Debated in Parliament on 4 Aug 2014.
Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong asked the Minister for Transport (a) whether measures are taken to ensure that Singapore Airlines (SIA) would avoid flying over zones of conflict; and (b) whether any SIA flight was using the flight route over Ukraine where MH17 was shot down on the day the incident happened on 17 July 2014.
Assoc Prof Tan Kheng Boon Eugene asked the Minister for Transport (a) whether SIA had been flying over Ukraine until the MH17 incident on 17 July 2014; (b) if so, which SIA flights had flight paths that used Ukrainian air space, and why SIA was flying over eastern Ukraine given Ukraine's heightened conflict with Russia and that Ukraine had closed its airspace between ground level and 32,000 feet; and (c) whether the Ministry exercises oversight over Singaporean airlines as to their flight paths, especially over or near zones of armed conflict.
Mr Yee Jenn Jong asked the Minister for Transport (a) whether any Singapore-owned airlines have flights over conflict zones; and (b) whether the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) has a process to constantly review and advise the re-routing of flights to avoid flying over such zones, even if such flights are permitted by international civil aviation authorities.
Mrs Lina Chiam asked the Minister for Transport whether any SIA planes crossed over the war zone in eastern Ukraine en route to Singapore at about the same time when MH17 was shot down.
Ms Tan Su Shan asked the Minister for Transport whether the Ministry will take any new precautionary measures to ensure the safety of passengers flying in and out of Singapore, especially on routes flying over areas of conflict following the recent downing of MH17.
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Mr Nicholas Fang asked the Minister for Transport what are the regulations governing Singapore flag carriers when it comes to the use of flight routes over war zones around the world.
Mdm Speaker, with your permission, I would like to take Question Nos 10 to 15 together, please.
Yes, please.
Let me first start off by expressing my deepest condolences to the families of those who were on board flight MH17. Indeed, we all know and agree that this was a terrible tragedy.
Let me now move on to address the queries raised by Members. They are related to how Singapore carriers plan their flight routes, whether they flew over the same airspace in Ukraine as MH17 and how the Government exercises oversight over Singapore carriers in their flight planning.
Let me start off by providing an explanation on the management of airspace. Under today's international civil aviation system, states are responsible for the oversight and management of the airspace for which they are providing air traffic services. From time to time, a state providing air traffic services may restrict or prohibit aircraft from flying over certain parts of that airspace. These restrictions may be imposed for various reasons, including military requirements and meteorological events, such as the presence of volcanic ash or adverse weather conditions. All these restrictions must be publicly communicated to airlines, other states and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as soon as possible.
Ukrainian airspace lies on the major air routes between Europe and Asia. In particular, it lies on the most optimal route for aircraft travelling between Europe and the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. At the time of the incident, it was, therefore, being regularly and heavily utilised by many airlines. These include, for example, Qatar Airways, Emirates, Etihad, Air India, Finnair, KLM, Lufthansa, Virgin Atlantic, Swiss Air, Thai Airways, as well as SIA. On the other hand, airlines plying routes between Europe and North Asia typically do not need to use Ukrainian airspace as it does not lie on the most optimal route between those two regions.
The airspace over Ukraine is divided into several Flight Information Regions, or what is known more commonly as FIRs. One such FIR is the Simferopol FIR over Crimea. In April this year, ICAO issued an advisory for airlines to avoid the Simferopol FIR airspace, due to a
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potentially unsafe situation with both the Ukrainian and the Russian authorities claiming to be controlling that airspace. There were similar advisories issued by the US, Ukrainian and European authorities for the Simferopol FIR.
MH17 was downed in a different FIR, the Dnipropetrovsk FIR in eastern Ukraine. I think it is easier to refer it to the eastern Ukraine FIR from now on. In technical terms, it is the Dnipropetrovsk FIR.
The Ukrainian authorities on 1 July 2014 issued a prohibition for commercial flights from ground level to 26,000 feet in this particular FIR in the eastern Ukrainian region. On 14 July 2014, almost two weeks later, this prohibition was extended to 32,000 feet. No reason was given by the Ukrainian authorities and they continued to allow commercial flights in this airspace above 32,000 feet.
The Ukrainian authority is in the best position to assess the threat to commercial flights over its airspace. Indeed, under international law, Ukraine is responsible for putting in place measures to ensure the safe passage of civilian aircraft. Since the Ukrainian authorities continued to allow commercial flights in Dnipropetrovsk FIR above 32,000 feet, no other national authorities, no regional aviation bodies, nor ICAO, had provided any advisories to avoid that part of the Ukrainian airspace.
The responsibility for flight planning lies with airlines, which are required to take into account all necessary information to ensure the safe conduct of their flights. Such information includes airspace restrictions or prohibitions, weather conditions, safety and security considerations and advisories from international and regional bodies.
