulties in making payments to allow them to pay in instalments. The difficulty again is to distinguish between who can afford and who cannot afford. We do not want to go down the route of setting up another mechanism, more resources to go and check that. But subject to that, I have given directions earlier this year to the Police to consider in which areas we can go, for possibility of instalment payments on fines.

There were some points about young people, what sort of assistance they get when Police interview them, amongst others. Actually, for those who have not been following closely our criminal justice system and our system of imprisonment or incarceration, there has been a sea change in approach. Today, for example, the Prisons service tags itself as Captains of Lives. They are no longer prison wardens. When the people come in, the statistics show that there is a high likelihood of recidivism when they go out. They are going to come back again. So, our task is to actually be with them and make sure as much as possible that they do not come back. We do a lot of intervention when they are in there.

We actually want to go earlier, upstream, do not even let them become prisoners, do not even let them get into trouble. What can we do upstream? And we want to look as much as possible, for people who infringe or who have committed some offence. We want to see how we can move them away from the penal system to a more guidance programme for rehabilitation. So, the primary focus, if I can use one word to describe our system today, it is to focus on rehabilitation.

Which is why the very significant changes on first- and second-time drug users were put through legislation. And Parliament agreed with it.

So, for young people, we have diversionary programmes for those who commit minor offences. In the past four years, four to five hundred guidance programmes cases a year. Completion rate has been about 80% to 90%. We also have a guidance programme for young offenders who commit less serious sexual offences, like possession of obscene films and so on. We give them Adolescence Sexuality Treatment.

The Streetwise Programme is a voluntary programme for wayward young people. And we have an enhanced Streetwise Programme. For those involved in minor gang-related offences, they are sent to these programmes.

Our approach today is first, we try and prevent them from getting into Prison. Second, if they commit some offence, as far as possible, we put them in different tracks. We do psychological assessment. Even if they have to serve time, then, we see whether they have to serve the full time or whether they can be put through different programmes and then, put in halfway houses to the extent possible – of course, depending on the nature of the offence.

So, that has been the approach and if Members are interested, we can give them a specific, more in-depth briefing. But there has been a very significant change in approach here.

Ms Lim talked about victims in a couple of specific cases. Ms Lim, Ms He Ting Ru will accept, I do not know the facts, I do not know why specifically the matter was not proceeded with. All I know from what has been said in Parliament is that AGC advised that it cannot be proceeded with. Beyond that, I do not know anything else and I cannot comment on it.

There are always two sides to every story and we will have to ask AGC why it did not proceed.

Ms He said that defence lawyers face unequal access to witnesses and evidence. Again, in principle, I agree there should be fair access. What is fair, how do you detail what is fair, there might be a difference of views. It was not quite clear to me what exactly she said. But I am setting out a matter of principle here.

Access to counsel, I have dealt with earlier.

Ms He Ting Ru also talked about compensation for miscarriage of justice. I think in principle, if it is a vexatious case, if it should never have been brought, compensation ought to be paid. But on a regular basis, if every case, the state loses, you have got to pay compensation, then, I think I would take a different approach and a different view. I do think that would create chilling effect on prosecution. But I do not think that is what Ms He was suggesting.

Mr Dennis Tan expressed his concern about the young and the poor. I say for the record, we are all concerned. Mr Dennis Tan is not the only one who is concerned. I think his concern is legitimate but we are all concerned.

He also spoke about judicial training and he spoke about this point about rotation between the different parts of the Legal Service. I have given a very full answer and I have said that these matters are dealt with by various boards headed by the Chief Justice. He decides, together with his board, and there is, I described the Personnel Board for Judges and Personnel Board for Legal Service Officers.

Mr Tan also spoke about qualifications of Judicial Officers. These are matters for the Legal Service Commission. They will take into account. I told you about the Judicial Personnel Board. They will deal with it and choose. I think he got some of his facts wrong. The point he made about one year for Magistrates and three years for District Judges, or DJs – that is only possible when the Chief Justice is of the opinion that the person is suitable. Otherwise, the normal process is three years for Magistrates and seven years for District Judges.

