National Service – Balancing Operational Readiness, Safety and the Will to Fight

Mr Deputy Speaker, it has been a difficult few weeks for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The death of CFC(NS) Aloysius Pang and other servicemen before him have provoked one of the most wide-ranging public debates about National Service (NS) in recent memory. As suggested in the title to this Adjournment Motion, I will speak on three distinct but interlinked themes – training safety, operational readiness and the will to fight, before concluding on some areas that the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) should consider to improve the safety architecture in SAF.

First, training safety. Members would know that the women and men in uniform in the SAF perform tasks that are inherently risky. They operate heavy machinery and weapons in difficult conditions. The work demands that they can function at the physical, psychological and emotional limits of human endurance during both training and operations. The ability to perform under pressure during training can help bolster effectiveness during operations. Hence, the time-honoured military saying for soldiers in training, "The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war". However, the risky nature of such work demands, particularly for a predominantly conscript army, that extra care and attention be devoted to safety and the management of risks during training.

Human lives are at stake when unnecessarily risky and unauthorised training is carried out in the SAF. Injury and death of personnel during training decrease the operational effectiveness of our military. To the extent that women and men in uniform and the public do not believe that the SAF manages such risk to acceptable levels, there will be negative consequences for morale, performance and the institution of NS. Therefore, training safety must always be of the utmost importance for MINDEF.

However, MINDEF's recent message to make, and I quote, "zero training deaths the norm" is not only unrealistic but also wishful, considering the inherent risks in training a military force that must be ready to defend the country at a moment's notice or whenever called upon to do so. As a result of the expectations created, every time a training fatality occurs, the public pressure on MINDEF and SAF commanders down the leadership chain takes on a very corrosive edge. This damages not just the SAF, but the institution of NS, too.

In the aftermath of CFC(NS) Aloysius Pang's passing, MINDEF's narrative has shifted somewhat to, I quote, "a zero-accident mindset". NSmen and those who are familiar with the SAF understand what MINDEF wants to achieve when it speaks of striving for zero fatalities – that MINDEF takes safety seriously.

But the word that the public focuses on is "zero", and the end state of zero-accidents or fatalities is a goal that cannot be achieved even in industries with notoriously strict safety standards and compliance requirements like aviation. For example, in October 2015, maintenance engineers did not follow established procedures to insert landing gear pins before troubleshooting a landing gear fault causing a Singapore Airlines A330's nose-wheel to collapse at the boarding gate, resulting in multi-million dollars' worth of damage. It was not a minor miracle no fatalities ensued as passengers waited to board the aircraft and a technician stood just metres in front the plane.

Mr Deputy Speaker, no organisation, let alone one that is in the business of war and defending Singapore’s sovereignty, can realistically promise zero fatalities or training incidents even as the public must insist on the strictest training safety parameters for the SAF, and MINDEF strives for the same.

Second, operational readiness. Like other organisations with a requirement to be operationally ready at a moment’s notice, military personnel must be able to complete their assigned tasks safely and effectively. But, more so than any other type of organisation, militaries like the SAF must also stress discipline and hierarchy. This enables the organisation and its members to become a lethal fighting force that can call upon a whole suite of weapons to kill the enemy and those that seek to do Singapore harm.

To reach such a level of proficiency, training has to be tough and realistic. But tough and realistic training must strike a balance between discipline, hierarchy, risk management and safety, so as to prepare the SAF to be operationally ready for different and difficult circumstances. As much as I support the safety review currently being undertaken by the SAF, it must not lead to a public perception that the SAF has gone soft. While requirements, expectations and the training methodology must adjust to each generation of NSmen and the equipment they operate, the SAF must be mindful not to swing to an extreme where realistic training is compromised.

In this regard, the public response to the death of CFC(NS) Aloysius Pang has been far from one-way, dominated by doubts cast over MINDEF and the necessity of NS. It has also prompted a significant counter-perspective – one that is shared by many NSmen, including amongst those who are currently fulfilling or have completed their NS requirements and commitments. They asked: in spite of the training incidents that occur from time to time, can Singaporeans envision a safe and secure Singapore without operationally-ready NSmen and an operationally-ready SAF?

On the latter point, the recent bilateral spat between Singapore and Malaysia was raised as an example of the possibilities that could be imposed upon Singapore if not for the strong SAF that any potential adversary has to contend with. Many online commentators focused on the Mahathir factor as a reason why the sharp deterrent edge of the SAF represents a central pillar for our existence as a sovereign nation. However, the need for a strong SAF is not personality-specific or for a particular moment in time. It is, in fact, far more fundamental.

