Debated in Parliament on 7 May 2019.
Order for Second Reading read.
Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."
Sir, Tim Berners-Lee introduced us to the World Wide Web in 1989. Thirty years later, more than half of global population – 4.4 billion – are active Internet users, 3.5 billion of which are on social media. The ubiquity of technology, the way it is embedded in every aspect of our everyday lives, is a given. It has gone beyond just being a useful tool to help us perform tasks to becoming the primary means by which we search for information, we communicate, and we socialise. It is commonplace to see families, groups of friends, all sitting around a table, all looking down at their phones. Some figures to demonstrate the widespread use of the Internet and social media are as follows: Google handles more than 5.5 billion searches each day; there are 2.27 billion monthly active users of Facebook; there are 500 million tweets which are sent each day on Twitter; and almost five billion videos are watched on YouTube every day.
Singaporeans are at the vanguard of growth in internet use. In 2017, Singapore, alongside Sweden, topped the Global Inclusive Internet Index. This index measures the adoption and ease of access to the
Internet. There is no question about the benefits of the Internet and social media, and the convenience that they bring to our lives. But these benefits also come at a price.
In exchange for this convenience, we have in turn bestowed significant power on the social media companies. We voluntarily surrender personal data to them, exposing the most intimate details of our lives on social media websites. We are often unaware that websites and companies are collecting and amassing our data, without our knowledge, until perhaps a scandal breaks.
Last December, Facebook admitted that it had struck deals with companies like Netflix, Spotify, that allowed them to read, write and delete private messages of users. Google Plus, for instance, on two separate occasions last year, admitted that it had exposed personal data of over 50 million users in total to third party developers. After the first discovery, that mistake was hidden from the public for over half a year. Amazon’s Alexa, as another example, an "always on" device in our homes – Bloomberg recently revealed that the team charged with auditing commands given to Alexa had access to customers’ home addresses and other personal information. Alexa also recorded private conversation and sent it to a user’s acquaintance.
In short, there is no adequate way to moderate and control how this information is used, or shared by others. And it is not a simple matter of a leak of data, or loss of privacy. Many of us think that we still have some measure of control over our privacy. Some brush off loss of privacy, saying it is a worthwhile exchange for the convenience and benefits that technology brings to us. But we fail to recognise that the digital traces that we leave online can be connected and thereafter shared with others. There are wide-reaching, and sometimes devastating repercussions that could occur.
There are some key areas of concern for us and I will enumerate them.
First, on cyberbullying. Cyberbullying is, really, traditional playground bullying transmuted into an online new digital form. In many ways, it is more insidious than traditional bullying. There is anonymity, and there is a lack of a physical confrontation and it allows people to engage in conduct that they may not ordinarily engage in, in normal daily life. The effects are more wide-ranging, more long-lasting. The abusive comments that are put up can be permanently displayed on the Internet. They are broadcast to a large online community. And in truth, the victim has nowhere to hide.
In our 2014 Second Reading speech on this Bill – POHA – the Government highlighted alarming trends about cyberbullying. Since then, matters have grown worse and I will cite a few numbers to this House. In 2017, a survey commissioned by Talking Point found that three out of four children and teenagers had reported being victims of cyberbullying. In a 2019 Google survey, teachers in Singapore view the need to prevent cyberbullying as the most pressing concern when it comes to teaching children about online safety.
The consequences of cyberbullying can be dire. The Journal of Medical Internet Research published a study last year and showed that cyberbullying raised the risk of self-harm or suicidal behaviour amongst young persons by 2.3 times. The latest research suggests that bullying may cause physical changes in the brain, increasing the risk of mental illness. Studies have also shown that bullying in childhood has effects that last into adulthood as well. Mental problems including anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies, poor general health, lower educational, financial and social functioning. Many suffer in silence and we may not know until it is too late.
