Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill

Thank you. I will discuss the proposed amendments in the following order. First, the eligibility criteria and the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC). Second, multiracial representation in the Presidency. Third, the framework governing the Elected Presidency's custodial powers, including the role of the CPA; and fourth, the entrenchment framework.

First, eligibility and the PEC. When the system of Parliament appointing the President was replaced by direct elections in 1991, a prequalification approach was established to ensure that "voters are given qualified and suitable candidates to choose from". This was necessary because the Elected President had to be a person who "fulfil[s] exacting standards of competence, experience and rectitude". In his custodial role, he can prevent access to past Reserves and veto Budgets, transactions and key appointments. He cannot simply rubber-stamp the Government's proposal or pass off the CPA's recommendation as his own. He must make his own decision in the exercise of his discretion.

That means he must have knowledge, competence and discernment to assess whether proposals are in the national interest. He must have the courage, conviction and confidence to disagree, where necessary, with the CPA and the elected Government. If he does not perform his role well, he may allow hard-earned money – the hard-earned money of all Singaporeans – to be frittered away needlessly, or prevent the Government from acting in a time of need to avert a crisis.

Several contributors to the Constitutional Commission argued against the imposition of stringent eligibility criteria by comparing the Presidential eligibility criteria with the apparently less exacting eligibility criteria prescribed for the Prime Minister. However, as many of these contributors subsequently conceded, this is a false comparison.

A person only becomes a Prime Minister after passing through "many stringent tests of leadership". He must be elected as a Member of Parliament in the general elections. He will generally lead and be endorsed by the political party which wins a majority of Parliamentary seats. He must command the support of a majority of elected Members of Parliament. These Members of Parliament would have had the opportunity to scrutinise his abilities and values closely. These requirements mean that there is a multi-layered filtering process where a person's abilities are tested before he is likely to become Prime Minister.

The President comes into office by a different route. He is elected into office directly by the public. There needs to be eligibility criteria that set a baseline for the experience and qualities which a candidate ought to possess.

If eligibility criteria are necessary for the Presidency, then the question is whether the current criteria serve as effective thresholds for Presidential candidature. Some clearly require updating because they are out of date.

The economic environment we live in is very different from when the Elected Presidency was introduced in 1991. Our gross domestic product (GDP), Official Foreign Reserves and Central Provident Fund balances have grown by approximately six, seven and eight times, respectively.

Just consider the eligibility criteria for private sector candidates. In 1993, there were only 158 companies, or about 0.2% of Singapore-incorporated companies then, which met the $100 million paid-up capital requirement. Today, there is a much larger base of Singapore companies, and the smallest of the top 0.2% has a paid-up capital of approximately $431 million, and if you go back to the 158th largest Singapore-incorporated company today, it has a paid-up capital of approximately S$1.6 billion. There is, therefore, a need to update and refine the eligibility criteria. Clause 7 of the Bill amends Article 19 for this purpose. With your permission, Mdm Speaker, may I ask the Clerk to distribute the second handout?

Currently, a person can qualify for Presidential office by having held for three years a position in any of the four limbs of the existing Article 19(2)(g). The first three limbs, which have been referred to as the "automatic track", give automatic qualification to any candidate who satisfies their requirements.

Limb (i) admits holders of certain key public offices. Limb (ii) admits Chairmen or Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of Fifth Schedule Statutory Boards. Limb (iii) admits Chairmen or CEOs of companies with a paid-up capital of at least $100 million. Limb (iv) has been called the "deliberative track". Qualification is not automatic, and an applicant has to satisfy the PEC that he has held a position that has given him experience and ability comparable to those under the first three limbs.

These four limbs still exist under the revised framework. However, a new presentation is adopted in the new Article 19(2)(g)(i). The current limbs (i) and (ii) are housed under the public sector service requirement found in the new Article 19(3). The current limb (iii) is housed under the private sector service requirement found in the new Article 19(4). As for the current limb (iv), each of the "public sector" and "private sector" routes will have its own "deliberative" track for qualification. Please refer to Handout 2.

The Bill retains the three-year qualifying tenure, but introduces, in Article 19(2)(g)(ii), a "look-back" or currency period that applies to all qualifying routes. Any period of service a candidate relies on must fall partly or wholly within the 20 years that immediately precede the date of the Writ of Election. This ensures that each candidate's experience and ability is reasonably current.

In light of this revised presentation, the existing Article 19(3) and (4), which relates to disabilities of the President, are deleted and re-enacted by clause 8 of the Bill as the new Article 19A.

I will now elaborate on the public and private sector service requirements.

The public sector service requirement may be satisfied in four alternative ways. The first way is by holding the key public offices set out in Article 19(3)(a). And this list remains identical to the existing limb (i). It is a "tightly drawn" list of senior officeholders who have handled "complex matters with a wide-reaching public dimension". There is no current need to modify the list because the demands of these offices are self-adjusting over the years. The scope and complexity of these officeholders' responsibilities will increase alongside the development of our country.

The second way to satisfy the public sector service requirement is by serving as the chief executive of a Fifth Schedule entity, as provided for by Article 19(3)(b). As compared to the existing limb (ii), Article 19(3)(b) narrows the qualifying offices to only the "chief executive" of the Fifth Schedule entity. "Chief executive" is defined in Article 19(10) as "the most senior executive who is principally responsible for the management and conduct of the entity's business and operations".

This change ensures that candidates who automatically qualify have sufficient experience in exercising authority, managing large organisations and taking responsibility for making critical and major decisions with wide-ranging and long-term consequences.

Article 19(3)(b) also expands the qualifying entities beyond the Fifth Schedule Statutory Boards to also include Fifth Schedule Government companies, such as GIC Private Limited and Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited. These companies are key institutions that manage significant amounts of the national Reserves. Indeed, they are so important to the national interest that the appointment of their chief executives and their annual budgets are subject to Presidential oversight. To ensure that Fifth Schedule entities are of sufficient size, clauses 13(b) and 14(b) of the Bill update the qualifying threshold for adding entities to the Fifth Schedule, from $100 million to $500 million. Clause 34 of the Bill removes Ministry of National Development (MND) Holdings from the Fifth Schedule, as it is now defunct.

The third way to qualify under the public sector route is through Article 19(3)(c), which provides the public sector "deliberative" track. It applies to a person who has served for three or more years in an office in the public sector, for which the PEC must be satisfied that, having regard to the nature of the office and his performance in that office, he has experience and ability comparable to a person who has held a qualifying key public office or has been the chief executive of a Fifth Schedule entity. The PEC must also be satisfied that he has the experience and ability to effectively carry out the Presidential functions and duties.

Examples of persons who may persuade the PEC that they qualify under this track include, for instance, ambassadors of international stature with deep diplomatic experience who have played key roles in negotiations for complex international agreements requiring political and financial acumen and judgement. A person with extensive experience helming a major international organisation may also qualify.

The fourth way to qualify under the public sector route is through Article 19(3)(d), which allows for aggregation of two separate terms of qualifying public sector office for the purpose of satisfying the three-year requirement. Each of these terms must be at least one year in length. For example, a person who has served as a Chief Executive of a Fifth Schedule entity for two years and as a Permanent Secretary for one year will qualify, provided that each of those terms falls wholly or partly within the 20-year window.

The private sector requirement may be satisfied in three alternative ways. The first way is by serving as chief executive of a company that meets the criteria provided by Article 19(4)(a). As with Fifth Schedule entities, only holders of the most senior executive position will qualify.

Four other substantive criteria must be met.

First, Article 19(4)(a)(i) requires that the person's most recent period of service as the chief executive of that company, ignoring any period of service less than a year, must be at least three years.

Second, Article 19(4)(a)(ii) read with 19(7) sets a size requirement for the company. The company must have, on average, at least $500 million shareholders' equity during the person's most recent three-year period of service as chief executive.

As explained in the White Paper, the assessment metric is changed from paid-up capital to shareholders' equity, because shareholders' equity is a better indicator of a company's size and complexity. The updated quantitative threshold of $500 million reflects the vastly different economic climate today, compared to 25 years ago. While the increase in the quantitative threshold may sound large, significantly more companies fulfil the updated size requirement today than companies which fulfilled the existing criteria in 1993.

Third, Article 19(4)(a)(iii) requires that the company must have, on average, made profit after tax for the entire period during which the applicant served as the chief executive. This includes discontinuous periods of service, and also periods of service falling outside the 20-year look-back period.