Singapore carriers, such as SIA, utilise sophisticated computer-based flight planning systems to help in their flight planning. They also continuously conduct risk assessments on their flight routes. Experienced and trained specialists evaluate the integrity of the flight plans and make adjustments based on real-time information. They take into consideration advisories from national authorities and international aviation bodies, as well as information shared by partner airlines and the wider airline industry. The decision is then made by the carrier on whether to impose limitations on its flights through a particular airspace, even if the national authority managing that airspace may not have issued any advisories. Throughout this process, the safety of the passengers and crew is paramount.
I should highlight that SIA, as part of its safety assessment process, had proactively avoided overflying certain conflict areas even if the airways were available for use. For example, in early March 2014, weeks before ICAO and other authorities issued advisories on the Simferopol FIR that was closed in April, SIA had in early March already made its own
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safety assessment and adjusted its flight routings to avoid the airspace above Crimea. In addition, for several years now, SIA has proactively avoided flying over certain conflict areas in the Middle East, even though the airways there have been available for commercial flights and even though various other carriers continue to use them. I believe that Singapore carriers will always put safety first and will not compromise on the lives of passengers and crew.
With regard to the airspace in which MH17 was flying, SIA had relied on the information available and kept its flights clear of the restricted heights. However, as there were no restrictions for flights above 32,000 feet or any information suggesting threats to aircraft at those heights, SIA, like many other airlines plying between Europe and Asia, had continued to use that airspace. At the time of the downing of MH17, flight SQ351 from Copenhagen was estimated to be approximately 90 km away. As soon as SIA received news of the incident, they immediately re-routed all their flights to avoid Ukrainian airspace entirely.
Since the incident, many have expressed concern over the safety of flights overflying conflict areas. I wish to assure the House that safety is and remains of paramount importance for civil aviation in Singapore.
The international community, led by ICAO, is urgently reviewing the issues and potential responses to be pursued with respect to civilian aircraft operating to, from and over conflict areas. We will participate actively in these efforts to make air travel safer and more secure.
Moreover, as the regulatory authority, CAAS requires Singapore carriers to put in place a robust flight planning process to ensure the safe operations of flights. The CAAS does this through the Singapore Air Operator Certificate Requirements it issues, which requires Singapore carriers to take into account all necessary information for the safe conduct of their flights. In addition, CAAS also requires Singapore carriers to have in place the appropriate organisation structure, processes and systems. Audits and checks on compliance with such procedural and organisational requirements are conducted regularly. Furthermore, CAAS will promptly update Singapore carriers with safety or security information issued by relevant national and international aviation authorities. When necessary, CAAS may provide additional guidance to Singapore carriers.
Following the MH17 incident, CAAS has requested Singapore carriers to review their risk assessment of flight operations over conflict areas.
Let me conclude. International civil aviation requires an aircraft to traverse multiple countries and no single authority would be able to provide all the information on the situation outside its jurisdiction. Countries need to rely on one another and need to work
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together in order to ensure the continued safety of civil aviation. CAAS is looking into measures to enhance the sharing of safety and security information among national aviation authorities and airlines. Airlines can then plan their flight routes and assess the risks involved, more robustly.
The downing of flight MH17 is a horrible tragedy and we hope that it would never happen again. As a nation, we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our neighbours and we express our deepest sympathies to the families of all the victims.
Ms Irene Ng.
Thank you, Madam. Our thoughts go out to the families of the victims of MH17. I think we should learn the lessons from this tragedy as it highlights the vulnerability of carriers flying over conflict zones, especially those with sophisticated weaponry.
Can I ask the Minister, according to the flight tracking website, Flightradar24.com, SIA is one of the most frequent operators flying over the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine. It flew 75 times in a week before MH17 was shot down, in contrast to 48 times by Malaysia Airlines. Would the Minister agree that SIA should have tightened its own risk assessment earlier and adopt a stricter protocol on flying over conflict zones, given that several airlines, such as British Airlines, Korean Air, Qantas and China Airlines had all re-routed flights from as early as March when Russian troops invaded Crimea?
I understand the Minister's point that the authorities have to take the signals and the advisories from the national authority overseeing the conflict areas. But can I ask the Minister whether it is possible for our Singapore aviation authorities to improve their intelligence on the ground, so that they can assess the safety of the conflict zones and avoid those where there are potential hazards?
Mdm Speaker, I thank the Member for her supplementary questions. Indeed, SIA is one of the more frequent users of the airspace over eastern Ukraine, more so than Malaysia Airlines, mainly, in part, because we have so many flights to and from Europe.
On whether we should have followed the example of Qantas, Korean Airlines, British Airways and so on in avoiding this area, I think for Korea to Europe, the most natural and optimal flight route actually does not require them to fly over the Ukrainian airspace. They are in a different geographical part of Asia and it is mainly the Southeast Asian, South Asian, Middle Eastern countries that are on the most direct route between Europe and these areas
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that would require overflight of eastern Ukraine.