In Singapore, for instance, it was reported a few years ago, that a 13-year-old girl was bullied by her friends on Facebook and in a WhatsApp group. She started cutting herself with metal rulers and razor blades as a result, causing injury to herself. In the US, a 12-year-old girl in Florida hung herself after being subjected to cyberbullying by two 12-year-olds: rumours about having sexually transmitted diseases, vulgar name-calling and the like. In the UK, a 17-year-old boy in Manchester stepped in front of a train after he was called a "black rat" and "ugly" online, both by people he knew and also by people who were complete strangers to him.
The second area of concern is in doxxing. Doxxing is the disclosure of personal information to cause violence or harassment to others. The term was originally used in 1990s to describe a tactic used by hackers. They would release dossiers of personal information about other hackers, to breach their anonymity and expose them to harassment. We are familiar with some local examples: the Caltex incident, Members would know; about the couple who pushed the old man at Toa Payoh hawker centre; and of course, the Anton Casey case, where he had to leave Singapore as a result.
Some may say, these people get what they deserve. But doxxing has a darker side. It has been used as a political tool by extremists. In the US, an ISIS-linked group published names, addresses and phone numbers of 1,400 mostly US military and government personnel, urging supporters to attack them. Can you imagine if you were one of these 1,400? In New Zealand, in the wake of the Christchurch terror attacks, an anti-gun control Facebook group posted contact details of the Queenstown detective online. One post featured an image of a rifle and words, "Come and take it". You can imagine how dangerous this information is, and can be, in the hands of wrong people.
Some other examples. In New York, an 18-year-old boy, a gifted violinist, killed himself after his roommate live-streamed him behaving intimately with another man, to 150 people. Also in New York, a journalist, Asher Wolf made anti-war posts online. Her address was shared on the dark web, and people posted dog faeces through to her, in her mailbox. In South Africa, a journalist, Karima Brown. Her contact details were published on Twitter by the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters. She received an onslaught of graphic messages threatening rape and murder. Some threatened to expose her flesh by peeling her skin off. Finally, in Boston, there was a mis-identification of the Boston bomber. After the Boston Marathon bombings, online citizens on Reddit wrongly identified Sunil Tripathi as the Boston bomber. The family received hundreds of threatening and anti-Islamic messages, even though they are not Muslim.
Third, the area of falsehoods. Falsehoods are disseminated even more easily today for a number of reasons. First, the psychology of Internet users. Internet users are prone to confirmation bias. They have shorter attention spans, people skim, rather than critically evaluate content. They tend to share information because it triggers an emotional response more so than because of its credibility. Users generally share links without even having read them. When content gets shared enough times, it seems and appears more credible.
There is also a market for online disinformation tools and services. Fake social media accounts commonly used to spread falsehoods. "Click farms" consisting of large number of low-paid workers can be used to sell video views, "likes" and even votes. For instance, Members will probably know, that one million Instagram "likes" can be bought for US$18 and 500 re-tweets for US$2. Bots can sometimes take the place of these low-cost workers as well enhancing the spread of this online disinformation. Other online influencers can also be paid to spread false content, and clickbaits can be used to profit from Internet traffic.
Falsehoods affect people, real people in real life, as well as entities. Some examples. It affects those close to home. One of our local actresses: messages were circulated suggesting that she had an STD. She started receiving messages such as: "Are you a prostitute?" and "Heard you have STD. Get well soon." Lewd comments continued to surface even after the facts were put out and it affected her reputation even when she tried to venture overseas.
Recently, the Select Committee on Online Falsehoods heard from a new citizen, Mr Hetamsaria, falsely identified in an article as a new citizen who was disappointed with Singapore and considering giving up his citizenship. The article was shared over 44,000 times on Facebook. The family was deeply affected by numerous xenophobic comments made about them.
Just last week, there was fake news on Facebook that a veteran of our local acting scene, Lim Kay Tong, received a 16-year sentence. In truth, this was a clickbait. When users clicked on the link, it led to a recipe for tikka. Another linked to a recipe for pumpkin spice cheesecake. But the impact of the clickbait was self-evident. There was also fake news circulating on WhatsApp claiming that Fandi Ahmad was taken into custody for hurting someone. Again, a clickbait.
