Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill

Mdm Speaker, I speak in support of this Bill. I also declare my interest as a dispute resolution lawyer in private practice.

This Bill deals with the administration of justice and includes changes to the Judiciary and the Office of the Attorney-General. Some of these amendments are to pave the way for the Singapore International Commercial Court which will be set up.

I will deal with three new appointments created by this: namely, the Deputy Attorney-General, the Senior Judge and the International Judge. The appointment of the Deputy Attorney-General is set out in the new Article 35(8) to be inserted in the Constitution. The eligibility criterion is the same as that of the Attorney-General and he is empowered to carry out any duties of the Attorney-General assigned to him. The duties of the Attorney-General are broad and include advising the Government on legal matters and acting as the Chief Prosecutor.

The size and complexities of the Singapore Government have grown along with the growth of our economy over the years. Crimes are getting more complex, too, and the size of the Attorney-General's Chambers has grown correspondingly with the duties it has to cover. In this regard, I think it makes sense to have additional senior people who may assist the Attorney-General with his duties.

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I know that there is scope for the appointment for multiple Deputy Attorney-Generals. I am interested to know how many Deputy Attorney-Generals it is envisioned that will be appointed, at least for starters, and whether each will have distinct duties. I am also interested to know whether this appointment will have any impact on the role of the Solicitor-General, who is, currently, the most senior person in the AGC after the Attorney-General.

The other interesting change is to the Judiciary: the position of Senior Judges being created to allow Judges, who have past the retirement age, to carry on sitting as Judge either for a fixed term or for a specific case. I welcome this development. Many Judges at their retirement age are still in very good health and have a wealth of experience. A good number carry on practices as highly regarded arbitrators. So, I think it would be a shame for the Judiciary to lose their expertise just because they hit the retirement age. The Senior Judges scheme allows us the ability to continue to tap on them.

The International Judge is also a new and rather unique creation. It is very unusual for a country to appoint a foreign qualified person as a Judge in its own national Courts. This provision is to support the Singapore International Commercial Court which will have the capability to hear cases governed by the laws of other countries. It makes sense to have these Judges, qualified in the relevant laws, to hear these cases.

This concept is similar to International Arbitration where a tribunal in Singapore can hear cases governed by the laws of other countries and issue an arbitration award. The SICC, in this sense, is like a hybrid between arbitration and litigation and I would expect that for any international commercial contract, parties that would otherwise have chosen litigation before the Singapore Courts can now choose the SICC instead, especially since this gives them the flexibility of having a Judge versed in foreign law.

I believe international arbitration still continues to have some advantages over the SICC, particularly in that international arbitration awards are likely to be easier to enforce under the UN conventions, whereas an SICC judgment would still be treated as a foreign judgment. However, the SICC enjoys the usual advantages of a court procedure over arbitration, with the added advantage that a suitably qualified foreign judge may be available.

One feature of these constitutional amendments that I find interesting is the idea that Judicial Commissioners, Senior Judges and International Judges may be appointed to hear specific cases under clause 8(5)(a) or to be appointed for a specified period. The idea of a judge being appointed for a specific case is quite unique and, in my view, eminently sensible. As the practice of law gets more and more specialised, there will be practitioners who have in-depth knowledge of specific areas and it would make sense for them to be tapped to hear

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important cases that arise in those areas.

This provision essentially allows flexibility to tap a wide range of experience since it permits the tapping of retired judges, international judges and potentially any other lawyer as a Judicial Commissioner. I can see the benefits of this procedure being used widely since it gives tremendous flexibility to find the person suited for a particular case. Once again, this is common in arbitration.

I am not entirely sure if the purpose of this provision is for it to be used widely on a regular basis or for it to be used exceptionally. If the intention is for it to be used widely, then it might make sense to also, perhaps at a later date, review the appointment procedure which still currently involves the President, the Prime Minister and the consultation of the Chief Justice. So, if we are going to get judges to hear specific cases, a more streamlined procedure might be helpful in the administration of justice.

Overall, I welcome these changes. Singapore's legal system is already one of the most highly regarded in the world and, because it is respected by both developed and developing countries, we are a popular jurisdiction for international contracts and for dispute resolution. I believe these changes will improve our system even further and provide additional impetus for parties to use Singapore as a commercial hub.

