Debated in Parliament on 14 Jan 2019.
Order for Second Reading read.
Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."
Sir, in 1997, Singapore became a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). In 2000, Singapore enacted the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, or CWPA for short, to give effect to our international obligations under CWC.
Under the CWPA, Singapore established a licence system to control various activities involving chemicals listed under CWC, known as "scheduled chemicals", for a permitted purpose. The licence system requires all entities involved in such activities to apply to Singapore Customs, which is our National Authority for CWC, for a licence.
In a small and densely populated city-state like Singapore, any use of chemical weapons can lead to catastrophic effects.
Allow me to remind Members of what transpired in Japan on 20 March 1995, when thousands of Tokyo residents boarded the subway, unaware of the horrific events that were about to transpire. That day, a coordinated sarin gas attack carried out by the cult Aum Shinrikyo killed 13 people and injured thousands. It was later found that in the years leading to the attack, the cult had transported tonnes of chemical precursors to its laboratory for the manufacture of sarin.
More recently, events involving the alleged use of chemical weapons have gravely threatened the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. Last year, we witnessed two supposed chemical attacks in the United Kingdom involving a nerve agent that caused deaths and serious injury. The year before, a nerve agent was reportedly used in our own region to assassinate an individual in Kuala Lumpur International Airport.
Sir, as these attacks have demonstrated, we cannot rule out the possibility that actors with ill intent could get their hands on toxic chemicals and weaponise them. Should such an incident occur on our own shores, the consequences would be profound. It is incumbent upon countries to take measures to ensure the safety and security of their population against the use of chemical weapons on their own soil. I believe all Members would agree that Singapore should do its utmost in this regard.
Prior to this Bill, the CWPA already provides for controls on the movement of all scheduled chemicals into and out of Singapore. It also provides for controls on the movement within Singapore of Schedule 1 chemicals, which are the most dangerous category of chemicals. However, the CWPA does not impose controls on the movement of Schedules 2 and 3 chemicals within Singapore. These chemicals have a range of industrial and chemical purposes but could also be weaponised or used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. As a matter of national security, it is important to ensure that the movement within our borders of all scheduled chemicals which could be used for illicit ends are subject to the proper controls. This is the main objective of the amendments that are being enacted in the present Bill.
Let me now turn to the salient provisions of the Bill.
First, to ensure proper controls for the movement of all scheduled chemicals within Singapore, clause 6 enacts new sections 9A and 9B of the CWPA. Section 9A requires prior approval to be obtained from the Director-General of Customs here before a person transports a prescribed scheduled chemical exceeding a prescribed quantity within Singapore. It is known as "Transport Approval". This Transport Approval can only be granted to certain licensees under the CWPA. This means that, in addition to a CWC licence obtained by a licensee in relation to the use of certain prescribed chemicals, that licensee must also obtain a Transport Approval to transport the prescribed scheduled chemicals within Singapore. This framework has been benchmarked against existing practices by the National Environment Agency (NEA) and the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), which control the transportation of hazardous substances and petroleum and flammable materials respectively. Section 9B allows the Director-General to cancel or suspend a Transport Approval if necessary. An example is if the CWC licensee is convicted of an offence under the CWPA after a Transport Approval was granted.
Second, the current requirement for record keeping under the CWPA is limited to information and records for purposes of the CWC. Clause 8 would now require any person who transports prescribed scheduled chemicals exceeding a prescribed quantity within Singapore to keep records in relation to that transport.
I now turn to the proposed amendments which will provide additional powers to the Director-General and national inspectors, which include Customs or Police Officers. These powers will allow them to carry out their new roles relating to the control of the transport of scheduled chemicals.
First, the proposed amendments under clause 9 expand the scope for the Director-General to seek information relevant to the transport of any prescribed scheduled chemical within Singapore in contravention of CWPA. The existing CWPA only allows the Director-General to seek information with regard to a declaration which Singapore is required to give under CWC.
Second, the scope of "inspection power" and "compliance purpose" have been expanded to cover the transport of prescribed scheduled chemicals. New inspection powers have been included, such as the sealing of samples taken in relation to the transport of any prescribed scheduled chemical and requiring the owner to send the sample for analysis and bear the costs and expenses arising from the analysis. Such powers will be useful when a national inspector suspects a contravention of the CWPA and has to ascertain if the chemical transported is a prescribed scheduled chemical exceeding a prescribed quantity. This will help ensure the responsible transport of any scheduled chemical within Singapore in accordance with CWPA.
Other existing powers, such as interviewing persons working on premises, have also been broadened to include persons found within a vehicle. Clause 10 provides for these changes.
Third, national inspectors will be empowered to take additional action if they have reason to suspect that a vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of the new section 9A. The new powers will allow national inspectors to: (a) stop and board the vehicle; (b) seize any item from the vehicle which the inspector reasonably believes to be the subject matter of, or connected with the commission of, an offence under section 9A; and (c) arrest an individual under certain circumstances. Clause 12 provides for these changes.
In the event that any item is seized, clause 12 allows the Director-General to determine the premises for its storage. The owner must bear the reasonable costs and expenses arising from the storage. This ensures that safe and secure premises are used to store the seized items, which may contain chemical weapons.
