Debated in Parliament on 28 Feb 2019.
Head J, Ministry of Defence. Mr Vikram Nair.
Mr Chairman, I beg to move, "That the total sum to be allocated for Head J of the Estimates be reduced by $100".
In 2017, we celebrated 50 years of National Service and Singaporeans of all generations joined in. The SAF has been an integral part of Singapore and we are all either serving National Servicemen or family members of one. Yet, the SAF was set up over 50 years ago and much of the training involved training in jungle warfare which reflected the terrain of our region.
Yet, the nature of our region and the nature of our threats have evolved significantly over the years. If we start with the threats, the SAF will set up against the backdrop of the Cold War and the struggle with the communist insurgents in the region was one of the main focuses.
The Cold War is over. In its place, we see new rivalries and tensions. The strategic competition between the US and China has intensified and it appears to be a new great power rivalry. Tensions in the South China Sea continue and no swift resolutions appear to be in sight.
The Korean peninsular, probably one of the last legacies of the Cold War, remains volatile. And although Trump and Kim are having a second summit, there does not appear to be any firm commitment to denuclearise on the part of North Korea.
India and Pakistan have always had tensions between them, but the events in the last few days are particularly worrying, especially because of how fast the conflict seems to be escalating.
Against this backdrop, ASEAN countries have also been spending more on defence and these are our immediate neighbours. Defence spending has doubled from 2003 to 2016. Fresh in Singaporeans' minds would be the fact that Malaysia still has two vessels in our waters. Although both sides have made efforts to de-escalate since, there does not appear to be an easy resolution or end to this matter. And if matters escalate – we hope it will not be necessary – but the SAF may have to get involved.
On the other end of the technological spectrum, the threat of terrorism remains present. There are an increasing number of foreign fighters returning to the region from the wars in the Middle East and they remain a potential source of terror here.
ISIS has also set up in Indonesia and there were reports of attacks being planned on Singapore from there. The issue with terror attacks is that they are targeted at the civilian population, unlike conventional warfare, and could strike anyone, anywhere.
Against the backdrop of these threats, the SAF faces two primary challenges. The first is falling cohort sizes, meaning that we are probably going to have fewer people coming into National Service. The second is reduction in available areas for training. Singapore already has a very significant disadvantage in terms of size in any conflict. And our only hope appears to be that if we rely more on automation and sophisticated equipment systems, we may be able to compensate for this somewhat.
And it is in this context that I ask about the future of the SAF. In view of the variety of threats we now face, how does SAF ensure it remains an effective fighting force, capable of defending Singapore? What new capabilities will SAF be introducing over the next few years to meet the new security challenges? My second cut.
I earlier discussed the wide variety of threats SAF was facing. SAF also has a wide range of resources and capabilities it has developed over the years, as well as a variety of different operations that it engages in. This is necessary to deal with the wider spectrum of threats we are facing, as well as the more messy nature of warfare.
However, even if these demands on SAF continue to grow, as mentioned earlier, it faces constraints in terms of having less space to train. More and more SAF training areas and camps are being converted to other users, particularly residential and commercial uses. The announcement in relation to Paya Lebar airbase was one reason the example of this.
I am aware that SAF has adapted to this in many ways. This includes the more productive use of land for training, such as multi-storey rifle ranges and centralised conducting of training activities such as Basic Military Training and reservist training. SAF has also leveraged on its good relationships to train in territories overseas and this has helped train incapabilities that we may not be able to train in Singapore as well. Most NSmen and reservist would have some experience of training overseas.
These efforts are indeed commendable. However, I remain concern as more and more training areas are given up for other use. How does SAF overcome its training area limitations and ensure that it continues to have sufficient land to house its facilities and conduct its training?
*Question proposed.*
As mentioned in this year's Budget speech, today's more uncertain world spells greater possibility for tension and even conflict. Unexpected incidents under such circumstances can result in potentially dangerous unintended and uncontrolled escalation. The Government has rightly continued to stress the need for Singapore to support a stable, rules‐based order founded on international law and norms. I would like to ask how MINDEF provides this support through its defence diplomacy efforts and its guiding principles.
