Debated in Parliament on 17 May 2018.
Speaker, Sir, first, let me thank the Leader and Members of this House for allowing me to make this Statement on National Service (NS) training deaths in the midst of the debate on the President's Address. I have requested to do so to address the concerns of Members here and the public over this matter. And I think we are right to be concerned as every NS death should be treated with utmost seriousness, whether it is in Parliament, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) or the Home Team.
Any death among SAF soldiers or Home Team personnel is grievous. These are our security forces who serve this nation with loyalty, commitment and pride. They keep us safe, they defend our island home, often in challenging and dangerous circumstances knowing the risks to themselves. Especially painful is when young National Servicemen who are serving their full-time NS, die. All of us feel it acutely. This House offers our deepest condolences to the families of 3SG Gavin Chan, CFC Dave Lee and, from the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), CPL Kok Yuen Chin. We know that no words can replace their loss. We grieve together with them even as we honour the memory of their precious sons who served and sacrificed for our country. The SAF and Home Team will continue to assist their families as best as we can.
Commanders on the ground fully recognise this heavy responsibility of keeping every son of Singapore safe during their NS training, whether it is in the two years that they come full-time for intensive training, or each time that they are called after that. We must strive hard for zero training deaths because any death is one too many. And I believe it can be done, even as National Servicemen train realistically and effectively to protect us and defend Singapore.
But achieving zero fatalities can only be achieved with constant vigilance, no lesser. Because on any given day, thousands of National Servicemen run around in challenging conditions, they move vehicles on air, land and sea, in Singapore and overseas. In the SAF, modern military platforms travel at high speeds and our exercise tempos are very quick. Our Terrexes can move at 100 kilometre per hour. Our armoured vehicles can move at 70 kilometre per hour.
All of us recognise the higher risks in military training because even for mass civilian activities, whether it is marathons, swims or cycling events, fatalities occur. We read about them and they occur for a variety of innocent reasons. But we must design our safety systems and enforce them so that training deaths within the SAF can be eliminated. It is a difficult goal to achieve, to get it right every time, whenever a platoon or company that goes out on exercise, whether it is day or night. But we must constantly improve the rigour of our safety systems to reach that goal because, if we do not, it may mean another precious son lost to a family.
Members in the House – Mr Dennis Tan1, Mr Henry Kwek2, Mr Vikram Nair3 and Mr Ganesh Rajaram4 – have filed questions on two recent NS deaths within the SAF and on general matters related to training safety. I propose to address their queries in this Statement. Here, I want to beg the House's indulgence and patience. I will give details as much as we know.
In September last year, 3SG Gavin Chan died when the Bionix vehicle he commanded rolled over. And in April this year, CFC Dave Lee died from complications of a heat stroke. Both were serving their full-time NS: 3SG Chan had served for one year and eight months; CFC Lee for four months.
We treat each training related death with utmost seriousness. We deal with it at the highest level within the SAF and MINDEF. The Armed Forces Council (AFC) convenes an independent Committee of Inquiry (COI) to examine thoroughly the circumstances leading to the incident. It is a four-member team chaired by a senior civil servant from outside MINDEF and includes a senior doctor from the public sector. The COI has full powers. It can access all relevant information, access any personnel, haul them up to investigate the circumstances leading to death and they will determine events or persons that contributed to the event, to the death and make recommendations to rectify any lapses found.
Separately from the SAF and MINDEF, the Police conducts parallel investigations and the Coroner may decide to hold a public inquiry.
Let me first share the detailed findings for the late 3SG Chan for which all investigative processes have been completed, including those by the Queensland authorities because the incident occurred in Shoalwater Bay and, therefore, governed under the laws of Australia. Speaker, with your permission, I would now like to ask the Clerk to distribute the report from the Queensland coroner.
Yes, please. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members.]
This report from the coroner was provided to 3SG Chan's parents. 3SG Chan's parents have given us permission for it to be distributed to Members of this House, except for the post-mortem findings which are redacted out of respect for the privacy of 3SG Chan and his family.
The Queensland coroner’s report provides the circumstances leading to the death of 3SG Chan as a result of multiple injuries sustained from motor vehicle trauma. I will read excerpts, which Members can follow in the distributed report.
“On 15 September 2017, Sergeant Chan, who was participating in 'Exercise Wallaby', an annual unilateral training exercise conducted by the Singapore Armed Forces at Shoalwater Bay Training Area in Queensland died after the infantry vehicle (known as the Bionix) he was commanding rolled and he suffered significant injuries.
The police conducted an investigation into the circumstances of the incident. The police found no defect with the infantry fighting vehicle. The police found from scene evidence and witness information, that its path forward was halted due to an obstruction. Sergeant Chan, who was commander of the vehicle, gave orders for the driver to reverse slowly down the hill. The commander who was stationed in the turret, with his upper body clear of the vehicle structure, was giving instructions to the driver directing him to reverse and where to reverse. All confirmed that the driver was continuing to reverse slowly, and in accordance with the commander’s instructions, when the vehicle traversed over a flat granite rock for about 4 metres before the vehicle became stuck on a large boulder, holding up the vehicle undercarriage. The commander instructed the driver to turn the steering wheel in an attempt to gain traction when suddenly the vehicle dropped down over the rock rolling sideways before coming to rest further down the slope. Sergeant Chan was ejected from the vehicle and suffered significant injuries. Life support was commenced at the scene before he was airlifted to hospital where he was later pronounced deceased.