In the State Courts today, we have 55 Judicial Officers who hear criminal cases. All are qualified persons who are at least seven years. I stand corrected – these are the figures I have been given. If it is inaccurate in any way, I will let Mr Dennis Tan know.

And training of Judicial Officers, again, I agree with Mr Tan, and it is already being done, as he will probably know – Singapore Judicial College. And Mr Tan agrees that this is a good development.

Mr Pritam Singh talks about disclosure, setting up a statutory framework on what needs to be disclosed. I think specific on Kadar vs Public Prosecutor, Mr Singh would recall, that I told this House that it is good in principle, the Kadar case, and should be followed. Maybe Mr Singh does not recall, but that is what I said.

So, the Government is absolutely ad idem with Mr Singh on this point.

Looking at setting out the disclosure requirements in statute, I am happy to tell him that, knowing that he is going to raise it today, we have been discussing it since early this year, internally. It has started with MHA; it is being discussed. I think it is unsatisfactory that it is left as a common law principle. So, we are going to put it out in statute – what is appropriate, what is fair, how do you framework it, which are the cases and principles you take. It is being discussed with various stakeholders; we have not discussed with the bar yet. I think we have discussed it with Supreme Court, I cannot remember specifically.

It has been something that we have been discussing since early this year. But this small event of COVID-19 has put many of these things out of kilter. So, a little bit more time is being taken.

Mr Singh also talked about how do counsel discuss relevance and non-relevance. I think all I can say to him is, AGC officers have an over-arching duty as ministers of justice. Mr Singh and I cannot be telling them what to disclose and what not to disclose. But the principles are clear. Again, as I have said, we will put it out in statutory form. So, he is pushing at an open door on this.

Ms Lim talked about more means for seeking compensation. I think she knows 2010, we amended the CPC to require the Courts to actively consider. Because we felt that while we had given the Courts the power to order compensation, we did not see enough cases where compensation was being awarded. So, I actually decided that we had to go further.

So, in 2018, the law was further amended and now, the Courts are required to give reasons if compensation is not awarded, where it has the power to do so. That requires an active consideration. Victims are there in a criminal case. Rather than requiring the victims to start another proceedings, decide then and there how much money should be paid. But if for some reason, you think that no money ought to be paid, you set out your reasons.

So, victims will be able to participate in the process by making submissions. It is really meant for simpler cases. The criminal Courts are not equipped to deal with complex hearings which are dealt with by civil Courts. And we also should be careful about dragging out proceedings because there is a knock-on effect on the Courts’ ability to deal with other cases.

The Courts have also been empowered to order compensation to the dependants of a person whose death was caused by an offence. For example, for bereavement and funeral expenses.

So, those are the points I wanted to cover. There are other points which I am sure some other colleagues will cover.

Coming back to Mr Leong Mun Wai and the Committees of Inquiry, he will recall the earlier exchange. He has agreed that there was no issue he could identify and there was no need for a Committee of Inquiry, or a Commission of Inquiry. But now, he has reversed himself and says, I suppose an hour or so in between, has helped him to recall why he wanted it in the first place.

Mr Leong, let me put it this way. You are quite wrong in saying this is an internal review by agencies. Let me explain. First, it has gone through a very public process with detailed cross-examination and an examination in the minute, a forensic examination of all the issues. Every possible issue relating to the Police, and AGC, and the evidence has been dealt with in great detail in public, in cross-examination and in submissions. So, what is it that you want from a review that has not been publicly set out?

Then, you have a High Court Judge who sets out his judgment and has set out what he said were the issues. So, you have got a judgment from a High Court, setting out, “This is where I felt that Police were lacking and this is where I think the AGC was lacking”. So, we had that process, which is, I think he would accept, an independent process.

Next, as regard to AGC, that is going to go for another Disciplinary Tribunal. And the officers will give account of what they did. It will be dealt with by the Disciplinary Tribunal or DT, and if the DT feels that there is a case to answer and it needs to be referred, it goes up to the Court of Three Judges. Or the DT dismisses it – whatever it is, that is another independent inquiry. So, that deals with the AGC part of your requirement for the Commission of Inquiry.