When meeting and engaging with foreign counterparts during peacetime, such as in the Shangri‐La Dialogue, how does MINDEF seek to contribute to the prevention of unintended and uncontrolled escalation of tensions in the region? More specifically, what kind of practical cooperation with other militaries regionally have MINDEF engaged in to enhance co-operation and dispel mistrust? Does MINDEF maintain or initiate high‐level military hotlines with the military from other countries to ensure that any potential issues on the ground can be discussed quickly?
Mr Vikram Nair. You have two cuts. Please take both together.
Chairman, ASEAN is the cornerstone of our regional security architecture. It has promoted an avenue for Southeast Asian countries to meet and discuss areas for mutual cooperation. While most people are familiar with ASEAN as an economic forum, ASEAN is also an important platform to come together on Defence matters. The ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting or ADMM was one of the primary pillars of these.
In recent years however, relationships between ASEAN appear to have become more strained for several reasons. First, the rivalry between the US and China also seems to be putting pressure on ASEAN countries as some come under pressure to choose in this rivalry. Second, on matters related to the South China Sea, there appears to be a growing risk of divide among ASEAN members as some of them are direct claimant states in this matter, while others have differing views and different economic incentives in this. Third, terrorism is a growing security threat, and with fighters returning from the Middle East to the region, there is a pressing need for cooperation to manage this threat.
In 2018, Singapore assumed chairmanship of ASEAN and the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting. What have we achieved with our Chairmanship of ADMM in 2018? Next cut.
Many countries in the Asia-Pacific have overlapping maritime and territorial claims. As tensions escalate among claimant states, there is a real risk of miscalculation on the ground. As militaries become more advanced, the cost of any conflict will be grave. For example, if fighter planes of one country are perceived to have improperly crossed into the territorial air space of another country and that country responds by shooting down the plane, that could quickly lead to retaliation and escalation and both countries may find themselves on the path to war.
The current exchanges between India and Pakistan are an example of how quickly a conflict can escalate once one party engages in the use of force.
Given the high risk of conflict breaking out, it is important for regional militaries to establish mechanisms to build trust, strengthen confidence and minimise conflict in the region. At the Committee of Supply debate last year, the Minister for Defence spoke about creating a Code for Unplanned Encounters for military aircraft. Could MINDEF provide an update on this and any of the confidence building measures that were introduced to reduce the risk of conflict escalating in the region?
This year, fully a third of our Budget goes to Diplomacy and Defence. It is the lion's share of the Budget, and for MINDEF at least, spent in anticipation of actions we hope never to take, and events we hope never to transpire.
However, the fact that we are prepared, willing and able will continue to make a difference in the way the odds fall for or against us. Deterrence is as the Finance Minister has said, one of the two important prongs of our foreign relations. In this, I would like to first ask: what is the role of the SAF in the on-going bilateral dispute with Malaysia in our Territorial Waters around Tuas?
Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a few days back, has set out our Government's position and that of the Malaysian agencies with regard to the intrusions by Malaysian government Vessels into Singapore Territorial Waters in Tuas. We have seen that Dr Vivian Balakrishnan and his counterpart in Malaysia have agreed at their meeting on 8 January this year to set up a working group of their officials that will discuss the de-escalation of the situation in the waters off Tuas, and will report within two months. We certainly look forward to this report.
In the meantime, Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, has also told this House how our security personnel will respond to intrusions into Singapore Territorial Waters. The Police Coast Guard, Republic of Singapore Navy and Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore are all part of the protective cover that we have, in defending our waters. For sure, there is a difference between what we can do, given our military equipment, and what we should do. Intrusions into our waters have taken place since late November last year. We have seen how these intrusions can lead to accidents.
In February, we had asked again for Malaysia to withdraw its vessels from Singapore's Territorial Waters off Tuas, after a collision between Greek carrier Pireas and a Malaysian government vessel, Polaris. This is not something that we had not foreseen – in fact, we had previously warned our neighbours, the Malaysians, that through these actions of theirs, it poses a threat to safety of navigation in the area.