The police investigation established that there was no defect with the vehicle, and there was no suggestion that the driver was doing anything other than reversing very slowly, and at the specific direction of Sergeant Chan. The police considered that it was likely that the incident occurred because of the commander’s decision to reverse on a slightly different path down the hill and that his choice to be positioned with part of his body outside the vehicle exposed him to greater risk of injury. The Singapore Armed Forces recommendation is only the head and shoulders be outside the turret of the vehicle during operations. The police considered it was a very unfortunate incident whilst deployed in difficult terrain in ‘black out’ conditions. It was noted by the police that the driver was driving in compliance with SAF policy at the time of the incident, and under the specific instruction from Sergeant Chan.”
These are the findings of the Queensland authorities. The Committee of Inquiry here, appointed by the Armed Forces Council, corroborated from their own investigation the findings by the Queensland authorities. The COI further determined that Sergeant Chan and his platoon mates were sufficiently trained and qualified to participate in the exercise. They had no mental and physical conditions that could have affected their fitness to participate. The medical and safety coverage provided was found to be timely, adequate and proper.
In addition, the COI conducted interviews with SAF soldiers at the exercise to piece together the chronology of events that led to the Bionix overturning. The mishap occurred during night training for Bionix units. For Members' information, Armour units do this regularly, because they have to become proficient to fight at night or under conditions of poor visibility. That is something that they must learn to do.
Safety lapses were identified by the COI. First, the night vision device (NVD) of 3SG Chan’s vehicle was not working. They have issued a night vision device which allows them to see in darkness, but it was not working. It is needed if armoured vehicles are to move at night. Without the night vision device, armoured vehicles can move but only with the driver's hatch open and headlights switched on for better visibility. That is in the training safety regulations. However, according to the driver, Sergeant Chan felt that the headlights “would give away their position to the enemy” and decided to continue training without headlights.
Accounts from his platoon mates to the COI attest to Sergeant Chan's strong motivation and high standards of performance during training. Sergeant Chan was zealous in his training and probably wanted to complete the night mission assigned to their armour unit. Unfortunately, in the darkness, the vehicle entered an area with a steep incline and boulders. At that point, Sergeant Chan stopped the vehicle, dismounted to assess the surroundings and found that a boulder was blocking the vehicle. He re-mounted the Bionix, sitting on the top edge of the vehicle commander hatch and told the driver to open his hatch and switch on the vehicle’s headlights so that they could reverse away from this area. Unfortunately, as they were doing so, the vehicle overturned on the steep embankment. The three other soldiers in that Bionix did not suffer any injuries. The COI concluded that Sergeant Chan’s injuries resulted from him being thrown out of the vehicle as it overturned, causing his demise.
The Queensland coroners’ report agreed that this was the cause of this event. The report said, “…in the circumstances I find that Sergeant Chan died when he was ejected from the vehicle which he was directing. It is unfortunate that he took the decision to position himself with a significant portion of his body outside the vehicle.” The coroner's report continues, “…the incident is none other than a very unfortunate accident due to the nature of the difficult terrain and the operation then being performed.”
Arising from their investigations, the Queensland police found no basis to charge any person. The COI also found no negligence, foul play or misconduct, but recommended that the SAF review its training safety regulations on the position of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Commander, so that the vehicle commander is able to execute the overturning drill, which means that he is able to drop quickly into the vehicle. If he cannot do this, because you are much better protected inside the vehicle than out, the vehicle must stop. The COI also recommended stronger compliance and checks on night vision devices (NVDs) and to enforce the wearing seatbelt rule for passengers when the vehicle is moving.
The SAF has followed up and also implemented additional training for armoured vehicle commanders on uneven terrain. Training safety regulations (TSRs) have been tightened to limit exposure of the body of the vehicle commander to waist level when executing certain operational tasks. The SAF has also implemented drills for day-to-night and night-to-day transitions and this includes NVDs and other night fighting equipment on the checklist which need to be in working order. Wearing seatbelts is enforced, with disciplinary actions taken against those who have not done so.
Sergeant Chan’s death was classified as a training-related incident and compensation offered to the family. Sergeant Chan’s parents accepted the honours of a military funeral. The Armour formation paid their last respects to a dedicated commander whom they are proud to call one of their own. Sergeant Chan was a good soldier.
Let me now turn to CFC Dave Lee. To investigate Corporal Lee's death, all the processes that I have described for Sergeant Chan, the COI, police investigations and Coroner's inquiry are yet to be completed. His death was about two weeks ago. I will only share information from our own internal investigations. When Members have clarifications later – and I encourage you to ask for clarifications – I will share what we have, with some caveats, that the COI and the independent Coroner's inquiry, if held, and the Police investigations will have to come to their own facts.