The key determinant that necessitates a strong SAF is founded in our geopolitical realities. We are a small country of under six million surrounded by much larger neighbours in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) where our two closest neighbours, in particular, are represented by about 300 million people combined. Putting race, religion and other fault lines aside, we live in a world where larger countries are wont to lord over the small and powerless, throwing laws and legal norms out the window, particularly when there is no real price to pay for doing so. Combine this with Singapore’s peculiar circumstances – chief of which is that we are geographically very small – and the need for a capable and resolute SAF becomes abundantly clear, regardless of who our neighbours are.

In such a context, Singapore’s need for a strong operationally-ready deterrent force that means business and can promise and deliver a bloody nose on any adversary becomes not just acute, but critical. The public must never forget that the institution of NS which underpins a strong SAF stands at the delivery end of that promise.

Finally, the will to fight. Mr Deputy Speaker, the will to fight is an important concept that unites SAF personnel and NSmen, regardless of rank. It embodies our sense of national identity, why we regard Singapore as home and why we will be steadfast and resolute in defending the country. Building up the will to fight in a country which is not ethnically homogenous, generally affluent and where immigration is an important Government policy, is no mean feat and is always challenging. It requires constant attention and reflection. As a result of the recent incidents, some of the discussions in the aftermath of CFC(NS) Aloysius Pang's passing have the potential of damaging the institution of NS unless MINDEF steps in to decisively address broader misgivings that are simmering in the minds of some Singaporeans.

Other well-meaning Singaporeans have also asked fundamental questions about NS. One of the more well-reasoned ones has sought to question why MINDEF cannot evolve to employ an all-regular force. These questions and other similar ones do come up from time to time, and it would be important for MINDEF to establish why such an outcome is or is not realistic.

Some years ago, on the back of a Committee of Supply cut, I proposed that MINDEF publish a detailed defence White Paper outlining the strategic imperatives of SAF. Amongst many useful purposes, such a document could serve as an important reference for all segments of the public, including our neighbouring countries, to appreciate and understand why Singapore needs a strong and world-class military that is able to defend the sovereignty of the country.

Mr Deputy Speaker, doubts about the necessity of NS weakens not just the very institution but our collective will to fight. More insidiously, the ubiquity and ever-present nature of the online media are such that an adversary can weaken our will to fight without even firing a single shot in anger by identifying the pressure points in our society’s psyche. Undermining public confidence in our citizen army is a ripe and ready strategy an adversary will employ to fulfil its national aims. Should the public lose its confidence in the SAF and support for NS is undermined, the force over-match that our military currently enjoys will be rendered irrelevant in the face of a divided public. While Singaporeans should never shy away from sharing their views and opinions on matters of public interest even if they are not mainstream, we should not lose our sense of perspective and proportion. In spite of earlier surveys highlighted in this House about the public's support for NS, the recent spate of training deaths reminds us how the status quo can be shaken very quickly.

To that end, the Minister’s earlier reply to my Parliamentary Question on how the current safety review in the aftermath of CFC(NS) Pang's unfortunate passing is different from earlier ones is to be welcomed.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to rule out the likelihood that there could be a number of shortcomings in the SAF training system that disrupt the balance between safety and operational readiness. Specific areas should be looked into from a fresh perspective.

One approach MINDEF should consider is stretching the retirement ages of the officer and WOSE corps. Compared to many militaries around the world, there is an argument to be made that our officers, in particular, are made to retire a little too prematurely with many valuable years of experience potentially lost to make more long-lasting and valuable contributions to the organisation.

The importance of deep experience for our regular commanders in foreseeing the risks of high-intensity training, mitigating for them and being better prepared to deal with unprecedented mishaps was perhaps put best by Chesley Sullenberger, the captain of the US Airways flight that landed in the Hudson River on 15 January 2009 after a catastrophic bird strike that destroyed both of the plane's engines, putting 155 lives at risk. Instead of returning his stricken plane to the airport, Sullenberger made a decision to ditch the aircraft in the river, a decision that was later extensively scrutinised but proven to be ultimately sound. He said and I quote, "For 42 years, I have been making small, regular deposits in this bank of experience, education and training. And on January 15, the balance was sufficient so that I could make a very large withdrawal."

Mr Deputy Speaker, extending the time our senior commanders remain in their command appointments so that they are able to acquire deeper operational knowledge would have positive spinoffs in anticipating and preventing training incidents. In this regard, SAF should also pay particular emphasis on retaining officers and WOSEs after they retire. It should consider individuals, who have previously left active service to take up competitive and well-paying appointments, as members of the safety inspectorate or other safety-related outfits in the SAF.