Overall, our recent dispute with Malaysia has emphasised the need for Singapore to have a credible defence to protect Singapore's sovereignty. We have made clear our stand and we have sent strong signals that threats to our sovereignty will not be cost-free. Patience is a virtue but patience also has its limits and it also cannot prevent accidents from taking place, nor does it automatically lead to de-escalation of tensions.
Finally, I would like to ask Minister what guidance he has given to our agencies in this regard? And specifically, what is MINDEF and the SAF doing to enhance our defences around Singapore?
Chairman, Sir, National Service is a key institution in this country well call home. Hundreds and thousands of men have served in uniform since 1967 and stand ready to defend the country as operationally ready NSmen. In the run up to 2030, however, the effects of our steadily declining TFR will begin to be acutely felt with National Service numbers dropping by about one-third from the current numbers. This outcome will have a significant impact on manpower-intensive vocations and services such as the Army, in particular.
Some years ago, Minister shared that part of the solution would be the steady evolution to motorised platforms and equipment that require a lower complement of men and women to man. Can the Minister update the House on how the SAF is preparing itself for a manpower-lean future and outline the SAF's approach over the next few years, so as to ensure that a credible and effective fighting force stands ready to defend Singapore from 2030. And to this end, does the Minister foresee an even greater reliance on unmanned platforms and does the SAF intend to procure such platforms in a weaponised form in larger numbers?
Separately, in light of the regional and global environment, it would appear the SAF will continue to play a significant role in various national duties alongside Home Team units. More recently, Minister has spoken about ramping up cyber warfare and cyber defence capabilities. These are likely to stretch the SAF's manpower requirements even further. How will the SAF manage the manpower imperatives of these new functions in addition to its core war-fighting responsibilities in light of dwindling numbers over the next few years?
Chairman, MINDEF recently announced the intention to purchase the F-35, a 5th Generation multirole aircraft, which can perform: air-to-air, air-to-ground, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
More importantly, the F-35's stealth capabilities can help us maintain air dominance and overcome sophisticated air-defence. At the same time, the F-35's can fuse sensors and information from different sources, thereby networking our 4th Generation aircrafts and SAF assets together. In short, the acquisition of F-35 can level up RSAF's capabilities significantly. And despite earlier concerns of the F-35 programme, it has achieved initial operation capability in several countries, including the US.
At the same time, given the unprecedented complexity of F-35 as a programme, we can expect it to evolve and mature over time. In other words, the cost of the F-35s can differ, and perhaps decrease, as the F-35 programme becomes more matured. Therefore, it is important for us to purchase the appropriate number of F-35s, with the appropriate capabilities, at the appropriate time.
Sir, the Military today has a strong emphasis on information technology and data analytics, including big data. The use of this has become integrated into many aspects of Defence. On the other hand, cyber attacks and breaches are also getting more innovative, threatening, complex and widespread. Cyber-threats do not fit into traditional security framework.
So, therefore, Singapore cannot let down our guard. We are on the radar and the target of many, due to a variety of factors. Recently, the launch of the Cyber Defence School is an excellent move, providing training across the networks and in cyberspace. It will help in training officers in preparedness, thinking several steps ahead of the perpetrator and culprits.
How is MINDEF upscaling cyber defence and security and ring fencing, with a view to fortifying our national and defence cyber security systems? In alignment with this can the Minisry also update us on what further efforts are being pursued to continue to develop the area of cyber defence and expertise in the SAF? Can we also have an update on the Cyber NS Scheme and how MINDEF intends to boost our cyber-defence expertise in the military. Knowing also that the military response must be part of a concerted national effort, how is MINDEF's approach coordinated with that of other Ministries and Agencies in our national cyber-security eco-system?
Mr Chairman, the establishment of Cyber Defence training is key to a future-ready 21st century defence capability. And these skills will come in useful, not just in the SAF, because the cyber frontline is everywhere. Anywhere, there is a network, a digital device, a gadget connected to the Internet of Things. And so, as successive generations of cyber defence vocationalist graduates complete their full-time National Service and become operationally-ready NSmen, these servicemen can add to the pool of cyber defence knowledge and cyber defence instincts in Singapore.