On 18 April this year, Corporal Lee displayed signs of heat injury after completing an eight-kilometre fast march in Bedok Camp. An SAF medic attended to Corporal Lee to bring down his core temperature and he was evacuated to the camp's Medical Centre where body-cooling measures and treatment were instituted by the SAF medical team there. He was taken to Changi General Hospital (CGH) and warded in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Unfortunately, Corporal Lee's condition deteriorated and he passed away on 30 April 2018 at CGH, about 12 days after his admission.
Following the incident, the Army declared a safety timeout for all training and also specifically reviewed training that posed risks of heat injuries. During the timeout, commanders were reminded of the importance of safety measures which include hydration regimes, temperature-taking regimes, management of the work-rest cycle – I will explain what this means – and identification of personnel who could be at greater risk of heat injuries. These are currently in place; these are preventive safety measures against heat injuries.
While the SAF has not had any death from heat stroke since 2009, heat injuries do occur each year. We are at risk. We are a tropical island, hot and humid. In 2010, the SAF convened a workgroup, which included many external experts, to address this specific problem. This workgroup recommended clinical practice guidelines that were endorsed by MOM and the then-Singapore Sports Council. These guidelines formed the regimes which I have just mentioned against heat injuries and they include mandatory water parades before, during and after a training activity. We take temperature before the training and any soldier with a temperature above 37.5oC is not allowed to train.
In addition, we take the recorded ambient temperature. If it exceeds a certain level during training, rest periods are mandated at appropriate intervals to allow soldiers to cool down. This is one of the recommendations of the expert panel which the SAF follows dutifully. And it is not just taking a thermometer. We use a wet-bulb globe temperature heat stress monitor. It is a hand-held device which will give you the ambient temperature, calculated with the humidity. And based on that, the SAF institutes work-rest cycles. If it is below a certain temperature, for instance, you can exercise for 30 minutes, but you must rest for 15 minutes. Above 33oC, you must exercise for 15 minutes and rest for 30 minutes and so on and so forth.
Commanders and soldiers are reminded to look out for signs and symptoms of heat injury during training. In the event of heat injury, we have on-site cooling measures which include the removal of clothes and application of ice or water to the affected serviceman. The SAF medical centres have customised-built evaporative body-cooling units for heat injuries. Our commanders, soldiers, regulars, Full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) and Operationally Ready National Servicemen (NSmen) know from their own experience that it is the consistent practice for these processes and precautions to be carried out.
We must press on to achieve zero fatalities from heat injuries. The SAF is currently evaluating the use of individual wearable devices to monitor a soldier’s condition real-time. MINDEF will also commission an External Medical Panel, as we did in 2010, to review the SAF's policies and measures for the management of heat injuries and recommend improvements. This panel should consider further steps, especially when recorded temperatures in Singapore over the last two decades have gone up, increasing the risk of heat injuries.
As these two cases show, after every training-related death, independent and impartial investigative processes will determine the key facts, arrive at appropriate conclusions and we will take corrective measures to prevent mistakes from being repeated. This includes punishing those who contributed to the death through reckless and negligent acts.
SAF servicemen can be charged and punished in the civilian criminal Courts, even if their acts were committed within the SAF, as part of their duty. I have said so in this House previously but these examples bear repeating for their salutary warnings. In 2012, an SAF vehicle overturned during an exercise and it caused the death of a soldier. The Conducting Officer who appointed a serviceman to drive the military vehicle even though the Conducting Officer knew that the serviceman did not have a military driving licence was convicted in the criminal Courts and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. The officer was found to have committed a rash act and attempted to pervert the course of justice. In 2005, the Supervising Officer, Conducting Officer and instructors who were involved in the death of a trainee who was submerged in water during a Combat Survival Training course were sentenced to six to 12 months' imprisonment.
In all cases, prosecutions of SAF servicemen in criminal Courts are based on independent Police investigations and when the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) decides that there are sufficient grounds to prosecute. It will be the criminal Courts that determine the level of culpability and commensurate punishments. Separately, the Coroner may hold an inquiry to determine the causes of death and contributory factors. The SAF fully accepts these judicial processes and, indeed, deems them necessary to achieve and maintain a zero-fatality training safety system.
I know that there are accusations against the commanders of Corporal Lee, but we should let the independent COI and Police investigations fully investigate the circumstances to establish the facts. We will deal with any wrong-doing thoroughly. Those that deserved to be punished will be punished. If any persons are found to have been negligent or culpable, they will be punished according to the law, both in civilian and military Courts.
But we must be careful not to discourage or unfairly punish commanders who are executing their responsibilities dutifully, because many commanders are National Servicemen, too, who take seriously this mission we in society have imposed on them – to train capable fighting units able to defend Singapore against all threats. And he is serious about his duty and he wants to build a fighting unit. We must be careful that we do not discourage them or punish them unfairly.
