Terrorism (Suppression of Misuse of Radioactive Material) Bill

Madam, terrorism commands our constant attention these days. Author Van Hipp describes this very well in his book "The New Terrorism". It has taken on a completely new fate.

Singapore is not immune either. Even as we do not house large-scale nuclear plants and facilities, being open to the world still puts us at a potential risk. The radioactive and nuclear threat involves criminals and terrorists often acquiring and using these elements for malicious purposes via the following channels: one, nuclear explosive devices; two, nuclear materials to improvise nuclear explosive devices; three, radioactive materials to construct a radiological dispersal device; or fourth, dispersal of radioactivity through sabotage of installation or during transportation.

Advances in information technology (IT) and the availability of the radioactive materials have also increased the likelihood of all these attacks happening anywhere in the world, practically, in fact, made even a lot easier these days. Some of these devices, when detonated and released, can disperse the radioactive materials over a wide area, contaminating persons, environment and property with long-lasting effects and impact. Also, something else to consider. These days, terrorists use hybrid models, that is, blending nuclear and conventional devices. Thus, the need for all of us to be robust and savvy with our counterterrorism measures as well.

Madam, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), many of the significant and severe cases of misuse were perpetrated by persons with direct access to the materials or have the ability to get the licence to procure them without suspicion. And indeed, we do have some of these facilities in Singapore, such as, in the use of nuclear imaging, nuclear medicine and a few other industries. They may not be big but they are significant enough for us to be concerned about.

Thus, my queries include, firstly, does the Ministry have a listing of such facilities and industries in Singapore? Secondly, are there specific guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources, and its transport from facility to facility? Thirdly, have there ever been any breaches thus far in Singapore? Fourth, how about our control at our borders? What are our detection strategies for deployment of border monitoring equipment and counters? Fifth, have there ever been any threat of this nature in Singapore?

Sixth, in clause 11, it is stated that Singapore's jurisdiction to deal with the nuclear-related offences committed elsewhere extends even outside Singapore to a certain extent. This is an important commitment as a member of the global community. Do we have sufficient numbers of persons and expertise trained in this area to contribute significantly and meaningfully?

Seven, being a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and also being a strong advocate of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, Singapore's stand is very clear. If in the event of an occurrence of such an incident, how does Singapore share on the international platform and database? The IAEA found that one of the weakest areas of collaboration is the poor reporting and weaknesses in reporting and upkeeping a database. How is Singapore planning and training for this? Do we subscribe to any such databases, for example, the Johnston Archive or The Global Chronology?

Madam, I do support the stiff and strict penalties that have been announced with the Bill and I support the Bill.

Mdm Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill, which some might say has been a long time in the making.

In 1996, the International Court of Justice delivered their now famous advisory opinion to a controversial question. They were asked whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances is permitted under international law. Among other things, and in a 7-7 split decision, the Court replied that it cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful under international law, in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state is at risk.

The late great Judge Christopher Weeramantry was one of the seven dissenting Judges in the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Case, and he said that the "use of nuclear weapons contradicts the fundamental principle of the dignity and worth of the human person upon which all law must depend. It endangers the human environment in a manner which threatens the entirety of life on this planet".

Fortunately, that same year, in 1996, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General at that time, after his review of the applicable international law, concluded that there was a need to elaborate on international treaties, including on a treaty preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

After several rounds of treaty drafting and negotiations, the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signature in April 2005. The Convention does not impose any new obligations on states in their use of nuclear weapons. It covers primarily the activities by nuclear terrorists, to be exact. It requires states to criminalise these offences via national legislation and to establish penalties in line with the gravity of such crimes.

Today, more than 100 countries, as the Minister said earlier, 109 countries have ratified the Convention and passed enabling legislation to give it domestic effect. Singapore remains one of only 16 countries that have signed the Convention but have not yet ratified this Convention. It is, therefore, high time for this Bill, Madam. This House should welcome the basis for jurisdiction that this Bill sets out, which is a version of universal jurisdiction or tri-extradite, its guidelines for extraditions, the punitive measures it puts in place, and other measures it seeks to enact to prevent, deter and counter nuclear terrorism which takes place inside or outside Singapore's territorial borders.

For the sake of clarity, Madam, I would like to ask only the following questions of the Ministry. The first and perhaps the most important question is: why did we wait so long? If we signed in 2005, why are we seeking to ratify only in 2017? Perhaps, the more pertinent question is: what is prompting our move this year to look at ratification? The Minister mentioned ISIS and, certainly, that must be a concern. But are there issues or concerns closer to home, in this region, geopolitical threats that we may or should be concerned about?

Second, to what extent was the Ministry's desire to pass this Bill and to ratify the Convention, prompted by the US doing the same in 2015?

Third, going forward, how does the Ministry intend to cooperate with IAEA and the neighbouring Asian state parties which have also recently ratified this convention? Specifically, I am thinking about South Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam, which have ratified this convention in the past two to three years. How would we be working with them to secure compliance?

