Debated in Parliament on 7 Jul 2014.
Mdm Speaker, thank you for allowing me to make this statement. May I have your permission to display the slides which I will refer to during my statement?
Yes, please. [Slides were shown to hon Members.]
Thank you, Mdm Speaker. On 8 December 2013, a riot took place following a fatal road traffic accident along Race Course Road in Little India. The riot was the worst public order disturbance in Singapore in more than four decades.
On 13 December, I appointed a Committee of Inquiry (COI) chaired by former Supreme Court Judge G Pannir Selvam with three other members. The COI's Terms of Reference are shown on the screen.
Over the past six months, the Committee examined testimonies from 323 witnesses. It offered to interview all 57 foreign workers who were to be repatriated, and interviewed the 20 who accepted the offer. The Committee visited the scene of the riot, foreign worker dormitories and other places where foreign workers congregate during their days off work. It also conducted open hearings lasting 24 days and heard testimonies from 93 witnesses.
The COI submitted its report to me on 27 June. The report was made public on 30 June and my Ministry also sent the report to Members of this House via e-mail on the same day. The COI report describes what happened that night and analyses factors that contributed to the riot. It also makes several important recommendations and observations to improve the management of such incidents and to reduce the risk of such incidents recurring.
I would like to put on record my appreciation of the Committee's hard work in undertaking an open, searching, thorough and comprehensive Inquiry. I also thank the team of investigators, legal officers and civil servants that supported the COI, as well as witnesses who gave evidence at the inquiry.
Let me first summarise the COI's key findings before providing the Government's response to the COI's recommendations.
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The COI found that the riot was triggered by a fatal road traffic accident and that the victim's own actions were primarily responsible for the accident. The victim was intoxicated, had lost his balance and had fallen under the bus while running in the bus driver's blind spot. At the time of the accident, the time-keeper was neither on the bus nor near it.
The COI concluded that the primary or triggering cause of the riot was the occurrence of this fatal accident. However, a confluence of other factors fuelled its subsequent escalation.
First, the COI attributed the escalation of the riot to the crowd's misperception that the accident was caused by the bus driver and the time-keeper. The crowd also misperceived the actions of the first responders from Police and SCDF, whom the crowd saw as protecting the bus driver and the time-keeper instead of arresting them.
Second, the COI's view is that some of the workers at the scene that night could have carried a "cultural psychology" of "retributive justice" that spurred them to take the law into their own hands.
Finally, the COI assessed that alcohol was a major contributory factor to the nature and escalation of the riot.
The COI had also carefully examined other possible causes of the riot. Based on the evidence gathered, the COI concluded that the riot was not a result of dissatisfaction among foreign workers with their employment and living conditions in Singapore. Nor was the riot premeditated or planned. It was also not related to ethnic or any endemic form of discrimination.
The COI pointed out that while the riot was a shock to many Singaporeans, it was not as severe as many others that had happened in other parts of the world. There was no loss of life, no prolonged fighting between Police and the rioters, and it was dispersed relatively quickly. The riot remained contained in a small area. Arson of private property and looting did not occur. No shots were fired by the Police, and neither tear gas nor water cannon was used on the rioters.
The COI thus concluded that the overall outcome of the SPF response was good, but it would have been better had it not been for the overturning and burning of Police cars, ambulances and emergency vehicles.
Twenty-five people were arrested at the scene that night. More than 400 persons were called up for subsequent further investigations. Eventually, 25 persons were charged, 57
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were repatriated and 213 warned and given advisories. To update Members, of the 25 charged, 14 have been convicted and sentenced, the most recently this morning. Eight of these 14 have completed their sentences and have also been repatriated. The cases of the other 11 charged are still in progress.
On the Home Team's response that night, the COI commended the SCDF officers for performing their duties well. The officers demonstrated quick thinking and common sense in departing from standard operating procedures to adapt to the changing needs on the ground. The COI also assessed the Police's overall response to be relatively swift and efficient. In the first phase – which was the initial response and extrication of the deceased's body and the evacuation of the driver and time-keeper – the responding officers did a commendable job of handling the situation.
The COI was of the view that during the second phase, from 10.15 pm to 10.45 pm, while the ground commander felt that his best course of action was to hold his position until the arrival of the SOC, this should have been re-evaluated when the SOC was late in arriving, as the situation on the ground was changing and the response should have been adjusted accordingly.
The COI's view was that there were opportunities for Police to intervene and take decisive action during this period from 10.15 pm to 10.45 pm. The COI stated that the rioters were destroying property and pelting the officers with objects, but the COI did not agree that it was a life-threatening situation, or that the officers would have been in severe danger had they moved in to stop and arrest the rioters at that time.
The COI's analysis will be useful for Police's review of their doctrines and procedures, and provide inputs for Police's scenario-based training for dealing with public order incidents. These will help our officers and commanders hone their incident management skills. The COI arrived at its assessment based on a reconstruction of all available information collected after the riot by a team of investigators.
On the other hand, on the night of the riot itself, as commanders and officers arrived at the scene as quickly as they could, they faced a highly charged and rapidly evolving situation. They made their decisions in the heat of the action, and under time pressure, based on the information they had available. The Police Divisional Commander who assumed incident command arrived on the scene at 10.11 pm. A few minutes after that, the rioters started flipping cars over and setting them ablaze with the first at 10.28 pm. The commanders and officers that night did not have the benefit of hindsight. Their decisions and actions have thus to be evaluated in that context.
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Mdm Speaker, it is not always possible to take the analyses done after the fact and substitute them for the judgement that the commanders and officers had to make on the ground that night. We will not be able to know definitively what the outcome would be if a different course of action had been taken during this phase, given the emotional crowd which was volatile and prone to misperceptions.
Mdm Speaker, the commanders and officers that night did the best they could in the circumstances they faced, with the information they had on hand. Although there was destruction and damage to emergency vehicles, the riot was brought fully under control within two hours of the initial accident, contained within the immediate location, without loss of life or serious injury, and without the use of lethal force, including firearms. The area was re-opened to people and traffic by early the next morning, a few hours later.
Mdm Speaker, a riot on the streets of Singapore is unacceptable. We have to take preventive action to minimise the likelihood of such a riot occurring and improve our capability to deal effectively with a riot if one does occur. Anyone who takes part in a riot must know that he will be dealt with firmly in accordance with the law.
The COI made eight recommendations under two main categories – Strengthening the Home Team and Measures to Manage Congregation Areas. The COI's recommendations have provided an independent perspective of the measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of a riot and to better prepare ourselves to respond to any such incident.
The Government accepts all of the COI's recommendations. The COI's recommendations address weaknesses and areas that we have to improve on, provide validation of several of our ongoing plans which address the COI's concerns, sharpen our focus on what the priorities should be, and provide impetus for us to do more in certain areas and to implement them sooner. We have also not waited for the COI's report to act, but have implemented various improvements since the riot on 8 December, some in the days immediately following the incident. I will now address the action the Government is taking on the security-related aspects of the COI's recommendations. My colleague, the Minister for Manpower, will address the foreign manpower issues after my statement.
In making recommendations on the Home Team's response to public order incidents, the COI took into account how SPF's focus and resourcing had evolved with Singapore's security needs. From the mid-1970s, Singapore witnessed a rapid reduction in the number of public order incidents. Consequently, SPF gradually shifted its focus and resources from riot control to other priorities, such as crime prevention and community policing. In 1983, the number of riot control troops was reduced from 12 to eight, and from 63 to 46 officers
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per troop.