Fourth, Article 19(4)(a)(iv) introduces a solvency requirement. This applies to candidates who have ceased serving as chief executive of the company before the date of the writ of election. The company must not have been subject to any insolvency event within three years of the applicant's last day of service as the chief executive, or until the date of the writ of election, whichever is earlier.

Under Article 19(5)(a), candidates may only rely on their most recent period of service in a given company, and the size requirement for that company must be met during that period. This prevents candidates from cherry-picking terms of office for qualification purposes.

Take, for instance, a candidate who was a company CEO for six years. For the first three years, the company had an average shareholders' equity of $500 million. But for the most recent three years, the average was below $500 million. The candidate cannot rely on the first three "successful" years of service to qualify for Presidential office, as that was not his most recent period of service as chief executive of the company.

Article 19(6) empowers the Legislature to specify how the PEC is to determine shareholders' equity and profits after tax, as well as what constitutes an insolvency event. The detailed definition of these concepts may change along with accounting standards and insolvency law.

Article 19(7), (8) and (9) introduces an updating mechanism to permit increases to the minimum required amount of shareholders' equity.

The amount can be increased if a committee, consisting of all PEC members: one, recommends an increase; and two, Parliament, by resolution, either agrees to the full increase or chooses to increase it by less than the recommended amount.

The committee must review the amount at least once every 12 years, but may do so more frequently if it chooses. Parliament cannot raise the threshold when the office of President is vacant, or in the last six months before the expiry of the incumbent President's term. The updating mechanism cannot be used to decrease the minimum amount. That can only be done via constitutional amendment.

The second way to qualify under the private sector route is through Article 19(4)(b), which provides for the private sector "deliberative" track. It applies to a person who has served for three or more years in an office in a private sector organisation. The PEC must be satisfied that the person has experience and ability comparable to a person who has served as a chief executive of a typical private company with $500 million in shareholders' equity. As with the public sector deliberative track, the PEC must also be satisfied that he has the experience and ability for Presidential office.

Examples of persons who may persuade the PEC that they qualify under this track include, for instance, chief executives of companies limited by guarantee; managing partners of large partnerships; and chief operating officers (COOs) or chief financial officers (CFOs) of exceptionally large or complex companies.

The third way to qualify under the private sector route is through the aggregation of terms under Article 19(4)(c). This operates similarly to aggregation of public sector terms, save that the private sector candidate may only rely on his most recent term in each company. He is not entitled to cherry-pick his terms, as explained earlier.

Clause 16 of the Bill introduces amendments relating to vacation of and removal from the Presidential office. The new Article 22L(1)(aa) provides that a President vacates his office if he ceases to be a citizen of Singapore.

The new Article 22L(3)(e) provides that the President can be removed if, in demonstrating his eligibility to the PEC, he intentionally or knowingly makes: (a) a materially false or misleading statement of fact; or (b) fails to state a material fact. Similar amendments will be made, in due course, to the grounds for rendering an election void under the Presidential Elections Act.

Clause 6 of the Bill repeals and re-enacts Article 18 to strengthen the PEC.

With the changes to the eligibility criteria, the PEC members will have additional responsibilities, such as (a) assessing if an applicant held the most senior executive position in a Fifth Schedule entity or private company; (b) assessing if a private company fulfilled the size, profitability and solvency requirements; (c) or determining whether the various eligibility criteria are fulfilled in situations involving aggregation of terms. They also have to sit on a committee to periodically review the minimum shareholders' equity threshold.

Article 18(2) augments the PEC with three additional members, so as to expand the PEC's expertise to deal with these additional responsibilities.

Currently, the PEC comprises three members: the Chairman of the Public Service Commission (PSC), who is the PEC Chairman; the Chairman of the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA); and a member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR), nominated by the PCMR Chairman.

Article 18(2) adds: (a) a past or current CPA member appointed by the CPA Chairman; (b) a person who must be qualified to be, or have been, a Judge of the Supreme Court, appointed by the Chief Justice; and (c) a person who has private sector expertise and experience that is relevant to the functions of the PEC, appointed by the Prime Minister.

The PEC will remain a standing institution. Article 18(3) stipulates that appointed PEC members will hold six-year terms and may be re-appointed.

Article 18(4) provides the grounds on which a PEC member's office may be vacated. Two of these bear elaboration. First, Article 18(4)(c) provides that PEC members who are appointed to the PEC by an appointing authority can have their membership revoked by their appointers. This mirrors the existing approach for the PCMR member who sits on the PEC.

However, Article 18(6) specifies that an appointment cannot be revoked from the time a writ for a Presidential election is issued to the time a person is declared to be elected as President. This avoids changes to the PEC composition during an election period, which could lead to confusion and also to possible claims of influencing the elections.

Second, Article 18(4)(e) stipulates that the CPA member who sits on the PEC will vacate his PEC office under certain conditions.

Article 18(5) and (7) provides for situations where a PEC member's office falls vacant or where a PEC member is unable to discharge his functions. Article 18(8), (9) and (10) deal with the PEC's internal procedures.

I turn next to the issue of multiracial representation in the Presidency.

Mdm Speaker, Singapore has progressed well as a multi-racial society. A recent survey by CNA and the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) shows that Singaporeans strongly believe in meritocracy and that a high proportion report living out multicultural ideals.

However, there is a need to ensure multiracial representation in the Presidency, given its historical and principal role as the symbol of our multiracial nation. This unique role distinguishes the Presidency from all other public offices.

Prior to 1991, Parliament had appointed Presidents who collectively represented all the different racial groups.

As the President noted in his message earlier today, it was no coincidence that our first four appointed Presidents were Malay, Eurasian, Indian and Chinese respectively.

As then-Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew emphasised, this rotation was "important to remind Singaporeans that [our] country was multiracial", and the Elected Presidency had to continue to be "a symbol of a multiracial community, and an expression of our national identity".

We are not alone in recognising the importance of multiracial representation in the office of the Head of State. In Switzerland, Canada and New Zealand, the office is rotated among ethnic groups, or periodically held by racial minorities.

Since the Elected Presidency was introduced, much public attention has been focused on the "technocratic" aspects of the President's custodial function. The symbolic role of the Presidency has sometimes been overlooked.

But the symbolic role remains of vital importance. It is necessary to continue emphasising this role, particularly because once we have direct elections, it is difficult to ensure that the Presidents will continue to collectively represent the different racial groups. This is a real concern – that members of minority groups may not be elected to the Presidency for long periods of time. This will undermine the President's vital role as the symbol of our multiracial nation.

Views have been publicly expressed, including before the Constitutional Commission, that special arrangements to ensure multiracial representation in the Presidency detract from meritocracy. The argument is that a President must be elected on the basis of merit, and that race should be irrelevant to this determination.

But multiracial representation can be achieved while ensuring that meritocracy is not compromised. As noted in both the Commission's Report and the White Paper, meritocracy-related concerns lose force if the eligibility criteria apply to candidates of all ethnic groups.

Furthermore, as the Commission put it, "the most meritorious candidate may not always be the most electable", because race "has an impact on at least a portion of the electorate". Indeed, the CNA-IPS survey I referred to earlier showed that a significant proportion of respondents were not willing to accept a President from a race other than their own. Therefore, a candidate's race may work against him in some situations and may have a decisive impact in moderately close elections.

In trying to ensure multiracial representation in the Presidency, we must carefully balance a number of considerations: the need for multiracialism with our meritocratic ideals; helping, and not impeding, our progress towards our long-term goal of greater multiracialism; and having direct elections while ensuring that Presidents from minority groups are elected from time to time.

After considering many different models, the Constitutional Commission recommended a "five-term hiatus" model, which the Government has accepted.

It seeks to balance all the factors mentioned earlier. It involves minimal intervention and will come into play only if open elections fail to periodically return Presidents from different races.

We also agree that a hiatus of five terms strikes a good balance. If the hiatus is too long, the system may not meaningfully ensure that the Presidency is accessible to the various racial communities. Conversely, if it is too short, the system comes close to designating successive elections for different races, which might not be appropriate in a system of direct elections.

Clause 9 of the Bill inserts the new Article 19B to establish the "five-term hiatus" model.

Elections will generally be open to candidates from all races. However, if a particular racial group has not held the Presidency for the most recent five consecutive terms, Article 19B(1) reserves the next election for candidates from that group. The usual eligibility requirements continue to apply. If, during a reserved election, no eligible candidate from the relevant racial group comes forward, the election becomes an open election.