Preventing sophisticated cyber attacks by malicious parties is now a critical mission for both governments and companies globally. Yet, nearly every country in the world lacks cybersecurity talent. Singapore needs all hands on deck. Recognising the need for individuals to play their part, a new "digital defence" pillar has been added to Singapore's Total Defence framework.
Our young digital natives Singaporeans are well-placed to protect our nation in the cyberspace. Therefore, the NSF Cyber Scheme is an important foundational initiative. Could MINDEF provide an update of the Cyber NSF Scheme? How will we ensure that our NSFs' expertise is constantly updated and deepened? We must also collaborate with private sector to keep up with evolving technologies and be updated to ceaseless cyber threats.
The continual development of cyber defence expertise must go beyond just having the Cyber NSF Scheme. We must also continue to develop them when they ORD. What are MINDEF's plans to build a strong reservist corp of Cyber NSmen? In fact, I encourage MINDEF to consider developing a Cyber NSmen Scheme. There are already many NSmen in the IT industry with deep cybersecurity expertise. Some of them are highly skilled Operators while others are already IT industry captains. Our Cyber NSFs can form the foundation of this Cyber NSmen Scheme.
The Israeli Defence Forces' Unit 8200 has reportedly had many of its servicemen gone on to build many top IT companies. Similarly, our Cyber NSFs can go on to have such impact and help to build up the tech expertise in the private sector. This spreads talent in a manpower-scarce Singapore. We need to ensure that we enrich our Cyber NSFs training such as providing for a stronger nexus with the start-up sector. With this, we can build up dynamic and sustainable cyber capabilities that will protect Singapore at all times.
Sir, now than ever before, Singapore's security is at risk from a variety of conventional and non-conventional threats and sources. All the more we need to remain vigilant and defend ourselves and our borders. We will need to continue to boost our capacity and capabilities and build up our defence capabilities, systems, operations, manpower and technology. We need to ensure we maintain our edge at all times. This requires state-of-the art mindset, equipment and systems. The military hardware itself is costly.
With that background, what will be the projected medium to longer term increments in defence spending? How are we to balance this against the needs in other competing areas. Training also, Sir, requires planning and preparation, more so in terms of teams training, table top exercises and simulated exercises. These are also not cheap. How will MINDEF be allocating funds into these aspects of development and training as well?
Sir, since the maiden batch of 9,000 soldiers were conscripted in 1967, more than one million male Singaporeans and second-generation permanent residents have invested their time, blood, and sweat in faithfully performing their National Service (NS) duties.
Their sacrifices and their families' sacrifices have kept our country safe and secure. NS has served as the backbone of the SAF. It has been the bedrock of peace for Singapore over the last 50 years.
Even though the probability of conventional conflict is low, I am heartened that the majority of us acknowledging the importance of NS as a deterrent against potential adversaries. Over the years, our National Servicemen have responded with distinction to challenges such as international piracy, terrorism and even natural disasters abroad, while at the same time deterring potential aggressors.
In today's constantly changing geopolitical environment and in view of evolving security landscape and threats that are changing rapidly, MINDEF needs to redefine National Service.
At the same time, SAF also needs to response to a domestic challenge of falling birth rates which requires a paradigm shift in our approach to NS.
Sir, the SAF draws heavily from Singapore's human resource in order to defend our nation against a wide array of threats. However, an ageing population and declining fertility trends will have implications on our NS resources and will pose a significant challenge for us in the long term. The SAF will see a projected one-third reduction in manpower supply by 2030.
This is a significant number. Therefore, there is a clear impetus to effectively manage our NS manpower resource to ensure that MINDEF and the SAF are able to achieve its growing spectrum of missions even as the enlistment cohorts decline.
Over the years, MINDEF/SAF has introduced initiatives to allow the SAF to tap on our servicemen's civilian expertise and talent to expand operational capabilities. How is MINDEF harnessing the expertise of our current pool of servicemen to maximise the potential of our national servicemen?
With growing manpower limitations, what is MINDEF/SAF doing to ensure that we can maximise our manpower resources? Will MINDEF consider options taken by other manpower-scarce countries, such as tapping on woman power? Will the Ministry consider pushing back or doing away with the retirement age of regulars? Will MINDEF also consider redesigning functions so that in suitable areas, persons with disabilities can also contribute to our national defence?