Thank you, Mdm Speaker. Mdm Speaker, the Workers' Party opposes the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill. The Workers' Party is uncomfortable about the appointment of short-term Senior Judges who can be re-appointed after the age of 55. The renewal of these short-term positions is contingent on whether renewal is recommended by the Prime Minister and concurred by the President. The new Article 95(2) provides that a person who is 65 years of age or older may be appointed as the Chief Justice, a Judge of Appeal or a Judge of the High Court for a specified period. The Workers' Party is of the view that this weakens a concept critical to judicial independence, namely, the security of tenure.

According to the former Chief Justice, Mr Chan Sek Keong, "The freedom to choose one's government is a hallmark of democracy" and that the "governors and the governed must respect the law and all are equal before the law. But respect for and subjection to the law can only be sustained if a neutral institution exists to ensure that the law is respected and enforced against all. That institution, in all democracies, is the judiciary", and it is "the linchpin of a democratic society and the rule of law." Critically, the former Chief Justice notes, "The ability of the judiciary to fulfil such a role is by no means automatic or assured; this is

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heavily contingent on it being an independent institution."

Mdm Speaker, these observations of the former Chief Justice appeared in a Singapore Academy of Law Journal article in 2010, titled "Securing and Maintaining the Independence of the Court in Judicial Proceedings." The former Chief Justice's thesis was that the independence of the judiciary hosted a theoretical and practical component.

The theoretical component noted that judicial independence can be secured by surrounding judges with a protective wall against pressure from political appointees, parliamentarians and pressure groups with specific agendas. This protective wall can be categorised according to what secures independence "to individual members of the judiciary and those that secure the independence of the Judiciary as an institution." According to the former Chief Justice, protection afforded by this wall gives the Judiciary the impetus to carry out its Constitutional role and gives judges unfettered freedom to adjudicate disputes without fear or favour and according to law.

What are the components of this protective wall for individual judges? They include lifelong security of tenure and remuneration, immunity from civil suits, adequate remuneration and pension rights.

What are the components of this wall for the judiciary as an institution? They include a fair process for judicial appointment, adequate funding and support for the Judiciary and respect and support for the Judiciary in general.

Mdm Speaker, the Workers' Party is of the firm belief that this amendment to the Constitution offers the Government an opportunity to strengthen and reinforce the protective wall around the Judiciary to carry out its Constitutional role.

In accordance with our manifesto, the Workers' Party is of the view that the Constitution should be amended to extend the retirement age of Supreme Court Judges from 65 to 70 years, with no prospect of extension by the Government thereafter. While extensions and short-term appointments are administratively convenient, it is the Workers' Party view that they weaken the protective wall that upholds judicial independence.

Under the existing regime, which this Bill re-enacts, it is conceivable that a Judge past the retirement age may be retained by the Government because his or her judgments are "safe" ones and are acceptable to the Government, even as the Judiciary remains a separate Organ of State. While I am not suggesting that this has occurred, such judgments may well be read as a signal by other judges who have not reached their retirement age as a factor that may determine the prospects for future judicial employment past the statutory

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retirement age or for a permanent appointment, in the case of Judicial Commissioners. Such a prospect could threaten to breach the protective wall upholding judicial independence and confidence in the Judiciary.

It is apposite to note, as the former Chief Justice did in his article, that there was also a practical component to judicial independence – namely, that each Judge must believe in and maintain the integrity that the judicial office requires of him or her and that no protective wall can maintain judicial independence should judges be unwilling or unable to exercise personal independence in discharging their duties and functions.

Mdm Speaker, we have a first-class Judiciary. There is no reason to doubt the integrity of our Judges. However, judicial independence as an institution may well take centre-stage and remain in the spotlight in the years to come as our polity becomes more plural and as our citizens turn to the court to adjudicate or clarify disputes covering administrative action and social norms. Before that happens, the Government would be well placed to institutionally strengthen the protective wall of judicial independence so that confidence in the Judiciary remains high. Relooking at the concept of security of tenure for Judges is a good place to start.