Then, the Police. Three specific issues were identified: translation and two other issues. I have dealt with them, the three issues.

You see, the duties of Members of Parliament, is not to come and repeat whatever is outside but to apply our mind, take whatever feedback there is, crystallise it, apply it to the facts, listen to the arguments on the other side, and then say, “Yes, I see all these; now, I will tell you what it is.”

Because if you ask for a Commission of Inquiry, it is because you are not happy with something. You feel that there is a reasonable basis for having an inquiry into something. So, you need to tell us which part of this requires further inquiry.

I will answer your other points, but perhaps I can invite you to answer that.

If I could ask you, Mr Leong, I have heard about the four years. I will come back to the four years. Can you just help me because I have said we are happy to have – not happy – but we are prepared to have a commission of inquiry. I did say the officers involved will face Police disciplinary inquiry. Of course, the supervisor will face the disciplinary inquiry, too, because of the five weeks. So, we have settled the five weeks. So, what is it that requires the commission of inquiry? What is troubling you now? Do not give generalities. What, specifically, is the issue?

So, wait. Let us deal with the five weeks. I have told you that the IO and the supervisor were wrong and will be dealt with by way of a Disciplinary Tribunal. What is that you propose – what is your allegation? Are you suggesting that they did not do it because of improper influence? If so, say it and we will have a commission of inquiry.

Lapses do not equate to Commissions of Inquiry. Lapses equate to disciplinary proceedings. Commission of inquiry is if there is something larger.

You are not suggesting – it is good that you have disavowed any suggestion of improper influence. I am happy that you have said that. So, once we accept that, then the question is, on these facts—and I have told you 10% of the cases succeed on appeal. I have told you there is another case where there was a break in the chain of custody. We cannot be having Commissions of Inquiry each time the High Court says that the Police have made a mistake. So, the reason why I was prepared to recommend a commission of inquiry was because I felt your suggestion was Mr Liew had improper influence. But now that you have disavowed that—

Yes, thank you. And, therefore, in terms of how the Police handled it, the two officers – maybe more than two, or whether there were other IOs who have dealt with it at different times – that is a matter for the Police. Internal matter. And you would have heard me saying I welcome Ms Sylvia Lim's point. We do not want to make a scapegoat of this young officer. But, you know, rules are rules. He will be dealt with. So, leave aside the Police. There is no basis for a commission of inquiry against the Police.

For AGC, there is no basis for doing a commission of inquiry because if you accept that the AGC officers' conduct will be dealt with by the Disciplinary Tribunal, they will go into it – why they did it, what they did – you have got your independent inquiry. So, we do not need a commission of inquiry.

Okay, Minister. We thought that the systemic faults alone are enough to be a basis for the inquiry. But after your explanation, okay, we are prepared to accept that you have done a thorough investigation of the situation already, then we will withdraw our proposal for the inquiry.

Thank you, Speaker. I have two clarifications for Minister on what he has just said.

The first clarification concerns his response to my suggestion on the recording of statements in languages other than English. He mentioned that while he does not think that that can be done, of course, he also said that I think the gold standard was video recording. But I would also like to highlight that, in the UK, actually, they do have provision in their Police and Criminal Evidence Act that when an accused person wants to give a cautioned statement in a language other than English, that the police will record the statement in that language and later on an English translation will be provided. I wanted to highlight that other countries have done it. So, I hope that he will not close his mind to the matter. And if this could be done – that means, recording the text of the statement in a language other than English – I think that would greatly increase reliability. That is the first clarification.

The second clarification is what he mentioned in response to my point on the victims. The two cases which I have mentioned, of course, I am not expecting the Government to comment on the merits of the cases. My reason for bringing them up is to highlight that no reasons were given to the victims for the decisions made and, more generally, to advocate for greater recognition in the Singapore system of the role of victims as stakeholders. And based on these two cases – and there are many others as well – it is clear that victims do feel disempowered and I think we can do better to recognise their role as stakeholders in the system.