Finally, clause 14 contemplates the possibility, interestingly, of obtaining a public prosecutor's "fiat" or consent to prosecute. What are the reasons for this particular provision in clause 14? Will other existing Government agencies potentially have a role in investigation and prosecution of Convention offences under this Bill and, if so, which agencies would these be?

In conclusion, Madam, allow me to say that some words that were said by Judge Weeramantry two decades ago in 1996 still ring true today, unfortunately. He said that "a global regime of security which makes safety the result of terror and can speak of survival and annihilation as twin alternatives makes peace and the human future dependent upon terror. This is not a basis for world order". On that cautionary note, Madam, I support this Bill.

Madam, as noted by Ms Karen Tan, our Permanent Representative to the UN, the threat of non-state actors gaining access to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is becoming an increasingly real threat.

This Bill strengthens Singapore's position alongside other countries in the international fight against terrorism, in particular, nuclear terrorism. I will be making some suggestions and raising two areas for clarification on the proposed provisions, as well as concerns on Singapore's efforts in combating terror threats involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials.

Under section 6(1)(b)(iii) and section 7(1)(b)(iii), the use of radioactive material and Convention device, and the use or damage of a nuclear facility is an offence if a person does so to compel any person, international organisation or government to do or refrain from doing any act. However, this limb is missing from section 4(b) and section 5(b) on possession and manufacture and I would like to seek clarification on this.

It is plausible that a person's intention in the possession or manufacture of these devices is not to cause death or injury to persons or damage to property or environment, but instead to compel individuals and governments to act in certain ways.

For instance, in the October 2001 US anthrax attacks, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to reporters and political figures. The intention of the senior scientist at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases who did so was not to kill or sicken anyone, but to enhance the profile of his anthrax work, to improve his own standing among colleagues and to stimulate funding for biodefense by inducing fear in the population and influencing government policy. Given the similar risk of the potentially lethal consequences, should we also make possession and manufacture an offence where the intention is to influence others to act in a certain way?

Next, the proposed section 9 makes it an offence to demand another person to make available to the offender or to give the offender access to any radioactive material, Convention device, or nuclear facility.

However, it is only an offence if the demand is made by the use of force or by threats. It is conceivable that these individuals may induce others to act through the promise of reward or gratification. Should the scope of the section be widened to cover such scenarios?

I also note that section 11 outlines the extraterritorial nature of nuclear terrorism offences, stating that any person outside of Singapore committing an act which "if committed in Singapore, would constitute a nuclear terrorism offence", would be deemed to have contravened the law. I would like to ask if this is consistent with other terrorism offences as well.

This Bill will help to bring our legislative regime in line with international law on nuclear terrorism. Nuclear terrorism is but one of the elements of CBRNE threats. In addressing other aspects of CBRNE threats, Singapore has signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Domestically, the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, Biological Agents and Toxins Act, and Strategic Goods (Control) Act are some of the pieces of legislation passed to prevent access of non-state actors to CBRNE materials and to criminalise abuse of these hazardous materials.

Whilst strengthening our legislative framework, are we also doing enough to address security risks for facilities that hold dual-use materials which could be exploited or repurposed for terrorist usage? Although Singapore does not have significant nuclear material or facilities, it is relatively easy to weaponise chemical, biological, radiological or explosive materials. All cases of theft of nuclear materials that have occurred overseas where the circumstances of the theft are known were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders.

As such, in addition to the physical security of facilities holding CBRNE materials, are there also measures in place to address insider threats which may arise from the radicalisation of personnel working in sensitive areas involving contact with CBRNE material?

Madam, I welcome this move to combat nuclear terrorism and would further urge that stronger measures be taken to strengthen our CBRNE defence by putting hazardous materials beyond the hands of would-be terrorists.

Mdm Speaker, I thank the three speakers for supporting the Bill.

A nuclear or radioactive explosion will claim many lives or severe damage to property. Nuclear or radioactive contamination will have serious health and environmental consequences. The affected areas would require extensive cleaning up before they are safe to live in.

Singapore's ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism will allow us to join the international community in the fight against nuclear terrorism and strengthen our ability to prevent, detect and deter a nuclear terrorist attack.

Madam, the risk of a terrorist attack in Singapore involving the use of radioactive material is, as I said in my opening speech, low. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of such a terrorist attack. Over the years, we have been preparing and developing capabilities to deal with such risks.

Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan asked what reasons prompted us to seek ratification now. After signing on to the Convention in 2006, we conducted detailed studies of the capabilities required to meet the Convention's requirements. Since then, agencies, such as the National Environment Agency (NEA) and Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) have developed the necessary operational capabilities to deal with the illicit use of nuclear and radioactive materials in Singapore. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and NEA have also been working together to tighten the security measures at the premises of licensees that are storing higher risk radioactive materials.

In 2014, we acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and accepted its 2005 Amendment, which includes obligations to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

We also have to bear in mind that we are operating in a framework of various criminal legislation, such as the Radioactive Protection Act, which includes clauses, such as in Part VIIIA of the Radiation Protection Act (RPA) that relates also to the misuse of nuclear material. We also have the Penal Code and other legislation, basically those that pertain to terrorist acts, such as the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act and Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act.

