Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Mr Leon Perera.

Ms Sylvia Lim, please deliver your speech.

Mdm Speaker, this Bill is evidence of how a nightmare may come back to haunt us.

The Elected Presidency was created in the 1990s with the intention of safeguarding our past Reserves from being squandered by a "rogue government". However, the experience with the Elected Presidency has seen the PAP Government coming back to the House to amend the Constitution again and again, as unintended consequences arose.

One public episode of tension between the Elected President and the Government surfaced when President Ong Teng Cheong, a former PAP Deputy Prime Minister, held a press conference to highlight his lack of access to information about the assets he was supposed to safeguard. The Presidential Elections in 2011 were also a nightmare for the PAP leadership, with four candidates contesting the elections. I understand that some leaders were kept awake at night at the prospect of one of the other three candidates being elected.

Today's Bill presents complicated amendments to try to undo problems created by the Government itself. Yesterday, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean spent 90 minutes meticulously taking the House through the changes brought about by this Bill, together with seven pages of meaty handouts, the kind of content ripe for a major law exam.

Before I go further, there are three fundamental truths that underpin this debate, which the Workers' Party (WP) would like to acknowledge at the outset.

First, that the President's principal role is as Head of State, a unifying figure and symbol of the nation, domestically and to the world.

Second, that the President should not be another centre of power. In fact, this was a concern that the WP had articulated since the 1980s when the Elected Presidency was first mooted. In January this year, the Prime Minister reiterated that the President was not another centre of power.

Third, that the country's past Reserves should be preserved and strongly safeguarded by an entity that is elected by the people. The issue is who should be the gatekeeper.

Madam, I shall touch on the President as the Head of State which, we say, should be his principal and only role.

The WP notes that our past system of having appointed Presidents has produced Presidents who are generally held in very high esteem and are greatly respected by the people. Beginning with the appointment of President Yusof Ishak to President Wee Kim Wee, the fact that the President did not campaign and go through elections, in fact, elevated the office to being above politics. His focus on being Head of State was of universal appeal, and, in no way, diminished his stature, compared with our elected Presidents.

Today, the WP and many Singaporeans still believe the President should be an appointed office and above politics. To revert to such a system of appointed Presidents is not regressive; in fact, it would naturally take care of any concerns that minority communities would not be represented in the office, as this would automatically be resolved by a system of rotational appointments.

Madam, we disagree that the Presidency should be an elected office and should be tasked to safeguard the past reserves and the integrity of the Public Service. We thus oppose this Bill.

Our past reasons for objecting to the Elected Presidency have been recorded over the years. Under the scheme designed by the PAP Government, the strict and specific eligibility criteria would likely see the election of a pro-PAP President. In the event of a change of government, the President was likely to be the legacy of the previous administration, who could prevent the new government from being effective, for political reasons. This prospect was not just WP's thinking but the honest misgivings of some senior PAP MPs as well. For instance, during the Parliamentary debate on the 1988 White Paper on the Elected President, Mr Ong Pang Boon, a former Minister, noted as follows, and I quote:

"...the intention of the proposal as contained in the White Paper has gone even much further than originally mooted, which was to protect the country's financial Reserves from being raided by a profligate government elected to office. The reserved powers of the elected President now extend beyond financial reserves to cover all assets of the government and key Public Service appointments."

"The proposal, as contained in the White Paper, whichever way one looks at it, would ensure the election of a Presidential candidate from the PAP. Should by some freak election results, which the Government claimed to be possible, an Opposition government were elected to office, it would be logical for the PAP President to work to undermine and bring down the Opposition Prime Minister and his government, even if the Opposition wants to act responsibly."

Madam, fast forward to today. Today, we have an even clearer picture as to why the President should not be asked to take on the dual role of being Head of State and also safeguarding the Reserves and Public Service at the same time. Such a dual role has an inherent tension that politicises the office of the President.

This fact was recognised by the Constitutional Commission to Review Specific Aspects of the Elected Presidency. After considering the matter in detail and receiving submissions and evidence, the Commission felt compelled to point out the inherent problem with the dual role, even though it was going beyond its Terms of Reference to do so. The Commission noted that being a Head of State was a unifying role while being a custodian was a confrontational role; in addition, requiring the President to go through an election necessarily made him a partisan figure. The Commission also noted that the two roles required "different chemistry". The Commission went on to ask the Government to consider unbundling the two roles, so that the President could concentrate on his role as Head of State, while the custodial role be given to another body of persons. We respectfully agree with the Commission's observations.

Next, I move on to how the Reserves and other matters may be safeguarded. The WP agrees that the country's Reserves built up during the previous terms of government should be safeguarded. As the past Reserves belong to the people of Singapore, we believe the safeguard should rest with Parliament, as the elected representatives of the people.

To this end, we have studied the Constitutional Commission's recommendation that safeguarding of the past Reserves could be vested in a separate body, to be appointed, who have powers of delay. In other words, when the Government wants to spend past Reserves, it would need to send its proposal to this appointed body for review. If the body had reservations about the proposal, it would then send the proposal back to Parliament, which could then pass it with a supermajority vote.

Madam, the WP has always acknowledged that the past Reserves are worthy of strong safeguards. We also see the merits of the Constitutional Commission's rationale that MPs would benefit from the collective wisdom of a separate body with some expertise.

Having considered the Commission's report, the WP believes it is apt to consider creating a second Chamber in the Legislature, which could be called the Senate. Its primary role would be to safeguard the country's past Reserves. Besides past Reserves, we recognise that there is also some public sentiment that it is prudent that a body outside the Government should review the other decisions that the President is currently overseeing, such as approving key Civil Service appointments. We acknowledge that these are important matters, including decisions on whether a corruption investigation should proceed if the Prime Minister objects to it.

Madam, we do agree that there are benefits in having another body review such decisions. To ease the transition from the Elected Presidency system, we propose that all the discretionary powers currently vested in the Elected President be vested in the newly-created Senate. After the Senate has worked for some time, the Senate's scope could be reviewed.

Under this proposal, the Senate would be elected by the people in a national election, rather than appointed as suggested by the Commission. The election will be of individuals who do not represent any political party. We could start with a Senate of, say, eight individuals.

Madam, we see the election of the Senate members as critical, to make the membership process open and not susceptible to political interference. This will also give the Senate the necessary mandate for the important decisions it makes. Candidates for the Senate should possess relevant experience and expertise for the functions expected of the Senate. My colleagues will set this out in more detail.

Madam, as far as spending the past Reserves and key Civil Service appointments are concerned, the Senate would only have delay powers to refer any proposal back to Parliament for consideration. At that stage, Parliament should consider the reservations of the Senate, and, if thought fit, could still pass the proposal but with a supermajority of, say, three-quarters of MPs. Such a mechanism would see the safeguards on Reserves remaining with Parliament.

Next, Madam, I move on to some concerns about the Bill. Madam, the provisions of this Bill show that the Government knows that it is unwise to let one man have too much power. However, the Government seems to be locked into a position that there must be an Elected President, and is devising more ways to check him. However, the Government's chosen method of strengthening the CPA and enlarging its role is fraught with difficulties. The increased clout of the CPA will make it yet another power centre, which is not tenable as it is an unelected body.

One clear example is clause 3 of the Bill. Clause 3 deals with the entrenchment framework, which was summarised in Handout 4 distributed yesterday. Parliament had previously considered and passed the existing Article 5(2A) and Article 5A, but these had not been brought into operation. Those provisions had envisaged that any Bill to amend the Constitution that affected the President's role or powers could not be presented to Parliament unless the President agreed to it, or it had been put to a national referendum and two-thirds of voters agreed to it.

Clause 3 of the Bill will now introduce a re-revised entrenchment framework. The proposed Articles 5A and 5B will enable a Bill affecting the President's role or powers to be presented even if he does not agree and the proposal is not put to a referendum, so long as the CPA agrees to it.

As Deputy Prime Minister Teo confirmed yesterday, the new framework will give "legal weight" to the opinion of the CPA regarding entrenchment provisions. This had not been the case before this Bill. This provision will thus strengthen the position of the CPA vis-a-vis the President. How do we justify letting the CPA be the gateway to amendments to our fundamental law, the Constitution, when the CPA is itself unelected?

Madam, while we have stated our views, we do not believe that Parliament should arrogate to itself the right to decide such fundamental matters concerning the political system and state power or, as the Prime Minister put it just now, provisions which "determine the direction of the country".

It is proper to consult the people directly in a national referendum. We call on the Government to allow the people to make a decision on the nature of the Presidency and how the country's assets should be safeguarded.

Madam, we have the liberty of drafting the question that we believe can be considered to be put to a referendum. Madam, may I have your permission to distribute the question to Members?

Yes, please. [A document was distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 1.]