I do not really have a quarrel with either point. I think the recording of statements other than English, I know that Police have said, and I have a lot of sympathy for them that they have difficulties. We will look at the other countries and their models. But I have expressed the hope we are waiting for artificial intelligence and video-to-text automatically. We have looked at some, but they are not yet mature technologies.

On the second point of the role of victims as stakeholders, I think Ms Sylvia Lim would have heard me say, in fact, I have pushed for that. In fact, in 2018, we amended the law so that victims would be given compensation or the Courts would have to explain why they are not being given compensation, if the Courts so choose not to. But we will see where else the right role of victims can be better protected. Thank you.

I thank the Minister for his response. I just have one point of clarification. Is the Minister saying that jurisdiction with more legal aid or a more beefed-up legal aid system will lead to bad outcomes? Are there not ways that we can expand our system or having safeguards to make sure that the abuses that he cited do not happen and that costs do not spiral out of control? Thank you.

Thanks, Ms He. I was corrected by the Prime Minister that I had mispronounced your name.

I think the answer to both questions is, no, I am not saying any of those things. Again, I said we are on the same page. I believe like you that the poor should get legal assistance. We are doing it. I have said that I do not find the current system satisfactory and that we have been discussing for some time how we can do it better. I was addressing my remarks to some of the statements that you made but which were a little bit more absolutist – like this is a human right, this is cast in stone, it has to be done – and I pointed out that some of those may lead us into alleyways and byways which others have found themselves in and then we will get stuck in the weeds, and we would not be able to come back. So, we need to avoid those traps, but try and achieve the objective in a way that will make the Finance Minister reasonably comfortable. Thank you.

Mr Speaker, migrant workers face a unique set of challenges when navigating the justice system due largely to their low socio-economic status in our society. Many of the problems they face will be in addition to those faced by low-income Singaporeans, which my Workers' Party's colleagues in this House have highlighted.

First, I would like to discuss the challenges faced by migrant workers who are victims of abuse, salary non-payment or other offences.

Migrant workers face steep power imbalances when dealing with employers and Government authorities. They are in a foreign land and may not speak our local languages well. They are far from their families and their friends back home. Some migrant domestic workers do not even have a local support network because they have limited interaction with peers outside of their employers' homes. They are unfamiliar with our local laws and customs and often do not know their rights.

When faced with a situation where they are mistreated or denied their salaries, they may hesitate to make reports to the authorities. This was the case for Miss Khalifa, a maid from Indonesia who endured six months of horrific abuse at the hands of her employers in 2012. She was sent back to Indonesia just as she was due for a medical check-up and chose not to tell the immigration officers of the abuse as she was happy to finally escape it. It was only when she returned to her village in Indonesia that her family discovered her injuries and made a report.

Migrant workers in these situations are often caught between a rock and a hard place. If they choose not to report the wrongdoing, it may continue or their perpetrators may get away scot-free. If they choose to report the offence and their case is taken up by the authorities, they will have to remain in Singapore to assist in the investigations and cannot immediately return to their loved ones at home.

The legal process takes time. For maid abuse cases that go to Court, the investigation alone can take at least a year while the trial could take another year, not to mention appeals. By the time the final sentence is passed, the entire process may have taken two years or more. In the meantime, the worker may not be able to work to earn a living. This can be financially ruinous as they are often the sole breadwinners of a large family back home.

While victims for assisting in investigations are issued with a special pass to remain in Singapore, this does not grant them an automatic right to work. They are still required to seek permission from the investigating authorities before working. Fortunately, in most cases, permission is granted for victims. However, this work may not come easily. Many employers may be hesitant to employ migrant domestic workers who are assisting in Police investigations. Some victims may be so traumatised by the abuse that they do not wish to risk being in such a dangerous situation again. They also have to look for a place to stay. The burden of sheltering them currently falls mainly on non-government organisations or NGOs.

Taking a step back, there are other factors which may give migrant workers great pause before they make a brave move to report their abuse.

First, many come from countries where corruption and abuse of authority is rife. This could make them inherently distrustful of authorities. Some may even need to be assured that Police officers in Singapore will not demand a bribe to take up their case.

Second, the employers may sometimes make or threaten to make counter-accusations against them, for example, accusing them of theft or damaging company property.