Indeed, we have many positive examples of commanders who risk their own safety to protect trainees. In 2013, NSF commander Lieutenant Kamalasivam pulled a recruit down to take cover in the grenade-throwing bay. The recruit was new. He held the grenade, took out the safety pin and released the grenade lever. Lieutenant Kamalasivam's first instinct was to pull the recruit down and cover himself over him. Thankfully, both suffered minor injuries which they recovered from.
Even if there was no ill-intent, are NSF commanders trained adequately and do they have the maturity to exercise good judgement and consciousness regarding training safety? This is what Nominated Member Ganesh Rajaram asked.
All commanders undergo safety training both in the Specialist Cadet School (SCS) and Officer Cadet School (OCS). In addition, we have Unit Safety Officers and these are ex-regulars who have held senior appointments, who support the safe conduct of exercises. These Unit Safety Officers do not just have book learning; they have actual experience conducting and taking part in training and operations. But Unit Safety Officers cannot be everywhere all the time. So, for instance, for Exercise Wallaby, we sent 4,000 to 5,000 men down to Shoalwater Bay to train.
A strong safety culture and a zero-fatality training system can only be achieved if every soldier has that ingrained concern for the well-being of himself and his peers. On the ground, it is the creed of the commanders to take care of their men. If you do not know how to take care of your men and if it is shown that you do not know how to take care of the men, we will remove your command position, we will remove your rank. Commanders are taught to encourage their men and buddies to flag out when they do not feel well. Individual soldiers are advised to highlight risky behaviour and safety breaches and they can report them to their superiors without fear of reprisal. There is a 24-hour training safety hotline for commanders and soldiers to report safety incidents and near-misses. So, not only when something happens, but a near-miss, report it.
We have another External Review Panel on SAF Safety (ERPSS). It consists of prominent safety experts and professionals outside the SAF and it helps MINDEF scrutinise our safety management system. I have attached a list of its members. The current Chairman is Mr Heng Chiang Ngee, who was also Chairman of the Workplace Safety and Health Council till March this year. This panel reports to the Minister on the rigour of the system and presents recommendations to improve. These are qualified eminent members and I would like this External Review Panel to do more.
So, for a start, MINDEF has discussed with the Chairman of the ERPSS who has agreed to include one of their members in the COIs for all training-related deaths. In addition, the COI will now submit its full report to the ERPSS for further questions, comments and views. In turn, the ERPSS will provide a written report on the COI findings which will be made public.
With these multiple layers of safety and with experts within and outside assisting the SAF, we can move decisively to make zero training deaths the norm. I know it is difficult but it must be done.
Over the last two decades, we have had, on average, about one NS training-related death a year. From 2013 to 2016 we had no NS training deaths, four years, none. And this shows that zero fatalities can be achieved with effort. The Chief of Defence Force and the Service Chiefs have assured me that safety has always been and will continue to get their highest command attention to achieve zero fatalities. But we need every level to play their part, down to the individual commander and soldier, to protect their own well-being and that of their men and their buddies.
Our SAF commanders know that precious sons are entrusted to us when they train during NS. Our commanders take this seriously and never take this trust for granted. We will do our very best to achieve zero fatalities in training. We will work in unison and instil in every commander and soldier a strong sense of responsibility in ensuring training safety at all levels.
Mr Speaker and Members of this House, I have taken this opportunity to give as much relevant details as MINDEF and SAF have involving the deaths of NSFs 3SG Chan and CFC Dave Lee. I would encourage Members in this House to seek any clarification because Parliament is a critical and appropriate forum to ensure that we have done all that is possible to make safety a top priority so that every soldier is well-protected as they defend Singapore. Our soldiers deserve no less.
Er Dr Lee Bee Wah.
2.06 pm
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have three supplementary questions. This morning, I received an email from a concerned mother who has a son in National Service now. She says that she understood from her son that the "tekan" culture still exists in National Service. So, I would like to ask the Minister, first, is this "tekan" culture allowed; second, where is the channel for reporting such cases; and, third, what would be the range of punishments for the officers involved.
Mr Speaker, the Member will know my answer. It will be the same answer as she would give. If any Member of this House or any member of the public can give me details that there has been abuse of power and that recruits have been unfairly treated, let me know. We will deal with it.
We want our soldiers to be well-trained. But that does not give any excuse to any commander to abuse his position, to abuse his authority to do over and beyond what is necessary. If it is not safe for whatever reason, even well-intentioned, it is wrong. That is the bottom line. No questions. If you expose people to unsafe practices, go against training safety regulations, you are wrong from the outset. The excuses may mean very little because the TSRs are there to protect your men. And if you do not know how to protect the men, then I say you cannot be a good commander. It is behaviour prejudicial to good order and you do not deserve to be a commander and you will be punished accordingly.
Sir, it is extremely sad that we have deaths related to SAF training. My follow-up question is in relation to the unfortunate death of SCDF CPL Kok at Tuas View Fire Station. Can the Minister for Home Affairs assure us that all steps are being taken to help ensure that such an unfortunate and unnecessary death does not happen again?