In fact, there are some signs that the Government is working to buttress the concept of judicial independence already. In the Prime Minister's speech to Legal Service Officers (LSOs) on 20 March 2014, it was announced that a separate track would be created for LSOs. While the structure of the Legal Service remains an integrated one – hence, retaining room for improvement – this change is nonetheless an improvement from the current situation where legal officers rotate between appointments in the State Courts as Magistrates and District Judges, and as Deputy Public Prosecutors in the Attorney-General's Chambers, heightening the prospects of a conflict of interest and a potential lack of judicial independence.

The creation of a separate judicial service at the State Court level is a better measure to guard against members of the Executive from influencing the career and advancement of Judges at the State Courts, since the judicial officers' career track will now be assessed by the Judicial Branch Personnel Board and not the Legal Branch Personnel Board. In effect, what this change, as announced by the Prime Minister, does is to play some small, but not imperceptible, part in strengthening the protective wall of judicial independence. Even if this may not be the stated intention of the Government, it ought to operate as such.

Mdm Speaker, this amendment to the Constitution would have been a good opportunity for the Government to address judicial independence with an acute focus on the future of the Judiciary in Singapore. To make it better and to reinforce that protective wall. Along with the prospective introduction of a judicial service at the State Courts, it would also have been an opportunity for the Government to address judicial independence globally,

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across the courts in Singapore.

On the other changes proposed by the Bill, the Workers' Party does not object to the setting up of an International Commercial Court and the creation of the post of an International Judge as it is not envisaged to have direct ramifications on areas of sovereign domestic law which remains the domain of local judges and because it has the potential of making Singapore a key centre for legal work in Asia.

I have a clarification for the Minister about the Government's thinking behind the possible appointment of multiple Deputy Attorneys-General. The AGC already accommodates for the appointment of a Solicitor-General and a Second Solicitor-General. What additional work is the new Deputy Attorney-General or Deputy Attorneys-General anticipated to take on? Could not taxpayer money have been better utilised to strengthen the middle ranks of the Attorney-General's Chambers if a heavier workload is the reason for the creation of the office of one or more Deputy Attorneys-General?

Finally, I seek clarification from the Minister about the replacement of pensions with gratuities for Judges, members of the Public Service Commission, the Auditor-General and the Attorney-General, going forward.

Mdm Speaker, in 2012, when parliamentary pensions were abolished, Deputy Prime Minister Teo said that "the removal of pensions will further strengthen the principle of a clean wage and align the retirement scheme of office-holders and Members of Parliament to the Central Provident Fund system." There was no replacement of parliamentary pensions with any gratuity and rightfully so. Indeed, the concept of a clean wage goes hand-in-hand with good governance and transparency.

Furthermore, in reply to a Parliamentary Question in April 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Teo stated that for judicial and statutory appointment holders, the proposed gratuity plan is essentially of the same value as the pension and is taken into account in the overall salary levels when carrying out salary comparisons. It would, therefore, appear that there is a lack of consistency in the Government's approach towards the concept of a clean wage, if, indeed, a gratuity is seen to replace a pension.

In principle, because of the competitive salaries already received by civil servants, I seek the Minister's clarification about the current rationale behind paying certain civil servants a gratuity and why it would it not have been just simpler and more consistent to have a clean wage. Mdm Speaker, I oppose the Bill.

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Mdm Speaker, the Constitution is the supreme law of our country. It contains various provisions delineating the powers and functions of the various Organs of State, including the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The provisions of the Constitution may only be amended by the votes of two-thirds of the total number of elected Members of Parliament. Hence, any amendments to the Constitution should be scrutinised carefully to ensure that such amendments are, indeed, necessary and

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required.

Looking at the Bill before the House today, I would like to seek the following clarifications from the Minister.

The Attorney-General's Chambers recently announced some organisational changes to its own internal structure. There are now three divisions with different senior AGC officers appointed to helm the divisions. We have the Financial and Technology Crime Division, the Criminal Justice Division and the Legislation Division. In addition, we have, currently, the Solicitor-General, Mr Lionel Yee, who is a former Judicial Commissioner.