Third, in cases where there is no physical abuse, but strong elements of coercion or psychological abuse, the investigation might end with a warning but no punishment for the employers.

In all of these cases, the end result for the worker would likely be termination of their current employment and repatriation to their home countries.

The cost of premature repatriation is tremendous for these workers to find work in Singapore. They would have incurred thousands of dollars of debts owed to recruitment agents in their home countries. They would have to spend months, sometimes years, paying off these debts on the back up low salaries in Singapore. Being terminated and terminated and sent home will saddle them with huge debts, not to mention a loss of income and embarrassment for their families.

At the end of the whole trial, even if the perpetrator is convicted, the victim may not be financially compensated for the full extent of what they had suffered. While it is good that there is now a compensation framework for victims, this is not guaranteed as the perpetrator can escape payment of compensation by serving a jail term in lieu or claiming bankruptcy.

I will now move on to the challenges faced by migrant workers accused of crimes while in Singapore.

The same language hurdles encountered by victims are also faced by those accused of crimes. This was the case for Ms Parti Liyani who, according to the High Court judgment, was interviewed for some of her statements by investigators in a mix of English and Bahasa Melayu while she spoke Bahasa Indonesia. Her recorded statements were read back to her in English and translated into Bahasa Melayu by the Investigation Officer or IO. No Bahasa Indonesia interpreter was present for the recording of four of her statements.

During cross-examination in Court, the IO conceded that there was a difference between Bahasa Melayu and Bahasa Indonesia, and admitted that he could have understood Ms Liyani's statements in Bahasa Indonesia differently from what she had meant.

Justice Chan Seng Onn, in his judgment, also said that the likelihood similarly existed that Ms Liyani could have misunderstood the IO's questions during the interview and recorded statements read back to her differently from what the IO had meant. He was thus satisfied that there was a reasonable doubt in relation to the accuracy of the translation for two of the statements.

Accused workers also need to remain in Singapore to assist with investigations. Ms Liyani was arrested on 2 December 2016 and spent almost four years in a shelter managed by the NGO, HOME. While waiting for her case to be concluded, she was fortunate that HOME was able to find someone to post bail of $15,000 for her.

Most migrant workers accused of crimes may not be able to secure such a bailar. They faced a similar dilemma as victims when deciding whether to plead guilty or claim trial. Should they plead guilty, the time it takes for them to serve their sentence may be shorter than the time it takes to go through the Court process if they claim trial.

Ms Liyani was sentenced by the State Court to 26 months in prison, which was less than the four years she spent waiting for the outcome of the case. This presents an invidious choice for them. Even if they know that they are innocent, bizarrely, it is actually expedient for the migrant worker to plead guilty even if they did no wrong. But is justice served this way?

Should they claim trial, they may not find a lawyer and will certainly not be able to afford one.

The Minister for Law has mentioned that Ms Liyani's fees would have come up to $150,000. Criminal legal aid is available but not by default as they need to pass means and merits test. Even if they do, they may still not be able to find a lawyer willing to take up their case pro bono.

My Liyani was very fortunate to have a Singaporean lawyer, Mr Anil Balchandani, representing her pro bono at the trial and the appeal. Justice Chan commended Mr Anil for showing much skill and dedication in his work for this case.

I would now like to share some proposals on how we can make the justice system fairer for migrant workers who have to go through it, either as victims or accused persons.

First, we have to tackle the upstream problems, which severely hamper their bargaining power vis-a-vis their employers and contribute to their unwillingness to report abuse. We must find ways to reduce the high recruitment fees that migrant workers need to pay agents to find a job in Singapore. If workers do not feel such a sense of obligation to their employer because of a need to pay back exorbitant fees to recruiters, they will be more likely to report abuse when it happens.

I shared one solution to this during September's debate on the President's Address – to create a jobs portal that advertises all open positions for migrant workers. The positions should be open to only Singaporeans for a period of, say, two weeks before being extended to foreigners. With increasing IT savviness, migrant workers can even search for such positions from their home countries and apply directly. This move towards jobs transparency would cut out the middleman and reduce the need to pay exploitative fees to recruitment agents.