Mdm Speaker, the annex that is being distributed to Members seeks to ask Singaporeans to choose between two models in a national referendum. Option A, as advanced by the PAP Government, is where the President is elected and plays dual roles. Option B, which is the model that the WP prefers, is an appointed President without the custodial role which is now vested in an elected Senate.

Madam, let me conclude. Many Singaporeans, including our residents, have asked why the Government is rushing such an important matter through Parliament. They noted that Prime Minister Lee had said that there was no urgency, while the Law Minister has gone on record that the changes were not targeted at disbarring any individual from running. If that is the case, surely, there is still time for any change to be carefully considered for implementation in the following Presidential Election in 2023, rather than the one next year.

Madam, there have been public discussion and scepticism about the proposed changes. Indeed, Prime Minister Lee acknowledged previously that it would not be easy to convince Singaporeans about the need for these changes. There is an illustration. I came across a post on the Facebook page of Dr Tan Cheng Bock, a former Presidential candidate. The post from a member of the public read as follows, and I quote, "What kind of legacy are we leaving to the next generation when we define our Head of State by his wealth and race, rather than by his character, social contributions and public spiritedness?"

Madam, this is, indeed, an important question for all of us to answer. The matter before the House is a grave one and a hasty decision could well prove unwise.

Mr Zaqy Mohamad.

Mdm Speaker, thank you for allowing me to speak on this important Bill that has large implications on the future of governance in Singapore. I would like to keep my comments to three key areas of this amendment Bill.

Firstly, on the role of the President. As Head of State, the President is really a representative of the people. A representative of Singapore and Singaporeans on the global stage and a symbol of the shared values of Singaporeans, regardless of race, language or religion. I also know that, to many Singaporeans, many of our past Presidents also meant much more. They were unifying figures that were above policies and politics, endearing characters that some were labelled the "People's President". And like many Singaporeans, I, too, hope that our ideals in what we want in our President will not be lost, as we strengthen the qualifying criteria and governance of custodial powers.

During the last Presidential Elections, it was clear that many Singaporeans, including some of the candidates themselves, as the Prime Minister mentioned in his speech, did not have an accurate view of the role of the President and what powers came along with it. As a result, the debates surrounding the election and the election itself took on an unnecessary political slant.

But this episode gave us the opportunity to ask a question. Do Singaporeans know what the President represents? Clearly, over the last two days, we had heard that the role of the President is different from the Government's, otherwise the President would be no different from other executive political office holders like the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers. I agree with President Tony Tan that the Elected President "cannot be a second centre of power". As a small state, decisions have to be made with mutual trust and respect between the offices for the long-term benefit of Singapore.

Thus, it is important that if these changes are applied by the next Presidential Elections, more education must be provided for voters to better understand the Constitutional amendments and the role of the President. It must also be ensured that candidates are also better kept aware of their role and powers that they are standing for so that voters are not misguided.

That brings me to my second point, Mdm Speaker, the criteria for eligibility to be a President.

The constant emphasis on the custodial role of the President seems to be the financial acumen and executive experience of the candidate. I agree that times have changed and while the role of the second key to the Reserves is important, but an overemphasis on this in this Bill, manifesting in the tighter criteria of having led a $500-million company to justify the complexity of the role, immediately narrows the consideration of what qualities a President ought to have. Many I spoke to are concerned whether this criterion will discount other candidates who have other strengths to offer and what it takes to represent Singaporeans and Singapore.

There is another change that is made in tandem, with regard to the CPA which covers the enhanced safeguards of the CPA, the composition of the CPA and clarity on the veto powers of Parliament should the CPA and President disagree.

It is clear in this amendment Bill that adequate safeguards are in place for the custodial decision-making by the President, guided by "wise men" of the CPA. So, does the criterion have to be so rigid on financial acumen since he can always fall back on the CPA for sound expert advice, and that Parliament will also have veto powers of a two-third majority under specific circumstances?

Given the strengthened council that the President can seek wisdom from and the role of Parliament in intervening in a gridlock, could we have then retained the qualification criteria of $100 million in an executive responsibility, instead of $500 million?

The other criterion under Article 19(4)(a) that the company run by the candidate chief executive officer (CEO) must be profitable over the three-year period does not reflect market reality. Some sectors face challenging times due to the global environment. If you are a CEO in an oil and gas firm, it will be hard to manage three years of profitability today.

The reality is that even Government Budgets are not always in surplus positions when we have to take strategic measures for economic downturns. Also, some CEOs are also in place to turn around companies, but it does not mean that their performance was poor. But I assume that in such cases, they may still qualify under the private sector deliberative track in Article 19(4)(b).

However, as the deliberative track may be a catch-all for anyone who does not make a clear-cut case from the private sector track, it may also be good to explain whether the deliberations will be made transparent and reasons for acceptance or rejection of the candidate be made public.

Madam, we have had Presidents in the past who endeared themselves to the hearts of many Singaporeans. Many Presidents in the past, such as Mr Yusof Ishak, Dr Benjamin Sheares, Mr Wee Kim Wee, among others, were seen as Presidents of the people, above politics and represented Singapore well internationally.

The Presidential candidate is not applying for a job to be a Chairman of a listed company, where his financial and corporate track record should be the key criteria for evaluation. He is applying to be the President of Singapore, a role that demands a track record of service to society, of demonstrated ability and willingness to have contributed to society and Singaporeans, in a leading role, in addition to his role as custodian of Singapore's Reserves.

Therefore, I would argue that perhaps, we could have done the incremental increase for the financial criteria, rather than by a single step. Complement that criterion with some softer and relevant criteria like maybe the candidate should have played a key role in an organisation that has contributed back to society, say, a charity, community organisation or non-profit organisation.

My point is that it is not reflective nor healthy for governance in the long run, if the key criterion to evaluate a President's ability is his corporate track record. In Singapore, where we are encouraging multiple peaks of excellence and promoting diversity and inclusiveness, the gauge to measure the President must be broader and not narrower.

This brings me to my next point about enshrining race representation in the presidency. I support this change as I see it as a safeguard to reflect Singapore's racial diversity. Many I have spoken to have taken to it positively that the Government is committed to reflecting diversity in the presidential office.

So, we must embark on it carefully, having considered all the implications and pitfalls. At no time must the credibility of the seat of the President be seen to be undermined or under-valued by Singaporeans as this will not only erode the goodwill that previous Presidents have built up, it will also not be fair to the minority-elect President if there is even a doubt that he is there based on his ethnicity. While this is not a case, the Government must ensure that any such perceptions on the ground must be reversed through education and awareness.

I am heartened that the Prime Minister has just announced that the next election would be a reserved Presidential Election and I think many in the Malay community would also be heartened to have potentially a first Malay Elected President for Singapore. It must have been a heavily considered decision by the Government. I think the Prime Minister is expending political capital to get the citizens behind this, to also protect our multiracial and multi-religious diversity and principles.

I am in favour of this Bill, Madam, in general, as it is done in the spirit of keeping the office of President relevant to today's context. However, while we are at it, it also truly reflects on the demands and aspirations of today's society and have the office of the President of Singapore reflect those ideals. Mdm Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The proposed changes to the Elected Presidency that was first mooted by the Prime Minister earlier this year, is an important political process for our nation.

When I touched on this issue in Parliament at that time, I said that the move to have a provision for minorities is welcomed by the Malay community. I welcome the proposal by the Constitutional Commission that proposed a reserved election for the candidate of a certain race if, for over five terms, no candidate from that race has been elected as President. The Government has also accepted the proposal in its White Paper.

The Malay community's maturity stands out in this issue. Although they welcome the change, which promises the certainty of a Malay President, their main concern is that this should not be seen as an act of tokenism. Some are worried that the selection will not be based on merit. This concern is understandable because meritocracy is an important value in the lives and success of Singaporeans.

So, I feel that the emphasis by the Commission regarding the level of eligibility is a guarantee that no matter which candidate is elected, he or she must fulfil the criteria that have been set. Therefore, when we have a Malay Elected President, this will certainly be a moment of pride for the Malay community because he or she is a President who is qualified and capable and have met the conditions for eligibility that have been determined.

The one and only Malay President in Singapore's history, the late Encik Yusof Ishak, was a President for all the people. It has become a source of great pride to the Malay/Muslim community.

If the community is proud to have President Yusof Ishak who performed his duty exceptionally, representing all races outstandingly, surely there will be a Malay of a high calibre and is able to fulfil the eligibility criteria. The late Encik Yusof Ishak left us a priceless legacy, including as a leader who became a symbol of unity and harmony for a multiracial and multi-religious society.

The proposed amendments to the Elected Presidency with regard to the minority provision, must be seen in a wider context and goes beyond life as a plural society in Singapore. The issue of racial cohesion cannot be taken lightly, and it is also not something that comes automatically. Efforts will still be needed to preserve this situation. Therefore, the review of the Elected Presidency is timely.