There may be situations where two or three racial groups have not held the Presidency for five or more consecutive terms. Article 19B(2)(b) and (c) deals with such situations. The general principle is that an election will first be reserved for the racial group which has had a longer hiatus from office. If no eligible candidates come forward, then the election becomes reserved for the racial group with the next longest hiatus, and so on. This continues until the election eventually becomes an open election.

Article 19B(6) defines the three racial groups that reserved elections can apply to:

(a) the Chinese community;

(b) the Malay community; and

(c) a composite group comprising the Indian community and other minority communities in Singapore.

If a person does not fall within any of the three stipulated groups, he can still contest in open elections like any other Singaporean who meets all the usual requirements.

The definitions for the Malay, Indian and other minority communities are identical to those adopted in the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) context.

It is useful to note that the "other minority communities" refers to groups that have some degree of history, permanence and established presence in Singapore, such as the Eurasian community. A similar definition will be introduced for the purposes of determining whether a Presidential candidate belongs to the Chinese community. These racial community definitions have two aspects – an applicant must consider himself a member of the relevant community, and must also be generally accepted by that community as a member.

In the GRC context, this approach has proven to be capable of handling situations involving persons of mixed heritage. The establishment of the committees and procedures to decide whether a person belongs to one of the three racial groups will be provided for by way of legislation subsequently.

I turn now to the framework of the President's custodial powers, which the CPA is an important part of. The CPA is an independent expert advisory body with varied and deep expertise. It helps to ensure that the President's decisions are well-informed and provides a stabilising effect so that the President's important custodial function does not depend solely on the judgement of a single person acting alone. As the President said in his message, the CPA helps to "moderate" the President's custodial powers.

The CPA also plays a role in resolving disagreements that may arise between the President and the Government, as I will explain later.

Overall, we want the framework to facilitate wise and prompt decisions, with suitable mechanisms to resolve impasses. With your permission, Mdm Speaker, may I ask the Clerk to distribute the third handout?

The Bill improves the framework by making changes to the following areas: (a) first, the President's obligation to consult the CPA; (b) second, the Parliamentary overruling framework; (c) third, time limits for the exercise of President's veto; (d) fourth, disclosure of the President's and CPA's reasons; and (e) fifth, strengthening the CPA. Other consequential amendments will also be made.

First, the President's obligation to consult the CPA. The President is currently required to consult the CPA prior to exercising the discretionary powers listed in the existing Article 21(3). However, this requirement applies in relation to some, but not all, of his fiscal and appointment-related powers.

The obligation to consult the CPA should apply uniformly to all such matters. Clause 22 of the Bill introduces the new Article 37IA, which adopts this uniform approach. As a matter of legislative drafting, unlike the existing Article 21(3) which sets out a list of discretionary powers, Article 37IA(1) imposes a general duty on the President to consult the CPA before exercising any discretionary power conferred on him by the Constitution.

Article 37IA(2) introduces three categories of exceptions to the general duty, for which the President may, but need not, consult the CPA. First, the President's additional protective functions relating to restraining orders under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), detention orders under the Internal Security Act (ISA), as well as investigations by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). Second, the President's discretionary powers concerning the CPA under Part VA of the Constitution. Third, the traditional discretionary powers that pre-date the Elected Presidency.

Second, the Parliamentary overruling framework. When the President consults the CPA, the CPA will deliberate the matter and provide its recommendations. Where the President and the Government agree with each other, the CPA's views will not have any legal weight. However, where the President exercises his veto, a veto supported by the CPA should have greater finality than a veto exercised contrary to the CPA's recommendations.

Where the President's advisory council agrees with the Government instead of the President, the issue may warrant a "second look" by Parliament.

This approach currently applies already, only in two areas, namely: (a) Supply Bills; and (b) key appointments to the Public Service and Fifth Schedule entities.

In these areas: The President's veto is final if he acts with the CPA's support. However, where he exercises his veto contrary to the CPA's recommendation, a two-third Parliamentary majority may overrule his veto.

Whether, and when, to trigger an overruling is the Government's prerogative, but the President's veto stands unless it is successfully overruled.

The new Article 37IF(1), (2)(a) and (c), and (3) extends the overruling mechanism uniformly to all fiscal and appointment-related matters subject to a Presidential veto.

On a related note, I will later move an amendment to refine the overruling mechanism in relation to Fifth Schedule entities. Under the amended approach, a President's veto of a Fifth Schedule budget or transaction can be overruled only where the relevant entity has requested for an overruling resolution to be moved and the Government decides to trigger the overruling mechanism. The entity's board or management oversees its operations. They are responsible for the budgets and its transactions. They have the necessary information and context to assess whether to seek to overrule the veto. If the Fifth Schedule entity decides to accept the veto, that should be the end of the matter.

Article 37IF(4) stipulates two areas in which the Article 37IF overruling mechanism does not apply. First, it does not apply to the entrenchment framework, which has its own overruling mechanism. Second, it does not apply to Article 22H, which allows a President to withhold assent from the passing of ordinary legislation if he is of the opinion that the legislation circumvents or curtails his constitutional discretionary powers.

Third, time limits for the exercise of the President's veto. Where the President does not expressly exercise his veto, but instead chooses to remain silent, there could be ambiguity about whether the Government may proceed.

There are currently a few areas, such as Supply Bills, in which the President's failure to exercise his veto within a stipulated time limit will result in him being deemed to not have exercised his veto. Such a deeming mechanism ensures that the President's silence does not result in any ambiguity. It should thus generally be applied to Presidential vetoes.

Clause 11 of the Bill inserts the new Article 21A to introduce the deeming mechanism and stipulate time limits for the President's exercise of his veto powers.

Article 21A(2)(a) provides that a 30-day time limit applies for certain time-sensitive matters, namely: (i) Supply Bills, Supplementary Supply Bills and Final Supply Bills; (ii) the President's additional protective functions relating to ISA detentions, MRHA restraining orders and CPIB investigations; and (iii) amendments relating to entrenched provisions, when the entrenchment framework is brought into operation.

For all other matters, Article 21A(2)(b) imposes a six-week time limit.

Article 21A(3)(a) provides that where the Prime Minister certifies that a matter is urgent, the default time limit can be reduced to a minimum of 15 days.

Article 21A(3)(b) provides that the President and Cabinet may extend time limits by mutual agreement.

Article 21A(4) applies where a Bill is referred to a constitutional tribunal for determination.

The time from the reference to when the tribunal pronounces its opinion is not counted towards the President's time limit.

Corresponding time limits will be set for the CPA to provide recommendations to the President. This facilitates a good working understanding and also ensures that the President has sufficient time to study the CPA's recommendation.

The new Article 37IB requires the President to immediately refer to the CPA any fiscal or appointment-related matter over which the President may exercise a veto power. This is when the CPA's time starts running under the new Article 37IC(1).

If the President has a 30-day time limit, the CPA must make its recommendation within 15 days. If the President has a six-week time limit, the CPA must make its recommendation within three weeks.

Article 37IC(2) allows abridgment of time limits where a certificate of urgency has been issued. The President may extend the CPA's time limit under Article 37IC(3). In all cases, notwithstanding any extensions granted, the CPA must give its recommendation at least five days before the President's time limit for signifying his decision.

If the CPA fails to give its recommendation within the stipulated time limit, it is deemed by Article 37IC(4) to have recommended against the exercise of a Presidential veto.

Fourth, disclosure of President's and CPA's reasons. We agree with the Constitutional Commission that the framework for disclosure ought to be refined. However, as explained in the White Paper, we have adopted a different approach on some points. The revised framework, as set out by the new Articles 37ID, 37IE and 37IF, seeks to permit disclosure where necessary, while still protecting sensitive or confidential information. For simplicity, it may be thought of as a three-stage process. Members may want to refer to the handout.

The first stage applies in all situations where the President is required to refer his decision to the CPA. Under Article 37ID, the CPA's recommendation will be provided only to the President and will include the number of votes for and against the recommendation; and the grounds for the recommendation. The President must then decide whether to exercise his veto.

The second stage applies if the President exercises his veto. Under Article 37IE(2)(a) and (c), he must disclose his grounds and the CPA's recommendation to the Prime Minister. For vetoes relating to the Budget or proposed transaction of a Fifth Schedule entity, the President must additionally make these disclosures to the Chairman of the entity. This will allow the Government and the Fifth Schedule entity to learn of the reasons for the veto and, where overruling is possible, to make an informed decision on whether to initiate the overruling mechanism.

The third stage applies if the Government wishes to initiate the overruling mechanism. Under Article 37IF(2)(b), the Government must, before moving an overruling resolution, cause the President's grounds to be published in the Gazette and send the CPA's recommendation to the Speaker, for presentation to Parliament.