Second, support services should be provided to all workers who choose to make complaints against employers and find themselves without a home and a job. It should not be left entirely to NGOs and their limited resources. This support should include the provision of basic needs like food and shelter, counselling services and help on understanding their rights.

Third, every individual, local or foreign, should have access to legal representation. If they cannot afford a lawyer, legal aid should be made available to them. To prevent abuse, means testing could be done so that only those who are in genuine need will have their legal fees covered. I note that Minister said earlier that the public defender's office is under consideration. I welcome this and I hope that this will be pursued further.

And fourth, once the Court orders a payment of compensation to the victim, the system must ensure that the victim receives that payment. Victims should not be left high and dry, just because the convicted person is unable to pay. If necessary, a fund could be set up to ensure that victims are guaranteed to receive the compensation amount ordered by the Court.

In 2014, the AGC announced that it had formed an internal working group to focus on improving Court processes involving abused migrant workers. It mentions several areas it was looking at, including: one, exploring how to help more foreign maids get compensation for the losses they incur after they stop working because of abuse; two, improving Court processes involving abused foreign workers; three, securing medical reports and witness statements more quickly; four, persuading the Courts to fix early hearing dates; and five, expanding the use of compensation orders to help more maids obtain compensation for losses resulting from a criminal offence committed against them.

It has been six years since this announcement. What is the outcome of this working group? And what were their final proposals and which of them have been implemented?

Mr Speaker, migrant workers are among the most disadvantaged members of our society. Even though they are foreigners, they are an integral part of our society – looking after our children and elderly and building our skyscrapers and roads. As a developed country, it is our duty to ensure that they have equal access to justice if they suffer abuse or are accused of wrongdoing. Sir, I support the Motion standing in the name of Ms Sylvia Lim.

Sir, I recognise that fairness, access and independence are indeed cornerstones of Singapore's justice system. With that in mind, I have some proposals that I believe will help strengthen our criminal justice system. Many of what I will share has been discussed previously, but I hope to share further points in detail on some of these proposals.

My first point is about the Appropriate Adult Scheme that I raised in my Parliamentary Question that Minister addressed earlier. But can I appeal to the Government to re-consider and include foreign domestic workers for a start under this scheme and not all work permit holders? The scheme allows an independent and trained adult to accompany vulnerable groups who have to give statements to the Police. It is meant to ensure that the vulnerable person is not misunderstood during the interview.

It makes sense to also include FDWs into the scheme. After all, when we recently raised penalties for crimes against vulnerable people, we did specifically include FDWs as a class of vulnerable people. I completely understand the tremendous workload of our Police officers. So, may I suggest that MHA work with the NGOs for this and it might help ease the workload a little. I would be glad to help facilitate this process.

My second point is about video recording, and Minister has addressed this point significantly. All I am asking is whether MHA could share the timeline for the full implementation of this video recording. Hopefully, this can take place sooner rather than later.

My third point is about language interpretation. Can we ensure that all suspects are provided an interpreter in their own language and not just in a language that they understand, which the Minister has mentioned earlier? The key words here are "in their own language", which is used in the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) in some sections.

We need to enhance the CPC. The Code is vague. It states that people who do not understand English should be provided interpretation in a language they understand. It provides no clarity on what is the standard of "understanding" and who gets to determine it.

Sir, it is clear that we need to tighten the Code to ensure there is no misunderstanding during the course of Police interviews. I propose that we set high but reasonable standards for language interpretation during Police interviews.

First, all Police interviews start with the Investigation Officer (IO) informing suspects that they can request for an interpreter. Second, the suspect should be provided an interpreter in their own language. They should get to declare what this language is and this should be officially recorded. Third, the interpreter should have professional certification or relevant experience to ensure their services rendered are of suitable quality. Fourth, new rules should be introduced to mandate that interpreters follow certain protocols. For one, they should stick strictly to interpretation and avoid providing any legal advice or personal inputs. Programmes could be set up to accredit interpreters who receive training in this regard. Fifth, Police interviews should not start unless the interpreter is in the room. Sixth, the interpreter should arrive with minimal delay. Otherwise, a suspect may accept the absence of an interpreter to avoid being detained for an unduly long period of time. Seventh, the interpreter should not only translate the final statement, but also interpret what the Police officers and the suspect say.