Falsehoods about companies can cause them irreversible damage, set off a public relations nightmare and cause economic damage. Even giants like Coca-Cola are not immune. There have been stories claiming that clear, parasite worms were found in bottles of Dasani across the country. Several hundred people had been sent to hospital as a result. That FDA had shut down a manufacturing plant. Coca-Cola, of course, denied this, as did the FDA.
NTUC FairPrice, closer to home, was affected by multiple rumours. In 2007, a photo suggesting NTUC sold halal pork circulated on the Internet. Similar rumours later affected Ya Kun Kaya Toast and a Yong Tau Foo business at Westgate shopping mall. In 2017, Members would recall that there was a post going round social media suggesting that FairPrice’s house brand rice was made of plastic. All untrue.
Studies paint a bleak picture of a world where the spread of falsehoods over social media is quick, wide and pervasive, whilst truth, even if it corrects the original falsehood, lags far behind. An MIT study analysed 126,000 rumours that spread on Twitter over 12 years. The study showed that rumours travelled farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than truth in all categories of information. The study showed that tweets which perpetrated a falsehood about the Ebola virus being transmitted by air, outnumbered tweeted corrections by 2.7 to one.
Another study by the Journal of Experimental Psychology indicated that repeated exposure to a false statement on social media made it more believable.
And, finally, in a University of Buffalo study, 20,000 tweets during Hurricane Sandy and the Boston Marathon bombing showed that 86% to 91% of active twitter users spread falsehoods. Nearly as many did nothing to correct that.
It is self-evident, partly from what I have seen and partly I am sure from Members' own experience, that the Internet is almost impossible to control, akin to a lawless jungle. As in any jungle, the weakest and most vulnerable are disproportionately affected. Recent surveys showed multi-racial females have the highest risk of being harassed online. Adolescent girls are more likely to experience cyberbullying than boys. Seventy-five percent of children with autism are bullied online. Seventy percent of children with physical defects are bullied online. LGBT teens are at five times more at risk of being abused on Facebook than non-LGBT teens.
This online harassment translates into real world violence. One in three women in the US experiences domestic violence. Nearly 90% of domestic abuse shelters and programmes report that abusers have intimidated and made threats against them using electronic means. An Australian survey found that 98% of domestic violence practitioners reported clients who experienced technology-facilitated abuse.
We cannot trust the Internet companies to regulate this jungle. Why? Because their primary motivation is the pursuit of profit. In an internal company memo, Facebook Vice President Andrew Bosworth in June 2016 claimed that any growth, any growth on Facebook was good. Let me quote the memo, he said, "Maybe it costs a life by exposing someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools. And still, we connect people. The ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is de facto good." This memo leaked two weeks after the Cambridge Analytica scandal broke.
There is not enough transparency in how administrative standards are derived and enforced. There is no democratic process and no court process. Facebook only made public its community standards in 2018 after the Cambridge Analytica scandal erupted – 14 years after Facebook was first founded. People have no faith in social media giants to contain harassment. Users have complained that social media companies have taken days to address their complaints about harassment, if at all.
A poll in the UK this year showed that more than half the reports that women lodge about harassment on Facebook are met with either no response or response that the behaviour did not breach their own community guidelines. A Singaporean girl saw a Minister to complain that she had her picture put up on Facebook by a male acquaintance, along with derogatory remarks containing sexual innuendo. She wrote to Facebook, whose response was, that it did not violate their community standards.
Last year, a US Democratic strategist received threatening tweets. He complained to Twitter, which said it did not violate rules against abusive behaviour. The man later sent pipe bombs to politicians, and then, at that stage, Twitter said its earlier assessment was wrong. The actress who accused James Franco of sexual misconduct was also repeatedly harassed on Instagram. She made a report to FBI and said that Instagram ignored almost all her complaints.
Tech companies have admitted that they are unable to deal with some of these problems. So, we need a solution.