The Prime Minister's clear position about the need to have a provision for minorities, including Malays, in the Elected President system is much appreciated. It is certainly heartening to the Malay community who have not seen a Malay President since the late Encik Yusof Ishak held the highest office in the land.

Nonetheless, more importantly, it is a measure that will further strengthen the principle of a multiracial country, that is the crucial principle of upholding Singapore as a nation for all races, even though the Chinese is in the majority.

The Prime Minister's decision to propose this change is a courageous decision, especially in terms of the political risk in convincing the majority community that it needs to be done in order to preserve this principle of multiracialism. I, therefore, call upon the Malay community to accept this as an important trust and fully support the intent and this principle.

I thank the Prime Minister for his long-term vision for Singapore. I am certain that this development will be welcomed by the Malay community.

(In English): Madam, the changes to the veto and entrenchment framework will further strengthen the governance of the country, providing clarity on the process for Parliamentary override to avoid Government gridlocks and not to create an alternative power centre. These changes ensure a safeguard for Singaporeans to be assured that an irresponsible or profligate government does not raid our Reserves.

This process keeps the intent and integrity of any standing government on the use of Singaporeans' hard-earned Reserves under scrutiny. This is where the WP's position against the Elected Presidency is certainly outdated. The Elected Presidency framework is being evolved with enhanced safeguards to prevent gridlocks and, certainly, the Elected President does not have the powers to block the Government from functioning. Ultimately, the Elected President still has to seek re-election and has to justify his actions to the people.

So, why is the WP afraid of the Elected Presidency and why its designs on the Reserves to block this? On the elected Senate, how different is it from the CPA, apart from the election? The Prime Minister has mentioned earlier in his speech that the CPA has certain constraints. Therefore, if you want to elect a CPA, it is no different from electing your eight-man Senate. I think the Prime Minister has already explained in his clarifications. We have also seen how Senators out there have also caused gridlocks in the US.

So, we have to trust the judgement of a standing Elected President to do the right thing for Singapore, for our people, for our nation and for our nation's future. And this is why our trust and faith in the Elected President's judgement lies in his moral authority. This moral authority, as the Prime Minister has mentioned earlier, can only be earned by being elected by the people, and not appointed, as the Head of State. I rise in support of the Bill.

Mr Edwin Tong.

Mdm Speaker, just a short while ago, the hon Member for Aljunied Ms Sylvia Lim suggested in this House that we conduct a referendum in place of what is on the table today.

There are three points in response I would like to make. The first is that this would create a political contest that would be polarising, divisive, time-consuming and energy-sapping, repeatedly for eight members of the proposed Senate. Would this not be far more political and politicising than the current model that is on the table?

Second, it may be in the WP's interest to continually politicise issues and continually have a platform to allow themselves to politicise issues that affect Singaporeans and Singapore in general. But that is not the mandate of this House. That is not the purpose of having the second key and the custodian to the Reserves and the guardian of the Public Service infrastructure in Singapore.

Third, in any case, the issue of whether or not we should have an Elected President was in fact settled 25 years ago. It was settled 25 years ago when two White Papers were put to this House in 1988 and again in 1991 and, eventually, passed in this House. And it was one of the platforms on which the 1988 GEs were run and Singaporeans voted on it.

So, the only issue today that remains is whether the criteria should be updated in the manner in which this Bill has proposed, and whether or not there should be additional safeguards in connection with minor racial representation.

And I would add, Mdm Speaker, that just not long ago, two months ago, in paying tribute to our ex-President SR Nathan, Ms Sylvia Lim had said that, in fact, President SR Nathan made great efforts to reach out, including to her. Mr Pritam Singh told us a story about how President SR Nathan was always there to look out for everyone and encouraged him without raising doubt or concern about serving Singapore in a different colour, different course or different capacity.

So, Mdm Speaker, it is very easy for issues in this debate to be clouded and coloured by emotive propositions. For example, the office of the Elected President has been accused of being a PAP legacy, capable of only being drawn from an elitist group of senior civil servants. Never mind that these senior civil servants operate in a Westminster form of government who are loyal to the government of the day but should be, and are, impartial to political affiliation.

Or that all these amendments are apparently being proposed to debar some inconvenient candidates who might turn out to be uncooperative Elected Presidents. And it is said that the reason why the eligibility criteria have been revised upwards is precisely to make it more elitist. There is also the question of the minority racial representation. When one talks about racial representation, it can become quite emotive. But that would be the wrong approach to take when we look at this Bill.

The present amendments which this House has been asked to consider are not about establishing a PAP legacy. It is not about entrenching its powers and it is certainly not about stopping one or more individuals from coming forward if they are qualified.

In truth, the fundamental basis behind the concept of the Elected President is quite the contrary and the details in this Bill are quite the contrary. The Elected Presidency, with its custodial veto powers, in fact, limits the Government's ability to do as it wishes with the country's key assets and resources, namely, our financial Reserves and our Public Service infrastructure.

This is quite possibly one of few, if any, governments in the world proposing an elected counter-balance to check its own power to ensure that it is the system and not any individual or any government of the day that remains strong. And in seeking to achieve that, the qualifying criteria have to be set to ensure that any candidate has to possess the right attributes and experience to see through these functions.

So, far from being elitist, in fact, we should make no apology for wanting the bar to be set higher to ensure that everyone aspiring to that position will be well-qualified. And really, why should we accept any less when the issues at stake are our Reserves, which represent our future and our children's future?

Ms Sylvia Lim has also suggested that this has been rushed through, the process has been taken very quickly. It has been close to 10 to 11 months since the Prime Minister first raised this question in this House at the start of Parliament in January. The Commission was set up. A hundred and seven submissions were invited and received, including from the WP. There were several months of public hearings, very publicly reported in the papers. Subsequently, Ministers, Cabinet Ministers – we heard from the Prime Minister earlier – went out to conduct ground sensing, explain the Bill and do surveys.

The WP had the opportunity to present their submissions and make themselves heard by the Commission. They were invited to do so but they declined. Why? They had every opportunity of having their views considered and taken into account by the Commission, put into the Commission report tabled in the White Paper, and for this House to consider. They chose not to do so. Instead, they turned up with a proposed referendum which seeks, in my view, to enhance the unnecessary politicising of matters and issues in Singapore.

In relation to Ms Sylvia Lim's contention on the CPA, the suggestion was because there is now a CPA that has been enhanced, and the enhancement of the CPA was one of the suggestions I had myself mooted in January when I spoke about the Elected President when Parliament opened. I am heartened to note that the Commission has taken on board at least that suggestion, not necessarily by me, but perhaps from other sources as well. But it strengthens the CPA and it gives a greater resource to the Elected President.

The Elected President has three nominees onto the CPA, plus the ability to nominate the Chairman who has a casting vote. So, in any given issue that is put before the CPA, the President just needs to persuade one other Member of the CPA, together with a casting vote, before the CPA would go along with the President's decision. That is not the mechanism that overrides the President's powers or that curtails the President's powers. In fact, the Commission specifically considered this point and took the position that, in fact, if that happens, if the Chairman had to use his casting vote, then the Parliamentary override should be a higher supermajority of three-quarters, and that was not accepted.

So, Mdm Speaker, we come back now to what I think are the key issues of this Bill, which is, having put the office of the Elected President in place for the past 25 years, we are now looking at enhancements to the powers and roles of the CPA. When Emeritus Senior Minister Goh explained in 1998 to this House the background to the White Paper at that time, he said the financial Reserves and integrity of our Public Service would be the two key assets that we cannot afford to be eroded. The amendments that are being proposed today about enhancing and fortifying the key functions which the Elected President currently performs remain, in my view, as crucial today as when the Elected President was first introduced 25 years ago.

So, if we accept that fiscal Reserves and public infrastructure are worth safeguarding, then really, inevitably, the question has to be what qualifications should the Elected President have in order to best discharge that responsibility? In that context, having a qualifying criterion that is at least 25 years old based on being a CEO of a company that has a paid-up capital of at least $100 million, that criterion really needs to be updated.

If we look at the numbers proffered by the Commission, in 1993, only 0.2% of Singapore incorporated companies met the $100 million paid-up capital requirement. Today, however, the smallest of the top 0.2%, the same percentage of Singapore incorporated companies, we have a paid-up capital of approximately $431 million or more than four times what the threshold was. So, those numbers alone tell us why, how urgent it is to update those criteria.

The suggestion that the updating of the criteria is to foreshadow or foreclose some candidates, I think is also not tenable. If we look at the percentage of companies which would meet the shareholder equity criterion today, that is roughly similar to the number in 1993 – 0.23%. Further, because the absolute numbers have grown larger, 0.23% today will represent, in absolute terms, a bigger number of persons who would qualify. So, the fear that this criterion is being revised to close off an uncooperative Elected President really is unfounded.