Some of these points were addressed by Minister Shanmugam earlier and I am glad he has stated that some changes will be made. But I hope that all the points I have raised above will also be considered.

Sir, I recognise that there may be operational and cost considerations to having interpreters quickly and universally available. But we cannot have a situation where Police questions can be misunderstood, and we cannot allow suspects the opportunity to later claim that they had misunderstood questions. In the grand scheme of things, the cost of interpretation is a small price to pay for the procurement of justice.

Sir, in conclusion, I propose three things. One, the introduction of the Appropriate Adult Scheme for foreign domestic workers. Two, the mandatory video recording of all Police interviews. Three, the mandatory provision of language interpretation during Police interviews, with high standards set to ensure professional quality, prompt availability and no misunderstanding.

Time and again, we have seen cases turn on the uncertainty of what happens in the interview room. When this occurs, it does a disservice to suspects, Police officers, prosecutors, judges and all Singaporeans. My proposals will help alleviate these problems.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Sir, Mr Leon Perera brought up the ombudsman and cited many decades of history on this. But I would say in response to Mr Perera to look at the request in the context not only of the countries that he has cited – and I will come back to that in a moment – but also, particularly, in the context of Singapore – our system, our institutions and our people.

The intention behind the ombudsman is to enhance the rule of law, improve our criminal justice system and I think you have heard earlier Members from this side of the House brook no dissent with that. We all agree that that is a fundamental objective. We want to enhance our rule of law. We want to improve our systems. But I would suggest, Mr Speaker, that the proof of the pudding is really in the eating, in looking not only at the countries that have set up the ombudsman, but to look at where they stand after years, if not decades, of having the ombudsman and the impact it has had on their legal system.

So, in that respect, we have heard the World Justice Report cited several times. I would like to take Members back to that. Singapore, in 2020, was ranked 12th, an improvement from the previous year. In contrast, the three countries that Mr Perera cited as having had Ombudsman – Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines – were ranked 59th, 47th and 91st respectively. If you were to take the most recent Gallup Law and Order survey, out of a hundred points, Singapore scored 97. Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia were at least 10 points behind Singapore.

And if you look more closely at the most recent Crime Index 2020, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia are all behind Singapore. So, I would suggest that instead of just citing these experiences from other countries, to put it in the context of where this system operates and the people that operate the system as well, and ask ourselves, what is that reality? How does the Ombudsman translate into a better legal system, better rule of law and, fundamentally, a safer Singapore? Where would you choose to bring up children? Where would you want to have our women and children be safe late at night – in Singapore or some other countries? And I think that is the proof of the pudding. Proof of the pudding is in the eating and that is what I meant when I said that. Ultimately, you look at those indicators.

And in Singapore, we have our public institutions with its governance. We have internal reviews and, to the extent that some Members have said internal reviews are not sufficient because they are all conducted by internal people, then, on occasion, where necessary, there is the external review as well. I am sure Mr Perera is aware of the fact that there are many such panels.

In MHA, there is the independent Review Panel set up to review cases externally, independently. The SAF has set up external Review Panels as well. Likewise the SCDF. And to the extent that issues of public interest are raised, there is this forum in Parliament, and I am sure Members will agree that as we sit here past 10 pm this evening, that we spare no effort debating, discussing, going down into every detail that matters.

There is the current case. Members will remember that we have had the SingHealth breach raised in Parliament as well by way of Ministerial Statements, by way of Parliamentary Questions; the MRT breakdown, the MINDEF incidents, even what happens to doctors when they are apparently wrongly prosecuted.

And on occasion, even that may not be enough. And after the recent SCDF incidents were ventilated in Parliament, a separate Board of Inquiry, or BOI, was set up to look into the matter, separate from the Police investigation, came up with a report which subsequently MHA accepted. No cover-up on any of these occasions. On top of all of these, we have the COI. We have had a lot of debate about the COI, whether it is "committee" or "commission". But that provides an additional layer with public hearings. We have the Courts ultimately. And I thought I heard Mr Perera said that it is very difficult to bring an action in Court, either by way of judicial review or otherwise.