National Service was and continues to be essential for the defence of our nation. Fifty two years on, our country has benefited from relative peace and stability, achieved by a strong SAF that protects Singapore's interests, and supported by generations of national servicemen. Recent tensions with our neighbour over sea and air boundaries are a reminder of why we need a credible SAF, one that conducts realistic military training so that our soldiers are operationally-ready.
National Service (NS) has fulfilled a critical need for defence and security, and also provided the peace and stability facilitating Singapore's development and progress. Arguably, few national policies affect the Singaporean way of life to the extent that NS does. For many Singaporean men, NS is a rite of passage, where he takes on the commitment of defending his country at a young age of 18, and, regardless of social standing, race or religion, to be trained and served with one another as a unit. I would like MINDEF to provide an update on its efforts to maximise the potential of national servicemen and how we can enhance their NS experience.
Mr Douglas Foo. Not present. Mr Arasu.
National Service exists to fulfil the critical need of national security and defence. The Committee to Strengthen National Service (CSNS) was set up in March 2013 to examine how the NS system could be strengthened for the future to better serve Singapore and Singaporeans.
One of its recommendations then was for skills learnt during full-time NS to receive Workforce Skills Qualification (WSQ) accreditation as a means to further enhance the value proposition of NS and facilitate full-time National Servicemen's transition back to studies or the workplace. In today's rapidly evolving learning environment, we need to ensure that our NSFs are well-equipped to thrive in higher education or in the working world.
How is MINDEF working with the relevant agencies to support skills upgrading, so as to further enhance the value proposition of National Service today?
Mr Chairman, earlier this month, the Minister for Defence made a Ministerial Statement on National Service training deaths and safety enhancements for the Singapore Armed Forces.
The Ministerial Statement addressed some of the circumstances around the untimely death of Corporal First Class (CFC) Aloysius Pang and the Minister also shared some of the findings the Committee of Inquiry which was conveyed after CFC Liu Kai was killed in a training accident in November 2018.
The Minister also shared some training enhancements which were made in the SAF following the recent training fatalities. And just last week, the SAF announced that it has appointed its first Inspector-General who I understand started in that role on 27 February.
The issue of training safety is one which concerns us all. Every Singaporean family has a family member who has gone through or will go through National Service. We also have a large number of men and women who have chosen to protect our country as their careers. Some spend decades in our armed forces, ready to put their lives on the line for Singapore should the need arises.
I am aware of the issue of training safety is not confined to just to NSFs but also to the regulars who serve in the SAF. But this bond of trust we have with the families of NSFs and NSmen, those who are required by law is where it can be felt most needy. That is not to say that we should mollycoddle our servicemen or that we eliminate activities which carry the slightest amount of risks. That is not how a military should be run.
I would therefore like to ask the Minister how MINDEF and the SAF strike a balance between the need for an operationally-ready SAF that is able to defend Singapore's sovereignty with the need to ensure the safety our soldiers, especially during training.
We have heard on various occasions that this balance will be struck by MINDEF and the SAF and would like to ask the Minister for clarification as to how this balance is achieved.
As I mentioned earlier, the first Inspector-General of the SAF has just started in his role yesterday. The role of the Inspector-General was stated by the Chief of Defence Force as being to ensure that command emphasis on safety is consistently applied across all services and units. MINDEF also stated that the Inspector-General's Office will have full authority to scrutinise and enforce safety processes and practices at all levels of the SAF.
The appointment of the Inspector-General is a positive step. As I understand, that there was previously no organisation which covered safety across all branches of the SAF. The appointment has a strong signalling effect and indicates to our troops how important safety is to our armed forces.It was reported that the new Inspector-General stressed the importance of open reporting and that he wants to introduce concrete actions to promote open reporting.
I would like to ask the Minister if he could clarify what he sees the role of open reporting to be, particularly in a hierarchical organisation such as the SAF. Indeed, the concept of open reporting in safety matters counter-intuitive. In other organisations and industries, the reporting of safety issues and lapses is encourage through confidential reporting where the identities of those doing the reports are protected. This is particularly so if it involves unsafe practices by their superiors and colleagues. Are we essentially asking for whistle-blowers to come forward with the reports in the open? Could the Minister clarify why open reporting would be more successful than confidential reporting.