I move on to the final set of amendments which expand the scope of matters for which the Minister may make regulations under the CWPA. The proposed amendments under clause 14 allow the Minister to prescribe the fees for an application for a Transport Approval, or for any purpose under the CWPA. This gives the Minister flexibility to impose fees if the need arises. The current CWPA only allows the Minister to prescribe fees in relation to a licence application, extension or renewal.
In addition, regulations may now prescribe imprisonment for up to two years instead of just fines, on the conviction of any offence prescribed in the regulations. This permits regulations to specify imprisonment as a punishment on conviction of an offence in relation to the transportation of scheduled chemicals, among other things.
Sir, the Bill will have limited impact on the commercial operations of our companies in the chemical and other industries.
In September 2018, Singapore Customs conducted an industry consultation and reached out to 101 companies. These companies include current CWC licensees and member companies under the Singapore Chemical Industry Council. Based on the feedback received, the companies were generally amenable to the proposed amendments. The companies also submitted suggestions, most of which were accepted and incorporated into the proposed amendments. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.
Mr Speaker: Prof Fatimah Lateef.
Mr Speaker, this is an important Bill and, indeed, as we get more advanced and industrialised, our demand and acquisition for such chemicals will inevitably increase as well. Today, more and more industries are using some of these elements, which have the potential to become weaponised, in the wrong hands.
I have a few clarifications for the Minister.
Firstly, are there certain criteria and screening processes involved for persons joining and working in certain industries, such as the criteria that are available on who will be using and handling these chemicals, for people and employees, for example, using chemicals that have the potential to become weaponised? Are these criteria clearly set out and are the employees familiar with these criteria and how often are they renewed and updated? Is there some kind of accreditation for these employees?
Secondly, for the transportation process itself, are there requirements for the vehicles used to transport these items to be clearly marked and labelled? Are there special signages, logos or emblems used for these purposes as well?
Thirdly, transport of these items can take place in various ways. It could be from specific locations to another location within Singapore. How about the transfer of chemical weapons or related chemicals within the same campus or institution but, probably, from one building to the next or within the same building but to another premises? What about the regulations and requirements for such transfers? Are these also subjected to some kind of framework?
Fourthly,
I hope to have some clarifications on these issues and hope to support the Bill with the clarifications.
Senior Minister of State Mohamad Maliki.
Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank Prof Fatimah Lateef for her support for the Bill and for some of the clarifications that she has highlighted. First, let me say that a chemical attack on our shores could claim lives and have serious and permanent health consequences for those affected. Although the risk of a terrorist attack in Singapore involving chemical weapons is low, we cannot rule out the possibility that it might happen. Therefore, we must adopt a proactive approach by ensuring that proper procedures are in place, so that we are well-prepared to address any future threats or incidents. With these amendments to the CWPA, we can better manage the risks involved.
Prof Fatimah Lateef asked whether there were certain criteria and screening processes for persons joining and working in industries dealing with these chemicals. The main and alternate CWC licence applicants are screened for any red flags, such as violations of United Nations sanctions, before a licence is granted to them. As part of the licence conditions, these licensees are obliged to ensure the safe and secure handling of the chemicals. Drivers will also be screened before they are issued with a Hazmat Transport Driver Permit (HTDP). Note that only drivers with an HTDP are allowed to transport CWC scheduled chemicals exceeding a prescribed quantity. This and other requirements for transporting such CWC scheduled chemicals will be prescribed in the subsidiary legislation.
Prof Fatimah Lateef also asked whether there were requirements for the vehicles used to transport these chemicals to be clearly marked and labelled. There are existing industry standards on labelling, such as the Singapore Standard for Hazardous Chemicals and Dangerous Goods. Customs is studying these standards and will include them as part of the Transport Approval requirements, where relevant. The details of these requirements will be prescribed in the subsidiary legislation.
Prof Fatimah Lateef asked if the transport controls applied to the transfer of toxic chemicals within the same campus or institution. The current amendments cover the transport of prescribed scheduled chemicals in a vehicle by public road. Therefore, the transport of scheduled chemicals within a company's private premises is not covered. However, as CWC licensees, companies have an obligation to ensure the safe and secure handling of chemicals within their own private premises. For example, for the storage or handling of higher-risk scheduled chemicals, chemical companies are required to adopt mandatory security measures.
Finally, Prof Fatimah Lateef had a question about training for authorised persons and national inspectors who may have to seize these toxic chemicals. The current amendments seek to empower a national inspector to seize any item from a vehicle that the inspector reasonably believes to be the subject matter of, or connected with the commission of, an offence under the new section 9A. In the event that toxic chemicals must be seized for further investigations, the authorised persons and national inspectors may tap on the expertise of SCDF and NEA. These agencies have experience in the management of items which similarly require careful handling, such as petroleum and flammable materials and hazardous substances. This will ensure that seizure is done in a safe and secure manner.
Mr Speaker, these amendments will provide us with the necessary tools to manage the risks of a possible threat or incident involving chemical weapons. They will strengthen Singapore’s regulatory regime on the CWC-scheduled chemicals and enhance public safety and security.
*Question put, and agreed to.*
*Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.*
*The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Dr Mohamad Maliki Bin Osman.]*
*Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.*
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