The three-stage approach applies generally to all Presidential vetoes that are subject to Parliamentary overruling.

A slightly different approach is taken for Supply Bills. A Presidential veto of a Supply Bill has considerable public signature, whether or not the Government seeks to overrule the President's veto. The Government either has to return with a fresh Supply Bill, or have its spending confined to the Budget approved for the previous year.

In such cases, Article 37IE(2)(b) provides that, should the President exercise his veto, he must additionally publish his grounds in the Gazette and send the CPA's recommendation to the Speaker for presentation to Parliament.

Fifth, the CPA will be strengthened in three ways. This is necessary because of the enlarged role it now plays.

First, clause 17 of the Bill amends Article 37B to introduce two additional CPA members, one appointed by the President and another appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister.

The CPA will, therefore, have eight members in all: three appointed by the President in his own discretion; three appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister; and one each appointed on the advice of the Chief Justice and the PSC Chairman.

The President appoints one member to be the CPA Chairman.

The new Article 37IG introduces rules relating to the CPA's internal processes. The CPA has a quorum of five members, including the Chairman. The CPA's recommendation must be made by a majority of members present and voting. The CPA Chairman has a casting vote in the event of a tie.

Clause 23(c) of the Bill amends Article 37J(3) to give the CPA autonomy over its internal procedure, subject to any constitutional provisions.

CPA members act independently in advising the President and not at the behest of their appointing authorities. However, a careful balance has been built into the CPA's composition and processes as a safeguard. Let us assume that the President appoints one of his three appointees as the CPA Chairman. If the President's three appointees are unanimous on a particular recommendation, they will only need the agreement of one other CPA member in order for their recommendation to prevail by virtue of the Chairman's casting vote. Conversely, their recommendation may not prevail if they do not have a unanimous view or do not have the support of any other CPA member.

Second, Article 37B(2) staggers the terms of CPA members to ensure continuity and to enhance the CPA's independence. CPA membership is drawn into three divisions. Each division has one member appointed by the President in his discretion and one member appointed on the Prime Minister's advice. In addition, the first division has a member appointed on the Chief Justice's advice, and the second division has a member appointed on the PSC Chairman's advice. Each member's appointment expires every sixth year. The three divisions are staggered so that every two years, all seats in a division will expire together. If a seat is prematurely vacated, Article 37B(3) provides that the term of the replacement member is subject to the expiry date of the member he replaces, so as to preserve the staggering.

Clause 33 of the Bill inserts a new Article 165 to make transitional arrangements.

Third, clause 19 of the Bill inserts a new Article 37D(2) that requires appointing authorities to consider whether a potential appointee (a) is of integrity, good character and reputation; and (b) has expertise and experience relevant to the matters on which the CPA may have to advise the President on.

Clauses 10, 12, 13(a), 14(a), 15, 18, 20, 23(a) and (b), 24, 27, 28, 29 and 31 of the Bill make consequential amendments in light of the changes to the framework governing the Elected President's custodial powers.

I come lastly to entrenchment. The entrenchment framework introduces additional safeguards, over and above the existing requirement of a two-third Parliamentary majority for constitutional amendments, to further entrench certain specific constitutional provisions.

The concept of entrenchment surfaced in the 1988 and 1990 White Papers. When first mooted, entrenchment covered only the Elected Presidency and the core custodial powers of the office. The rationale was to protect the office and powers from easy removal or circumvention by an irresponsible government.

The 1990 Select Committee subsequently recommended extending the entrenchment framework to other provisions, including some that were unrelated to the Elected Presidency.

The entrenched provisions were protected by a national referendum requirement. If the President disagreed with a proposed amendment to an entrenched provision, the amendment – however minor or process-related – may be made only with the support of a two-third national referendum majority. In making his decision, the President was not required to consult the CPA. The entrenchment framework was not brought into operation because the Government felt that it needed more time and experience to refine and adjust the provisions governing the Elected Presidency, which is a unique institution.

Over the years, several revisions have had to be made to improve the working mechanisms for the new powers of the Presidency. Had the provisions been entrenched, it would have been very difficult to improve the system. As the Constitutional Commission observed, the entrenchment framework – if brought into force – renders it "virtually impossible" to amend any aspect of the entrenched provisions.

The fact that today – 25 years on – the Constitutional Commission has had to examine certain fundamental aspects of the Elected Presidency, culminating in this Bill, demonstrates the need for the institution to evolve over time.

As the system continues to evolve, we must revise the entrenchment framework to seek a better balance between rigidity and adaptability. A case study of the US presents a striking example of the need for such a balance.

Numerous US Presidents have emphasised the need for a constitution to be a living document. Yet, scholars have observed that it is "almost impossible" to amend the US Constitution. Amendments must receive a two-third vote in both Houses of Congress – the House of Representatives and the Senate – and be ratified by 38 of the 50 states. If just 13 states reject a constitutional amendment, the amendment fails. In other words, an amendment supported by more than 95% of Americans can still fail. Historically, of nearly 12,000 proposals introduced to amend the US Constitution, only 27 had been successful.

This may explain the greater role that the US courts play in "interpreting" the constitutional text so that it keeps up with the times.

This approach has been criticised for being anti-democratic. It results in constitutional law-making by unelected and politically unaccountable judges, and politicises the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the US example illustrates an important point: the Constitution must, in one way or another, continue to evolve over time.

In our context, this means that we must seek a suitable balance in entrenchment, between rigidity and flexibility. Finding this balance is, ultimately, a matter of judgement. In the White Paper, we approached this by considering three questions. First, which provisions should be entrenched? Second, should the referendum requirement be revised? Third, should the CPA's views be given legal weight in the entrenchment context?

On the first consideration, I mentioned earlier that most of the entrenched provisions relate to the Elected Presidency, but some are entirely unrelated to it. At the same time, provisions relating to other critically important institutions, like the Judiciary and this Parliament, are not specifically entrenched in the same way.

The Commission observed that since these other important institutions are not similarly entrenched, this may support the contention that entrenchment of the Elected Presidency should also be severely done away with.

We think that it remains critical to have an entrenchment framework for the Elected Presidency. The Elected Presidency serves as an additional check on a government in the two key areas. There is a risk that a government bent on raiding the Reserves or compromising the Public Services could remove the Elected Presidency to get rid of that check. This was the initial rationale for entrenchment: to protect the Elected Presidency and its core custodial powers against easy removal. By contrast, it would be much more difficult to remove well-established institutions, such as this Parliament or the Judiciary.

We will, therefore, streamline the entrenchment framework to cover only the provisions establishing the Elected Presidency and its core custodial powers. This approach will also make the framework conceptually more coherent, since it is founded on the unique need to protect the Elected Presidency and its powers from easy removal.

Other provisions which do not relate to these areas will remain protected in the same way as the rest of the Constitution, that is, through the need for a two-third majority in Parliament to amend these provisions. So, they are not unprotected, but continue to be protected by a two-third majority requirement in this Parliament.

The second consideration is whether the referendum requirement should be revised. Referendums serve a purpose on clear-cut strategic decisions, which are so important that it is best that the people decide them directly in a national vote.

However, referendums do have inherent limitations. They generally lead to binary outcomes, even though the issues that underlie the vote may be complex. Communicating these complexities to voters to make an informed decision is often not easy. Emotions and misinformation can have a big influence. For example, studies on the Brexit referendum show that a significant percentage of people who voted to "leave", subsequently regretted their vote.

More recently, in Colombia, the President signed a peace deal with the country's largest rebel group to end a 52-year-old war that cost the lives of 220,000 people and displaced another five million. For this he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the deal had to be ratified at a national referendum. Early polls suggested that it would be comfortably ratified, but a vocal anti-ratification campaign, led by a former Colombian President, engendered a shock result: 50.2% of voters voted against the deal.

Referendums should, therefore, be used in a circumspect way. Perhaps at this point, we should distribute the next handout.

Currently, the existing entrenchment framework applies the same referendum requirement bluntly to all entrenched provisions. The Bill replaces this framework with one that categorises the entrenched provisions into two tiers.

The first tier contains provisions fundamental to the existence of the Elected Presidency and the entrenchment framework itself. The electorate should have a direct say should the Government want to proceed with amendments to these provisions when the President, with the CPA's support, disagrees with the Government.

The second tier comprises provisions relating to more operational aspects of the Elected Presidency and its custodial powers. It may not be necessary to put such issues to a national referendum.