Finally, I would like to ask the Minister what steps that MINDEF and SAF take when safety lapses are discovered, including where no harm or injury is caused by such lapses. Apart from the appointment of the Inspector-General, I would be grateful if MINDEF could elaborate on other systems and safeguards that they have or will put in place to ensure training safety in the SAF, particularly in the light of recent training deaths.
Your time is up. Assoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal.
Mr Chairman, safety is one of the SAF's core values and it is integral to mission success. It enhances the soldier's confidence, and enables the SAF to conduct reality training and to operate effectively during missions. Safety, while an individual responsibility, is also a command responsibility.
I understand that our commanders and trained in command schools on the requirements on how to conduct training safely; and safety education and training are also constantly reinforced in the various courses that our commanders go through as they progress in their career.
During training, I also understand that commanders are responsible for planning a proper work-rest cycle to ensure that their solider have sufficient rest and exercise right judgement to moderate training intensity according to ground conditions.
Despite all the measures that have been put in place, there have been one too many cases of training safety incidents recently. What is MINDEF doing to ensure that there is command emphasis on training safety on the ground and that it is consistently applied for all the units of the SAF so that it can work towards zero training accidents?
Miss Cheng Li Hui, you have half a minute.
Chairman, since National Service was introduced more than five decades ago, generations of Singaporeans had served in various capacities and contributed to our national defence. The commitment of Singaporeans to serve in peace time allows us to build and maintain a strong armed forces.
Regulars and NS men have sacrificed their lives in building up this strong deterrence force. We will upgrading the Marina Floating platform to be renamed NS Square. Will the Ministry consider building a small memorial there or somewhere else to honour our fallen servicemen?
Chairman, as a member of MINDEF Advisory Council on Communal Relations, or MINDEF ACCORD, for the past three years, I have witnessed first-hand how MINDEF successfully build broad support from society, from businesses, schools and various communities. In particular, I would like to commend MINDEF on its successful engagement of Singaporeans through NS50 in the past year.
Nevertheless, in the wake of the recent training incidents, there is much work to be done to strengthen our people's support for NS and defence. We have also just introduced a new pillar for Total Defence. As such, what are MINDEF plans in the year ahead to engage the community and grassroots leaders to understand and support the importance of NS, as well as our broadened concept of Total Defence?
Sir, living in a safe and secure Singapore which the Government has worked tirelessly to ensure may have desensitised many Singaporeans to the multitude of perils that one may face today.
Recent events, and the threat of military escalation, have reminded many Singaporeans of the threats surrounding us. It is at times like this, that Singaporeans must understand the threats that we face, and the importance of total defence.
Sir, in line with total defence, I would like to seek an update in regard to the measures undertaken by the Ministry to build emergency preparedness capabilities in our population.
Sir, the world is changing. Climate change is resulting in more extreme weather conditions, while state actors and terrorists have shown that they are more than willing to exploit our vulnerabilities should we present them with such.
On this note, I would like to take the opportunity to introduce a ground-up initiative developed in Bukit Panjang. An Emergency Preparedness Resource Team, comprising 15 young Singaporean volunteers from different backgrounds, was formed a year ago, to explore ways to build emergency preparedness capabilities, in the community, to prepare Singaporeans for emergencies, both in Singapore and overseas.
The team compiled best emergency preparedness practices from both domestic, and international, sources. With the support of Bukit Panjang C2E, the Bukit Panjang Emergency Preparedness Guide was published. The guide covers 14 different scenarios. It also provides an Emergency Bag inventory that one may use when preparing for a disaster, a list of the various resources available in the constituency, and includes a directory of emergency hotlines in the 10 most frequently travelled overseas places by Singaporeans.
Sir, we are ultimately responsible for our own safety and security. It is my hope that this guide will help encourage greater ownership by Singaporeans in developing deeper emergency preparedness skills.
Sir, the second point which I wish to speak on pertains to digital defence. As we step into the digital age, and as our lives become more intertwined with the digital, the cybersphere has become an increasingly viable vector of attack for those who would seek to undermine us.