A second area of consideration for MINDEF deals with the point that in the run-up to 2030, the cohort of 18-year-olds enlisted for NS is going to get smaller. With less manpower to execute MINDEF’s mission, machines are likely to become more important, with soldiers and troops transiting to more lethal motorised and mechanised platforms, with even unmanned platforms becoming a weapon of choice. Such a shift would require a soldier to be familiar with not just soldiering fundamentals but also a mastery of the new weapons and machines under his or her charge. The type of accidents that can occur may also change, with risks of electrocution becoming more real than collisions and similar mishaps.

This development inevitably points towards more time required for training, live-firing and maintenance-related duties. NSmen may also need more time to refamiliarise themselves with their equipment during in-camp training (ICT) and before exercises, with more oversight from safety coordinators and training facilitators – something the NS training system would have to accommodate. To this end, the SAF may have to throttle back on non-core, non-training-related duties, and even national ones to focus more squarely on its core mission.

A final area of review must include a change in tone and culture towards safety, and this must begin at the very top. From a legislative perspective, a qualitative way to facilitate this must include a review of the Government's position on section 14 of the Government Proceedings Act. The argument that removing the right of a soldier to sue MINDEF would weaken the SAF or cause commanders to hesitate to push their troops must be broadly reconsidered against armies which have removed similar laws.

The United Kingdom, for example, has done so, and their military is not just involved in peacetime training, but significant combat operations. To drive home the centrality of safety for the SAF's peacetime mission, there is room for the Government to inject greater accountability into its protocols and processes by creating a specific carve-out for willful disregard of safety factors under section 14 of the Government Proceedings Act. Such an exception would cease to extend immunity to MINDEF or to a negligent commander in the event of an egregious breach of safety.

My colleague Mr Dennis Tan had raised this proposal in 2016 following the tragic death of Private (PTE) Dominique Sarron Lee. The Minister responded by suggesting that the removal of immunity may compromise training and prejudice commanders who, for example, push their soldiers to complete their Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT) or strive for higher performance.

To address such legitimate concerns, a possible exception to section 14 on the grounds of training safety would only apply if a commander behaves recklessly, maliciously or displays a willful disregard for safety considerations. For example, if a commander had deliberately chosen to cancel a safety briefing, disregarded training safety regulations, had not catered for sufficient rest before or between training and missions without adequate reason or risk mitigation approved beforehand by a more senior commander, then the blanket immunity provided under section 14 should not apply. It would follow that a Court of law should be left to determine whether MINDEF or the commander in question must be held liable.

In many ways, Mr Deputy Speaker, such a legislative change would represent an important bellwether for the evolution of training safety management in the SAF more than 50 years after the introduction of NS. But the significance of this proposal to tweak section 14 of the Government Proceedings Act does not lie in the fact that MINDEF or and any irresponsible commander can be sued. Paradoxically, in fact, such a change – legislatively determined – would serve to protect the institution of NS by making it more accountable instead of undermining it. It would buttress public confidence in the importance of NS, why safety is critical, and the lengths MINDEF and any Government of the day would go to, to protect the institution, even if it means putting MINDEF's own reputation and that of its commanders on the line. In doing so, MINDEF would send a clear and unambiguous message, which is, that the buck stops at the top.

To conclude, Mr Deputy Speaker, whenever any soldier falls, we all feel a collective pain, for a life that holds so much hope and promise. We also share in the loss of their family members who live with the grief and regret of losing a son or daughter in peacetime and in service of the nation. But the question in the wake of the training deaths experienced by the SAF over the last 17 months and the years before that, is whether this House can assure mothers, fathers, husbands, wives and loved ones that SAF personnel will be safe when they enlist for NS, when they are called up for ICT or when they serve the SAF. The answer must be an unequivocal yes.

As a core value of the SAF, there should be no doubt that the SAF takes this safety seriously precisely because we are a largely conscripted force. There are potential safety gaps that need to be considered and improvements which need to be made. I hope that these can be swiftly and thoughtfully instituted with the professionalism the SAF is known for, so that Singaporeans can rest easy knowing our military women and men are operationally-ready to keep Singapore safe and secure at all times.

Mr Deputy Speaker, let me thank Mr Pritam Singh for his comments in the Adjournment Motion. As Adjournment Motions go, you reflect on them and you cannot answer every point in the 10 minutes that you are allocated. I am sure that if the House wants us to debate the various points that the Member has brought up, I think we can find other fora to do so.