I had a quick look at the numbers and, in the last two years, there were 46 civil actions filed against the Government. I am not suggesting that these numbers are high or low. But I think where it needs to happen, this is an avenue. This is an avenue that our citizens can avail themselves of: bring their claims and the Courts – not the Executive, not an internal body – will evaluate these claims.

And, ultimately, when you have an ombudsman, the question really is: can they serve a better function than each of these specialist panels set up specifically for an inquiry, where necessary, with the relevant powers of investigation and with the relevant expertise for each of these cases?

Mr Perera said CPIB only investigates corruption, but not rude behaviour. Well, we have the QSM for that. We have the Members of Parliament who listen to residents every week, week in, week out. I am sure many of you would have come across occasions where you were told so and so was rude to me, so and so did not listen to me. There are proper avenues for this to be brought up. So, I would say to Mr Perera and to other Members suggesting the ombudsman, to look at this suggestion in the context of not only what we have in our society already running, functioning, but also what the end result has shown.

Sir, some questions have also been raised concerning the length of time that it has taken for the trial to proceed and why it has taken four years for Ms Liyani's case to be resolved. Let me take this House through some key events. The Police report was lodged on 30 October 2016 and Members will remember that Ms Liyani returned to Singapore in December 2016. She was then arrested and, for a period of time, the Police conducted their investigations.

On 5 June 2017, the Police sent the file to AGC for their investigations and recommendations. AGC asked the Police to clarify certain points, which the Police then looked into. Eventually, on 10 August 2017, the AGC directed the Police to prefer charges against Ms Liyani. She was released. She was charged in Court on 31 August 2017 and released on bail. Ms Liyani claimed trial to the charges and, at the second pre-trial conference in October 2017, AGC asked for trial dates in February 2018 – four months later. However, counsel said that he could not take dates in February or March 2018. As a consequence, the trial was fixed for hearing in April 2018. That was to accommodate her counsel's availability.

The trial commenced in April 2018. Due to the issues, it could not be concluded within the allocated period, and it took place over several tranches and eventually concluded on 17 January 2019 – 20 hearing days. And we are not suggesting for a moment, I think, that we should truncate the trial simply because we want to have speed as opposed to thoroughness.

There was a total of 16 witnesses – 12 prosecution witnesses, four defence witnesses – and the record of proceedings came up to 3,699 pages. The verdict by the State Courts was delivered on 20 March 2019 and Ms Liyani was sentenced a few days later on 25 March. She then appealed against the sentence and conviction. Detailed submissions were put forward to the High Court by both parties, and this was heard over three days – in November 2019, February 2020 and August 2020 and, eventually, the High Court acquitted Ms Liyani on 4 September 2020. Thank you, Mr Speaker.

I thank Mr Perera. I am not generalising and I know that you have gone into a series of other countries. I think if you did the research – which I am sure you did – you would have seen numerous articles about the ombudsman system in Australia, in the UK and the failings that they have had. Just look at the NHS ombudsman in the UK and the police ombudsman in the UK. Two examples.

Second, I am not in a position to speculate as to what might happen to those countries were there no ombudsman. But I think the point I am making is two-fold: first, look at the outcome in these countries – I am suggesting that they do not fare better than Singapore and I am sure the Member will agree; and second, perhaps more importantly, that we have our own systems, we have our own context. And we have our system that works in the way in which I have outlined. I am not sure if I did justice to it when I outlined it very quickly, in the interest of time.

I am sure the Member will agree that you have to apply suggestions in the context of what you already have in your own systems and look at whether that is going to improve the system or whether that would create yet another layer.

On his third point about the QSM, I made the point in response to the fact that you do not need an ombudsman to deal with someone who is rude to an individual. That is where you have the QSM, you have your Members of Parliament, you have other avenues like REACH to deal with.

On his final point, I think we all agree that if we can better the system – obviously – and I think on that, we are on the same page.