If the AGC is able to organise itself internally, why is there a need to have the appointment of Deputy Attorney-General institutionalised into the Constitution? I recognise the Bill states the intent for the Deputy Attorney-General to perform such duties of the Attorney-General as may be assigned to him or her by the Attorney-General. But is there really a need for such an office to be specifically provided for and protected under the Constitution? Surely, the Attorney-General can appoint a Deputy Attorney-General within the ambit of the office of the AGC without the need to amend the Constitution. Perhaps, the Minister can clarify on the role of the Solicitor-General as well.

Next, it is a fundamental principle of the Constitution that the Judiciary is independent so that the Government will not be able to influence any decision of the Judiciary.

Clause 8 of the Bill amends Article 95 of the Constitution to provide for the appointment of a Judicial Commissioner, a Senior Judge and an International Judge of the Supreme Court. Article 95(5) provides that the Judicial Commissioner, a Senior Judge or an International Judge of the Supreme Court may be appointed for a specified period only.

I would like to seek the assurance of the Minister as to the intent of such a provision. We should not depart from the fundamental principle that Judges should have security of tenure so that they can exercise their judicial independence without fear that their tenure of office will be affected. I acknowledge that in the appointment of a Senior Judge, the Prime Minister must consult the Chief Justice who will give his input as to the appointment. I also recognise that a Senior Judge is expected to be a person who had ceased to be a Judge of the Supreme Court. So, perhaps, the Minister could clarify as to the intent of the limited term of appointment.

Finally, may I ask the Minister whether the usual qualifications of a Judge under Article 96 of the Constitution would apply to the appointment of an International Judge of the Supreme Court? Whilst I applaud the intent of MinLaw to promote Singapore as a leading

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venue for dispute resolution, I certainly hope that we will allow sufficient opportunity for our local senior lawyers, Senior Counsels, retired Judges to be also considered for appointment as an International Judge of the Supreme Court. We should be mindful about appointing foreign senior lawyers as International Judges of the Supreme Court without giving proper consideration as to whether any of our own local lawyers or retired Judges would be suitable.

Perhaps Minister can also share some details as to what class of cases is likely to be heard and determined by such International Judges of the Supreme Court. I will speak more about the gratuity payable to judicial officers at the Second Reading of the Judges' Remuneration (Amendment) Bill. Subject to the above clarifications, I support the proposed amendments to the Constitution.

Mdm Speaker, thank you for allowing me to join in the debate. This Bill seeks, among other things, to create the office of Senior Judges and International Judges for our Supreme Court.

The backdrop for these changes is the innovative introduction of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC). This is going to be a new division of the Supreme Court designed to hear international cases, that is, disputes with little or no connection to Singapore other than the parties choosing to litigate here. If the SICC succeeds in its goal to attract international court based disputes, this will cement Singapore's position as a paramount centre for dispute resolution in nature; in the same way that London is the pre-eminent centre in Europe. It will build on the success of our Singapore International Arbitration Centre and enhance the choices available to parties who have disputes to resolve. They can choose litigation, arbitration or even mediation, all in a neutral, modern and cosmopolitan setting, which is designed to make international entities feel they can get justice in Singapore.

The last point is vital. International users feel that they will get fair and equal treatment in Singapore even if they have no connections here. It is thus important that we do not overlook the "I" in SICC, which stands for international. Users must feel that this is an international court situated in Singapore, rather than a domestic forum with limited understanding of transnational issues. To that end, the Judges who hear these cases must not exclusively be Singaporeans, notwithstanding the deservedly high reputation of our Singapore Judges. It will assure the Singapore community and the international community if well-known jurists from other countries sit on occasion to hear such cases, as the SICC will benefit from the experience and knowledge of cases with international features. It will also send a strong signal that SICC is truly an international forum for the parties to litigate here

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and the foreign counsels who argue their cases here and the foreign Judges who hear these arguments, together with our Singapore Judges.

It is thus a necessary and welcome step to permit the appointment of suitable persons who, in the words of the Bill, have the necessary qualifications, experience and professional standing to be International Judges. But can I ask the Minister to clarify these rather general criteria or, at least, specify the sort of qualifications and experience being looked for? Otherwise, it does seem a very wide brief to be given to the Chief Justice to recommend candidates for International Judges.