Mdm Speaker, I want to move on to this question of the hiatus-triggered mechanism. And I am heartened to have heard the Prime Minister outline the reasons and the rationale behind that, and I would just like to add my views on this. I think it is important that the Elected President plays that symbolic role. It is as important as the custodial role and function that he performs.

The Bill proposes that this balance be achieved by having a reserved election for a community that has not held the office for five or more consecutive terms. And this stems from the Commission's recommendation. The rationale behind it was that multiracialism and racial harmony are crucial in Singapore, and I quote, "An important element of multiracialism, in particular, racial minorities, are never represented in the office of the President."

But to be honest, when the Prime Minister first raised it in January, I was a little sceptical and somewhat reserved about this proposal. And the reason for that was because, in Singapore, we have always had a system that is strongly based on the bedrock of meritocracy. It is not about which race you come from. It is not about the creed that you subscribe to but whether or not you are up to the job. And that has always been our ethos and belief.

We have had many other policies in Singapore that revolve around racial mix. One example is the Ethnic Integration Policy, first devised, I think, in 1989 by the Housing and Development Board (HDB), to promote racial integration and harmony in our HDB estates. That policy was formulated as there were concerns that ethnic or racial enclaves were forming around Singapore.

The policy was thus meant to facilitate Singaporeans mixing freely with one another, with other races, in our HDB estates. And as a result, we have a variety of people from different races living in the same estate. We have hawker centres catering to persons of different races. So, we have a wide array of different food types. Children grow up and play with friends from different cultures in the void decks. Neighbours invite one another for meals on festive occasions – Chinese for Deepavali, the Indians for Hari Raya and so on. When we look back at it, I believe that such cohesion would not have been possible without this Ethnic Integration Policy, a policy that was active, deliberate and very consciously initiated and practised.

The concern, however, was that when you institutionalise minority representation in the office of the President, then you are choosing based on race and not on merit. I think we have heard the Prime Minister respond to that by saying that merit actually comes first. So, you might have a reserved election but the candidate who stands and steps forward must first pass the eligibility criteria.

Mdm Speaker, the mechanism that has been proposed and which the Bill proposes for adoption in the Constitution can, in fact, be a very valuable means of helping us to achieve multiracialism and racial harmony. But I see it as a means and not as an end. Looking back at our past, it is clear that where we are here today, 51 years from 1965, has been achieved by design and not by chance. The racial integration and cohesion which we enjoy including in our HDB estates, are precisely evidence of that.

The results of the CNA-Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) survey which Deputy Prime Minister Teo outlined yesterday, I think amply bear that out. And one other number jumped out at me which I would like to share with this House. There was the feedback unt Reaching Everyone for Active Citizenry @ Home (REACH) survey and it raised this question: whether there should be a reserved election for minority candidates if a minority member had not been elected President for five terms and so on. And the respondents were grouped by race. And the numbers, I think, tell us a story.

Amongst the Chinese respondents, 28% said they would support such a move. But amongst the Malay and Indian respondents, at least 40% said they would support the move. So, there is a differential. Why? Because those two races are in the minority.

And so, we may say that our ideal is to live in a racially colour-blind harmonious society, but all of that takes effort. The racial harmony that we enjoy today, in a world where racial fault lines are at their most divisive, is really the product of the carefully conceived and consistently applied policy of deliberate integration.

It is the product of various policies which have become almost second nature to us today, for example, reciting the words every day at the school pledge "regardless of race, language or religion". They mean something.

We see our signs, our Mass Rapid Transit announcements in four different languages, and they are taken for granted. The Prime Minister mentioned at the conference in October last year that we made a lot of progress for the last 50 years, but all of these stemmed from "an act of will, which we have sustained over many decades, but it is still work-in-progress". And that is where I think our hiatus-triggered mechanism fits in. It is part of this work-in-progress towards a truly race-blind and multiracial society. And I think Singaporeans are supportive of such policies.

Madam, some comparison has been raised between the system that the Commission has proposed and that of what is done in France, Canada and Switzerland as well. All I would say, Mdm Speaker, is that different countries have different motivations, and this just shows us how each country, each set of different ideals has to forge its own path and decide what is best and what suits its local environment. I take a leaf out of what the Prime Minister said earlier about how the British drafted us a very good Constitution, but if it does not work for us, it does not work for us.

So, the situation we find ourselves in is really sui generis, unique. As the Constitutional Commission noted, "The office of the Elected President is unique. It is not an institution derived from one which exists in any other jurisdiction. Rather, it is an entirely indigenous creation, designed to address the particular imperatives and vulnerabilities in our system of governance against the backdrop of our own historical context."

Consistent with our own unique history and that of the Elected President, the Bill now proposes a unique hiatus-triggered mechanism, which I think, after much consideration, does fit into our own historical, social and racial context.

I would also add that the beauty of this mechanism is that it would entirely recede into insignificance and into the background if candidates from the minority groups are regularly elected into office. And that means that we can keep up with our work-in-progress. And when the day comes when we have truly arrived at the objective of a race-blind state, then the mechanism which will help in the background will eventually fade into oblivion. Madam, with that, I support the Bill.

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Sorry, Madam, may I have some clarifications from the Member?

Yes, please proceed.

Mr Edwin Tong.

Yes, Ms Lim. Please keep it short.

Yes, Madam. Just one point. I do not think Mr Tong has understood us correctly when it comes to the election of the Senate. I am not sure why he is saying that every time we have an election for the Senate, we have to go for a referendum. There was no suggestion of that.

All we are suggesting is: it should be considered that whether to change the system from the Elected President to an elected Senate, that would call for one referendum. We would, of course, have Senate elections periodically, but that is not the same as having referendums.

Mr Edwin Tong.

The Member had suggested a referendum, which I have responded to, and she has also suggested that for each member of the Senate, they will have a separate election. And that is why I said that we will be over electioneering.

Ms Lim.

Madam, that is not correct. I never suggested, or we never suggested, that there will be a separate election for each member of the Senate. My colleagues will elaborate later on the mechanism of the elections and I would just like to say that Mr Tong is wrong on this point.

Mr Edwin Tong.

It says, "The Senate shall be established and elected by people." That is what it says here, in the Member's own document. You have proposed a Senate of eight persons. Unless I heard you wrongly. Unless you are suggesting that they will all be elected as a slate, which has its own different views. Otherwise, I think we can see from the Member's own document what Option B says.

Madam, I think my colleagues will elaborate.

Mr Low Thia Khiang.

Madam, Member Edwin Tong has raised several issues with the WP's proposal. My colleagues will elaborate on some of them. I will talk a little bit on the referendum.

The Member took issue with the WP calling for a referendum on the change of the political model we have. Yes, I understand that the Elected President system has been instituted long ago. In fact, on the issue of the change of the political model from a purely Parliamentary democracy inherited from the UK to the one that we have now, the Elected President, the issue has been set out by the WP at the very beginning when the Elected President's idea was mooted and debated publicly in the 1980s.

This is the second time the WP has called for a referendum on the change of political model. We called for a referendum in the 1980s. And there was a debate, a TV debate, on this. The PAP said that the 1988 election will be the one to decide whether the electorate will support the Elected President, and that was it.

Madam, I believe that a referendum is overdue for a change of the political model that we have. The change in the political system that we have now, the Elected President, is drastic to me. It will change our political system in a fundamental way that will have deep implications in the future because it will change from one that believes in Parliamentary democracy, where the people is sovereign and, thereby, Parliament is sovereign, being elected and representative of the people, to one where Parliament's powers will be curtailed, and it can cause gridlock if you are not careful. So, we should not take it lightly.

Moreover, as what Ms Sylvia Lim has said, when certain provisions in the Elected Presidency are entrenched, if you want to change it, it will require a two-third majority in a referendum. So, I think it is logical that since you want to have a change in the Constitution that requires, if there is a further amendment to that provision, a two-third majority in the referendum, we should have a referendum to make sure that Singaporeans agree today.

Mr Edwin Tong said that a referendum will politicise the debates and the system. But what were we talking about? We are talking about changing the political system. So, is it not political? A referendum is one way to determine in a democratic way whether Singaporeans will endorse and support such a new model. And I think it will settle the matter once and for all whether the Opposition will oppose it and whether our view on the system is supported by the people. Madam, I will turn now to speak in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mdm Speaker, the President is our Head of State. He represents Singapore and is the symbol of our nation and our people. The WP believes that the prestigious identity and status of the President will not be compromised simply because the Presidency is established through appointment by Parliament.