The SOC was established in 1992 and, after 2001 in particular, became a dual-response force for anti-terrorism, in addition to public order incidents. In 2004, the size of each SOC troop was reduced from 46 to 35 officers, but this was balanced with more intensive training and by improvements in equipment and technology.
The COI's view is that SPF's progressive shift of resources was a positive development. However, the COI's view is that, given the riot, Police must re-assess the likelihood of having to deal with large-scale public order incidents and strengthen the ability of its forces to do so.
Let me come to each of the COI's recommendations.
The COI's first recommendation is to improve Command, Control and Communications, or C3 capabilities, to help ground officers build a better picture of the ground situation, especially in rapidly changing scenarios.
This is an important area that needs to be improved. Police have an ongoing programme, started a few years ago, for a major upgrade of its C3 systems. Two key projects are now near completion and ready to be commissioned this year. A new Combined Operations Room will be ready in end 2014. It will be equipped with tools to track the deployment of Police resources, as well as dashboards and information management systems for improved awareness of the ground situation.
The new Police C3 system is also targeted to enter service in end 2014. It will bring more advanced communications, imaging and mobile computing technology to officers at the frontline, through mobile devices with data and voice communications. The on-scene ground commander will be able to receive collated information pushed to him from the Combined Operations Room. This will help him to build a better picture of the situation to improve his decision-making. The new Combined Operations Room and C3 system will strengthen Police's capability for incident management, and to marshal and deploy forces better to deal with rapidly developing situations.
Police have also started trials for body-worn and vehicle-mounted cameras. All Police fast response cars will be equipped with cameras by end 2015. The streaming of live video from vehicle-mounted cameras will help to establish a real-time situation picture that both frontline responders and operations centres can use. The cameras will also capture evidence for post-event investigation and the identification of perpetrators.
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Police are also studying how the Combined Operations Room can make good use of publicly-posted messages and images on the Internet or social media, as these can provide early indications and valuable information on a developing public security situation. This will also enable Police to quickly clarify and dispel any rumours or untruths, which can otherwise spread very quickly and create alarm or undesirable reactions.
The second recommendation is to appropriately train and equip frontline officers to respond to public order incidents.
Police will review what further capabilities our frontline officers need as first responders to deal with public order incidents. This will include a review of the training and equipping of officers. As our frontline officers have multiple policing duties, we will have to tailor their capability and training at a level appropriate for first responders and their mission. Should there be a large-scale public order incident that frontline officers, with their training and equipment, cannot fully deal with on their own, they will have to contain it, and call upon fully-trained SOC anti-riot troopers to quell it. I will speak next about how the SOC will be upgraded to respond more quickly and decisively.
The third recommendation of the COI is to increase the SPF's manpower resources, including the Special Operations Command, so that they can better manage mass congregation areas, such as Little India, and be ready to deal with large-scale public order incidents. The COI also said that, however, quality rather than quantity should be the major consideration in augmenting the force.
We will increase the size and capability of the SOC. In fact, we will double it. We need such a specially trained and equipped force to deal with large-scale public order incidents and the heightened terrorism threat, as well as to manage more mass events that require high-level security.
Currently, the SOC deploys two Police Tactical Troops (PTTs) on round-the-clock standby duty. We intend to increase the number of troops from eight to 12 so that we can put a third SOC troop on standby all the time. This additional troop will be configured for rapid deployment on lighter and more mobile platforms. We will also increase the number of officers in each troop from 35 to 44, and provide them with additional equipment to improve their sense-making and operational capabilities. This will enable each troop to deal more effectively with a wider range of situations and crowd-size. In total, we will add 300 officers to the SOC, doubling its current strength of deployable frontline troopers. We will commence the build-up immediately and progressively build up its capabilities over the next two to three years.
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On overall Police manpower, between 2008 and 2014, more than 1,000 new posts have been added to support new initiatives, such as frontline Community Policing, Safer Roads and investigations. More than 97% of these additional posts have been filled. Overall, Police have increased its headcount by about 15% over the past 10 years from about 9,000 to about 10,300 officers. Police require more posts for new frontline demands, such as a new Police Division Headquarters and two new Neighbourhood Police Centres, in line with shifts in our population. At the same time, Police will continue to review their structures and processes so that officers can be more effectively and productively deployed to where they are most needed.
To continue to attract and retain good officers, Police have enhanced their employment terms and provided more upgrading and education opportunities for in-service officers. SPF has also raised the retirement age of uniformed officers from 50 to 55, and re-employed more retired officers. More civilian officers have also been recruited to take on specialised roles, for example, in forensics and cybercrime, to complement uniformed officers.
However, there are natural limits to how much further we can grow the force without compromising standards. Indeed, the COI has recognised this and made the observation that quality rather than just quantity should be the major consideration in augmenting our force of fully-fledged Police Officers. Like other organisations or companies, it is not easy to hire and retain officers of good quality.
Besides our regular Police officers, we also tap on full-time National Service officers, for example, in our Public Transport Security Command, NSmen, volunteers and community partners. In addition, Police deploy Auxiliary Police Officers to carry out duties of a more specific nature that do not require a fully-fledged Police officer who is trained to deal with a multitude of situations.
Besides increasing manpower, Police have also been using improved deployment strategies, such as Community Policing, to build stronger partnerships with the community to fight crime. Police have also invested in technology as a force multiplier. For example, in the past two years, more than 18,000 Police Cameras have been installed at 3,300 HDB void decks and multi-storey car parks. These have been effective in deterring crime. All 10,000 HDB blocks will have Police Cameras by 2016. This combination of better operational deployments and applying technology have contributed significantly to keeping crime low and solving cases. For example, the number of unlicensed moneylending harassment cases has been cut by more than 50% compared to five years ago.
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The fourth recommendation is for SPF and SCDF to continue to build on their ability to respond in a concerted and co-ordinated manner to public order situations.
The COI reported that the response to the riot demonstrated strong teamwork and collaboration between the SPF and SCDF units in the first phase of extrication and rescue.
Mdm Speaker, Police, SCDF and other Home Team agencies work closely on the ground daily when responding to incidents, and have jointly developed protocols to handle major incidents. We will continue to integrate and enhance the capabilities of frontline first responders through joint standard operating procedures. These joint SOPs are also validated and improved through regular joint exercises.
The fifth recommendation is for SPF to look into generally cutting layers of approval or time needed to activate essential resources to respond to public order incidents and other emergencies.
The COI found that the approval process for activating the SOC was one factor that slowed their arrival. The Police have since then shortened the approval process. Prior to the 8 December riot, the activation of SOC troops required the concurrence of the Director Operations of Police. There were two key reasons for this procedure. First, the deployment of the SOC is a high-signature move and the assessment should be done by a more senior officer. Second, the Director Operations is better placed to assess the overall national needs and priorities when there are competing demands.
Police have made the process for activating the SOC for a public order incident more direct. Division Commanders can now activate the first SOC troop while alerting Police Headquarters at the same time. Traffic Police will also be simultaneously activated to facilitate the SOC's speedy movement to the incident location.
Mdm Speaker, may I have your permission to request the Clerk to distribute the handouts?