The required referendum threshold will also be revised from a two-third majority to a simple majority. The referendum threshold should be commensurate with the gravity of the decision in question. A two-third referendum majority requirement should thus be reserved only for provisions relating to the surrender of Singapore's sovereignty and relinquishment of our Police and Armed Forces, or amendments to those provisions, as currently already provided under our Constitution. These are the only circumstances under which a two-third referendum majority requirement applies other than those which were for the Elected Presidency.

The third consideration is whether the CPA's views should be given legal weight within the entrenchment framework. Under the existing framework, there is no legal difference whether the President acts with the CPA's support or against its advice.

The CPA's recommendations should be given weight so that it can serve as a counterbalance, as it already does in other areas relating to Presidential vetoes. This is so particularly since the entrenched provisions concerned areas where disagreements between the President and the Government might be sharp and intractable.

I turn now to the precise changes being made. Please refer to the handout.

I will first explain the changes being made to Article 17, which contains several key entrenched provisions. Clause 4 of the Bill amends Article 17 to set out the key functions and certain discretionary powers of the Elected President, and their relation to each other.

The principal Head of State function remains in Article 17(1). The new Article 17(2) is a statement of principle of the President's non-executive custodial function of safeguarding our Reserves and the integrity of our Public Service. The actual custodial powers arising from the functions mentioned in Article 17(2) are defined in the new Article 17(3). The new Article 17(4) provides that the President may exercise other powers and perform other functions according to the Constitution and any other written law.

The existing Article 17(3) and (4), which relate to the election of the President and the timing of polls, are deleted and re-enacted by clause 5 of the Bill as the new Article 17A.

I will now touch on the revised entrenchment framework itself.

Clause 3 of the Bill introduces the new Articles 5A, 5B and 5C, which establish the revised two-tiered framework.

Clauses 2, 30 and 35 of the Bill introduce consequential amendments and remove the existing entrenchment framework.

The new Article 5A applies to a Bill seeking to make textual amendments to Tier 1 provisions. Tier 1 provisions are listed in Article 5A(7). These include Article 17(1) and (2), which establish the President's function as the Head of State and the principle of his custodial function, as well as other provisions establishing the Presidential office.

The entire entrenchment framework, comprising Articles 5A, 5B and 5C, is also protected under Tier 1. This is with the exception of Article 5B(9), which sets out the Tier 2 provisions and, therefore, is protected under Tier 2.

A Bill to which Article 5A applies can only be introduced in Parliament under the routes set out in Article 5A(1) and (2). First, where the President concurs with the introduction of the Bill, or the President withholds concurrence contrary to the CPA's recommendation; or second, where the Bill is supported by a simple majority at a national referendum.

Of course, the Government can submit the Bill to a referendum at any time, regardless of whether the President's concurrence has been sought.

Under Article 5A(5), regardless of how the Bill is introduced, the Bill must still subsequently be passed by a two-third Parliamentary majority.

Article 5A(6) provides that a Bill introduced under the referendum route can be amended if the Speaker takes the view that the amendment is of a minor or purely drafting character, or that it does not affect the substance of the Bill.

The new Article 5B applies to a Bill seeking to make textual amendments to Tier 2 provisions. Tier 2 provisions are listed in Article 5B(9).

The new Article 17(3), which sets out the discretionary powers relating to the President's custodial role over our Reserves and key appointments, is protected in Tier 2. Only the specific discretion-conferring provisions of the Articles listed in Article 17(3), and not the entire Articles, are protected. The Explanatory Statement in the Bill gives a clear example. Article 142 falls within Article 17(3).

However, only Article 142(1A)(a) – the discretion-conferring provision – is entrenched in Tier 2. The other provisions, for instance, Article 142(1A)(b), are not similarly entrenched.

Tier 2 includes other provisions relating to the Presidency and the Election Judge. Article 5B(9) also falls within Tier 2, as explained earlier.

There are three routes for introducing a Bill to which Article 5B applies. That is in the handout. The first two routes mirror those available under Article 5A. These are set out in Article 5B(1), (2) and (5).

The third route is set out in Article 5B(7). A Bill to which Article 5B applies may be introduced in the ordinary way like other constitutional amendment Bills. However, it can subsequently be passed only by a three-quarter Parliamentary majority.

The new Article 5C applies to a constitutional amendment Bill that circumvents or curtails any discretionary power of the President that is conferred by a Tier 2 provision. Under Article 5C(1), the President may withhold assent to such a Bill.

The Article 5C mechanism is necessary because circumvention or curtailment of powers can occur without textual amendments being made to the power-conferring provision. Let me illustrate this with an example.

The Government's spending limit depends on the expected long-term real rates of return (ELTRROR) on the "relevant assets" pool. Under Article 142(1A)(a), the President's concurrence must be obtained for the ELTRROR proposed by the Finance Minister. In this way, the President has a say over the Government's spending limit.

Assume that a Bill purports to remove certain assets from the definition of "relevant assets". Article 5B does not catch this amendment because the power-conferring provision – Article 142(1A)(a) – is not textually amended. However, the President's custodial power over the ELTRROR and the Government's spending limit is diminished by such a change. This may, therefore, amount to a circumvention or curtailment that will be caught by Article 5C.

I should emphasise that this is only a hypothetical illustration. Whether there is any circumvention or curtailment is, ultimately, a question of law on the facts of every case.

Article 5C(4) stipulates the circumstances under which the President's withholding of assent may be overruled. Where he withholds assent with CPA's support, he may be overruled if the Bill is supported by a simple majority at a referendum, or a three-quarter Parliamentary majority affirms the Bill. Where he withholds assent contrary to the CPA's recommendation, a two-third Parliamentary majority may affirm the Bill.

Under Article 5C(2), on Cabinet's advice, a Bill may be referred to a constitutional tribunal for a decision on whether Article 5C applies to it. If the tribunal rules that Article 5C does not apply to the Bill, the President will be deemed to have assented to the Bill. But if the tribunal rules that Article 5C applies, then the President has basis to withhold assent. In this situation, the same Article 5C(4) overruling mechanism applies.

In all situations under Articles 5A, 5B and 5C, where the President has refused to concur or assent, the Government must make public the President's reasons and the CPA's recommendations before it can submit the Bill to a referendum or move a resolution to affirm a Bill. This is stipulated in Articles 5A(3) and (4), 5B(3), (4) and (8), and 5C(5) and (6).

The revised entrenchment framework seeks to achieve a more workable balance between preserving the adaptability of the entrenched provisions, and preventing easy removal or amendments to the Elected Presidency. We will consider bringing the framework into force after observing how the wide-ranging amendments in this Bill operate in practice.

Mdm Speaker, before concluding, I will just mention the amendments relating to Non-Constituency Members of Parliament (NCMPs). The reasons for and the extent of these amendments have been explained by the Prime Minister in the debate on the President's Address at the Opening of Parliament earlier this year.

Clause 25 of the Bill, therefore, amends Article 39 to increase the maximum number of NCMPs from nine to 12, and to give them the same voting rights as Members of Parliament. Other amendments consequential upon these changes are made as well.

Mdm Speaker, let me draw to a conclusion. Prior to the establishment of the Elected Presidency, the system for appointing the President by this House allowed Parliament to take into account a fine balance of considerations in appointing a President to office. It allowed for consideration of qualities, such as profound learning, good character, high reputation and strong moral fibre. The ethnicity of a candidate was also important, given our multiracial composition.

The outcome was that the Presidency was appointed from among the major racial groups, providing for them to be represented in the Presidency from time to time.

The inception of the Elected Presidency in 1991 did not change the President's foremost symbolic and unifying role. However, it overlaid onto the office an additional custodial role and transformed it into an elected office.

Today, it is no longer this House that balances all the considerations when appointing a President to perform the President's unifying and symbolic role. We, therefore, need another framework to achieve and maintain this fine balance. The proposed five-term hiatus mechanism helps, where necessary, to facilitate the periodic election of members of different racial groups to the Presidency. This ensures that even though Presidents are now directly elected, they will, over time, continue to collectively embody the multiracialism that symbolises us as a people and as a country.

We must also ensure that the eligibility criteria stay updated, to maintain a measure of assurance that Presidential candidates have the necessary experience and expertise for the custodial role.

These add to our continuing efforts to improve the Elected Presidency so that the President's custodial powers are exercised in a timely manner, and with sufficient weight given to the collective advice of the CPA. This will provide stability to our system and also help to avoid gridlock in situations where the President and the Government do not agree.

