Enhancing Fail-safe Redundancy in Internet Networks Given Digital Push with Smart Nation

Mr Speaker, I thank Dr Tan Wu Meng for his question. He has raised an issue that is important to both my Ministry and the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA), which is the resilience of our international and domestic Internet connectivity.

Sir, let me start with Singapore's international Internet connectivity. Singapore is a major Asia Pacific hub for submarine cables. We currently have 19 cable systems that connect us directly to more than 33 countries. We have multiple direct connections to key hubs, such as China, Europe, Japan and the United States, which enhance the resilience of our international Internet connectivity.

We have benefited from this resilience. The recent episode where our Internet links remained intact, despite damage to submarine cables caused by typhoons in Hong Kong and Macau in end-August 2017, is a good case in point. The fact that we had sufficient diversity and redundancy in international Internet connectivity enabled us to reroute traffic through undamaged cables. In contrast, Internet connections in a number of countries in the Asia Pacific were disrupted.

Nonetheless, Sir, it is important that we continue to find ways to improve the redundancy and diversity of our international Internet connectivity. We will continue encouraging new submarine cables to land in Singapore, especially if they will provide Singapore with alternative connectivity routes to key hubs. To do so, IMDA will work with relevant Government agencies and submarine cable operators to incentivise the landing of submarine cables, ensure sufficient landing resources, protect submarine cables from damage in our busy shipping lanes, and route cables to avoid disaster-prone areas.

Let me now turn to our domestic broadband Internet connectivity. Broadband Internet services are offered by multiple operators over multiple networks. These include the Nationwide Broadband Network, mobile networks and operators' own fixed-line networks. This diversity reduces the risks due to reliance on a single set of infrastructure and makes our domestic broadband Internet connectivity more resilient.

My Ministry and IMDA regularly review and put in place measures to enhance the resilience of our broadband Internet services. One key measure is the Telecom Service Resiliency Code, which was last updated recently in 2016. It aims to ensure that operators of key telecommunication infrastructure invest in and enhance the resilience of their networks against service disruptions. Other measures include IMDA's requirements for key fixed and mobile operators to conduct regular audits on their network designs, operational processes, business continuity planning and associated infrastructure and facilities. We will work closely with the industry to ensure that these regulations remain appropriate, effective and up to date.

Sir, in conclusion, my Ministry and IMDA recognise the importance of ensuring that our domestic and international Internet connectivity is diverse and robust. This is all the more critical as we strive to become a Smart Nation and Digital Economy. We will continuously monitor and review our policies and regulations to achieve this goal.

I thank the Minister for his comprehensive reply. I have two supplementary questions, please.

Firstly, I recall, in 2006, an earthquake near Taiwan damaged regional undersea cables and, for some time, Singapore Internet users had difficulty with overseas telephony and even broadband Internet access. Does our current planning consider potential major natural disasters, besides typhoons, for example?

Secondly, I was wondering whether at the national level there are ongoing table-top exercises to look at the impact of disruptions to Internet infrastructure that extends beyond just a single Internet service provider so that we can explore for potential systemic factors that individual service providers on their own might not have considered?

Sir, on the first question, as I have said earlier, we will continue to learn. In fact, we have learnt from the previous incidents so that we can enhance the resilience of our network. Following the Taiwan earthquake in December 2006, our operators have ensured that not all cable systems pass through the same earthquake-prone areas near Taiwan and Japan.

Secondly, some of our operators have made their cable network design more resilient to cable cuts by connecting the Southeast and East Asian countries in a ring manner which allows traffic to be rerouted via the unaffected part of the cable system when one part is cut. In other words, we learn, study and see where the points of systemic risks are and how we can overcome them.

On the Member's second question as to whether or not we conduct table-top exercises, what IMDA does is they work with the operators to ensure that, first, their own network must be resilient; and, secondly, the overall connectivity, and the possible systemic effects of one network over the other are also addressed. So, IMDA works very closely, firstly, to make sure that they implement the code that I mentioned earlier. Secondly, we ask them to do regular audits and IMDA will then take a global view across the entire sector to ascertain any risk at the network level.

So, we continue to explore this because we know that the systems will be getting more complex and a fourth operator is about to come in. So, we have to make sure that connectivity remains resilient.