Yes, please. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members. Please refer to the Annex.]
Thank you. I now move on to the COI's recommendations to manage foreign worker congregation areas. This is the sixth recommendation of the COI, which is to install additional lighting, safety and surveillance devices in areas which see large congregations of foreign workers, in addition to making better basic facilities available to
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those who congregate there.
Mdm Speaker, I had mentioned in my statement to Parliament in January this year that several measures had been progressively implemented in Little India since October 2006 to improve the physical environment; that is, prior to the 8 December riot in 2013. These included installation of backlane lighting, additional railings along Serangoon Road and operating the Little India Bus Services for workers.
Since 2009, Police have deployed auxiliary police officers and private security officers in Little India to manage anti-social behaviour. In 2011, these numbers were increased and, since then, there have been 81 officers deployed on weekends.
Agencies will continue to work together to improve infrastructure and enhance safety in Little India. We are currently installing additional lighting in 44 locations in Little India. LTA has concreted the grass patch at Tekka Lane and similar works are ongoing for a 10-metre wide strip of the field abutting Hampshire Road for use as a passenger waiting area for the Little India Bus Services. Permanent shelters and queue heads will be provided by the first quarter of 2015. Any change in the capacity of the Little India Bus Services will be gradual and in line with other whole-of-Government measures for Little India. Agencies will also look at various issues, such as bus service timing, to spread out demand and avoid crowding.
For better traffic management, Lembu Road has, since 8 June 2014, been closed to vehicular traffic every Sunday from noon to midnight. Campbell Lane will be converted into a pedestrian mall by the first quarter of 2015. Two new traffic lights will be installed along Serangoon Road and will be synchronised with existing crossings. These measures will enhance road safety and smoothen pedestrian and vehicular traffic flow.
Prior to the 8 December riot, there were 113 Police Cameras in public areas and HDB blocks in Little India. Since then, we have more than doubled the number to 250 Police Cameras. All 41 HDB blocks in Little India now have Police Cameras. Police will progressively install another 88 cameras in public areas between now and December 2015. This overall trebling of the number of cameras, beyond what was initially planned within this timeframe, will provide greater deterrence to crime and anti-social behaviour and allow Police and enforcement agencies to deploy their officers more effectively and forestall or respond more quickly to incidents.
Police have stepped up their presence in Little India since the riot with an additional 20 to 30 Police officers deployed every weekend along with a dedicated SOC troop. This is complemented by the 81 APOs and private security officers currently deployed there on weekends. To sustain an increased presence in the longer term, Police is looking at increasing
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the number of APOs and private security officers deployed in Little India from the current 81 to 93 officers. Police will continue to monitor the situation and calibrate the manpower and other measures deployed accordingly.
Public agencies have also been working together to address issues in other foreign worker congregation areas, such as Geylang. Let me take Geylang as one example. There will be stricter enforcement of licensing and parking rules, and 252 more cameras installed in Geylang by end 2016, compared to the 47 existing ones. We will also be enhancing the street lighting at 36 back alleys in Geylang.
For these congregation areas, Police will continue to conduct frequent patrols and enforcement checks to maintain law and order. In Geylang, for instance, an SOC troop conducts weekly anti-crime patrols to augment existing police resources patrolling the area. Police will also continue to deploy APOs to project additional uniformed presence at congregation areas.
The Minister for Manpower will speak later on the COI's seventh recommendation to make more services and amenities available to foreign workers outside of congregation areas, and to work with local community stakeholders on measures to reduce congestion at congregation areas.
The COI's eighth and final recommendation is to more strictly enforce against public drunkenness and set in place alcohol restrictions in hotspots where large crowds typically indulge in heavy drinking and, therefore, where a triggering incident could spark a breakdown of public order.
Prior to the riot, MHA had already embarked on a wider review of measures to control the sale and public consumption of alcohol, to address concerns of public order and disamenities.
Between October and December 2013, stakeholders and the general public were consulted on proposals to designate no-alcohol zones at some public places; and shorten the sale hours of liquor at retail outlets. Six hundred and twenty four persons participated in the e-Poll, and 337 pieces of written feedback were received. We also conducted focus-group discussions with members of the public and representatives from retail and public entertainment outlets. The majority supported such proposals.
The second phase of consultation was launched via the REACH portal on 16 June 2014 to seek the public's views on possible models for limiting the sale and public consumption of alcohol, drawing on examples from other countries and cities. This will help us to develop a
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model that best suits Singapore's needs and which will be effective and sustainable. This second phase of consultation will end on 31 July 2014.
Since the implementation of the Public Order (Additional Temporary Measures) Act on 1 April 2014, 163 individuals were found consuming alcohol in public during prohibited hours. They have been issued with Police advisories. Two liquor establishments are under investigation for contravening licensing conditions. Police has been consulting closely with the Little India Shopkeepers and Heritage Association, residents and Advisers to implement the measures as smoothly as possible. Feedback on the alcohol restrictions from residents has been generally positive.
In formulating the new measures on the sale and public consumption of alcohol, we will take into consideration public and industry feedback, the COI's recommendations and our experience from the alcohol restrictions in Little India. We will introduce the necessary legislation within the next six months before the Public Order (Additional Temporary Measures) Act expires in March 2015.
Mdm Speaker, let me thank the COI once again for its thorough and comprehensive work in the past six months. The COI adopted an open and transparent process. It sought submissions from the public, all of which were taken into account in the COI's deliberations. The public hearing was conducted in open court, with no restrictions on media or public attendance.
The COI came to the conclusion that the overall outcome of the SPF response was good. There was no loss of life, no prolonged fighting between Police and the rioters, and the riot was dispersed relatively quickly. While the COI found that the Home Team had generally performed well in quelling the riot, it has also identified areas for improvement and put forth recommendations which the Government accepts. We will implement all the recommendations. Since the riot, we have already started to strengthen our capabilities and enhance our operational effectiveness.
Mdm Speaker, the riot was the most serious public order incident Singapore had seen in over 40 years. Home Team officers were called to action; they quelled the riot and restored calm in Little India that night. But there were wider efforts beyond Little India and in the days that followed which helped to maintain calm and stability in Singapore. Members of this House, including Minister Lui Tuck Yew, Ms Denise Phua and Minister Iswaran walked the ground together with grassroots leaders in Little India to reassure the residents and local community. Other Members of this House did the same to reassure residents in their own areas, while other Members, including Minister Shanmugam, Minister Iswaran, Mr Vikram Nair and Mr Dhinakaran, together with staff from the High Commissions of India and Bangladesh, visited dormitories to engage the larger community of foreign workers who
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were not involved in the riot.
Non-governmental organisations and employers stepped up efforts to assist workers. Operators of recreation centres and dormitories organised more programmes and provided more services for foreign workers. Singaporeans generally responded in a rational and calm manner. All these efforts helped to ensure that there were no spill-over tensions after the riot and helped us restore normalcy quickly. I would like to thank everyone who contributed to this community effort.
Mdm Speaker, Minister for Manpower Tan Chuan-Jin will now address the foreign manpower issues in relation to the COI's recommendations and observations, after which, Mdm Speaker, with your permission, we will both address any matters that Members may wish to raise. Thank you.
Mdm Speaker : Minister Tan.