I would like to remind Members that questions and queries should be confined to the Statement made by the Minister for Defence. I think we fully recognise that there is a need to fully discuss the unfortunate and tragic SCDF incident and Members should file Parliamentary Questions and they should be aired in this Chamber. However, I am prepared to permit this question if the Minister for Home Affairs wishes to respond.
I will respond.
All right.
Mr Speaker, Sir, there are three aspects to this tragic case. First, of course, is the family. Their grief, their loss at CPL Kok’s passing, a young life which has been prematurely cut short. The family is at the front and centre of our thoughts and prayers. So, as we talk about the other matters, I want to emphasise that. It is tragic that this has happened, and we must, and will, do right by them and by the late CPL Kok.
I will now also deal with two other points, that is, what happened in this case and, third, what we can do to try and make sure that this does not happen again.
What happened? We will release the details that we can at this stage. There is a fair bit of evidence as to what happened, both witnesses' and objective evidence. But it is not appropriate for me to go into the details, the facts, at this stage. There will be a Board of Inquiry (BOI). The majority of the members will be from outside the Government. There will almost certainly also be criminal proceedings. The Attorney-General's Chamber has told me that, after reviewing the facts at this stage. Based on the facts that I have seen, I think so, too. I am usually very careful about saying these things. But I think so, too. There should be criminal charges.
So, the BOI will look into the facts. The facts will also come out in public, through Court proceedings. Everything that is relevant will be out. What I can say is that the conduct was unacceptable. It was a clear and serious violation of the rules and there can be no excuse for the conduct. People play games. They horse around. They make people like CPL Kok do dangerous things. Even force them into dangerous situations. And people who do this do not think. They do not think how it can go wrong and, when it does go wrong, a life is lost, needlessly lost.
Third, what are we going to do? It is imperative that we see what went wrong and learn the lessons. What more can we do to stop this sort of behaviour? We have clear rules. Commanders emphasise that to the officers and all new enlistees are told about the rules. Punishments have been meted out. Detentions have been given when infractions have been found. How do we make sure that there is zero tolerance? Parents send their children to NS. They trust us and we have to maintain that trust.
So, I have directed SCDF as well as the other Home Team agencies to relook at the rules, how they are enforced, focus on the enforcement, come up with a further set of measures by next week. Once they are finalised, I will announce them next week. Meanwhile, I have made it clear that, hereafter, it will be a command responsibility to ensure that such conduct is not repeated. And hereafter, Unit Commanders will be held responsible for anything like this that happens, any kind of conduct that is in violation or in breach.
Commissioner Erip Yap has sent a letter in very clear terms on this yesterday to all officers. He has also personally spoken to the Commanders, emphasising that message, and the same will be done with the other Home Team agencies. So, there will be zero tolerance and we will have to do, we will do our best not to let this happen again. Thank you, Sir.
Mr Pritam Singh.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have a few questions for the Minister for Defence pertaining to his earlier Ministerial Statement. My first question pertains to the COI concerning 3SG Gavin Chan and the finding that his night vision device was not working. Does the COI report indicate whether the non-serviceability of the night vision device could have been a critical factor in the incident, in that, 3SG Chan, had his device been working properly, could have taken some remedial action before the obstacle was discovered along the path where the vehicle was moving?
The second question is related to that, whether, in future, MINDEF would consider making public COI reports as a form of closure for the public, with, of course, the relevant details redacted? These could include sensitive information on behalf of the family and other operational reasons to redact certain information.
Speaker, I thank the Member for his questions. The training safety regulations for armour training at night require you to use night vision devices and, exactly for the purpose where you have poor visibility, you need to see where you are moving. You can move without night vision devices if you have, as I have said, the hatch open and the lights on. It is the responsibility of the vehicle commander to report if his night vision devices are not working and, whereupon, you stop the exercise for safety purposes.
I mentioned that we have now, henceforth, decided that we want to give as much information as we can and, as Mr Pritam Singh says, apart from sensitive issues or security reasons. But by and large, I think we should be prepared to give out as much information. That is the reason why we have said that the External Review Panel on SAF Safety will be a member of the COI. The COI will submit the full report to the External Review Panel for their questions, for their comments and views. This External Review Panel for safety will write a report and that will be made public.
For Singaporeans who have served NS, they will not be unfamiliar with this word, "keng". Sometimes, the commanders will use it, with the good intention, to make the soldier work harder to give their best and also for the unit camaraderie. So, they say “do not keng" or “do not skive”.
But we do know that, sometimes, soldiers are genuinely unwell and are, hence, not able to perform up to mark. Sometimes the commanders are not able to read this right, or make a right judgement and, sometimes, not give the soldiers the benefit of the doubt and, therefore, to take him off from the training.
So, I want to ask the Minister, how does the SAF strike a balance, especially, in our case, where some of our National Servicemen are just fresh from school and may not have the temperament and ability to make the right decision to manage such situations?