But let me start from where we agree, and it is very gratifying. We agree that NS is crucial. We agree that without NS and without the SAF, we cannot defend ourselves; that after 52 years, we are in a much better position of being able to defend our sovereignty and that we have come a long way.

We also agree that we want to make training for national servicemen as safe as possible. And as Mr Singh himself says, assure every mother, assure every parent, that their son will go back to them safe in the two years of full-time NS and ICTs.

How to achieve this? There may be some disagreement or differences. Mr Pritam Singh says "don't aim for zero fatalities" – that is a goal too high. You set too high expectations. And the Member is right in a way. But which mother shall we say can lose your son?

I came to that view that we should aim for zero fatalities from the experiences of our own commanders. And I will share with Members a very good speech by previous Chief of Defence Force (CDF) Bey Soon Khiang, because when it comes to running an operation, you have to listen to your commanders, you have to see what they can do.

So, this was a speech that Lieutenant-General (Retired) Bey Soon Khiang, who was the Republic of Singapore Air Force's (RSAF's) Chief of Air Force (CAF) and then CDF, gave at a safety symposium last year. I quote from him, "So, when you take a look at the RSAF's mishap data in our early years, the picture is a sombre one. For the first 20 years from 1970 to 1990, we lost in terms of fighter numbers, almost the same number as our entire F-16 fleet today. For comparison, the RSAF has operated the F-16 C/Ds for more than 20 years now from about 1996/1997, and we have lost two. And the last loss occurred more than 10 years ago."

That is a stark difference. Just pause to think. For the first 20 years, we lost in terms of fighter numbers, almost the same number as our entire F-16 fleet today. He went on to say, "Most significantly to me as a commander, such accidents also sapped the morale of the people unnecessarily. Each time we attended the funerals of fellow pilots and servicemen, seeing the grief of their loved ones was an emotional trauma. As a commander trying to explain to the family of the lost pilot why it happened, why they are going to continue with life without a husband or a son, grow up without a father, was most difficult. As Chief of Air Force then, I felt that I had failed to take care of my men. To me, they reported to work every day to train for war and I had failed in my duty to ensure that they trained safely so that they could return to their loved ones every day. So, this, he says, "was how Zero Accidents started."

"I started asking myself questions", he continues. "Back to the basics, I asked myself: have we lost sight of the overall mission to deter? Each accident erodes deterrence. If we cannot be safe, how does it reflect on our capability? If our own Singaporeans have low confidence in the RSAF", and in this case, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) or even the Army, "how can we even be a deterrent? If the RSAF is critical in the defence of Singapore, which lacks strategic depth, the situation is surely unacceptable, for before we started fighting the war, we had already lost 50 fighters. So, our peacetime exchange ratio must look quite bad. At the individual level, the whole idea of training in peacetime is to deter and, when deterrence fails, be there on the first wave. But you will not be there if you kill yourself during training. Then, the training is in vain."

Zero fatality is a very difficult target and, as Mr Pritam Singh said, may be impossible. But we have to aim for it. And as our own experience shows, in some years, we will be able to achieve it. Can anyone guarantee that there will be zero fatalities for the rest of our future? Surely not. But that zero fatality goal sears into the consciousness of every commander and every soldier that, to get there, you better be careful about what you are doing, that safety lapses will not be tolerated, that it will be safety first, because, at the end of the day, I want to train you and want you to be alive to be able to fight when Singapore needs you.

Mr Pritam Singh says, "Well, you can get the same outcome. Just allow the people to sue the Government, including MINDEF." That is a very tangential argument and misses the point. There is accountability for commanders who make a mistake. I do not need for those who want to sue the Government to do so before the commanders are held accountable. I have told Members many times, and we have taken commanders or national servicemen who had been derelict, who had not done their duty, to criminal prosecution, not just civilian payouts in the Courts. They go to jail. Their lives, in that sense, and careers, are ruined; and justly so, if they deserve it.

So, let us get back to basics. Mr Pritam Singh says, "Oh, don't be afraid of MINDEF's reputation." I am not afraid of MINDEF's reputation. I am more concerned about individual lives, about how our commanders, at any given moment of time, watch for the safety of their national servicemen, of the people under their charge, and yet, at the same time, conduct realistic training.

I think this is the right way to go. I think there will be no easy shortcuts. We will need everyone to pitch in, and I am grateful at least that all Members of this House believe that NS is an imperative, is a critical need, and that we must improve our safety standards so that we can uphold NS and national defence. Thank you, Deputy Speaker. [Applause.]

*Question put, and agreed to.*

*Resolved, "That Parliament do now adjourn."*

Adjourned accordingly at 6.07 pm.