However, the WP has, since the beginning of the 1980s, strenuously opposed the Elected Presidency. We do not oppose having a President for Singapore per se, but we are concerned about the far-reaching profound adverse influence on our nation resulting from the ulterior motive behind this whole mechanism. Very obviously, the stringent conditions required of the candidates are to ensure that whoever eventually is elected to be the President will be a pro-PAP person. In the event of the PAP losing a GE, this pro-PAP President can then obstruct the effective ruling of the non-PAP government.

Why did the PAP start to implement this Elected Presidency only after they lost the 1981 Anson By-election and the Potong Pasir Constituency at the 1984 GEs?

Since Independence, each and every President appointed by the PAP through Parliament had commanded the respect of the people. Moreover, since the implementation of the Elected Presidency in 1991, the PAP has never raised any issue concerning this system. Why is it that they are now suddenly taking issue with this system and going through all the trouble to set up a Constitutional Commission to review the matter, and make substantial amendments to the Constitution?

The 2011 Presidential Election caused uneasiness to the PAP. This was the first time since the inception of the Elected Presidency that four candidates contested for the position and they were not the preferred candidates of the PAP. Furthermore, the candidate who was eventually elected to be the President, won by a majority of not more than 1% of the votes. Despite all the manoeuvring, the PAP nearly stumbled at their own wishful thinking. That is why they are hurriedly conducting this exercise and trying to push through this amendment Bill to stop the frightening situation from happening again at the next Presidential Election.

The political system inherited by Singapore from the British is one of Parliamentary democracy, with the people electing the MPs, and the political party that wins the most seats in Parliament will form the government. All the Ministers are elected by the people. This gives the Cabinet the legitimacy of having won the mandate directly from the people. Under such a system, whether it is the Queen or the President, the Head of State has no administrative power.

Those days when the President was appointed, there was no need to worry about the Presidency being perpetually dominated by a certain race. That is why if you want to guarantee that the appointment of the President would reflect the needs of a multiracial society, the most straightforward method is to return to the appointment system.

Is this amendment to the Elected Presidency really meant to protect the interest of the minorities? If this is indeed the case, then why did the PAP not raise this issue in the course of the past two decades? It was only when the PAP nearly became a victim of the Presidential Election matrix designed by themselves in 2011, a situation which should never have happened, that the PAP quickly moved this amendment Bill.

This round of Constitutional amendments to vary the Elected President system has made the people uneasy. The ulterior motive behind this exercise is to ensure that even when the PAP has lost the majority in Parliament, they could still make use of the Elected President to contain the operation of the new government.

First, the amendment Bill raises the qualifying criteria of the Presidential Election candidates, thereby reducing the number of eligible candidates. Eventually, whether the voters would have anyone to choose from is unknown.

The present Elected Presidency is already trending towards senior public officers. Among them, many are senior leaders of the PAP, such as former Ministers or Speaker of Parliament. This round of amendments further raises the already stringent qualifying criteria. It further curtails the possibility of a candidate from outside the system to contest the election.

In such a situation, eventually, it is highly probable that the election would go uncontested, year after year, or all the candidates will be pro-PAP personnel. In the event that the PAP losses a GE, the Elected President can then act on behalf of the old regime to contain the new government, making the new government a lame duck which is unable to make use of the past Reserves when needed, and even could not appoint important officials.

When a non-PAP government elected by the people could not effectively operate and collapse, due to containment by the system designed by the PAP when it was in power, Singapore will be like the other democratic regimes which failed to make a political transition and resulted in social unrest, using violence and illegitimate means to settle the political conflicts. We could see for ourselves the political process experienced by some of our neighbouring countries. This is also the worry of the WP. We feel that the PAP is only concerned with its own interest and leaving Singapore to face great risks in the future.

In fact, this kind of political measures with the aim to paralyse a government has worried even some of their own PAP members. Former Minister Ong Pang Boon said during a Parliamentary debate on 12 August 1988, "No matter how you look it, the recommendation in the White Paper on Elected Presidency, is aimed at making sure a PAP candidate would be elected, so that in the event another party wins the next GE, he could unseat the new Prime Minister and his government, even when the new government is a responsible government."

Furthermore, for fear that the Elected President would not follow its instructions after being elected, the PAP has also enhanced the power of the CPA through this amendment Bill. The President is obliged to consult the CPA on all financial matters and appointments of key public servants. Should the President and the majority of Presidential advisors hold the same views, Parliament will have no right to overthrow the joint decision of the President and the CPA.

Members of the CPA are appointed and not elected by the people. Yet, not only has the President to consult them, even the Parliament formed by the Members elected by the people has no right to overthrow the joint decision by them and the President. As such, a President with no administrative power and a CPA which is not elected by the people, can stop the government from making use of the past Reserves and making key appointments of civil servants at the critical moments. Their power is greater than the Elected President and the Parliament elected by the people. This is certainly not in compliance with the principles of Parliamentary democracy. It is designed with an attempt to obstruct the normal functions of a new government which is legitimately elected and formed.

The WP agrees with having a set of mechanism to protect the Reserves from being abused. However, we want to remind the PAP that the Reserves do not belong to any term of government. It belongs to all the people of Singapore.

We do not agree with dedicating the important responsibility of protecting the Reserves and appointing key civil servants to one single person, namely, the President, and allowing a few members of the CPA to make the decision. Ultimately, the responsibility of protecting the Reserves from being abused should be vested in the Parliament elected by the people.

As such, the WP suggests setting up a Senate to replace the Elected Presidency, to exercise the powers of the President and the CPA. Senators shall be elected at a nationwide GE. Candidates for election to be Senators must possess certain qualifications, to be accredited by an Election Eligibility Committee.

Should the Senate not agree with the recommendations by the government to draw on the Reserves or to make certain key appointments, the proposals concerned shall be rejected. Under such circumstances, the veto by the Senate can only be overruled by the government with a three-quarter majority in Parliament.

On the appointment of the President, the Constitutional Commission recommended relieving the President of the political function of protecting the Reserves. The main role of the President is in uniting the nation. It should go beyond politics. Making the President protect the Reserves amounts to wanting him to be confrontational towards the government at certain times. This is in conflict with the function of the President. The WP concurs with this recommendation by the Constitutional Commission.

Such an important amendment to the Constitution concerns the operation of the future political system of our nation, with far-reaching impacts. The WP holds the view that in dealing with such a major reform to our political system and the separation of powers of the various government institutions, it should be decided by a public referendum of the people. A referendum enables the people to collectively decide on how to adjust our political system to deal with our future challenges. The referendum shall vote on two proposals: one, the solution as tabled by the PAP in the White Paper, and two, the solution by the WP which specifically includes the following points.

One, the President is the Head of State, to be appointed by Parliament on a majority vote, to represent Singapore.

Two, in appointing the President, Parliament should take into consideration the multiracial situation in Singapore.

Three, set up a Senate to replace the Elected Presidency and to exercise the veto power of the President and the CPA, including protecting the Reserves and upholding the integrity of the civil servants to be appointed by the government.

Four, Parliament can override the veto by the Senate, by way of a three-quarter majority of the total number of Members voting in favour thereof.

Mdm Speaker, basically, the WP agrees with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's own statement that "a nation shall not have two rulers". All the more, the Elected President shall not be another power centre. We agree with protecting the Reserves, but the Reserves protection mechanism must comply with the fundamental principles ofParliamentary democracy. At the same time, the situation whereby the elected government is unable to operate due to grossly excessive containment should be avoided.

As such, the WP strongly advocates that it can only be passed through voting by all the people.

Mr Seah Kian Peng.

Mdm Speaker, when the Elected Presidency was set up in 1991, the key discussions at the time were about the need for elections and the role of an Elected President. Racial representation was not a key point of contention. And yet it was implicit in our discussions over time, in particular in 1999, when two elements of the Presidency became clear.

First, that the President was not an alternative centre of power and his role was likely to remain largely ceremonial for most of the time. Second, that the President was a symbol of unity and of our nationhood. In this, the need for the President to come from the different races of our country becomes obvious.

The key reason for our debate today is that rules made in the past need to evolve to suit present circumstances. For a country whose anthem is in our national language, it cannot escape notice that there has been no Malay President for close to 50 years. A Malay President is not tokenism. It is an important part of our national life. The Malay culture, heritage and language deserve a larger place in our public spaces, especially given the large social changes brought about by the forces of globalisation.

Majulah Singapura is about the progress of Singapore. But progress is meaningless without a clear idea of the purpose and promise of our country. Purpose: semangat yang baru. One of our key purposes in this small island is to strive to achieve great things together: "Marilah kita bersatu; Dengan semangat yang baru".

Our new spirit – semangat yang baru – is to create a new nation regardless of race, language or religion. Yet, to say "regardless" is not to say "disregard" – therein lies the way towards irrational liberalism. To have complete freedom is mere jungle survival. In Singapore, our model of multiracialism is not a pretense of colour-blindness, but an "eyes open" model where rules are made to balance whatever inequalities bestowed by nature, circumstance or human bias.