Mdm Speaker, Deputy Prime Minister Teo provided MHA's response to the findings and recommendations of the COI into the Little India Riot on 8 December 2014. I will now respond to the part that touches on the management of the foreign workforce in Singapore.
I am glad that the COI has established that the underlying cause of the 8 December riot was not systemic dissatisfaction with employment and living conditions in Singapore among foreign workers. I think we can all agree that the process of inquiry was robust and the evidence and testimonials furnished to the COI by non-government organisations, civil society activists and, more importantly, the foreign workers themselves, helped us see things in a proper perspective.
The COI has also concluded that, by and large, we have a good framework in place to protect foreign workers. This includes regular reviews to ensure that legislation is adequate and appropriate. Most Members would be aware that over the last few years, we have enacted a series of legislative changes to the Employment Act, the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act and the Employment Agencies Act to better protect workers.
The COI's findings have also been corroborated by the interim results of another survey conducted after the riot by an independent survey company Nexus Link, and commissioned by MOM and the Migrant Workers Centre (MWC). Again, the results are consistent with the COI findings and showed that the vast majority of foreign workers, over 90%, expressed high
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levels of satisfaction with working in Singapore and planned to continue working here after their current employment stint. Over 80% said that they would recommend Singapore to their friends and relatives as a place for work. Satisfactory pay and working and living conditions were the top three reasons cited for recommending Singapore as a place to work.
In addition to these survey findings, the fact is that over 70% of foreign workers renew their contracts after the first two years. Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that the majority of foreigners continue to consider Singapore an attractive place to work. Ultimately, what the workers themselves say and do matter. The COI report puts to rest the more speculative causes for the riot that were offered by some critics and that were echoed blindly by some sections of the foreign media. These same critics often propagated this, painting a negative picture of our agencies, of Singaporeans and of Singapore at large to not just our internal local audience but to the international audience as well.
Significantly, the Indian media, which had a more direct interest in this issue and more access to the workers, on the whole reported responsibly and fairly on the Little India riot. As the Foreign Minister has noted, this incident has not affected our bilateral relations with India.
While the COI has found no evidence of systemic mistreatment of foreign workers, they have pointed out that there might nonetheless be a minority of errant employers who mistreat their workers. I have stated this before in this House: mistreatment does exist. In an earlier statement in Parliament, I have also cited the number of egregious cases. While any case should not be tolerated, the numbers are exceedingly small. My Ministry treats feedback on mistreatment of workers, whether local or foreign, very seriously and we will investigate such employers. If there is clear evidence that any employer or any other person has breached the law, we will not hesitate to take the necessary enforcement actions. I might add that workers who provide false information – and that occurs as well – must also be held accountable.
I accept fully the COI's observation that there is always room to improve the situation. Indeed, that is so. We certainly do not take the current state of affairs for granted and will be implementing the thoughtful recommendations in the COI report.
The COI has recommended that more services and amenities be made available to foreign workers outside of congregation areas like in Little India. This is something that we are already doing, and intend to step up on. Indeed, providing for the needs of foreign workers requires strong inter-agency coordination overseen by an inter-Ministerial committee, covering issues like housing, transport and security. Efforts are on-going to speed up the construction of dormitories which, beyond providing adequate living space, have built-in amenities and recreational facilities to take care of the daily basic living needs of
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workers. The new dormitories which are being launched are required to be self-contained, with adequate space set aside for living and gathering, as well as the provision of facilities like mini-marts, gyms, canteens and TV rooms and, of course, WiFi, which is very important. Over time, we aim for more workers to be accommodated in such self-contained housing facilities which will reduce the need to travel far for basic services.
We also recognise that this is not simply an issue of providing hard infrastructure. Soft infrastructure matters and operators of dormitories have a role to play. As I have previously mentioned, MOM will be establishing a regulatory framework for large dormitories that have a larger impact on their surrounding communities. I am pleased to note that from our engagements with industry, the operators are on board with us on this. My Ministry is working through the details and will provide more information of this regulatory framework in the coming months.
The Government is also pressing on with efforts to establish more dedicated recreation centres for foreign workers. There are four today – in Soon Lee, Kaki Bukit, Woodlands and Penjuru. We will increase their number in tandem with the increase in our foreign workforce numbers. These centres provide a wider range of amenities that individual dormitories may not be able to, such as remittance and banking services, supermarkets and sports facilities. We will work closely with local community stakeholders in shaping the amenities and services available at these centres so that workers do not need to go far to get access to these services.
The COI has also suggested that more effort be made to educate foreign workers on issues, such as their rights and protections, avenues for them to seek assistance and local social norms. Currently, we already make an effort to push out essential information to workers before they enter Singapore and throughout their stay here. Information on key salary components is included in the In-Principle Approval letter which employers must send to their in-coming workers in their home countries, in their own languages, before they depart for Singapore.
As part of the Work Permit card issuance process, a comprehensive guidebook is given which covers workers' legal rights and responsibilities, channels for assistance provided by Government and non-government organisations, as well as social norms. Workers who have problems can always approach MOM for help at our Services Centre. Workers who approach us for assistance can be assured that due effort will be taken to safeguard their interests and well-being.
During their stay, road-shows are conducted by Government agencies at dormitories and key foreign worker gathering spots. Newsletters are also regularly distributed to keep workers updated on our latest initiatives or policy changes. Much of our engagement of
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foreign workers is conducted in the workers' native languages.
Nonetheless, we do accept the suggestion by the COI and will look into how our outreach to workers can be further improved. For example, we are looking to create more targeted and easier to understand materials so that key messages can be put across to foreign workers more simply. We will also look to extend our reach through collaboration with partners like student volunteers, many of whom have expressed an interest in befriending foreign worker groups.
Even as we undertake to effectively manage the foreign workers in our midst, the broader lesson is that foreign worker numbers cannot grow in an unabated manner. In line with the recommendations made by the Economic Strategies Committee in 2010, we have begun to moderate the growth of foreign workers to more sustainable levels, with a greater emphasis on productivity improvements. We have also taken deliberate and progressive steps to raise the quality profile of our foreign workforce and help businesses reduce their reliance on low-cost foreign labour. This is painful but it is a necessary adjustment we are making to restructure our economy, and the Government has introduced the $5.9 billion Quality Growth Programme in Budget 2013 to help our businesses and industries to make this transition.
The foreign workforce tightening measures have slowed foreigner growth significantly. Excluding construction and domestic workers, the foreign worker growth rate was halved from 9.4% in 2011 to 4.6% in 2012, and halved again to just 2.3% in 2013. For construction, manpower has grown over the past few years in large part to support the ramp-up of construction projects, including essential transportation, housing and healthcare infrastructure for Singaporeans. We will continue to build in the coming years, but in a more manpower-lean manner, with many construction productivity measures being introduced.
In conclusion, the COI has rightly pointed out that the riot was a unique event, perpetuated by individuals who were not representative of the majority of responsible and law-abiding foreign workers. The COI's findings have made clear that negative generalisations about the foreign workforce have no place in our society.
I believe that Singaporeans genuinely appreciate the contributions of these workers and wish to co-exist harmoniously with them. On our part, the Government will continue to nurture, to manage such spaces; as well as to manage the overall numbers to minimise impact on the local community.
Mr Hri Kumar.
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Thank you, Mdm Speaker. I have three questions for the Deputy Prime Minister. First, the Deputy Prime Minister mentioned that the SOC force will be increased by 300. The Police Commissioner justified during the hearing that he needed an additional 1,000 officers in the force and the COI spoke of recruiting quality than of quantity.