The amendments to POHA today, give power to the people so that the man on the street can take back the truth and find a way to reclaim his dignity. We seek to simplify the process to make it easier for the man on the street to get recourse, to get redress; make clear what remedies he can get; enable him to tackle falsehoods and harassment once they are published; enable him to put the truth out there, to counter falsehoods that may affect his livelihood, or in the case of a company, its business.
So, first, let me take Members back to our first attempt in 2014 to deal with online harassment holistically, when this piece of legislation was first enacted. This, as Members will recall, was the first piece of legislation dedicated to protecting victims of harassment, both offline and online. It laid down clear norms as to what constitutes unacceptable social behaviour. The presence of this framework encouraged victims to come forward to seek help, to seek redress. To date, more than 3,000 Magistrate’s Complaints have been filed under the Act. Over 1,700 prosecutions have been brought. About 900 convictions have been obtained. There were 500 applications for protection orders under this Act of which over 200 such orders were granted. These numbers demonstrate how important POHA has been as an avenue of relief to victims of harassment.
In introducing the revisions today, we have taken keen interest in feedback on POHA from at least three groups. First, the Courts. Second, the civil society groups. And finally, from the victims of harassment themselves. Let me sketch out the feedback that we have obtained, given to us by these three groups, which have been instrumental in shaping the amendments behind this Bill.
First, the process of obtaining relief under this Act. It is clear to us that processes under POHA can be simplified further, made cheaper and also faster. The current process of applying for an expedited protection order (EPO) and protection order (PO) can be streamlined. The forms can be made simpler. Some victims have said, they feel that they need the assistance of a lawyer to navigate the current process. Currently, applying for a PO costs about $300 to $500. In contrast, there is a simpler and more inexpensive method to apply for a personal protection order (PPO) under the Women’s Charter.
Those victims who choose instead to file a Magistrate’s Complaint face some difficulties. First, the outcome of the complaint often turns on the conclusion of police investigations. Victims do not know when these investigations might conclude. A victim who has filed a complaint with the Magistrate, does not have the benefit of the protections afforded by a PO. If a PO is necessary, the victim has to separately apply for one in the civil courts. We can simplify the procedure, so that a victim does not have to provide evidence of his or her harassment more than once. We can also ensure that we prevent the duplication because reliving the experience only causes further mental anguish for the victim.
Second, feedback received is that the courts should also be given more powers when making orders. In particular, the scope of the POs should be widened. It should cover related persons of the victim, as harassers often target persons close to the victim in order to get to the victim. The courts should be able to order offenders to be sent for psychiatric assessment and treatments where appropriate as there are cases where mental illnesses may well be the root of the offender’s behaviour.
Third, it was suggested that POs should also be given more bite. At present, a breach of a PO is not arrestable. This perceived lack of severity might be another factor which deters victims from coming forward and applying for POs.
Further, our attention was also drawn to a specific group of victims – victims of intimate partner violence. These are often victims in a romantic relationship. They may be dating or married. If unmarried, they do not qualify for protection under the Women’s Charter, which only protects victims of family violence. Some might assume that it might be easier for an unmarried victim to break off the abusive relationship. However, the psyche of an abused partner is sometimes the same, whether married or unmarried. The intimacy of the relationship allows the abuser to create a psychological hold over the victim and makes it difficult for the victim to break free. Research shows that romantic love can sometimes be like an addiction.
A PAVE study in 2012 in Singapore, showed one in three unmarried persons between the ages of 15 and 34 were found to be in an abusive relationship. Of these, two-thirds had their first abusive relationship in their teens. On average, for 20% of those who were abused by their spouses or were themselves abusers, the abuse started when they were first dating.
Let me highlight the case of Mdm A. She dated a man for five years, they had five children. Dating violence started in the first year of their relationship. The man began by shouting vulgarities at her. It escalated to physical violence – he hit, kicked, slammed her face on the floor, threatened her with a knife. And all of this, in front of the children. He threatened to kill himself or the children and abused the children. He would follow Mdm A everywhere and track her whereabouts via calls, texts, GPS. When Mdm A decided to seek help, she could not apply for a PPO under the Women’s Charter as she was unmarried. Her first child who did not carry the man’s name on her birth certificate was in same position. She could only apply for PPOs for the other four children. Mdm A and her children had to go to a crisis shelter, where they are living now. The man is in a new relationship.