Also, how do we use more positive ways to encourage our soldiers to give of their best rather than a negative way of saying "don't keng" and, therefore, that is how we should go about? Should we look at how we can eradicate this form of practice that we see even in the good old days? Till today, I believe this is still happening. How can we use a more positive way to encourage soldiers to give of their best?
Mr Speaker, Sir, we should be governed by training safety regulations during training and that is what they are there for. The way our training safety regulations are written, they give the benefit of the doubt to the individual soldier. If he feels unwell, he can flag himself out. That is the starting point. Whether you think he is not completely truthful is beside the point. He has the prerogative to flag himself out. You can train him to do the same exercise later, slowly, gradually, but that is a command decision.
But as these two examples show, that is not really the culture that prevails. Our young men who do NS are highly motivated, in the case of Gavin Chan. He wanted to complete the exercise for his unit. In the case of Dave Lee, he completed the eight-kilometre fast march.
So, I am not sure that it is accurate to characterise this dilemma between pushing people because they are inherently not as motivated. Our experience is that National Servicemen are motivated and, if they are not, then it is part of your skillsets to motivate him, to give him confidence, to be able to complete the exercise.
Mr Speaker, I thank both Ministers for their Statements. I think this shows the seriousness of the matter that the Ministers themselves take every death seriously. As a serviceman myself, I think tough training is absolutely important. One of the things that I think was a little bit troubling and which came out in social media as well, both in relation to CFC Dave Lee as well as to CPL Kok was the allegation of abuse, abuse of power. I think both Ministers are clear that this should not happen.
My suggestion would be that National Servicemen be given an opportunity, perhaps a whistleblower's channel, somewhere outside the respective units perhaps directly to the Ministry, in the event there is such abuse or fear of such abuse, especially if the fear is that the unit's culture encourages that, in which case they would be afraid of reporting within the unit. That is one suggestion.
Mr Speaker, we have a 24-hour safety hotline that you can call and report it. It will get attended to.
When death occurs, emotions are riled up, you have many views, some substantiated, some are unsubstantiated, which is why I said that, this House, Members here also play a critical role in making sure that safety gets top priority. As we have shown in the case of 3SG Gavin Chan, the COI established fully the facts. If there were people culpable, as previous COIs have shown, they were held responsible. So, in any case, in any death where people are culpable or negligent, they will be dealt with according to criminal law or in our military Courts. I think we have enough cases to show that all of us want to have a zero-fatality system. We are working towards that.
If Members have any other suggestions, I am happy to hear them and see whether we can incorporate them. But I want to assure you, this gets top-most priority, gets top attention at MINDEF and the SAF.
Mr Speaker, whenever we talk about "tough training", one of the things that is affected will be their mental state, the psychological state. May I know in this COI, will we be looking at the mental and psychological state of the soldier at that moment? And especially important because I think in this kind of situation, particularly when there is tough training, the psychological state would actually affect the physical performance. It can be not just on an individual level but affecting an entire section, platoon. Under this kind of situation, a soldier may just push himself to the extreme. So, I hope that maybe we can also look at, in the future, how do we have more psychological support in the army, in the training.
The COI's primary mission is to establish the facts that led to the incident and cause of death, the contributory factors. That is quite clear and I think we understand that. If the psychological preparation of soldiers was inadequate, it will be flagged out. And, yes, we pay attention to the psychology of the men. It is part and parcel of our military training.
Mr Speaker, Sir, may I ask the hon Ministers whether the parents of the two deceased National Servicemen would be allowed to observe and participate in the COI or BOI proceedings, given the specific nature of the incidents – one being a physical training incident, the other being an incident that should not have happened in the first place?
I think I understand what the Member wants, but we have to understand that the COI's job is to determine the facts and, in the process, usually, they interview many soldiers who give different accounts. First of all, it may be emotionally trying for the parents to sit there and to hear many accounts of the same thing happening again and again and, even as I recount it, 3SG Chan's events, it is very difficult. That is why we asked them for permission, can we reproduce this coroner's report? And if they had said no, then I would have to rely just to release to this House our COI report because, that coroner's report, by Queensland's procedures, is only given to the parents.
We want to assure the parents of any unfortunate National Serviceman who has died, that all the facts will be fully established. Not covered up, but full investigations. Anyone held responsible that deserves punishment will get punished. Neither should we go on a witch hunt, if they are honest mistakes, because the commanders are someone else's son, too, National Servicemen. Most of our SAF commanders are National Servicemen.
To points that, with this culture, there might be abuse, yes, I believe that some of it may have gone overboard. But by and large, our National Servicemen, our NS commanders, are decent, young men, who are doing their duty that we asked them to do to raise fighting units. We want to strike a balance, we have to make sure that we, in this House, send the appropriate signal; we, in leadership, send the appropriate signal. Safety first, do your job, if you abuse your position, you will be punished. But if you do your job dutifully, all the facts will come out and you need not fear, but continue to do your job.