As the Minister has accepted all the recommendations, could the Deputy Prime Minister clarify how he intends to recruit such numbers given the tight labour situation, and particularly, how long he anticipates the Ministry will need to bring the numbers up to an acceptable level?
Second, in the meantime, does the Ministry have any interim or temporary measures to address the manpower deficit?
Finally, Mdm Speaker, on a separate note, I have read and heard a number of commentaries about what the Government should do in order that similar incidents like these will not happen again. That sentiment concerns me because I do not think the Minister or anyone can give that assurance to this House. Perhaps, the Deputy Prime Minister could clarify, even with the successful implementation of all recommendations, what he sees is an acceptable or reasonable response to similar incidents in the future.
I will respond to the Member's questions in reverse order. I have spoken quite a lot on manpower already. I should clarify that that was what the Police Commissioner testified. It is not what the COI recommended. The Police Commissioner, together with staff in the Ministry HQ, are discussing how to deal with the manpower issue. I will come to that.
The Member asked a very interesting question. I have responded to the COI's recommendations in the sequence and the order in which the COI made its recommendations, as it is easier to understand the actions taken from that point of view. But it may not be as intuitive if you are looking at it from what the Police and other agencies actually do on a daily basis and how they would minimise the likelihood of a riot and how do they deal with it. So, I will now discuss what we are doing in that sequence rather than the sequence of the recommendations.
Since 8 December 2013, we have already made important improvements to strengthen the Home Team's capability to respond better and more quickly to public order incidents. These capabilities will be further strengthened in the months and years ahead. Let me put it
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now in the sequence of how the agencies and the Police would actually deal with situations with the new resources and new capabilities that we have.
First, we now have more Police Cameras in critical locations, not just in Little India but in other areas. In critical areas, these cameras will enable Police to make better and faster appreciation of a developing situation. In fact, it will allow the Division and Combined Operations Room (COR) to take actions even to forestall a situation from becoming something more serious and to make deployment decisions earlier.
For example, if you see a crowd build up or if you see a group of people starting to get a bit rowdy, you can actually respond to that more quickly and diffuse the situation before it becomes something more serious. And then with a better appreciation of the total situation that is provided by the cameras at one central location, it is easier for the Police to deploy the various forces that they have and to coordinate their activities better. So this is what it means in operational terms on, say, a typical crowded weekend. And having seen what has happened, they can also make a call if they need other resources more quickly, such as the SOC.
The second point is that Police have shortened the approval process to activate the SOC. The combination of these two means that the need for additional resources, such as the SOC, can be appreciated earlier and the call can be made earlier, cutting down the time to respond, which is one of the key issues that the COI quite rightly pointed out.
Third, the new Combined Operations Room and the new C3 system will be operational by the end of this year. They will strengthen Police's incident management and enable Police to marshal and deploy forces better to deal with rapidly developing situations and provide a better and quicker response. So, not just in one locality, but even if they have a number of different incidents to manage around the island.
Fourth, commanders and officers on the ground will be able to communicate better with the new communications and C3 system. I have been involved in many operations myself and the communication system is never enough to meet operational needs. We need to improve the communications and C3 system, so that the ground officers will be able to communicate better with each other. They will be better able to coordinate and adjust their responses as they will have a better picture of what is happening, where the on-scene forces are as well as those that are arriving to assist them.
The Police have also revised its doctrines and protocols on communications for a major incident. Additional networks will be made available to provide communications during a
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major incident. This will help manage and reduce congestion of the communication networks.
Fifth, as I have mentioned, we will be doubling the size and capability of the SOC progressively over the next two to three years. This will provide us with a more capable, flexible and faster response capability.
Sixth, the lessons learnt from this incident, which the COI has analysed, will enter into the review of training and doctrines and in equipping of our frontline officers. The scenarios and possible responses painted by the COI will also enter into doctrine development, and the training of our officers and commanders.
I have gone into some detail in my statement and also in this response because we take the lessons from this incident seriously and we take the recommendations of the COI very seriously. And MHA and the Police will implement the recommendations vigorously.
In my statement, I have also stated what complementary measures we are taking in congregation areas in general and also specific to Little India. With these efforts, we will be able to minimise the likelihood of a riot taking place while at the same time, improving our capabilities to contain and quell a riot quickly if one does occur.
But Madam, I have visited a number of cities, both in western countries and in eastern countries, to look at their public order and counter-terrorism forces, C3 systems and contingency planning and deployment. Even in cities with the most intensive 24-hour sensor and C3 coverage of critical areas and officers present on the ground to respond all the time, they have not been able to guarantee that there are no incidents.
Just as Singaporeans did not expect the riot to break out on 8 December arising from a fatal road accident, a public order incident can be sparked off by a single trigger or a confluence of factors. It is not possible to predict or foresee to the last detail every possible incident that can arise. But we can and we will need to work on minimising the chances of a riot taking place while at the same time improving our capabilities to quell a riot if it does.
I have spoken at length on the manpower issues and how we are dealing with them. These are not unique to the Police or the Home Team. Every organisation in the public sector and the private sector is dealing with these issues: productivity, recruitment, retention; how we can use our people better; where we can save manpower and re-deploy it to other areas. In the Police Force, we will do that as well. I have outlined some of those measures earlier. But we are quite confident that we will be able to strengthen the SOC with the additional 300 troops in the next two to three years' time.
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Thank you, Madam. Mr Lui Tuck Yew and I are the Members taking care of different parts of Little India and we want to register our thanks to the Home Team which has supported the residents and us even before the riot.
Despite the alarming physical damage and the death of one man, we are very grateful that the riot was quelled the same night. Mornings after were back to normal and post-riot measures were decisive and effective and sent a strong message that we do not tolerate such riots. Again, we want to officially thank and salute the Home Team for its contribution, including the ground commander from Tanglin, who, I believe, has done what he could in the heat of action and without the benefit of hindsight.
My question is this. I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister if he has taken consideration of the residents' response to what has happened in the last six months. In the last six months, the majority of our residents, including some restaurants and temples, have found measures, such as the alcohol sale and consumption restrictions, increased Police presence, improved transport arrangements – all measures which are very, very useful. There is a strong appeal to have these measures sustained for the long term. It has never been more peaceful.
I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister if the residents' appeals could be given stronger and heavier weightage, compared to general voices from the public; in developing, especially the permanent measures in the residential zones and even the nearby zones.
I have been heartened by the Manpower Minster's promise to ensure that the foreign workers' interests are looked after as well.
I want to also speak up for the businesses which had depended primarily on the foreign workers in Little India. I want to ask if the Minister or the relevant agencies would give priority for the Little India businesses, since more basic services, such as grocery, remittance businesses, are being set up as part of the new strategies in the workers' dormitories.
First of all, Mdm Speaker, I would like to thank Ms Denise Phua and also her colleague Mr Lui Tuck Yew for the very active involvement that they have taken in the concerns of the residents and stakeholders in Little India. It has been very helpful to us because it helps us to understand and work with the stakeholders better.
Many of the measures I described are of a long-term nature: the bus service improvements, the queuing systems, the road traffic management. We will continue to monitor and work together with Ms Denise Phua and other stakeholders to see how we can
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improve and adjust as we go along.