Mdm Speaker, in January this year, the Prime Minister spoke of the need to ensure that our country does not get "swept off course by a transient public mood, or an erratic government". The Government needs to be able to respond to the mood, but not go too far and "capsize the boat".

I identify with this analogy at a very personal level. I devoted many years of my life serving in our Navy. In that time, I experienced navigating through both calm waters and rough seas. We learnt never to underestimate the power of the seas. We could not control the environment around us, but we sailed with confidence in the knowledge that – even in the face of a challenging environment where the unexpected might occur – we had built into our vessels various systems to maintain their stability and integrity.

One of these is to provide sufficient ballast. In rough seas, this helps to prevent the ship from pitching and rolling uncontrollably and capsizing. Yet, if there is too much ballast, the vessel's speed, agility and responsiveness will suffer.

Our nation, like a ship, needs an optimal amount of ballast – enough to keep us stable, but not so much as to render us sluggish and unresponsive to change.

Our Presidency has always served as our flag – our maritime flag – a symbol of our identity at sea. We want to make sure that the Presidency remains a symbol Singaporeans from all communities will continue to identify with.

But since 1991, it has also become an important part of our ballast system, stabilising our ship by safeguarding the two key areas – our Reserves and key appointments.

The proposed amendments seek to enhance the ability of the Presidency to play both these important roles, to help keep our people united and our country stable. Madam, I beg to move.

*Question proposed.*

Mdm Speaker, the constitutional amendment Bill that we begin debating on today needs to be seen in the context of strengthening our system and our country. From a Third-World country that suffered from a weak economy and racial strife in the 1960s to the First-World nation that we are so proud to declare as our home wherever we go today, it is our incorruptibility, meritocracy and multiracialism that saw us through.

These values would be nothing but mere words if we only expounded them in forums or paper, but it was through Singaporeans' support, continuous social improvements and conscientious system and policy design that we could truly embrace them. Therefore, any amendment must be made in the spirit of further entrenching our values of incorruptibility, meritocracy and multiracialism within Singapore, so that we can continue to ensure continued peace and progress for our nation.

When studying the amendments set out in this Bill, there are two key components that stand out to me and which I would like to talk about in this debate.

Firstly, Elected Presidency is necessary. We had introduced in 1991 an Elected Presidency with reserve powers to safeguard our Reserves. However, there have been calls to revert the Presidential system to the appointed system from the current elected one.

Some are concerned about Singapore becoming inevitably fragmented as segments of the population take sides. Some were concerned that candidates will make unrealistic but populist promises that are not provided for in the Constitution and, therefore, cast ridicule on the system. Some Members of the Opposition have even argued for an abolishment of the Elected Presidency, reverting back to the former system of Appointed Presidency, as they say that an elected President, whom they assumed as the Ruling Party's nominee, may abet in squandering away our Reserves together with the Government! But I have different views. Allow me to share.

First and foremost, and the most important, the custodial role of the President is to safeguard our Reserves should the Government of the day go rogue and, hence, the metaphor of the President as holding a "second key". And because the Government of the day is formed by the Party that had won Singaporeans' mandate, it would be almost impossible for the President to challenge the Government if the President has no electoral mandate to back him.

Our founding Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, articulated this point very clearly in 1984. He said, and I quote, "[If] President were to block the spending of any Reserve which the government in office has not itself accumulated, the newly elected Prime Minister will be furious to be thwarted. Therefore, it may be better for the President to be elected by the electorate, instead of Parliament, so that he can have the moral authority to intervene, preferably with the agreement of a Presidential Committee for the protection of Reserves."

Second, the argument that an appointed President is better than an elected President in preventing a rogue Government from squandering away Singapore's Reserves is unconvincing. Assuming Party X won the mandate and forms the government, but it turns rogue and, since it is in power, decides to reward its political allies through high value contracts without tender and when the finances go south, decides to draw on the Reserves to fill the fiscal hole. And now, let us assume the President is an appointed one – appointed by moving a Motion in Parliament by the Prime Minister, who would be from Party X. Clearly, with Party X's members forming the majority of the House, the candidate favoured by Party X will become President. Such a President is in no position, and may have no intention, to block any unwarranted draw on the Reserves.

In contrast, with an Elected Presidency system, eligible candidates who have no political leaning and truly have a heart to serve Singapore can contest against the so-called establishment candidate. Singaporeans might regret electing Party X into government, but they sure can make the right decision through an Elected President.

Third, the Presidential Election is unlike a General Election. The roles of a President, what can or cannot be done, are clearly set out in the Constitution. There should not be a contest of different political directions and values, which can be divisive. The Presidential Election will instead focus on choosing the candidate best suited to assume the custodial role and in representing Singapore.

Finally, if the candidate does not understand what can or cannot be done as a President and makes wonderful election promises that cannot be fulfilled under the Constitution, then this candidate's wisdom and abilities are in question. With the enhanced eligibility criteria, I believe the qualifying candidates will not have such an issue.

Therefore, I am supportive of having an Elected President because he or she must have the moral authority to stand against a government that has gone rogue. He or she must be able to safeguard our Reserves, which are sacrosanct to Singapore's long-term survival as an economy and as a nation.

Second, multiracialism is key to Singapore. Prior to today's debate, I was part of a panel discussion organised by Zaobao in September. During the discussion, Cultural Medallion holder Mr Han Lao Da, also known as Mr Han Yong Yuan, shared an anecdote that particularly resonated with me.

All our Singapore dollar notes, if one notices, bear the portrait of our very first President Mr Yusof Ishak. Our currency is not only used within Singapore by Singaporeans or foreign visitors; some of it also gets circulated overseas, reaching the hands of many foreign friends. The message subtly conveyed through our currency's design is the emphasis on multiracialism in Singapore.

Seventy-five percent of Singapore's population is ethnic Chinese. It is easy to mistake us as a Chinese society and this is not a figment of our imagination. In the not-so-distant past, many people in the West had either not heard of Singapore or often mistook Singapore as part of China. Even today, after years of hard work in fostering multiracialism and positioning ourselves as a multiracial society, Singapore is still nicknamed as "坡县" amongst some groups of People's Republic of China (PRC) nationals, referring us to being a county, not even a province, of China. Whether it is a term of affection or not, it is clear that Singapore, in some quarters, is seen as a Chinese society and a distant county of a larger China.

China is an old friend of Singapore. We should, and we must, continue strengthening the Sino-Singapore relationship. But perceiving Singapore as a Chinese county undermines our independence and standing as a sovereign nation.

Drawing our lens closer, look at our neighbours and one can easily observe how Singapore's population makeup is unnatural in this part of the Southeast Asia region.

That the majority of our population is ethnic Chinese is a fact. But we must make sure that our Head of State – an important national symbol – reflects our multiracialism. The imperative of doing so goes beyond fulfilling our ideal of a multiracial society, even though this is absolutely desirable. There is a need for us to assert our independence and multiracial complexion because of the geopolitical realities we face. Non-Chinese Singaporeans are not a "by the way"; we are all an integral part of Singapore.

Therefore, what if we do not have a President of a particular race for a prolonged period of time? What if it is not because the candidate of a particular race is less capable or less experienced or has less stature, but because voters simply prefer someone they feel they identify with more?

Some argued that by having a reserved election, we will be sacrificing meritocracy for multiracialism. I disagree. Both are equally important and this amendment Bill helps to ensure this. I will set out my reasons as follows.

Firstly, the eligibility criteria, which really is the first filter, will ensure that all candidates have the required competency and experience, regardless of whether it is a normal Presidential Election or a reserved one. With the amendment to the candidates' eligibility, most would agree that it is a highly stringent set of criteria. Under the updated criteria, far less than 1% of the total number of registered companies in Singapore will have shareholder equity of $500 million. At this level, I believe their CEOs would have the competence, experience, credibility and stature needed to stand as the Head of State of Singapore.

Second, prejudices are real. The IPS Study on Race and Religion in Singapore by Dr Matthew Matthews released in 2014 revealed that racial prejudice continues to be present in modern Singapore. And 62.8% of respondents think there is about the same or more racial prejudice in Singapore today compared to five years ago. Non-Chinese are four times more likely to feel racially discriminated against regarding a job or job promotion, compared to Chinese. And even though 95% of respondents feel that Singapore is important to their sense of identity, still 88.7% also feel that race is integral to their sense of identity as well. And if we really walked the ground, one would know that within certain segments of our population, there is a racial preference for President and in a specific order.

My point is that having preferences is a human tendency and, even if we studiously tried to be race-blind, race preferences can still manifest unconsciously. The person having these preferences may not even be aware of it. Therefore, if a talented individual fails to be elected because of his or her race, it would truly be very sad.