There are other such cases and I am sure Members themselves will be familiar with their own experiences. We need to find a way for people in intimate relationships, who are the subject of serious abuse, to get POs more easily. PAVE, in particular, highlighted this strongly to us and has advised the Government on how best to deal with the situation. As a result, we amended the Penal Code yesterday and are proposing amendments to POHA today to further strengthen the recourse.
We have carefully considered the feedback, some of which I have sketched out, from stakeholders alongside the need for greater regulation. We will improve the process of obtaining relief from the Courts. Let me start with that in the Bill. The Bill has a new part 3A, which will establish the Protection from Harassment Court (PHC). The PHC will be dedicated to dealing with harassment matters, whether online or offline, and will have oversight of all criminal and civil cases under the Act. It will be sited in the State Courts and will have the jurisdiction of a District Court. The judges will be specially trained to deal with harassment matters. Volunteers will be on hand to help victims navigate the court process.
In egregious cases, it may not suffice to grant the victim a civil remedy in the form of a PO. The law may need to deal with the offender even if the victim has not already gone to the police. In the Bill, there is a clause 18 which imposes a duty on a judge granting the EPO to consider whether a criminal investigation is warranted. So, the Court has a proactive duty to look at facts, circumstances in the course of granting the EPO. If it is, the judge must refer the matter to the police. The intention is for serious cases of hurt or harassment which come to the court to be referred to the police. This will ensure that the State can intervene, and intervene at an early stage to reduce the risk of further or greater hurt to the victim.
In addition, we are taking measures to help victims to meet the burden of proof. Clauses 16(1) and 17(1) provide that if the respondent has been convicted of a hurt offence under the Penal Code, or a POHA offence, the requirement to show that the respondent has contravened POHA will be deemed satisfied. In other words, the victim will not have to prove his or her case more than once.
In terms of streamlining procedures and expediting timelines, we have worked with the State Courts to do so, so that the process for applying for a PO under POHA will, as far as possible, be aligned to that under the Women’s Charter. The victim will be able to file an application for a PO using a simplified form, at the PHC or online. Relief will also be quicker and more permanent. Clause 17 will ensure that EPOs will be in place until conclusion of proceedings unless they are successfully challenged. The victim will no longer have to renew the EPOs every 28 days. The hearings will also be conducted more quickly. The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for EPOs within 48 to 72 hours of application. Where there is an element of violence involved, the PHC will try to conduct hearings for EPOs within 24 hours of the application.
The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for final POs within four weeks of the application. The timelines, of course, will be subject to practical constraints. For example, if an application is filed over the weekend, the Courts may only be able to hear it on the next working day. Applicants should of course, always seek police intervention if they are in immediate physical danger. Finally, should the Court decide to stay proceedings for a PO under the new section 13A pending a criminal investigation, it may take longer for a PO to be granted. However, in that situation, an EPO will be in place until the PO is granted. We hope that these measures will relieve some of the anxieties that an applicant faces when invoking the court process and encourage those in need to come forward.
Next, in terms of enhancing the protection for harassment victims and related persons. We will enhance the protection for these categories of person, expand the scope of POs and the powers available to the Court when granting a PO. Let me explain. First, clause 16(1) widens the ambit of POs to deal specifically with the situation where an offender may publish a harassing communication which is then shared by others. A PO can now be made to prevent the publication of communications which are, not just identical, but also substantially similar to the offending communication. In addition, clause 16(2) clarifies that Internet intermediaries can be ordered to disable access to an offending communication published on their platforms. This is to try to clamp down on harassing communications going viral, or spreading even further.