The major issue which Ms Phua may be concerned about is the alcohol measures – measures and hours. These are still being looked at in great detail. As we look at new legislation, we will certainly take into account the concerns that have been so eloquently expressed by Ms Phua and together with the other views that have been expressed by others who have an interest in this matter.
Mdm Speaker, in response to Ms Dennis Phua's suggestion, in principle, we do welcome the participation of businesses in Little India as they may bring unique value to the foreign worker clientele. In fact, we understand that such collaboration is really ongoing. So, we do urge Little India businesses to proactively approach dormitory operators to market services and to convince them of the value that they could bring. This is something we are supportive of.
Thank you, Mdm Speaker. I have two questions for the Deputy Prime Minister. The first is the Committee of Inquiry was critical of the ground commander's actions, particularly in what was called the Second Phase of the riot. What is the Deputy Prime Minister's view on this? What actions will they take in relation to the ground commander, if any?
The second is probably the flip side of the question. The Committee was also quite complimentary of the overall result that was achieved and also singled out certain Police officers for praise. Will anything be done to recognise the efforts of these Police officers?
I had given MHA's assessment and perspective on the COI's comments on the Second Phase of the operation, particularly between 10.15 pm and 10.45 pm that evening. The COI had put forward a more interventionist course of action that the officers might have taken that night during that half-hour period.
The purpose of an inquiry after an event has occurred is to determine what happened and how things could be done better. The COI has indeed carried out a thorough analysis and put forward its views on what could have been done in such a situation with full knowledge of all the information and the facts. The assessment put forward by the COI, as I had said earlier, would be very useful to be entered into the doctrine development process, training, scenario injects or scenario-based training for officers and commanders. They would be able to consider issues, such as how would you best bring a situation under control and, if you intervened and if you took certain actions, would it cause the situation to escalate or to de-escalate? Or what relative strength of forces is needed to carry out particular
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courses of action?
But the COI arrived at the assessment based on a reconstruction of all available information after the riot. When I evaluate the actions of the commanders and officers on that night, I have to look at the context of the situation that they faced that night and the information that they had available.
Riots are dynamic situations which call for dynamic responses. This is a point which the COI also made. It is thus important for us to consider the dynamic and rapidly unfolding situation that night and the situation faced by the commanders.
On the night of the riot, the officers arrived at the scene as quickly as they could. As they arrived, the commanders and officers came into the midst of a highly charged and rapidly evolving situation. In fact, some Home Team officers were injured by the actions of the crowd very early on, even during Phase 1. The officers and commanders had to make decisions in the heat of the action, under time pressure, based on the information they had available before them at that time. The Police Division Commander, as I had mentioned, arrived at 10.11 pm. Shortly after that, a few minutes after, the riot flared up and, by 10.28 pm, the first cars were flipped over and set on fire.
The commanders and officers did not have the benefit of hindsight and all the information available. We know what happened that night and what decisions had been taken by the officers on the ground. But we will not be able to definitively know what might have happened if a different course of action had been taken. We cannot be sure that it will definitely be better. We do not know if it might be better or the outcome might have been worse. Because we know that the crowd was emotional and prone to misperceptions.
Mdm Speaker, as I said, it is not always possible to take the analyses done after the fact and substitute them for the judgement that the commander or the officers had to make on the ground at that moment in time.
The actions of the Police also have to be seen to be proportionate and fair. In fact, I would say that the day after the riot, because the actions of the Police were seen as proportionate and fair, it helped also to restore calm and confidence among all parties – Singaporeans, foreign workers and the whole community. If the Police's actions were seen to be excessive, I think it would have caused a new set of issues and concerns.
I would also like to make an additional point. This is the issue of how much forces you need when you are assessing whether to take action. When you are able to have the force advantage, you can choose the amount of force to use and calibrate it better. You decide
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whether to escalate. When you have to intervene and you do not have a force advantage to engage a mob, matters can quickly escalate to the use of lethal force. In that situation where you do not have the force advantage, it is actually the mob that decides whether there is an uncontrolled escalation and not the officers.
There will be situations where engaging is necessary, even without the force advantage, for example, when lives are at imminent risk. But I think that it is not so easy to substitute an analysis after the fact for the judgement that officers have to make on the ground.
So, I have evaluated the actions of the commander and the officers that night, and I do not find them wanting.
Thank you, Mdm Speaker. Madam, I have six clarifications for Deputy Prime Minister Teo. The first clarification concerns the issue of manpower shortage. I think it is not a new issue and we have discussed this in Parliament for quite a number of years. As Deputy Prime Minister mentioned, the first time it was taken seriously in that sense was in 2008. That was when the House had to face the fact that there were several security lapses, for example, the escape of Mas Selamat, ICA clearing people with the wrong passport and people escaping from Court. And now we find that we are confronting this issue again because of another major incident, meaning a riot.
I would like to ask Deputy Prime Minister Teo whether he himself was personally surprised at the Commissioner's statement that, in his assessment, 1,000 more officers were needed by the Police to be effective. Is this indicative of any communication gap between the heads of departments and the Ministers, for example?
In one of my recent Parliamentary Questions (PQs) in 2012, I had asked the Government about policing resources, in particular, about community policing. And the Government did not seem to quite agree that there was a serious under resource problem. And yet during the COI, we find the Commissioner talking about robbing Peter to pay Paul to find resources, the SOC saying that they could not arrest people because they did not have enough manpower.
So, I would like to ask the Minister whether he was surprised at this assessment by the Commissioner of Police and whether this indicates a communication gap. And also, whether there is some other more holistic way that the Government assesses resource deficiencies rather than to act because of incidents that occurred of such a nature?
The second clarification concerns one of the findings of the COI about the causes of the riot. The COI mentioned that one of the main contributory factors was a misperception by
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the crowd that they were being discriminated against by the responders and so on. There were some quotes by workers asking if their lives were worthless and so on. I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister whether he agrees that it is important for us to look at the way we do our law enforcement on our foreign workers. In other words, are we harsh towards them or do we give them a certain level of respect?
In this regard, I would like to cite two examples: one is that I filed a PQ in 2008 —
Ms Lim, if you could just seek your clarification and not to make speeches.
Madam, I will try. In 2008, for example, when there was an incident of an attack of a woman at Clementi Woods, what the Police did was to round up the nearby construction workers, 200 of them, to take blood samples from them. Looking at the methods used, I mean, there may be an impression created that there is a certain stereotyping, for example, by the Police in their actions. Commissioner of Police also mentioned that in Geylang, there was hostility and antagonism towards the Police. Would the Police be looking at their policing methods?
The third question is about training of the frontline officers. The COI recommended that the frontline officers should also be trained and equipped to deal with some public order disturbances. I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister whether he agrees that no amount of training really can be a substitute for actual practice in policing such incidents. In this light, would he consider, for example, that the Police should allow more peaceful protests in Singapore in certain designated roads, so that the Police can actually, on a regular basis, test their policing capabilities in terms of policing cause-based crowds? Riots, of course we do not want that, but they progress, basically, from some sort of cause-based protest. I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister whether he would consider that.
The fourth clarification is whether the Police will be looking at drawing up specific incident management plans for hotspots, such as Little India. It was not clear from the COI findings whether there was any incident management plan drawn up prior to the incident. So, is this something that the Police are looking at?