Third, the President must personify our Singaporean character and values. Before the current elected Presidential system, the convention in the appointment system had been to appoint Presidents from different races. In this amendment that we are debating today, the reserved election ensures that a particular race, defined as "community" in the Bill, will not be neglected over an extended period of time. And this applies to all races, not just the so-called minority races. Meaning, even though the Chinese form the majority of our population, but if for some reason, there is no Chinese President for five terms, the sixth term will be reserved for the Chinese. Therefore, I do not see this as a discriminatory rule, since it applies to all races. Madam, allow me to continue in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] In Singapore, the President is the Head of State and our "second key". The President represents all Singaporeans. Be it domestically or internationally, our President must have certain powers and dignity so as to personify our Singapore spirit.

At today's debate, I would like to talk about the importance of the attributes of the Presidential candidates and the importance of maintaining a multiracial society.

Firstly, the quality of the candidates must be high. Hence, it is necessary to raise the criteria. Times have changed. In the 1990s, there are less than 200 qualified companies in Singapore. Today, qualified companies based on the same criteria have increased to more than 2,000, more than 10 times as many. If we do not raise the criteria to reflect our current situation, how can we ensure that the candidates are truly capable and thus his words carry weight and will not be looked down upon?

Moreover, the candidates selected based on these more stringent criteria, whoever he or she may be, we can be assured that he or she has the capability and confidence to control the "second key" and that our Reserves will not be squandered away.

If we look at this issue from another angle, raising the qualifying criteria can avoid certain situations, say, there are several Presidential candidates and one of them does not possess the relevant experience and capability. However, he is a charismatic speaker and even promises things that he cannot possibly deliver. He managed to persuade the people and is eventually elected. After the election, we then realise that he actually does not have the relevant knowledge and cannot discharge the Presidential duties well. To make things worse, he does not possess sufficient knowledge and holds a different view from the Government, yet he insists on doing things in his own way. This will result in a gridlock. Such a situation will definitely lead to more problems than benefits. Hence, it is necessary to raise the qualifying criteria to make sure that every candidate is competent.

Secondly, to maintain a multiracial society should not only be limited to our attitudes and words and how we treat our compatriots. It must be seen to be so.

Earlier in my English speech, I talked about the sensitivity of our geographical politics. It is not difficult to see that this "little red dot" with a dominant Chinese majority is rather unnatural in this region and among our neighbours. On the other hand, some Chinese netizens refer to Singapore as "Singapore county" which seems to regard Singapore as part of China. Although some people think that this is an endearing term and shows that Singapore and China are old friends, it will inadvertently affect Singapore's international image and undermine its independence.

Multiracialism is the foundation of our country and it is the secret of our success. It cannot be taken for granted. Even though Chinese make up the majority of the population, every citizen is an integral part of the Singapore Family. Therefore, the President who represents us should exemplify the spirit of multiracialism. By having Presidents from different races from time to time will reflect our diversity and will surely benefit Singapore.

Some people are concerned that a hiatus-triggered reserve election will weaken meritocracy, an equally important founding principle. I believe that meritocracy and multiracialism are equally important and a reserved election does not mean that we have to compromise one or the other.

Firstly, to meet the more stringent qualifying criteria is the foremost criterion and the first filter. Be it normal Presidential election or reserved election, all the candidates must meet the same stringent qualifying criteria. There is no preferential treatment. They all have to prove that they have what it takes to be a President.

Secondly, when a member from any racial group has not occupied the President's Office after 30 years, namely, five continuous terms, the sixth Presidential Election will be reserved for a candidate from that racial group to ensure that all races are treated equally.

Basically, I hope that we will never have to have a reserve election. It is merely a preventive measure.

We all understand and agree that the Singapore President shoulders the responsibility to safeguard our Reserves. The President is our "second key". He or she symbolises our Singapore spirit.

As Chinese, our community accounts for three-quarters of the Singapore population. We are influential. If we sincerely believe in the value of multiracialism, we, as the majority race, should take our stand and act upon what we believe to support this Bill.

The reform of the Elected Presidency is carried out after much deliberation at the Government's end. The adjustment was made after public consultation and after the Constitutional Commission has studied this matter thoroughly. I believe that the reason behind all these efforts is because the Government hopes to enhance the mechanisms in Singapore and to lay a stronger foundation for Singapore's future.

We are all very proud of Singapore. Our "little red dot" has accomplished remarkable achievement in the international arena. Wherever we are, at any international occasion, we are able to hold our heads high. Singapore is our home. This is where our heart belongs. Here, in Singapore, neighbours come from various walks of life and have different backgrounds. We have many shared memories and experiences. We have also created countless miracles together. Hence, we must continue to work hard and forge ahead with the same nation-founding philosophy.

(In English): Madam, I support the Bill.

Mdm Speaker, I agree with the key changes to the Elected Presidency.

I agree on the need to change the qualifying criteria so that the potential candidate has the experience to deal with how our sizeable financial resources should be managed.

I also agree that given the complexity of the issues facing our Government, that the strengthened CPA and the closer working relationship in the CPA and Elected Presidency will ensure the best decisions for the sake of our nation.

Finally, the need to ensure that every community has the chance to see one of its own becoming the Elected President underscores the very nature of our multiracial society. It very specifically endorses the view that this multiracial character of our society must also be represented in the highest office of the land.

Personally, I would like to see this multiracial character of our society be a lived reality in all aspects of our society. Achieving this is an ongoing effort but which we must never let up. For now, I shall focus on how we seek to achieve this in the Elected Presidency.

Madam, one of the stated aims of the new Elected Presidency changes is to ensure that every community has a chance to see one of its own becoming the Elected President. Yet, the real challenge is to ensure minority representation in an electorate where the Chinese community dominates.

Surveys and statistics have shown how, despite all our efforts at forging a common Singaporean identity, the current reality in Singapore is that the tribal tendency remains a factor. People still tend to drift towards their own kind. These findings have caused some discomfort to some Singaporeans. I myself did not find it pleasant reading it.

It is also my sincere wish that, one day, race will no longer matter. But for now, we cannot ignore the facts and trust that the better angels of our nature will surely prevail especially on a matter as critical as the Elected Presidency.

We had recognised such tribal tendencies in some of our policies, such as the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) in public housing. When that policy was implemented in 1989, there was some unease amongst Singaporeans, including the minorities. The policy seemed heavy-handed. Yet, over the distance of time, the policy has served the national interest well by preventing ghettos in our public housing and enabling integration to take place.

I myself struggled with this policy in my younger days. But I have to recognise that we need such policies to avoid the pitfalls of other societies that have ignored the human tendency to behave in tribal ways and insisted on seeing the world as they sincerely believe it to be. These societies have suffered for it. The integration of different communities into a cohesive and united Singapore society requires deliberate policy tweaks and constant work.

We are now introducing a similar policy tweak. While being presented euphemistically as a circuit breaker in successive elections of the Elected President, it is a tweak that guarantees a chance for a person from the minority to become the Elected President. In typical Singapore fashion, if this works, we will see, over a sufficiently long time, representation from the various communities as Elected Presidents, reflecting the racial breakdown of our society.

The support for this proposed policy tweak has not been unanimous. Some argue that Singaporeans are mature enough to know whom to elect in order to maintain a harmonious society. Then there are also some who feel that such a move goes against the strain of meritocracy as they believe in, and, in fact, is really another example of doing too much in helping the minorities in Singapore. Where do ordinary Singaporeans lie in this spectrum of views?

The recent study by CNA-IPS found that, given a choice, most Singaporeans prefer someone of the same race as President. More than 80% of respondents of Malays and Indians said that they would accept a Singaporean Chinese as President. However, less than 70% of Chinese respondents found a Singaporean Malay or Indian to be acceptable as President.

Furthermore, according to a Ministry of Communications and Information (MCI) survey, when asked if they think we should have a minority as an Elected President, the vast majority, including the Chinese, agreed wholeheartedly. However, when presented with the circuit breaker option, the majority baulked. Why is this so? We can only guess. But these studies confirmed the concerns I had when this idea was first mooted.

I was concerned because it was putting the minority communities, including my community, in the spotlight again. To understand this is to put yourself in the shoes of the minority community, especially the Malays, and see it from our perspective over the 50-year trajectory of nation-building. We have frequently been in the spotlight for the last 50 years. After separation from Malaysia, there were difficult questions for all communities, and more so for the Malay community, in this new nation.