In general, I know that Singaporeans will support a President from any race, but the proposed changes to the Elected Presidency scheme to reserve an election for a minority group comes across as compromising on meritocracy.

This is an easy argument to make – if we want fair political competition, we must open the playing field to all. This is a marketplace heuristic and, many times, it carries well into the political arena.

In the marketplace, it is the duty of those who create rules for the market, to make these as fair as possible. This is what we strive to do in our politics as well. As what the Prime Minister says, we need good politics.

For example, this is why in the GEs in Singapore, we cap the amount of money that any party is allowed on campaigning to blunt the competitive edge that richer parties may have. We use rules to make the competition as fair as we can, knowing that the goal is to pick the best candidate, not the one that has the most monetary resources.

This idea of "best", therefore, needs to be regarded in relationship to the job at hand, and the rules must allow us the best chance to get the "best" man in.

Let me state the purpose of an Elected President without frippery. The purpose of electing a president in Singapore is to make sure that someone safeguards our Reserves from a populist government. He and his Council of advisors will provide the rational, clear-headed analysis that will veto any attempt to raid our Reserves. They are our shield and the Bill we are debating today gives this shield strength.

What then is the role of popular elections within this statement of purpose? In a way, the rules of Presidential Elections are analogous to those Singapore has adopted for all our political processes. We know that the processes of voting and popular election are subject to human biases and we need, therefore, to ensure that the best man or best woman has a chance of being in office despite these biases.

Singaporeans have a pragmatic job scope for our President. We are more concerned that the Presidential candidates have the necessary experience and acumen to safeguard the nation's Reserves than his race. Saying this, however, does not mean we step down and say, "Okay, this is a free-for-all popular contest. If race does not matter, then surely it does not matter that, yet again, a Chinese is elected president".

Here, it is important to understand what being race-blind means. It means that no one should be prevented from high office because of his race, no one should be discriminated from any office or job because he is a Malay, Indian, Eurasian or Chinese. It does not mean that we, therefore, treat all races the same in all aspects of life.

The Americans took many years before they elected a Catholic President. Many more, before they elected an African-American. And they are an older democracy than we are. As the Prime Minister has pointed out, even in 2008, the vote for Obama was markedly along racial lines.

It would be naive to think that after just 50 years of nationhood, we are race-blind when it comes to politics. It is thus that I support these amendments and, in particular, the hiatus-triggered principle because equality of races is not a given. It is because we hold true to that ideal that we must make rules, knowing that we are not playing at some Platonic form of a game, but in the very real world.

This hiatus-triggered principle is an example of Singapore's semangat yang baru, a legislative innovation that shows how seriously Singapore takes equality among races.

Today, this need to ensure that all races have a part in national life has been corrupted by accusations that the revisions in the law are part of a political chess game. So, to gainsay these critics, I ask that the changes come into effect in phases: perhaps, the revised eligibility criteria before the next Presidential Election and the reserved election provision to be only after the next Presidential Election.

Do we need an Elected President? There are those who take advantage of this debate to re-open old lines of argument. They say that we do not need an Elected President because the President is an alternative centre of power and blocking the Government could create gridlock in our policy-making.

Some political party had in the past said that the Elected President undermines Parliamentary democracy, because the office is similarly popularly elected and the veto power effectively gives one person the power to stop an elected government from its work. These objections are based on a wilful ignorance of the clarifications of the role of the Elected President I have laid out above. A close reading of the Bill should put these to rest.

Mr Low Thia Khiang says that the WP objects to the Elected Presidency because it "could potentially cripple a non-PAP government in its first term". On the face of it, they said that the "crippling" is caused by the President blocking replacements to some of the key appointment holders. But given that the purpose of the Elected President is to block the squandering of our Reserves, we need to relook the WP and other parties' objection to today's Bill.

Let me ask: who can object to a President who wants to prevent a populist rundown of Reserves? Who would do that except for people who may have plans to run this down?

This may seem to be a hypothetical parlour game, but I assure you, for shareholders of any company whose reserves in their company or for residents whose reserves in their Town Councils have been run down, this is not. Fiduciary responsibility may seem to be a boring game, something that we expect and take for granted. But I assure you, for the people of a country with nothing but its Reserves, it is deadly serious.

Singapore's Reserves have been built up over 50 years. In that time, we have had reason to call upon its use only once. We ought to be fearful of any party that thinks it will face the risk of running it down in its first term, and, moreover, that it will be calling for its use in such contestable situations that the President and his Council will feel obliged to block it.

Mdm Speaker, the Government has accepted the Commission's proposal to revise the amount to $500 million in shareholders' equity, from $100 million in paid-up capital, as it is probably a better measurement indicator of the financial complexity of the organisation led by the private sector candidate. Given today's inflation and financial landscape versus 25 years ago, the previous requirement is no longer adequate to ensure that candidates have the fiscal savvy to hold the second key to the Reserves. In fact, throwing in the political complexity of today's world would mean that the eligibility criteria need to be updated significantly.

Using the $500 million benchmark, I believe about 700 companies are still eligible to nominate their most senior executives to be the country's next Elected President. Hence, the potential candidates that can come from this pool is still sizeable.

Promise: berjaya Singapura. Second, I feel that Singapore has now come of age, with a large pool of Singaporeans with deep links and affinity to this country. Hence, I believe that we should consider only Presidential candidates who are born in Singapore, in contrast to those who have taken up citizenship along the way.

In addition, we look up to a President as a symbol of unity to the nation. Currently, the required qualifications as stated in our Constitution are: being a citizen of Singapore, and not below the age of 45. I feel the candidate's age can be set higher, at not below the age of 50. I think the new 50 is the old 45.

A potential Presidential candidate now applies to PEC for a certificate of eligibility. In turn, the PEC is tasked to ensure that a candidate fulfils the necessary qualifications of integrity, good character and reputation set out in the Constitution, before the certificate of eligibility is issued. The task on them is crucial, to mitigate the dangers of candidates who over-promise and over-commit beyond legislative provisions if they are elected, and having a process to deal with this.

If the candidate is found, for whatever reason, intentional or not, to have delivered inaccurate information attesting to his qualifications, can the PEC consider a process to rescind the certificate of eligibility and disqualify that candidate? This is not of course something that we expect, only something we must guard against.

To add on, it will also be prudent of the PEC to consider a process that allows Singapore Citizens to register their objections to the Committee on that candidate's nomination.

On the Prime Minister's announcement on tweaks to the NCMP scheme, I have some reservations on the voting rights. Given their nominated status, I feel that NCMPs do not have the mandate of the people. Hence, I am of the view that there is no basis to grant them full voting rights as elected MPs.

However, since I fought hard for my seat in a GE, I could, of course, be thought to be biased. I, therefore, would not object to this but instead urge a closer review of the consequences of full voting rights and the danger of allowing NCMPs who may represent special interest to vote on matters of national interests. Of course, in many cases, the two may not conflict, but one can imagine that in those few that they do, difficulties may arise.

We have always had a unique take to racial harmony that cannot be found in other nations. We believe that it takes careful, deliberate and calibrated interventions plus policies on our part to make racial harmony a reality in Singapore and leaving nothing to chance or fate.

I have spoken about the legislative innovations in GEs to keep faith with both the legitimacy that derives from a popular process, while ensuring fairness in this process. In the same way, I consider today's debate on the Elected President as part of our singular and Singaporean way of dealing with race relations.

In this and in so much more, we are guided by the phrase which our children pledge themselves to every school day – may our hopes and dreams bring Singapore every success. "Cita-cita kita yang mulia;berjaya Singapura!"

Assoc Prof Daniel Goh.

Mdm Speaker, just a quick clarification for Mr Seah Kian Peng. I think the Member has confused the Nominated Member (NMP) with the NCMP. We are not nominated and we do not represent special interest. So, may I know which special interest we could possibly represent?

Mr Seah Kian Peng.

Mdm Speaker, I am not saying that all NCMPs represent special interest. I am just highlighting the potential danger of that and, in those aspects, to just pay attention to that area.

Mr Dennis Tan.

A quick clarification, Madam. Perhaps Mr Seah could give an example, just so we can understand what the concerns he has.

Mr Seah Kian Peng.

I do not have any particular issue but I am just stating that there could be different interest groups that may make their cases known to a particular NCMP for them to take up his case. And, in effect, that Member then basically is just putting forth an agenda on that basis.

Mr Leon Perera.

Just to clarify that point with Mr Seah. Would not the same apply to an elected MP?

Mr Seah Kian Peng.

Well, first of all, we represent the majority. In highlighting any concerns, I think it is important, first, to state upfront who we represent and, if there are any conflicts of interest, that should be declared upfront.

Mdm Speaker : Mr Christopher de Souza.