Fifth, if you look at the map, there is a boundary between two Police Divisions in Little India. I think that Race Course Road is a boundary. On the west side, it is policed by Tanglin; and on the eastern side, it is policed by Central. Will the Police be looking at whether this can be a complication as in, if something were to happen, who is to take charge, for example? Did this boundary, for example, cause DAC Lu, in the sequence of events, to try to marshal resources from "E" Division, when "A" Division resources were actually quite nearby? Would
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the Police be looking at whether a more seamless management of such hot spots under one division would be a better way?
Last of all, the riot control doctrine was discussed during the COI and we were told that the incident manager was supposed to assess the crowd intent, sentiments and so on. I would like to ask whether there was actually in the plan the requirement to provide a psychologist or other assistance to the incident manager to help him make this kind of difficult assessment.
I will try to answer the six questions that Ms Lim has raised, in reverse order. Riot control doctrine and whether or not a psychologist is useful: part of the training of the riot troopers and the commanders, in particular, is to understand crowd psychology. But whether we will have a psychologist actually next to the riot control commander to advise him continually, I am not sure that that is necessary or practical. But they have to understand crowd psychology in terms of how to deal with a crowd.
I had a long talk with the SOC officers when I visited them prior to the riot and again after the riot, and they explained to me some of the approaches that they used in riot dispersal, and a lot of that involves crowd psychology.
On the boundaries, I think the suggestion, the observation that Ms Lim makes is a valid one. Police are looking at this issue of where to draw the boundaries. Of course, wherever you draw the boundaries, you can have a problem. Because as Ms Lim pointed out, perhaps the Commander of "E" called the "E" Division resources, and did not call the "A" Division resources. But supposing it had been drawn all within one division, then you could have said "Well, the boundary is so close by, how come you did not divide it into two, so that the resources of both divisions could be called?" So, there is always a boundary issue whenever you have such issues.
But on the incident response that night, I have looked carefully at the COI report and I have also looked carefully at the Police's AAR Report, the boundary issue did not seem to figure very prominently. Both division commanders actually came on the scene, they were able to coordinate and decide who is in charge. They called in forces from both divisions. But having said that, I think it is a valid consideration whether the boundary can be drawn at another place, but wherever you draw the boundary, you will have boundary problems.
Contingency planning for that night, yes, indeed, there were contingency plans. For example, the Police activated a contingency plan that allowed them to call the fast response cars from around the island to respond quickly to the location. That is one of the contingency
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plans that the Police have, which they actually activated that night.
On whether we want to deliberately allow protests and demonstrations in order to give the Police and the SOC practice, perhaps Ms Lim might want to go one step further and, say, allow the protests to get out of hand, so that they get a little bit more practice.
Why?
But why not, since you want to give them practice?
Madam, the answer is obvious. We do not want damage to property or loss of life, but peaceful protests are arguably a freedom and civil liberty we want to project.
We can see the logic, or lack of it, in purposely allowing protests and demonstrations just in order for the SOC to practise. But I should say that one of the reasons why I do want to increase the size of the SOC is because we do have more events in Singapore, large-scale events, and you do not really need to deliberately allow protests to take place in order to give the SOC practice. A typical football match and other events like that already provide the SOC quite a lot of activity and action. Quite frankly, I do not think many Singaporeans would want to see more chaos, demonstrations on the streets disrupting their daily lives and also taking up resources which can be used for other purposes.
On the second point on misperceptions. Yes, indeed, there were different views expressed during the COI on how one could interact with people with different cultural backgrounds. Indeed, that I think is an important and valid consideration. We will provide more cultural background orientation for officers, including auxiliary police officers, who have to deal with and interact with people from different cultural backgrounds on a regular basis.
On the manpower issue, I think I have spoken at some length on this already, both in my main statement and in response to Mr Hri Kumar. Basically, the manpower issue is not one which is faced only by the Police, MHA or the Government. Anyone who runs an organisation in Singapore knows that we face a manpower situation which we all have to deal with. No problem is going to be solved just by asking for more manpower. Whether you work in an MNC, a company or the Government, you know you are not going to solve your manpower requirements just by asking. But we also know that there is no harm in asking, so we all ask anyway. But that is not the solution and we all know that.
I have outlined the various solutions and approaches which we are taking to deal with the manpower issue. But the realities are quite stark. In the coming five years, we will have
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fewer young Singaporeans entering the workforce than in the past five years. So, the issue is not going to get simpler and it is not going to be solved simply by asking, though there is no harm asking.
Mr Nicholas Fang.
Thank you, Mdm Speaker. Two questions for the Deputy Prime Minister. It is heartening to hear that the SOC force will be doubled and increased. I would just like to ask how will the emphasis in terms of their dual responsibilities of maintaining public order as well as counter terrorism operations be delineated and where will the emphasis be placed given that it does send a strong signal to the rest of the world whichever side that we place the emphasis on.
A related question to that: instead of increasing instances of disorder here or given the lack of frequency of such incidents relative to other countries, is there a potential for deploying our forces for more exchange or training in other countries in neighbouring partners to gain greater exposure?
One question for the Manpower Minister. It is heartening to hear that there will be efforts taken to improve the lives of foreign workers here and also to help them to understand life in Singapore a bit better. Will this ever come into contradiction or tension with the long-term aim of keeping such a workforce transient and not necessarily encouraging them to sink roots in Singapore?
We do send our officers for training, for exposure, for exchanges with other forces. In fact, in the development of our SOC, we have benefited a lot from the experiences of others – equipment, doctrine, training and so on – because they have a lot more experience of this and practice than we do. But it is not common for forces to send their nationals to enforce the law in other countries. So, we do have exchanges regularly, but actual enforcement is another matter.
On the balance between terrorism and public order, this, indeed, is one of the issues which we have to face in building up any force. Do you build up a force which is dedicated only for a particular task? Because then your force is designed and trained only for that and you do not use it for anything else. And if you have another requirement, you build up another force for that. That may not be the most effective way of doing so because you may not have to deal with both simultaneously. They both may have to be on standby. You may want to actually deploy a larger force to deal with one contingency should it occur. Therefore, we do carefully judge what kinds of missions we can give the forces that we have and we train them to be multi-purpose; but we also try not to over-task them because then they will
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be jacks of all trades but masters of none.
Mdm Speaker, in response to the Member's question, I think it is important for us to look after our foreign workers. In fact, it behoves us to look after all our workers, whether local or otherwise. So, that is why legislation is in place to make sure that they are adequately looked after.
It is also important to make sure that enforcement takes place fairly. It is also important to make sure that education takes place, so that they understand their rights and to make sure that their welfare is looked after. And also to educate them on the social norms. It is also important for Singaporeans to understand that. So, that is where opportunities to create opportunities for interaction and mutual understanding is required as well. But is this mutually exclusive with the fact that the foreign workforce is transient in nature? I do not think so. It is a right thing for us to do as a society. Bearing in mind that it is still a transient workforce, it does not mean that we should not do these things.
Mr Yeo Guat Kwang.
Madam, while working and housing conditions were not the cause of the Little India riot, we cannot take for granted that a riot may not occur on such basis. So, I would like to ask the Minister for Manpower whether there is a severe shortage in supply of housing for migrant workers. And how would MOM ensure that there is an adequate supply of housing for migrant workers, as well as how to further improve the living conditions of all the migrant workers? We also have to actually ensure that the employers proactively and actively play their role to ensure that they manage the foreign workers well in their workplaces.