May I ask the Minister whether there is a hydration protocol in place to prevent heatstroke before and during exercises for our soldiers? What is this protocol and is it sufficient to prevent heatstroke? I would also want to ask whether the thermometer that CFC Dave Lee was using was in good order.
As I have said, these are the facts that the COI and the Police must investigate. So, any findings that I give, I will put the caveat that these are internal investigations. The COI and Police report should disregard it as this is what we found. He was found to have a normal temperature before the activity started. Whether the thermometer was working, I think we have to investigate that. I do not know, I presume it was because it would be used for others as well.
Hydration protocols, yes, we do, and there are certain volumes that one has to take in. I think those with sons in NS will recognise that it is done de rigueur. Everybody stands up with their water bottle and takes the requisite volume and you have to prove that you have drunk it. Because some worry that some people may feel that they have enough water and they pour it on the ground. And all these measures, for good units, they recognise that it is done, strictly followed because it is meant to protect our soldiers.
Firstly, I thank the Minister for the comprehensive Statement. I share his sentiment and I feel for the families for their loss. Having said that, the Minister has answered most of my questions. I just want to elaborate on one point about empathy and the maturity of commanders.
I have got a son who is entering National Service next year. When I look at myself compared to him when I did my National Service, I would like to think I was a lot more matured than him going in. I think that is because, as the society matures, kids are taken a lot better care of and they are more pampered at home. We have got kids who are going into NS who are not of the same build of before and I would like to think they are not as hardy.
Having said that, in terms of commanders, whether they are section commanders or officers of other rank, does the army focus on qualities like empathy as well as being able to assess how a kid is doing vis-a-vis performance? Because, to be fair, I do not think it is intentional, I think all commanders and all National Servicemen want to perform at the best of their ability. But, sometimes, it is difficult to tell and maybe they would need a lot more training in this area. So, if the Minister could share if there is such training and if it is going to be enhanced, given that we are getting generations coming in that may be a little less hardy than what we were, growing up.
I can summarise the Member's question: how do we select commanders to have the necessary maturity and wherewithal to make good judgements? It probably applies to all jobs. In this debate and in the President's Address, think of what Singapore is doing with NS.
Very few countries have been able to maintain NS. We are taking every 18-year-old, 19-year-old for two years, put them together and, say as part of nation-building, as part of building up a defence force or a good Home Team, mix together, lead one another, train, work together, fight together. Do that in any society, you get the full plethora of the frailties of human nature.
Malaysia started its NS, which included women. And even for that kind of activity, there were reported deaths for a variety of reasons. So, we have to make sure that for our National Servicemen, the commanders are well chosen. We have psychological tests, to the extent possible, they weed out those who have mal-adjusted attributes, that are not fit to lead. In addition, peer appraisal plays a very important role. You are appraised 360o. And if your peers think that you are not fit to lead, that you do not have enough empathy, or that you do not listen, or that you do not have enough command presence or command ability, then we do not choose you.
Can we step up the activities so that they can make good judgements? You know that in Officer Cadet School (OCS), we have situational tests. We put people together, give them situations and assess how they respond. So, yes, that is incorporated in trying to figure out the psychology elements that make a good leader and to see whether this chap has it or not.
We have succeeded in our NS and this is why it is so important that we give it top-most priority when it comes to safety. We know your sons are precious. You give them to us, to the Police, to the SCDF for two years; we want to train them. We want to return them to you well-trained and safe.
Mr Dennis Tan.
I have two supplementary questions but not relating to 3SG Gavin. One, in respect of the answer that the Minister has just given to a previous question, the Minister mentioned about empathy training, possibly during Command School at OCS or SISPEC. May I also ask the Minister if he would consider having further post-commission training, meaning for junior commanders, after they have received their command rank? The basis for my question is that I think those of us who have done National Service will also realise that, for some commanders, you may not see this in OCS or in SISPEC, but after they have gotten the rank, somehow the rank got to them. And that is where the abuse of power, the tendency for abuse may happen. Perhaps in very small numbers, but, nonetheless, this is something that the Minister may wish to consider looking into.
My second question relates to the Minister's information just now where you mentioned that the second review panel will be – correct me if I have heard you wrongly – given access to the COI reports. Would the Minister also consider that on other training safety-related reports, perhaps of lesser importance, let us say an intra-SAF Board of Inquiry (BOI) report relating to some accidents or incidents which may not even involve any actual casualty but, nonetheless, relating to training safety, would this panel be given access to such reports so that they have a good overview of the kind of incidents that may happen in the SAF and to be able to provide suggestions for improvement?
Speaker, on the Member's first question in terms of post-commission training for those who might be susceptible to abuse their position of authority, as I have said, if you are in that position, the safety counts first. We have the TSRs there so that, regardless of your empathy level, or your authoritativeness, you follow them. That is not negotiable.
We can consider training them, but remember that these sons are given to us for two years, to the extent possible, all of them are given safety training while they are in Specialist Cadet School or OCS. So, that is a mandatory module.