I strongly support the establishment of digital defence as the sixth pillar of total defence. We must ensure that both the Government, and members of the public, do their part to ensure our cybersecurity. Sir, I would like to seek some clarifications on how the Ministry intends to build cyber defence capabilities.
Ms Joan Pereira, you have two cuts. Can you take both together?
Sir, in this age of the Internet, Singaporeans are increasingly well-connected. Many of us are able to access information 24/7, make transactions anytime, and communicate with others through our mobile phones and social media platforms. While Singapore’s strong digital connectivity offers enormous social and business opportunities, it is also a point of vulnerability that individual hackers, criminal syndicates and state adversaries exploit to do us harm.
As Singapore moves toward becoming a “Smart City”, we need to be better prepared against threats from the digital domain. What measures do MINDEF have in place to rapidly detect and contain digital threats against Singapore?
Recent incidents of data breaches had highlighted the human factor as a major vulnerability. In fact, users of the internet have long been viewed as the weak link. No matter how robust are our Internet structure, software and hardware, complacency, poor personal hygiene and low awareness of digital threats will endanger our SAF systems. What steps do MINDEF have to strengthen this area and how will the Ministry ensure that internal and external audits of our digital networks are robust?
MINDEF has recently launched Digital Defence as a new pillar of Total Defence this year. How are we getting Singaporeans to be more aware and better prepared to respond to digital threats?
Over the past year, we have seen how the spread of fake news online have divided societies, influenced elections and triggered ethnic riots overseas. Singapore is not insulated from these events. In fact, as a multi-cultural and diverse society, Singapore’s social fabric could easily be threatened by the spread of falsehoods that exploit potential fault-lines in our society, such as race or religion.
One of the biggest challenges we face in combating fake news is on social media and messaging applications, such as Facebook and WhatsApp. Does the Ministry have any measures to counter misinformation online, such as an IT team to look into messages circulating online and intervening on the same platforms with clarifications?
More importantly, we have to shore up our social defences, strengthening them on all fronts to counter these online threats. From our neighbourhoods, workplaces, markets and other common spaces, we will see and experience the real nature of our interactions and unity, making us less easy as targets.
Does the Ministry have regular outreach sessions and public education initiatives to enhance our awareness of Social Defence? How can our Social Defence be further strengthened to deal with these online threats?
Sir, Total Defence was launched in 1984 to galvanise all Singaporeans to play our part in building a strong, secure and cohesive nation that is resilient against any crisis. It is a framework for an all-round response to threats and challenges and it involves six aspects, one of which is psychological defence.
Sir, in this day and age our Total Defence, especially psychological defence has become more relevant and important. Today, Singapore faces a range of challenges, one of the most worrying are disinformation campaigns. Such campaigns are dangerous because they target the hearts and minds of Singaporeans and are difficult to detect early. They also take several forms – from exploiting social fault-lines in order to weaken our national unity to eroding people’s trust in the Government.
With the increasing use of the internet and the social media, many of us are becoming more vulnerable to fakes news and misinformation online. In this context,
Mr Douglas Foo, not present. Ms Joan Pereira, can you take both cuts together.
Sir, Singaporeans’ commitment towards defending our country rests on our citizens’ full understanding of our vulnerabilities and an ingrained conviction of the importance of what we are defending. It is therefore of utmost importance to instil this understanding in our youth from a young age.
In this digital age where growing global interconnectivity may result in the potential dilution of the “Singapore Identity”, it is important that MINDEF reaches out to youth to deepen their understanding of Total Defence, and ensure that they remain resilient to external misinformation, misguidance and threats, especially from the digital domain.
Businesses play a crucial role in economic defence as it is critical that they are prepared for emergencies and can recover quickly from disruptions to our economy.
For example, in the recent incident of eggs, fish and shrimp export restrictions from Malaysia, our businesses were able to adapt effectively to the threat of disruption to our food supply. Food security is an essential requirement for our national security.
Therefore, it is important for the Government and businesses to work together to put in place measures to build up a strong and robust economy which would in turn ensure the resilience of our country.
How is MINDEF leveraging businesses to bring across our Total Defence messages?
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