Second, clause 16(2) extends the scope of POs to protect related persons of the victim. This will ensure that individuals such as Mdm A, in my example, will be able to obtain POs for herself and her children, rather than have to live with the abuse and to worry about potential harassment or abuse to her children.
Third, we have acted on feedback that the Courts should be empowered to proactively intervene in cases where the harasser’s conduct may not cross the threshold of criminal or dangerous conduct, but where the facts demonstrate that the harasser is mentally ill.
Clause 19 empowers the court to order the respondent to undergo a psychiatric assessment after it grants a PO and undergo psychiatric treatment if certain criteria are fulfilled. And the criteria are: that the respondent must have a psychiatric conditions susceptible to treatment, capable of being treated. The respondent must be suitable for treatment. The psychiatric condition must have contributed to the contravention that formed the basis for making PO, having a nexus with the conduct complained of.
The criteria and nature of the treatment will largely mirror the treatment regime under the Criminal Procedure Code, with appropriate safeguards. Failure to comply with the orders will be punishable as contempt of Court.
Two further amendments in clause 16(1)(a) clarify the law. POs can be obtained against entities who commit contraventions under the Act. The common law principles of attribution will apply. This will address cases that have already been brought before our courts, for example, where wayward companies might have crossed the threshold of lawful debt collection into criminal behavior such as intentional harassment or violence in the context of conducting their lawful activity. So, harassing, intentional harassing sometimes violence in the context of carrying out their debt collection.
Companies may have sent different runners to harass a victim. Victims can now obtain a single PO against the company and they do not have to bring each runner who conducts each of these harassing acts to Court each time.
Domestic exclusion orders are available under the Act. These orders, which are also available under the Women’s Charter, will allow victims to exclude a harasser from their shared residence. This is so even if the harasser has a proprietary interest in the residence.
We are also taking measures to strengthen the recourse available to victims and increase the deterrence factor of the remedies available under the Act. First, clauses 4 to 10 and 13 clarify that entities can be liable for contraventions under the Act. They can be prosecuted or sued for damages and the common law principles of attribution will apply. This will discourage entities from allowing their employees to harass customers.
Second, this House heard yesterday about amendments to the Penal Code to double penalties for offences committed against vulnerable persons. Under the proposed POHA amendments, clause 10 provides that penalties for POHA offences against vulnerable persons, be they adults or children, will likewise be doubled.
Third, we spoke earlier about the pressing need to protect victims of intimate partner violence. The Government has amended the Penal Code to provide for enhanced penalties for specific offences committed against intimate partners. In a similar vein, clause 11 of the Bill doubles the penalty if a POHA offence is committed against an intimate partner.
We are also taking steps to ensure that a harasser who reoffends is also dealt with severely. At present, as I mentioned earlier, breach of a PO under POHA is not an arrestable offence. This is in contrast with the position under the Women’s Charter. In response to concerns that POs issued under the Act are perceived as ineffective, we propose to amend the law. Clause 22 provides that if a harasser breaches a PO, this will be arrestable in prescribed circumstances, such as where hurt is caused or where the harassing conduct persists despite the issuance of a PO. In addition, clause 9(b) provides that if a harasser breaches a PO more than once, he will be liable on subsequent conviction to twice the maximum punishment prescribed. This also brings the Act in line with the Women’s Charter.
I turn now to online harassment. I spoke earlier about the scourge of technology when not handled properly. I would like to turn to amendments that have been targeted towards online behaviour and harassment.
First, on doxxing. To understand the basis of the doxxing amendments, let me first highlight a case that might fall through the cracks today. A Singaporean girl, whom I shall not name, was in the middle of her "O" levels. She discovered edited photographs of herself on a Tumblr blog with pornographic content. She started receiving unsolicited messages on her social media platforms. One day, she noticed a man following her home. Her former best friend, it turned out, had emailed her full name, photos, address and names of the school and tuition centres that she attended to over 60 porn blogs. With this knowledge, she retreated from her social interactions, afraid to even leave her home. This young girl was a victim of harassment. However, the email sent by her friend to the porn blogs, despite its malicious intent, may not have been caught by existing POHA provisions which require communications to be "threatening, abusive or insulting" in themselves.