For Qantas, they have a stopover in Dubai enroute to London, which I believe it is probably the only area in Europe that they fly to now using Qantas Airlines. And that flight path, again, does not require them to overfly the eastern part of Ukraine, whereas the partner airline, Emirates, which they have a code-share with, actually flies over eastern Ukraine, whether it is to parts of Europe or to New York on their flights. British Airways, indeed, avoided Ukrainian airspace for their flights to our part of the world, but British Airways has also decided and, very recently, affirmed their decision that they will continue to fly over Iraq, which is an airspace that many airlines have decided not to fly over.
There is no one example that we can follow. Each airline would have to make its own best judgement, taking all factors into consideration.
On improving intelligence on the ground, we will try our best, but our airlines operate to many parts of the world and there are conflicts in many parts of the world as well. We will try and improve on this, but it is not so easy or always possible to have direct and accurate intelligence with all that we can do.
Madam, national civil aviation authorities have every incentive to keep their airspaces open because they earn overflight fees. In this case, when you look at the Ukrainian national authority, there were tell-tale signs that things were not right. I find it incongruent that the airspace could be opened beyond 32,000 feet but not below 32,000 feet. I think that is a tell-take sign. And prior to that, the downing of MH17, in June and July, there were at least four incidents in which aircraft were shot down over part of this airspace in Ukraine. If this information is not enough to persuade SIA and CAAS that it would be risky to fly across eastern Ukraine, then I do not know what is.
It is important to recognise that even though other airlines may fly over this airspace, we should not take the view that what is good enough for them is also good enough for SIA. We need to recognise that there is no single global authority that is responsible for keeping the skies safe. Ultimately, it is down to each individual airline and the national civil aviation authorities.
Mdm Speaker, I thank the Member for his supplementary question. On the incentives for national authorities, I think it may be a bit too presumptuous to harbour the belief that they are motivated only by commercial considerations because of the money they collect from overflight of aircraft. I do believe that many, if not most of all, are concerned over safety of civilian aircraft. And, certainly, if they were to take a longer
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term look at things, any time a serious incident of this nature happens, everybody avoids the airspace thereafter, and in the longer term, it does them no good.
On whether given what we now know about what happened in eastern Ukraine, why CAAS and SIA did not take more stringent measures – much, much more stringent than what other airlines were doing – I guess it goes to show that 20-20 hindsight is more prescient in those who operate from the side lines. And we just have to make sure that we take these factors into consideration, we look at what other airlines are doing, we look at what other regional authorities and the warnings that they are issuing and we take all that into consideration. Let us not forget that when the Simferopol airspace was closed, ICAO, FAA, the European authorities came up very quickly and all of them made recommendations, advisories or prohibitions on the use of that space.
SIA had already decided some weeks before that, because of the confusion over who was really in charge of the airspace, that it was better for them to avoid Simferopol FIR. Even after the Ukrainian transport aircraft was downed, three days before 17 July, the only advisory that came up was from the Ukrainian authorities. No other national body, no other regional grouping, actually came up to express an advisory or to prohibit the use of the space. Indeed, as I mentioned, there were also other airlines that were using it, including airlines from the US, Europe, Asia and so on.
So, we will have to make our own best decisions for ourselves because if you are to avoid every area with conflict, I think it would be very difficult for us to continue flying to many parts of the world.
Madam, I join the Minister in offering condolences to the families who had lost their loved ones. I would like to ask the Minister what sort of internal expertise is there within CAAS to evaluate flight risks and to gather intelligence and whether there are plans to strengthen this particular department.
The next supplementary question is whether there are other Singapore Government agencies that are proactively evaluating risks over conflict zones and sharing this information actively with CAAS.
CAAS draws from a variety of different sources, most of all from its interactions with other national bodies, as well as regional groupings. Airlines, too, would rely not only on the advisories given but on the exchange of information with other fellow airlines on what they are doing, what they are avoiding, what they are continuing to fly over. Overall, I think we probably have better insights into what is happening in our part of the world. So, nearer home, I think we watch it and we know it best. Further away, I think you
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will have to rely on bodies that are closer in geography to those parts of the world and exchange views and information with them. But as we have known from recent issues released from ICAO, they are looking urgently at setting up a senior task force to look at how the process around the world can be strengthened.
I thank the Minister for his very good answers. I have two supplementary questions. This is pertaining to pilots. Have any pilots or airline personnel made known their reservations to CAAS about flying over the war zone in Ukraine? Secondly, what is the alternative route now for SIA flights to fly to Europe?
I am not aware of any pilots who have made known their concerns flying over war zones. It is not being brought to my attention. What happens now is that for flights to and from Europe, SIA and indeed almost all airlines, have avoided flying over Ukrainian airspace completely. What it means is that this requires approximately a 30-minute deviation from the most optimal flight route. So, depending on which part of Europe SIA flies to, they may choose to fly to the north of Ukraine or south of Sevastopol, over the lower southern part of the Black Sea, in order to reach their designation. But it involves approximately a 30-minute deviation from the most optimal flight path.
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