The appointment of International Judges will be for specific cases for specified periods, so there is little danger of creating a surfeit of Judges. On the contrary, the increased workload of the Supreme Court, if it starts to hear more international cases, will put a strain on our judicial resources. This is where the appointment of retired Judges as Senior Judges again or specific cases for specified periods will help to plug the gap. Our Judges have judicial tenure up to age 65, but many of them still have the energy and commitment to contribute to the legal landscape. It would be a great pity to lose the benefit of their collective wisdom and experience. The appointment of Senior Judges on an ad hoc basis is thus an efficient manner in which we tap on the qualities of our retired Judges.

It thus puzzles me to hear opposition from the Workers' Party to these changes, to argue that this weakens one of the pillars of the rule of law by undermining the security of tenure of Judges. We currently have security of tenure of Judges up to age 65. This Bill does not to seek to change that. In many countries which do have security of tenure, there are mandatory retirement ages. For instance, in the United Kingdom, there is a retirement age of 70. In United States, there is life-long tenure for Supreme Court Judges, but this has been criticised by many commentators as, in a sense, giving a Judge a licence to go on for longer than his shelf life. Currently, we do have the provision to extend Judges who reach the age of 65. One example is the ex-Chief Justice, whose sage words Mr Pritam Singh quoted. So, I fail to understand how appointing retired Judges for specific cases for specified periods in some way undermines the protective wall around the independence of our Judiciary.

Ms Sylvia Lim also thought that appointing Judges for short terms might have them worrying about being reappointed. But the Senior Judges we are talking about are retired High Court Judges. They are not short-term Judges. They have already been selected and appointed as High Court Judges and served a full career as a High Court Judge, with security of tenure up to age 65. To be able to tap on them, either for a specific period or specific cases, to me, is a cost-efficient way to be able to address shortages in judicial resources when the caseload of the High Court gets too heavy, and to be able to tap on their collective wisdom and qualities for specific cases. I do not see in that any danger that they will suddenly

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become short-term in their thinking and this somehow undermines their independence.

So, far from breaching the protective wall around the independence of the Judiciary, I see these changes as strengthening our Judiciary and, thus, upholding the rule of law. Mdm Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mdm Speaker, I thank the Members for supporting the Constitution Bill and will address the concerns that they have raised.

Mr Vikram Nair raised a query as to how many Deputy Attorneys-General will be appointed, at least at the start, and how this appointment impacts on the role of the Solicitor-General.

On the question as to how many DAGs will be appointed and what their duties will be, our intention is to largely leave this to the Attorney-General to determine according to the organisational needs of the Attorney-General's Chambers. At the beginning, we think there will be one.

How does the DAG interact vis-a-vis the Solicitor-General? The Solicitor-General will be the Permanent Secretary-equivalent for the Attorney-General's Chambers.

I thank Mr Nair for his suggestion that the appointment process for Judicial Commissioners, International Judges and Senior Judges could be made simpler. We will consider his suggestion. But this is what we think works now.

Let me now turn to Mr Lim Biow Chuan's comments. Mr Lim noted that the internal organisational changes in the Attorney-General's Chambers were made public recently and queried the need to make amendments to the Constitution to appoint the Deputy Attorney-General. The internal organisational changes are meant to streamline the internal processes. The amendments to the Constitution are required because the Deputy Attorney-General will enjoy the same security of tenure as the Attorney-General.

Mr Lim also made some comments in respect of the independence of Judges. I will take those comments when I deal with Ms Lim's and Mr Pritam Singh's comments.

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I welcome Mr Alvin Yeo's points. As regards the discretion that is given to the Chief Justice on International Judges, the intention is that we want the Bench to be of an outstanding quality. It is difficult to prescribe, through legislation, who they are or where they will be from. But there are a number of checks and balances. It has ultimately got to be on the advice of the Prime Minister and agreed to by the President. And our intention is that this will be a Bench that will attract international work. If you do not appoint people of that quality, you simply would not get work. So, I think we have to look at how the process goes, but I take the point.

Moving to the points made by Ms Lim and Mr Singh, in a sense, their speeches relate to amendments which are not being made. It is not so much that they oppose the amendments that are being made. They are saying that this is an opportunity, since we are amending the Constitution, why do we not change parts to make sure that there is no possibility of appointing Judges or Judicial Commissioners for the short term. I take it that, specifically, and I heard them say that for the SICC and the related amendments, there are no objections. The objections are in relation to the appointment of Judicial Commissioners and Senior Judges, which is, in fact, a continuation of the existing practice, except that we are introducing the category of Senior Judges.