At the same time, we faced socio-economic challenges. We lagged behind in education. Higher divorce rates, higher crime rates and, more recently, Islam has been associated with the terrorism threat. The situation, of course, has been improving because of the hard work by the community and the Government's support, and we must continue to forge ahead. But it has not been all smooth sailing.

Against this backdrop, I was worried that this move, to ensure that there will be a Malay president, will be seen as the Government going out of its way to help a minority community that has lagged behind. I was worried that a Malay candidate may not be able to command the respect of all Singaporeans.

So, I will be the first to say that we must never compromise on the qualifying criteria. If we are to carry out the proposed tweak to ensure minority representation, we must do so because it is good for Singapore and Singaporeans, and not just for the minority communities, and, certainly, not for the Malay community. The candidate, minority or otherwise, must meet the same exacting requirements and, therefore, be seen to be good for all Singaporeans.

Let me also recognise that this desire to see a president from one of our own, especially for the Malays, is an emotive one. Among the older Malays, having lived under a Malay president, it is understandable that they yearn for one after a very long time. We have not had a Malay president for 46 years. Our first President, the late Mr Yusof Ishak died in office on 23 November 1970. An entire generation of Malays has grown up without ever having a Malay president. Furthermore, the younger generation has grown up with meritocracy as the basis of how our society is organised. And, hence, among younger Malays, there seem to be a bit of reluctance to have the circuit breaker. Yet, in closed door discussions, many would raise their hands in wanting to see a Malay president. But very few would say this publicly.

Some would argue that the race of the candidate should not matter; that the most important thing is whether that person can do the job and do it well. But to have a qualified Malay to do the job speaks to a long-held desire among the community to see one of us serving in the highest office in the land. It is about our place in this nation that we call home.

Malays, more so than other communities, look forward to seeing one of their own recognised for excellence and leadership. So, when Natasha Nabila topped the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) in 2007, and, in fact, broke the record for the highest PSLE scores till then, the community was overjoyed. In previous years, a Chinese student may have topped the PSLE and yet we did not see fireworks or celebrations in the Chinese community.

For me, it speaks to a personal experience. In 1968, we had our first Malay President's Scholar, Mr Mohd Ismail Ibrahim, my eldest brother. That same year, my brother's school mate from Raffles Institution, Mr Christopher Catherasoo, was also a winner of the President's Scholarship.

The celebration by both communities could not have been more stark. When we sent my brother off at the airport ‒ and this was Paya Lebar Airport ‒ my entire clan turned up and some had even camped overnight at our place. Christopher, on the other hand, was accompanied by only his immediate family. The airport was swamped by Malays! It was a moment of celebration.

The truth is that we do not have many Malays in key positions of power and leadership. Having one being a President is not just nice but timely. But this cannot, and must not, be the reason why we should have a Malay President. The Malay candidate must meet the same exacting standards as demanded of candidates from the other communities. My reason for raising these examples is for the other communities to better understand the psyche of the Malay community and the historical burden that we have carried when we have been perceived as an underachieving community.

I now come to my final point, which is about the quality of the candidates. There are two equally important roles of the Elected President – ceremonial and custodial. I fully support both roles, especially that of a unifying figure representing all Singaporeans. In this regard, it is the character of the candidate that I most worry about. After all, we have seen very successful businessmen who are also crooks. To have stayed honest is too low a bar.

How do we guarantee that that candidate will make decisions in the best interest of all Singaporeans? Indeed, what makes a good president for all Singaporeans? While we have debated much about the qualifying criteria, especially the candidates' experience in managing large organisations, equally important are the values and ethos of the candidates. Madam, allow me to continue in Malay.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mdm Speaker, I agree with the changes to the Elected Presidency.

I agree that we should change the qualifying criteria so that candidates have sufficient experience to manage the country's finances effectively.

I agree with the additional powers for the CPA considering that the issues faced by the Government are increasingly complex. Closer cooperation between the CPA and the Elected Presidency will ensure that the best decision can be made for the country.

Efforts to ensure that every ethnic community has a chance to see its community representative as an Elected Presidency, the highest role in the land, is a reality of our plural society. Personally, I would like to see Singapore's multi-racial character emphasised across the whole of society. These efforts must continue. For the moment, my focus is on how this can be achieved in the Elected Presidency system.

Mdm Speaker, as I have explained earlier, many efforts have been made to create a single Singaporean identity. But the reality is that every community has the tendency to choose its own people.

Some Singaporeans are uncomfortable with this fact, including myself. For example, when it was introduced in 1989, I was unsure of a number of Government policies, such as the EIP in public housing. However, it was successful in achieving the Government's objective of ensuring that our housing estates do not turn into ghettos where only minorities live. In fact, it gave an opportunity for people to integrate. Clearly, we need such policies so that we do not make the mistakes of countries that ignore the tendency of people to divide themselves into ethnic groups. The integration that we see today in Singapore is the result of such policies that are created intentionally. It will also require a continuous effort to ensure harmony among the different communities.

The changes proposed to the Elected Presidency will ensure the minority communities will have the chance to become an Elected President. In the long term, it will become a reflection of the plural society in Singapore.

The results of a study by CNA-IPS show that, if given the opportunity, a large majority of Singaporeans will tend to choose a candidate from their own community as President.

Meanwhile, an MCI study showed that, when asked whether Singapore needs a minority as an Elected President, the majority of respondents, including Chinese respondents, agreed. However, when asked about the review of the Elected Presidency system that will ensure minority representation, they did not agree. Why? These studies confirmed my concerns when this idea was first introduced.

I was concerned that, once again, the minorities are in the spotlight, especially the Malay community. Over the last 50 years, the Malay community has continually been in the spotlight. After Singapore separated from Malaysia, the question was raised about the position of all communities, especially the Malays, in a new Singapore. At the same time, we faced socio-economic challenges, including education, high divorce and crime rates and, recently, the threat of terrorism. This situation has changed as a result of concerted efforts by the people and with the support of the Government. The reality is that we have gone through difficult times, but we have to continue with our efforts.

With this background, I am concerned that the move to ensure Malay representation will be seen as a Government effort to help the minority group which has been left behind. I am concerned that the Malay candidate will not have the full support of other Singaporeans.

So, I firmly state that we should not change the strict criteria that was established. If the change is done to ensure a minority representation, it must be done because it is good for Singapore and all Singaporeans, and not just for the minority groups. The Elected Presidency candidate, whether it is from the minority group or not, must fulfil the qualifying criteria and he must be good for all Singaporeans.

I agree that the desire to see a President from our own community, especially among the Malays, is an emotive matter. For older members of the community who have seen a Malay President, their yearning for another Malay candidate once again after 46 years can be understood. However, for the younger generation of Malays, who have grown up in a system of meritocracy and have never had a Malay President, they seem rather reluctant to accept this review. But in closed meetings, many wish to see a Malay President. Nonetheless, not many may want to admit this fact openly.

More than other communities, the Malay community has a strong desire to see one of its own being recognised for their achievement or leadership. So, when Natasha Nabila became the top PSLE student, breaking the record for the highest aggregate score in Singapore in 2007, the whole Malay community also shared her joy. It is different when a Chinese student becomes the top PSLE student. We do not see the Chinese community going into such celebrations.

The same thing happened to my own family in 1968, when my eldest brother, Mohd Ismail Ibrahim, became the first Malay recipient of the President's Scholarship. In the same year, his classmate from Raffles Institution, Christopher Catherasoo, also won the President's Scholarship.

But the celebrations from the two communities were vastly different. When we sent my brother to Paya Lebar Airport, my whole clan went together. Some even spent the night in my house. But Christopher was only sent by his close family members. The whole airport was filled with Malays! It was a moment to be celebrated together as a community.

Ultimately, when we have a President, even if he is a Malay, the candidate must meet the established criteria. We want the candidate to be respected and to have the full support of all Singaporeans.

(In English): Mdm Speaker, we must look for good, honest, hardworking, selfless individuals who are prepared to do what is right for Singapore. To be a president is no mere job. It is a calling to serve all Singaporeans. It demands integrity, selflessness and the desire to always promote the common good. So, regardless of the candidate's race, they must all be held to the same high standards of character and values. We must never compromise on standards. We do not want, and we cannot accept, tokenism. We want a president to command the respect of all Singaporeans.

I, therefore, stand by the proposed enhancements to the Elected Presidency framework because, first and foremost, these enhancements serve to ensure that the best qualified person who reflects the values and ethos of our nation will be elected to the highest office of our land. [Applause.]