Lessons from Drone Attack on Oil Facilities in Saudi Arabia

Thank you, Mr Speaker. To ensure that Singapore's air defences are robust to deal with drone attacks, we must draw important lessons from the recent drone attack on Saudi oil facilities and any such related incidents. Indeed, the SAF monitors closely the development of these drone incidents, so that we can assess the adequacy of our defence systems and to plug gaps when identified. Over the past decade, the SAF has enhanced our air defence systems against possible drone attacks.

The recent Saudi attack reflects the growing and evolving capabilities of drones that are available to both state and non-state actors who mean to do us harm. Let me provide first the spectrum of drone capabilities that we need to protect ourselves against, before elaborating on specific defence responses. Let me start with the Saudi attack. While reports still need to be confirmed, that attack shows clearly that the range and manoeuvrability of drones have increased – depending on the reports you read, from 700 to 1,500 km. These medium- and long-range drones are able to avoid radar detection and also hit their targets with great precision. I think many Members would have seen the pictures after the attacks and how precise those attacks were.

The Saudi attack was conducted by sophisticated weaponised drones and that represents one extreme of sophistication in terms of drone capabilities. If we take the other extreme where you have simple drones that can be bought in retail stores and that would intrude into restricted air space, but even though they are very simple devices, they can disrupt civilian or military air traffic because they pose safety hazards. The impact is not trivial, as the past incidents in Gatwick and Changi Airport showed. In both incidents, planes were diverted and grounded which resulted in both real and opportunity costs – amounting to millions – to airport regulators, airlines and passengers. These simple off-the-shelf drones can be modified with some know-how to avoid detection by conventional means that most commercial airports employ.

So, on one hand, very sophisticated, weaponised drones that can go up to 1,500 km; and the other extreme, toy drones that you can buy from the stores that create great impact. Between these two extremes are the class of drones that can carry simple munitions such as grenades and small arms. For example, ISIS had been successful in modifying and weaponising small drones with explosives to attack ground forces and facilities. It is documented. In August 2018, drones carrying explosives were used in an attempted attack on the President of Venezuela.

So, taken as a whole, the security threats posed by drones are therefore real and the impact can be damaging, even devastating, depending on the platform used. Against this wide spectrum of threats, there can be no single counter-response. It would neither be proportionate nor sustainable to employ sophisticated assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars to take down hobbyist drones that can be bought for less than a thousand dollars. For these threats, other tools would be required, such as regulations, deterrent fines and penalties, education, and working with relevant stakeholders including drone-hobbyist communities themselves. And I think MOT has been very busy doing that and we are passing some Bills to enhance penalties. For Changi Airport, MOT and CAAS deal with possible intrusions from drones. MHA and SPF take the lead in defending against drones in specific areas of security concern and during major events. The SAF will assist them when called upon and when needed.

Beyond these specific responsibilities by various agencies against drones in their geographic domains, the SAF remains responsible for drone attacks against Singapore by would-be aggressors, especially towards key installations. For example, the SAF recognises that terrorists can use drones as a form of attack. Within our region, an ISIS-linked individual had planned to use commercial drones to conduct bomb attacks in Malaysia. Singapore continues to be a target for regional terrorist groups, as demonstrated by the foiled terrorist attack on Marina Bay Sands in 2016. These incidents are sober reminders that the risks are not theoretical and we must remain vigilant.

Let me go through specific enhancements that the SAF has put in place over the past decade to buttress our air defences against drone attacks. First, early-warning systems. The RSAF has enhanced its early warning capability with more capable sensors like the G550 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft and Multi-Mission Radars. The assets we have in place now would have been able to detect the alleged drones used in the attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia.

After identification, these drones would be taken down by our Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems, which have now been upgraded with new platforms. The SPYDER system has replaced the older RAPIER system and the ASTER-30 missile system will replace the I-HAWK system. Some Members as NSmen and GBAD units would have been familiar with the old systems. The SAF is confident that these systems can protect Singapore against aerial threats from both manned and unmanned aircraft. Our air defence system is live, 24/7.

I also mentioned drones in the middle part of that threat spectrum. What do we do against these? These threats are rapidly evolving and while they may not cause large scale damage, can cause bodily harm, undermine confidence and disrupt our society. Just imagine if grenades were dropped or suicide attacks with minor explosives were used. Against such threats, as we did in NDP or during the Trump-Kim Summit held in Singapore, the SAF puts up additional sensors and counter-offensive capabilities when required during high signature events or when intelligence assessments indicate specific risks.

The SAF will continue to monitor threat developments and learn from all incidents that occur globally to provide appropriate responses to the spectrum of potential drone attacks that are commensurate with the level of threat, sustainable and cost-effective.

I thank the Minister for his response. Two supplementary questions, Mr Speaker. First, do we have military hardware, the assets, to counter the military threat of a military-grade UAV attack or a military drone attack? In particular, would our air defence continue to provide a protective umbrella over Singapore, notwithstanding the advent of military-grade drones and UAVs, and the threat they pose? The second question – I agree that the solution does not depend solely on MINDEF. Therefore, how will drone hobbyists be made to abide by rules such as to avoid air space close to key installations which in turn will help our authorities quickly detect, isolate and neutralise the real and harmful threats?

Mr Speaker, both questions are good ones and reflect the complexity of our mounting counter-responses to specific threats. So, let us take the first threat that Mr de Souza mentioned about – the sophisticated drones. There, I think, as a whole, most militaries including the SAF are more confident. Because once you go beyond a certain size, whether it is manned or unmanned, your air defence systems are up. They are low-flying, they try to avoid radar detection, you can have counter-offensive measures which deal with that using a different array of sensors, as well as responses. I would say, there, I think, the short answer is that, if the alleged components or platforms as in the Saudi attack were used, we are quite confident that we would have detected it as well as been able to neutralise it.

It is the other spectrums that are more troublesome, sometimes. Hobbyists drones – how do you deal with them? It is inappropriate to use the systems that we use against large weaponised drones, for them. Sometimes, it is ineffective. There, I would say that the industry is busily working because it is a global issue. Many airports can be affected as we saw in Gatwick and Changi; and our own scientists and SAF are also looking for appropriate measures that are sustainable and cost-effective. As well as against the intermediate set of spectrum that I talked about; in other words, larger sized drones, not as quite as big as the ones that are used in the Saudi attack but nonetheless, can carry small arms, small ammunitions and grenades, and so on and so forth.

Mr Speaker, may I ask the Minister whether there is scope to require the manufacturers of these hobbyists' drones to cooperate with MINDEF such that action can be taken?

The answer is yes. In fact, the industry has responded. For instance, certain class of drones that are by certain manufacturers have built-in software that you can key in, which incorporate coordinates of restricted zones so that the drones can never fly in. But they can be easily altered. So, you can require it and regulations will form part of our tool box against such aspects. In the main, that will help reduce the noise. In other words, you put in those regulations and, by and large, the majority of distributors and hobbyists will comply with the rules, and that reduces the noise so that you can focus on the errant drone operators.