Now, let me take that at two levels. The first is the broader philosophical issue. Of course, security of tenure is important, and that relates to independence. We now guarantee Puisne Judges up to the age of 65. Should we make it absolute to age 70 or such other age and should we not make the practical adjustments that we have made in respect of having appointments like that of the Judicial Commissioners?

In an ideal world, that, I think, is an approach that should be considered and, fundamentally, we do not disagree. But the point is, you have to take the profession as you find it and then you have to try and fit the rules as best you can. If you are too theoretical or too dogmatic about this, in the end, you will not have the Judiciary that we have had with the outstanding reputation that it has. It has that reputation. It is highly ranked by the World Bank and other such institutions precisely because of the approach we have taken.

What is the balance between giving them security and the practicality? The practicality is that we have a small Bar, a small pool and an even smaller pool of talent of the quality to become High Court Judges and Chief Justices. If you approach a lawyer from the private sector, many of them – as Mr Lee Kuan Yew explained to this House long ago when he was dealing with Judicial Commissioners – have indicated and continue to indicate that they do not want the appointment as Puisne Judges immediately. They would rather come in as Judicial Commissioners (JCs) – take a short-term appointment, take it for three years and then decide whether they want to continue or whether they want to go back into practice.

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Some have stayed, some have gone back.

If you do not give that flexibility and if you are like some other countries where perhaps you have 100 people who can become High Court Judges, yes, then you have a wealth of talent. But if you have very few, then you need to make that adjustment and we have, therefore, provided for the appointment of JCs which has worked very well. Outstanding Judges, some of them started out as JCs – Chan Sek Keong, for example, possibly the greatest jurist of his generation, decided he would stay on and then he became the Chief Justice.

In the context of the point made by Mr Singh about independence, I do not think anyone questioned his independence, even though he was renewed for short terms after he turned 65.

I do not disagree with the fundamental point. I am just saying that those fundamental points sometimes have to be leavened with a practicality of a small Bar, which is what we have. And it is a very small talent pool. So, really, what we should be looking at is appointment of persons of the right timbre. At the end, that is your best guarantee. And judgments are public – we have a highly educated public, they can look at the judgments and decide whether the Bench is or is not of the quality that we want.

Now, the other points, and I do want to emphasise, this is not really about the amendments we are making, it is about the amendments that they wish we were making. But I will deal with it in this broad way anyway. Two other points that were made by Mr Singh is, first of all, the Deputy Attorney-General – why? I think there was a gratuitous point about taxpayer's money, the suggestion being that we are wasting taxpayer's money. Really, let us just be quite fair about this without being theatrical. Of course, the Attorney-General's Chambers is strengthening its middle sector. It has expanded substantially in the last few years. It has taken on a lot of officers.

At the same time, the Attorney-General spoke with us and said that he felt the need for someone at the Deputy Attorney-General's level. We are people who take the views of our Chief Justice and Attorney-General very seriously. How does he interact vis-a-vis the Solicitor-General? The Deputy Attorney-General will be the equivalent of a High Court Judge and that is why we are making the Constitutional amendments. He will be between the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General. And the Attorney-General needs a person of the calibre of a High Court Judge who is constitutionally protected and has his salary paid from the Consolidated Fund, to do the duties that the Attorney-General may give to him to do to help the Attorney-General manage AGC. There is a need for that, and also to deal with a substantial increase in other aspects of work, including criminal work.

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Now, as regards clean wage, there is no inconsistency at all in the position that is being taken. Deputy Prime Minister Teo said to this House that the Judges' salaries were at about the right level, as determined by the committee that was appointed. He said last year that the outcome of the PSD's review was the appointment holders are paid at about the right level in order to recruit and retain persons of high ability, integrity and commitment to hold such key appointments, which included pensions. So, pensions were computed and that was part of the package.

Salaries of Judges were delinked from salaries of political officeholders. Political officeholders do not get pensions. But Judges continue to get pensions and we have been very careful. By way of a Constitutional amendment, for example, you could have removed pensions of current Judges, but we do not want to do that.