Madam, Singapore is a young country. It is rightfully expected that Parliament continues to work hard to get the foundations of our democracy right, the foundations of a functioning democracy right.

While it is good for us to look around the world for best practices, it is also extremely important that, ultimately, we do what is good for Singapore. Our democracy needs to be a functioning democracy, so as to work effectively and efficiently in Singapore's environment.

Let me start with the Elected Presidency. As we are debating the highest office of the land, it is important to have strict criteria to ensure that candidates have the ability to carry the heavy responsibility, not just domestically, but out there in the world. In this regard, it is right that the Constitutional Commission was set up to think long and hard and independently on how to construct the qualification criteria.

Yes, it is important that we have criteria to help ensure presidential candidates are able to discharge responsibilities with dignity and distinction. But, Madam, it is also especially important that the deliberative track defined under paragraph (c) of clause 3 and (b) of clause 4 of Article 19 as amended by clause 7(b) of the Bill allows for a deep collection of candidates.

In 15, 20 years' time, it would not be too difficult to envision a situation in which Singapore may not need to use its past Reserves but, nonetheless, is facing a crisis of another sort, which may require a Head of State to augment the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs' efforts to make Singapore relevant to the world.

It is not easy to walk the tight rope between US-China relations today. It may get even tougher in years to come. In fact, it may even get tougher tomorrow.

The role of the Head of State to help navigate the tensions to stay relevant to both sides and to show to other nations that neutral Singapore is in their interest may, in fact, be more important a role than the custodian of the second key, or at least of equal importance.

So, we need to accommodate for flexibility in the deliberative track. In my view, the deliberative track should be broad enough to include the first four Presidents who, in my opinion, contributed immensely to Singapore before they were appointed. Encik Yusof Ishak, a Malay; Dr Benjamin Henry Sheares, a Eurasian; Mr Devan Nair, an Indian; and Mr Wee Kim Wee, a Chinese. What were their attributes?

Encik Yusof Ishak deeply believed in and was deeply committed to multiracialism. Dr Benjamin Sheares, an exceptional medical professional, inspired many Singaporeans, including people from the Eurasian community, to excel and to show that minority groups do have a role and future in our country, Singapore. Mr Devan Nair devoted his life to the unions. Mr Wee Kim Wee was a man, who through sheer hard work, became successful in journalism, contributed much in the diplomatic corps. Yet, where would these men fit in the current criteria? They neither ran $500 million companies or equivalents then, nor did they occupy an office that would immediately qualify them even to stand for elections. So, I request the Government to explain how the deliberative tracks under clause 7(b) of the Bill will be flexible enough to include men like Mr Wee Kim Wee, Mr Devan Nair, Dr Benjamin Sheares and Encik Yusof Ishak.

When it comes to understanding what would be comparable contributions for the deliberative track, the National Day Awards provides guidance in its rich tapestry of precedents, presenting criteria of what the State recognises as significant contributions. As one example, and just as one example, the description of the Distinguished Service Order, the Darjah Utama Bakti Cemerlang, states, "The Order may be awarded to any person who has performed within Singapore any act or series of acts constituting distinguished conduct."

What I am asking for is that the deliberative track through clause 7(b) recognises distinguished conduct for and on behalf of the state. This reasoning finds support in the deliberations of the Commission itself, who formed the view that it was not prudent to fetter the PEC's discretion by setting out an exhaustive list of factors that the PEC should consider, save one pertaining to performance, but that the PEC should take a holistic view of the applicant's experience and expertise, and assess whether he is likely to be qualified to hold the office of President.

What I am proposing is comparability in contributing to the lives of people or contributions to the lives of people. Yes, at this point in time of Singapore's history, we need to ensure that Presidential candidates have the competency to make decisions on the second key. But we cannot be overly focused on the second key. Needing to tap into our Reserves is only one aspect of the difficulties that Singapore may face. It is just as important for Singapore's future and survival that our Head of State reflects the ability, dexterity, diligence and resilience of Singaporeans to the rest of the world.

Today, let us not overly restrain ourselves to a qualification criterion that is not wide enough to draw a man or woman whom the body of Singaporeans or the Government believes is needed in years to come. It is for this reason that I ask for flexibility in the deliberative track.

I turn now to the second or alternative criterion, that is, the private sector criterion. Clause 7(b) of the Bill amends Article 19 such that the candidate has to be the most senior executive of a company with $500 million shareholders' equity and who is principally responsible for the running of the company.

We have heard the economic justifications for the change from $100 million paid-up capital to $500 million shareholders' equity in the form of several arguments. One, how the number of companies with $100 million paid-up capital has increased between then and now. Two, how shareholders' equity shows whether a company is a going concern rather than a historic figure which may be all lost. And three, how the candidate has to be hands-on, actually involved in the running of the company, rather than just the big picture.

Purely, economically and statistically, this may make sense. But I would like to go further than that. I would like to ask what is required of a President of Singapore. Does a senior executive of a company with $500 million shareholders' equity lead to the automatic conclusion that that person is cut out for the Presidency? Let me put my point into perspective.

Is it tough to run a $500 million company? Yes. Does one need to have financial proficiency and leadership ability? Yes, especially to hold the company together. These are useful attributes for the office of the President, but it cannot be all about commerce. And here, I agree with my learned colleague Mr Zaqy Mohamed. There must be an important additional requirement that that Singaporean must be people-centred, community-centred and nation-centred.

Essentially, in addition to running a $500 million company, a qualifying candidate should also have a record of public service. This could come in the form of holding a leadership position in a public charity or a similar community-centred institution. This is because being a custodian of the second key is just one among many other significant roles and duties the President holds which have, at their heart, people, their hopes and aspirations. Being community-centred is, therefore, a key characteristic and should be accorded that priority in any qualification criterion. Therefore, I ask whether this would be included in the deliberative track under the private sector path.

In conclusion, Madam, just 57 days ago in this House, we paid tribute to a giant of a man, the late Mr SR Nathan. His attributes and, indeed his whole life bring into clear focus the importance and the reality of what we are debating today – the responsibilities, pressures, expectations of the office of the President. Indeed, the lives of Encik Yusof Ishak, Dr Benjamin Sheares, Mr Wee Kim Wee and Mr SR Nathan paint a rich tapestry of selfless service to Singapore and Singaporeans. I hope the qualification criteria are flexible enough in its current form to collect men or women of similar robust calibre. I support the Bill.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Mdm Speaker, the changes proposed by the Government to the provisions that deal with the Elected Presidency in the Constitution by way of this Bill are uniquely significant. A key significance lies in the fact that a Constitutional Commission was formed to review the Elected Presidency, only the second time such a Constitutional Commission was formed in the history of post-independent Singapore.

However, the deepest significance of the Commission's findings, I would argue, Mdm Speaker, lies in chapter 7 of their report which rests firmly outside the Commission's terms of reference, something that the Wee Chong Jin Constitutional Commission also did earlier to include points outside their terms of reference.

After reading 107 written submissions and receiving oral representations from selected contributors, the Menon Constitutional Commission was compelled to ask a critical question, which, in the opinion of the WP, all Singaporeans ought to ponder over seriously, and that is, should the Presidency remain an elected office?

Having had many months to immerse itself in the genesis of the Presidency, its historical role and the function and operation of the Elected Presidency, the Commission found it a critical enough responsibility and duty to pen its thoughts about the Singapore without an Elected President and for the Government to consider undertaking a more fundamental change to the office.

With this background to the Commission's work in mind, my speech will cover four main points. Firstly, as guiding principles, the WP agrees that the President should not become an alternative centre of power, of political power and an elected entity should safeguard the nation's Reserves.

In January this year, when the Prime Minister announced the setting up of a Constitutional Commission to study changes to the Elected Presidency, Prime Minister Lee said that the President cannot be an alternative centre of power. In September, when the Law Minister rebutted the Constitutional Commission's alternative proposal to replace the Elected Presidency with an appointed Council of Experts, he said that the President himself must be elected to have the popular mandate to veto an elected Government.

The WP agrees with the Government on these two fundamental principles. First, the President should not become an alternative centre of power with the potential to undermine the sovereign authority of Parliament. Second, our national Reserves need to be safeguarded and the bodies safeguarding the Reserves would need to be elected to say "no" to the government of the day and to force a debate in Parliament.

This has been the WP position when the Elected Presidency was first introduced in 1991. We believe that an Elected President should not fetter the supreme power of Parliament as the people's representatives. The Presidency should be a dignified ceremonial office and a President from any race should focus on performing his or her role in fostering national unity and representing Singapore to the world. We also believe that the past Reserves should be safeguarded. But this custodial function should lie with the elected representatives of the legislature.

Secondly, the WP believes that reviewing the Elected Presidency by strengthening the CPA to check the Elected President complicates the Elected Presidency further. To this end, we disagree with the Government that the solution to the current problem is to tighten the qualifying criteria of the Elected Presidency and to strengthen the CPA).