Altogether, the framework of laws provides an umbrella of legislation to counter and deal with acts of terrorism, whether they are in the preparatory stage, advanced in the operations or even the actual act. Bearing in mind the threat assessment that I have spoken about earlier and, having done all of this, we are now ready to table this Bill, ratify the Convention, and put in place the remaining pieces essential to protect Singapore against such threats.

Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef asked what measures are in place to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack in Singapore.

First, we have a strict regulatory regime in place to make it hard for radioactive material in Singapore to end up in the wrong hands. All local entities that possess or deal in radioactive material are licensed by NEA. These activities are regulated under the Radiation Protection Act and its subsidiary regulations, which take reference from the IAEA guidelines. NEA has also worked with the security agencies to tighten security measures at radioactive material storage sites.

On the import of radioactive material, valid permits are required for all cargo entering our port checkpoints. If necessary, the cargo will be subject to x-ray screening and radioactivity checks. Any radioactive material detected is verified against the permits, and must comply with permit conditions.

Second, we will be cooperating with IAEA and other regional State Parties, and Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan asked about this. Singapore is a participating State of the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). ITDB is an international platform for IAEA and participating States to share information as well as intelligence, to combat illicit nuclear trafficking and strengthen nuclear security. Thus far, we have not detected any breaches involving radioactive material in Singapore.

Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries are also strengthening cooperation on nuclear issues through the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM). ASEANTOM is working closely with IAEA to support the establishment of a regional environmental radioactivity database and an emergency preparedness and response framework.

Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef asked what measures we have in place to prepare for and deal with an attack.

First, we have established an interagency committee to oversee nuclear safety and security in Singapore. The committee continually assesses the threat of nuclear terrorism in Singapore. Agencies validate existing plans and identify gaps through plan reviews and exercises. Interagency working groups undertake capability development to address the gaps and ensure agencies build up the necessary operational capabilities, facilities and measures to deal with these threats.

Mr Louis Ng mentioned the threat from other types of materials, such as biological and chemical materials. We would like to assure the Member that there are also interagency committees looking at the biological and chemical threats posed to Singapore, with similar structures and processes to continually review the protective security requirements for facilities that may contain such materials and our measures to deal with such threats.

Second, our agencies have developed capabilities and processes to deal with possible threat scenarios, such as the detonation of a radiological dispersive device. Should such an incident occur, MHA will coordinate a whole-of-Government response. SCDF will render assistance to casualties and contain the radioactive material, and will be assisted by agencies, such as the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), where necessary. NEA will provide technical advice to the response agencies to help mitigate the harm from the radioactive materials. The Police will take the lead in investigating these terrorism acts to find the perpetrators and take them to task. The Police will work closely with other agencies where necessary.

Third, beyond the efforts from our agencies, Singaporeans will need to be prepared for an attack which uses radioactive material. When hazardous materials, such as radioactive substances, are released into the environment, the authorities may have to evacuate people from the affected areas. Members of public may also be directed to initiate In-Place-Protection (IPP) at their homes or workplaces to reduce the risk of inhaling radioactive particles. This may include, for example, closing and sealing off gaps around all doors, windows and openings, and switching off all ventilation and air-con units that draw in air from the outside, until such time as the threat has dissipated.

SCDF trains members of the public on how to conduct IPP as part of its Community Emergency Preparedness Programme (CEPP). Participants will be briefed on the IPP procedures and have a hands-on session where they can practise on training simulators. IPP procedures are also included in the Civil Defence (CD) Emergency Handbook which is available for download on SCDF's website. Should any member of the public come across any suspected illegal possession or use of radioactive material, or any attempts to make any radiological device, he should inform the Police immediately.

Mr Louis Ng suggested expanding the offences in the Bill to include other activities. As I have said earlier, the objective of the Bill is to ratify the Convention. The acts that are criminalised in the Bill, therefore, follow those set out in the Convention. For the two acts referred to by Mr Louis Ng, these are covered under existing legislation. For example, the Member mentioned the scenario where a person may seek to gain access to material not by force but by unlawfully inducing others through the promise of reward or gratification. Depending on the actual circumstances, this could be an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, among other offences. Similarly, the possession or manufacture of any radioactive material without a licence, regardless of intent, is an offence under RPA. We will continue to monitor the types of terrorist attacks or activities carried out and consider in future if there is a need to further amend the laws.

Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan asked why we require the Public Prosecutor's fiat before prosecution of offences under this Bill. This ensures that the offences under the Bill which are very serious are brought to the personal attention of the Public Prosecutor before charges are even filed. This is a consistent approach for other terrorism-related offences, such as those in the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act.

Mr Louis Ng also had questions on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of offences under this Bill. I had spoken about this in the opening speech. The scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Bill is similar to that in other terrorism-related offences, again, such as the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act and others.

Mdm Speaker, ratifying the Convention is an important step towards strengthening the fight against nuclear terrorism, both locally and internationally. There are no immediate threats, but we take the possibility seriously. It is timely that we put in place the necessary legal framework now and join the international community to combat terrorism in all its forms, including nuclear terrorism.

*Question put, and agreed to.*

*Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House.*

*The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Desmond Lee.]*

*Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.*