This amendment relates to future Judges who will be appointed and we want to move them from the pension system to a gratuity system. The main difference is two-fold. One, they will not get monthly payments; and, second, there will be no post-retirement medical benefits. They will get a lump sum at the end of their tenure. And that is the way that most of the Public Service has moved.

The amounts were at the right level. The way you quantify that amount, we are trying to make sure that it is consistent with the rest of the Public Service. And this is the opportunity to make the Constitutional amendments without impacting on the current Judges because we do not want any suggestion that we are making changes to their income in a way that is detrimental to them. We are being quite careful about the way we are making this amendment. I think I have dealt with the questions that have been raised. Thank you, Madam.

I have one clarification to make and two clarifications for Minister. First, the Minister mentioned that Mr Pritam Singh and myself were speaking more on the changes which we wish the Government was making rather than the changes that it is making. But the point is that in this Bill the Government does reorganise those provisions that allowed for temporary Judges so we have to take a stand on the Bill because of this.

Second, I would like to ask Minister whether I heard him correctly that he says that as a matter of principle, he does not disagree that having Judges of short tenure actually undermines the principle of judicial independence. I would like him to clarify because that was the sense which I have got from him.

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And the second clarification for Minister is that he mentioned that we have a small Bar and the practical matter was that it may not be so easy to find people who are willing to take on the judicial appointment. But I do notice that in the current High Court Bench, for example, although many of them, if not most of them, started as JCs, quite a number of them continued on to be confirmed as Judges without taking a break at all to go back to practice. So, is it a question of just finding the people who see taking on judgeship as a vocation and are willing to go into it without thinking about practice?

I will deal with the two questions. The first is an observation which I do not think requires a response. Do I agree or did I say that, as a matter of principle, the short-term appointments undermine the principle of judicial independence? I think maybe Ms Lim and, perhaps, Mr Singh, will be the only two people in the House who might have gotten that impression. It is the very opposite of what I said.

What I was saying is that, as a matter of principle, I agree that we should try and look at giving security of tenure and, we do, for Puisne Judges, up to the age of 65. But you also make adjustments and, in the context of a small Bar, the difficulty of getting people and the need for people to come in for a short term and go off. You make your adjustments. It will not undermine judicial independence. Indeed, our Judiciary already has all these structures, and the only change that is being made here is the appointment of Senior Judges. Other than that, everything is the same. With all that existing structure of Judges after 65 being appointed for short terms, even the Chief Justice was reappointed – Chief Justice Yong Pung How and Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong had more than one short-term tenure extended a number of times. The independence of our Judiciary is something I do not think you challenge, I do not think anybody else challenges it, and we are very highly regarded and ranked. So, I believe that the current structure does not undermine the principle of judicial independence or integrity. And, indeed, we rank very highly. But I do agree also that, where possible, we should move towards greater security of tenure. So, there is a slight difference in emphasis.

As regards the third point – I am not quite sure. Can I ask Ms Lim to repeat the third point so that I can respond?

Yes. I understand. By definition, those who became Judges obviously did not go back. That is why they remained as Judges. There are those who have left. And we believe that they contributed. We believe that having such a system where they come in for a two- or three-year appointment, and then let them make the choice, and also the Chief Justice sometimes will recommend that they are very good lawyers but they may not have the right judicial temperament. So, that has allowed us to have the flexibility, without really, I think, anyone questioning their independence or integrity. Therefore, we have not sought to change that system.

And up to now, I can tell Ms Lim that when practitioners are approached, often, their preference is to come in as Judicial Commissioners, and then decide. They often say to us, "We do not know whether this is something that we can do." It is not a question of aptitude. It is not a question of wanting to contribute. It is not a question of taking a salary cut. Even when they are prepared to do all that, they do not know whether they would be cut out for it. It is a very harsh isolated life and it is very hard work. So, combine the two, some people have told us they would prefer to go back. So, I think it has worked well. With the touchstone that, as far as possible, as our Bar increases in size, in depth, in quality, we should try and move towards greater rather than lesser security. With that caveat, I think, at this point in time, these changes would greatly enhance the reputation of our Judiciary. Thank you.