The doxxing amendments are an extension of the existing provisions on harassment and seek to deal with this lacuna in the law today. Clauses 4(a) and 6(d) introduce the offence of doxxing. For this offence, the intention or knowledge of the publisher is key. Doxxing will be made out if the person published identity information of another person: intending to cause harassment, alarm or distress; intending to cause the victim to fear that unlawful violence will be used against him or another person, or to facilitate unlawful violence against the victim; or knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the publication is likely to cause the victim to fear that unlawful violence will be used against him or another person, or to facilitate unlawful violence against the victim.
Identity information is defined as information that on its own or with other information identifies, or purports to identify, the victim. This includes photographs, contact details, address and place of employment.
The new offence will not affect most people, who continue to engage constructively on the Internet. It does not stop them from: identifying the perpetrators of crimes, including traffic offences or POHA offences or, indeed from posting videos of public disputes to give a factual account of an incident. On the other hand, publishing someone’s contact details to netizens intending to harass or alarm that person, or intending that other netizens use the information to harass or hurt the person, is unacceptable. Publishing photographs and contact details of a girl, intending that others use those details to harass her, is likewise unacceptable.
There have been concerns raised that the new doxxing provisions could be too broad. These similar concerns were raised about the existing harassment provisions back in 2014. Harassment is heavily fact specific and doxxing is a subset of that. It is no different. The law today in fact, with these amendments, adds clarity. Doxxing is currently prosecuted through a mix of provisions arising in different pieces of legislation. Courts will now be able to develop a body of jurisprudence on when the offence made out and, furthermore, existing case law on when intent is made out in the circumstances can be relied upon.
Other concerns have also been raised about whether the new provisions can deal with anonymous posters. Let me deal with that. Anonymity not a new issue under the Act. Minister Shanmugam, when he spoke on this Bill in 2014, addressed this. Even if the respondent or publisher is anonymous, he may be identified by an Internet location address, website, or other unique identifier as the court may order. In addition, POs are binding, even if the person behind the account may not be identified. The POs can be served on multiple accounts as well.
As with the other victims of harassment such as cyberbullying and intimate partner violence, a victim of doxxing will be able to avail himself of the streamlined processes and expedited timelines as well. The court may order that the offending communication be taken down by the offender and persons who have shared the original post or substantially similar posts. Where appropriate, the court may also order that an Internet intermediary disable access to the offending post. And finally, where an EPO involving online doxxing is involved, the Court will aim to hear the application within 24 hours.
Let me now turn to online falsehoods. First, in terms of setting the context. Aside from doxxing, the Bill also enhances existing measures available to address the spread of falsehoods by repealing and re-enacting the falsehoods regime. The falsehoods regime under POHA aims to help individuals to give recourse and redress against the effects of falsehoods whilst, at the same time, striking the balance with the right of people to hold their own opinions and debate matters of interest.
Broadly, POHA categorises the remedies available by types of orders which are available, split into five categories. Section 15 deals with the final orders which can be given in cases of falsehoods and section 16 deals, amongst others, with interim orders for the same. This is similar to the approach taken in section 12, which makes a PO available against both persons, entities and Internet intermediaries. In contrast, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill has distinct parts dealing with individuals versus corporate entities – and these are found in Part III and Part IV of that Bill.
For the avoidance of doubt, the falsehoods regime under sections 15 and 16 POHA, and clause 20 of the Bill, deals with false statements of fact. This includes misleading statements but does not cover criticisms, opinions, satire or parody.
Let me make this clear. First, a statement that omits material facts is misleading if the statement would have been considered by a reasonable person to be misleading by reason of such omission. If for example, A says that B is dishonest, that is a statement of opinion and not a false statement of fact. However, if A goes on to say that B was convicted by a court of cheating, then this is a false statement of fact if B was never convicted of such an offence. This is also false if B was subsequently acquitted on appeal.