In tightening the qualifying criteria for the Elected Presidency, the Government seeks to lessen the potential for the Elected President to become an alternative centre of power by severely reducing the number of qualifying candidates and restricting the pool to a super elite group of executives in the private and public sectors. This is based on the mistaken premise that a candidate from such a pool is immune to politicisation and will not become an activist President.

The Government has refused to recognise that the problem is inherent to the Elected Presidency by virtue of a popular mandate. Unlike the typical MP, the Elected President is elected by the whole nation to represent the country without political affiliation. The competitive election process between individuals against one another compels candidates to offer platforms to attract votes. The outcome of such a popular election tempts candidates to use the percentage of votes garnered as an indication of popular endorsement and the elected candidate to claim a mandate beyond his or her constitutional powers.

The Government had recognised that, even with existing discretionary powers, we run the risk in the Elected Presidency of placing too much power in one person to properly check a popularly elected Parliament.

The CPA was set up to moderate this risk by endowing the Elected President with a team of advisors so that his or her decisions would always have the benefit of a group of experts and/or experienced persons.

Again, in order to further moderate the risk of the Elected Presidency having too much power to clip the Government's wings, the Government is turning to the unelected CPA. By expanding the CPA from six to eight members and obliging the President to consult the Council on all monetary matters related to the reserves and all key Public Service appointments, the Government is not merely strengthening the CPA's advisory capacity, but is changing the very nature of the CPA beyond its advisory function.

In attempting to create another check, namely, the strengthened CPA on the original check, namely, the Elected Presidency, the Government's approach will, in effect, create a third key for safeguarding the Reserves. When the President disagrees with the Government, the strengthened CPA will be empowered to settle the decision on the side of either party. This makes the CPA another alternative centre of power. This approach risks politicising the office of the Presidency further, by placing the Elected President in a situation where he will be caught in a three-way face-off in making crucial custodial decisions. This approach also risks producing complicated three-way situations that could end in gridlock and the erosion of the legitimacy of the elected Government. An unelected CPA should not have the power to create such outcomes.

The Government's proposal to reserve an election for an ethnic community, if the past five Elected Presidents did not come from that ethnic community, does not solve the problem. Over a long period, our Presidents should come from the main ethnic communities to symbolise and express the multiracial fabric of our nation. However, to tie this important symbolic role with the electoral process risks politicisation of the role. As the ethnicity of the candidates will be pushed into the glare of competitive elections in the case of reserved elections, this will inadvertently lead to the politicisation of multiracialism and may even introduce communal interests into the contest.

Thirdly, the WP proposes to revert to the ceremonial Presidency and to establish an Elected Senate to fulfil the custodial role as the solution.

We studied and deliberated the Constitutional Commission's report and agreed that the most elegant solution to the problem is the Commission's alternative proposal to revert to an appointed ceremonial Presidency and to set up a group of experts to exercise the Elected President's custodial role. However, as the body performing a check on Parliament should have a popular mandate, we believe this group of experts ought to be popularly elected.

With your permission, Mdm Speaker, I would like to distribute a two-page handout which presents two flowcharts. The first is titled Checks and Balances under Option A, which fleshes out the key details of how the Elected Presidency system with a strengthened CPA, as conceived by the Government ,would operate. The second, titled Checks and Balances under Option B, presents a streamlined system of checks and balances with an elected Senate, as put forth by the WP.

Please proceed. [Copies of the handout were distributed to hon Members. Please see Annex 2.]

Thank you, Mdm Speaker. We propose that a Senate be established within our Legislature as an Upper House to exercise the custodial functions that are now exercised by the Elected President. Eight Senators shall be elected from a list in periodic elections where non-partisan candidates will have to fit the qualifying criteria. A Senate Elections Committee will select the most suitable 16 candidates to stand for the Senate election. Properly mandated by popular elections, the Senate will take over the custodial powers of the Elected Presidency.

A Senate veto will return relevant Bills to Parliament for debate, which Parliament can veto with a 75% or three-quarters majority. As part of the legislative arm of the State and not the Executive arm, and mandated to fulfil a limited custodial role, Senators would be under no illusion of having any executive or policy-making powers. It is the WP's belief that such a two-chamber legislative system will minimise gridlock and enhance constructive politics.

With the establishment of the Senate, the Presidency shall revert to an office appointed by Parliament with no custodial role to perform. By focusing on unifying Singaporeans and representing Singapore to the world, the dignity of the office will be preserved and protected from the risk of politicisation inherent in electoral competition and in checking Parliament and being checked by an appointed CPA. Parliament shall consider the multiracial character of society and factor in multiracial representation when making the appointment. This way, the symbolic role of representing our coveted multiracialism will also be preserved and protected from politicisation.

Fourthly, the WP is of the view that the proposed constitutional amendments are major changes that should not be made with indecent haste and should be put to a referendum.

The amendments to the Constitution that the Government has proposed are far-reaching and wide-ranging and deserve much more airtime where the changes can be subjected to proper and thorough public debate. Any changes made with indecent haste will expose the Government to suspicions and accusations that it is seeking to shape the terms and outcome of the election when the country is on the verge of the next Presidential Election.

In the amendments proposed by way of the new Articles 5A, 5B and 5C, the Government has affirmed the utility, desirability and legitimacy of a national referendum in introducing controversial changes to presidential candidate eligibility. Given that the Prime Minister has acknowledged the proposed fundamental changes to the Presidency are controversial and potentially unpalatable to many members of the public, we believe that a national referendum on these proposed amendments should be held after an appropriate period of public debate.

The public should be presented with a simple choice between the Government's proposed amendments and the WP's proposal as outlined in this paper. The two options represent the main ideas mooted by the Constitutional Commission, with minor modifications. As such, we believe the referendum questions should be marked in a non-partisan manner as simply Option A and Option B, as explained by Ms Sylvia Lim earlier. A simple majority should suffice to decide the referendum.

In conclusion, Mdm Speaker, should this Bill be passed in its current form, the Elected Presidency will soon host a triple-weak situation. A weak institution that is structurally flawed in hosting different and contradictory objectives, weak public knowledge about the powers of the Elected President and, finally, an Elected President whose electoral mandate will be weakened as a result of the strengthening of the unelected CPA.

This House needs to focus its energies on the path that the Commission has laid for the future of the Elected Presidency. Instead of rushing this Bill through Parliament in time for the next Presidential Elections, the WP calls for the Government to delay any changes to the Elected Presidency. The Government should do this not because it has been suggested by the WP or the Constitutional Commission in varying forms but to protect the institution of the Presidency and to create a more accountable and robust system than the one we host today for the next 50 years.

Assoc Prof Mahdev Mohan. One minute, please. Dr Tan, do you have a clarification? Yes, please.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Dr Tan Wu Meng.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Senior Minister of State Desmond Lee.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Dr Janil Puthucheary.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Dr Janil Puthucheary.

Madam, I am still confused. The Senate Elections Committee is not itself elected; the members would be appointed, I presume by Parliament. So, how do they then prevent – in other words, actually, the key point is that if you have a pool of 24 or 36 candidates, how does the Senate Electoral Committee and what mandate does it have to prevent somebody standing as a Senator, and restricting that list to 16 people for the public to decide? Would they be given strict criteria by the House to decide upon, such as age, financials? What is the nature of that decision? What is the mandate for that decision? That is what I am asking.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Dr Janil Puthucheary.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Low Thia Khiang.

Madam, I am clarifying. What I want to clarify is that the WP has put forward an alternative to the system of Elected President. Of course, by no means it is perfect. It is the same as what the Prime Minister said, it is not perfect. The idea is for us to look at the fundamental difference, look at which is the better system we should have and, of course, there are details. You have had the Elected President system for 25 years, you have problems, you come for amendments.

Similarly, we expect our system of Senate, if accepted, will have similar problems. So, let us have debate on the fundamental idea, the pros and cons of having a Senate and the Elected President. Do not be bogged down by details. If you are going into the details, it would thereby end up debating the details rather than the main substantive proposal.

So, let us focus on what is fundamental and whether the idea sounds logical and whether it is a fairer system. Details, yes, we can work them out and I think we can finetune them in time to come.

Ms Chia Yong Yong.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Yee Chia Hsing.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Yee Chia Hsing.

Yes, they can stand, but how it works is that, currently, because they are appointed, the diversity helps in giving a different perspective and a more rounded decision-making. But if they stand for election, some of these people, they may not be able to, for example, give a very rousing speech. So, they may not end up being elected. So, that is my point to the WP.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Mr Koh Poh Koon.

Mr Pritam Singh.

Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan.

Order. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 5.20 pm.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 5.00 pm until 5.20 pm.

Sitting resumed at 5.20 pm

[Mdm Speaker in the Chair]