For the External Review Panel, yes, the full COI will be given to them so that they can assess the information and ask more questions and, from that, write their report. My own position is that there will be certain security elements. But, by and large, in many instances, the security elements can be maintained. And I would give as much information to this House, to the External Review Panel that you want, so that they, too, can come to an independent conclusion. Whether we want to include them to assess serious injuries, I think the Member's point was not deaths, or COIs or BOIs. Certainly, if the ERPSS feels that they can do more work, I will be happy to ask them if they could also be included.
Assoc Prof Randolph Tan.
Sir, the question I have is quite similar to what Mr Dennis Tan has asked. I think the Minister will agree that the thicker you make the TSRs, the more difficult it could actually be for the commanders in the field. The Minister referred earlier to the fact that commanders actually need certain skills. Is there an on-going system to assess whether there are deficits in the attitudes, as well as the skills of commanders in the field? Is there an on-going system to ensure that, if such deficits are discovered, they can be remedied?
We receive, for two years the entire spectrum of abilities from society for males; all of them come to us. And we have to run a system. We have fairly rigorous selection criteria for commanders – OCS, Specialist Cadet School. Can you get it right each time? For the majority, yes. Are there some that you chose as commanders that are not fit to be? If there are attributes which show up and you do something wrong, they will be called out because safety is not negotiable, as we tell them.
So, it is a difficult question that you have asked: do we constantly second-guess and check on them? In honesty, it is difficult, but remember, in the military, there is a hierarchical situation, so I take it that the commanders above them would spot it. There are these annual reviews, but let me try to simplify this. We take it that commanders have various skill sets and various empathy levels. But let this message be very clear: when it comes to safety, it gets top-most priority. When it comes to the welfare of your men, that is your top-most priority, whatever your skill sets, whatever your empathy level. You protect the well-being of your men first.
Minister, let me first declare my interest. I have a family member who is serving in the same platoon as CFC Dave Lee. And following the incident, there were many parents and National Servicemen in the same platoon who were sharing concerns and worries. So, I would like to ask the Minister if the Ministry is familiar with the state of affairs of the motivation and the level of our National Servicemen in the same platoon being in so close contact with the deceased. As well as whether has conversation been taking place with the family members to assure them that the safety protocols are in place and their sons can continue to be in the exercise and various operational readiness that they are being put through in the camp?
When this incident occurred, the Army was mobilised very quickly at the top leadership levels. We stopped, had a safety timeout for all activities; paused, everybody stopped, safety first. We checked all processes, even when it is not related to heat injuries. Then, specifically, for heat injuries, make sure that the protocols are in place and then we restart the training. For that individual unit, the Army Commanders went down, engaged the men, engaged the family members of the deceased CFC Dave Lee, as well as what the Member has rightly pointed out, how it would affect his platoon mates.
So, I was watching whether the social media furore over this would divide, as the Member rightly alluded to, the men and the commanders. Would they gel together on this? And we have to learn from these lessons that when something wrong happens, does it divide or does it unite? Because no one can guarantee you that no such incident will occur in another period, in another time, in another unit. We will do our level best to get a zero-fatality system. It does not only apply to the SAF, it applies to other problems in society.
I think in this quiet Chamber where we have the equanimity to examine all the facts, to ask why our men are doing this. What is the purpose? How do we run the system? Is this a bad system? Is it a good system? Is there abuse that is rampant? Are there a majority who are just trying to do their duty? We then come to the very decisions on what we need to do to strengthen the system; but never degrade it, never reduce the trust, but build up this cache. And each year that we can do this, the SAF will get stronger, the SAF will get safer to protect us.
We will take one more question, Mr Yee Chia Hsing.
Thank you, Speaker. Human memories are short. So, after every incident that happened, the danger is that when this current batch of servicemen graduate, move on or retire, the new batch of servicemen, all that they have are the TSRs that have been modified or added, but they are in a vacuum without context. So, I am not sure whether we can change our safety training, also to put context to the TSRs when we do the training to say, “We put in this TSR because that incident happened and we lost a serviceman.” So that people would realise the importance of the TSRs for subsequent batches of servicemen.
Speaker, the Member has made a very essential point for safety management systems. I used to be Minister for Manpower and he is absolutely right. We went to countries that have very good safety systems. The Scandinavians have excellent safety systems because that is their culture. So, we have to build a culture so that even when commanders change, even when National Servicemen change, we retain it.
Some of you may have worked in ExxonMobil where, before every meeting, they would give you a safety briefing. Even if it is a 15-minute meeting, the organisers would give you a briefing to tell you where the exits are, to tell you what happens. It is de rigueur.
We have to do that. We have to do that so that the safety systems are maintained and that is why we have Unit Safety Officers that build up this culture. It will take time, but we have gotten it. As I have said, on average, we have one death a year. I believe if all of us give attention, as we did in 2012 to 2016, no fatalities. Let us give this our best attention. Let us go that extra mile and make sure that our sons remain safe.
Order. The Clerk will now proceed to read the Orders of the Day.
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