Mdm Speaker, this issue of a lack of adequate accommodation crops up regularly. There has been a lot of misunderstanding from the media, in spite of our clarifications. It is a worthwhile opportunity for us to surface this again.
Of the 770,000 non-domestic work permit holders, almost half of them are Malaysians who commute to work daily and, therefore, do not need dormitory beds, or those in the manufacturing and services sector who are allowed to rent and live in HDB flats and in private estates near the places of their work. The more relevant group pertaining to dormitories is the remaining half, who are the non-Malaysian construction, marine and process workers – about 90% of whom are already housed in purpose-built dormitories, factory-converted dormitories and quarters on construction sites. A vast majority of these housing premises are within regulatory norms. These dormitories are not of uniform standards. I think that is something that we acknowledge but, as mentioned, over the next
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few years, the aim is to speed up the construction of more purpose-built dormitories to ensure that the daily basic living needs of foreign workers are better taken care of. Over time, the aim is for a vast majority of this group of workers to be accommodated in such self-contained housing facilities. These efforts have already started a number of years ago, and will continue unabated.
Mdm Speaker, at four different paragraphs – paras 150, 157, 158 and 199 – the COI stated that SCDF performed its duties well on that night. Overall, SCDF responded to the riot relatively swiftly. The responding officers, led by ASP Tang and Lieutenant Neo, did a commendable job and, lastly, there was also effective command. My point is that while we debate what more could have been done, what improvements can be made, I believe it is important that this House also puts on record the bravery of the officers who conducted themselves courageously on that night. To this end, I would like to clarify whether it is the intention of MHA, in its post-mortem of the COI report, to commend the officers who carried out their duties professionally and bravely.
Mdm Speaker, first of all, I would like to thank the Member for recognising and encouraging the good work done by our officers. This is something which we will certainly consider.
Madam, I have three questions for the Minister for Home Affairs and one question for the Minister for Manpower. In my question directed at MHA during the Committee of Supply debate this year, I asked about the cultural training given to law enforcers. The Second Minister replied to say that a structured training programme is in place to ensure that APOs are able to meet operational needs. In light of the COI report which states that APOs and SPF officers should be given some basic training in cultural sensitivity, to this end, is the Ministry looking into amending the training programme for officers who patrol areas frequented by foreign workers? And if so, what is the scope of the cultural sensitivity training that the public can expect?
Second question – until new laws on the regulation of public consumption of alcohol in general are passed, is there a plan to introduce the restrictions on alcohol consumption in Little India to other places frequented by foreign workers, such as Geylang and the Golden Mile Beach Road areas, since the cause of the Little India riot may potentially be replicated in other areas where large congregations of foreign workers gather?
Third question – how does the Ministry plan to encourage greater awareness of section 18 of the Miscellaneous Offences Act, as recommended by the COI?
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To the Minister for Manpower, the COI report states that it supports better initiatives to improve accommodation facilities available to foreign workers here, as small improvements can significantly better workers' lives. To this end, how many dormitories currently comply with the URA's 2012 revised amenity provision guidelines covering all dormitories that house between 50 and 5,000 workers which require a minimum living space of 4.5 sqm per worker? When does MOM expect all dormitories to comply with the requirements set out in these guidelines? Will similar guidelines covering minimum living space be extended to employers who house their workers in other accommodation? And here I am referring particularly to marine, process and construction workers. Would MOM consider more regular monitoring of foreign worker accommodation for those workers who do not reside in large dormitories, who may be less likely to be aware of their rights in general, notwithstanding the efforts of NGOs and MOM so far?
We do not currently have any plans to impose alcohol restrictions in other areas, between now and the time that we put in the new legislation. We have explained during the passage of the Public Order (Additional Temporary Measures) Bill that we do not currently have the laws to allow us to do that in any case. And I recall that when we were debating the Public Order (Additional Temporary Measures) Bill, Members were of the view that we should take measures after having taken into account overall considerations and feedback from other stakeholders all over Singapore, unless the Member is suggesting that we should go ahead and introduce additional temporary measures in other areas right now.
On cultural training, yes, we will do so. I mentioned that just now, and this will have to be tuned for each different group and will include things like cultural attitudes, perhaps some language training and so forth. But it is also important to mention that on MOM side, there may also be culturalisation training for foreign workers who come to Singapore, so that they also understand our social norms and will abide by them.
On section 18, the Police will continue to enforce section 18 in a judicious way.
Minister Tan.
Mdm Speaker, in response to the Member's question, I think we are particular about living conditions, as I had stated. But I think URA, as part of the Inter-Ministerial Committee, is reviewing and making sure that the requirements for accommodation are suitable for our foreign workers. The majority of the purpose-built dormitories today do meet the requirements. For those that do not, we do inspect and we do follow up to make sure that has been done.
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In the same way, the regulatory framework that we announce shortly will also be looking at some of these measures. MOM will continue to monitor and inspect. A large part of it will also come from NGOs and other interested parties who do have information that will feed back to us. I have been to some of these checks and inspections as well. We do find egregious accommodation, and that will happen. That comes from information that is shared from the public as well as NGO groups. But when these are found, we will deal with them accordingly. So, this is something that is ongoing and we definitely pay attention to them.
Mr Patrick Tay. This is the last clarification before I ask the Deputy Prime Minister to sum up.
Thank you, Madam. I have two questions – one for the Deputy Prime Minister and one for the Minister for Manpower.
I want to ask the Deputy Prime Minister whether MHA or the Government will consider utilising the SAF as well as the Gurkha contingent to augment and handle public disorder and low-intensity conflict situations, as both are well-trained and equipped.
My second question: I have a large population of foreign workers living in Simpang Lodge, which is less than 400 m from the many HDB flats in my Nee Soon East Constituency. Besides over-crowding the public feeder services during rush hour, residents also shared that they congregate around void decks, grass patches and staircases in the neighbourhood, and complained about littering, alcohol consumption, illegal tapping of WiFi, cycling on pedestrian footpaths. In fact, I thank MOM for working with our Nee Soon East grassroots and various local agencies but I am asking if more can be done, including passing of rules and laws, to mandate not just new but existing dormitory operators as well as employers to ensure eradication of some of these challenges and disamenities that may in some instances fall outside the purview of existing laws and regulations.
Deputy Prime Minister or Minister Tan?
Mdm Speaker, with regard to Simpang Lodge, it is something that we are putting in effort, together with the various agencies. For example, apart from MOM, there are also SLA, SCDF, CNB, the Police as well as our NSE CCC. Let me just illustrate some of the measures that have been put in place and the efforts that are being undertaken. We educate foreign workers through roadshows. The last was held, for example, in February 2014, and two more of them in July 2014. We also conduct house-to-house visits and advise residents to secure their WiFi network. Since this effort commenced, the number of unsecured WiFi networks has dipped. Obviously, we are in that estate for those who are going to the nearby Housing Board estate in order to tap on these unsecured WiFi. Obviously,
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the numbers will also drop accordingly.
Reviewing liquor licences, especially those in the near vicinity of the dormitories frequented by foreign workers, is something we are looking at. We are studying a proposal to convert vacant state lands beside the dormitories into recreational sports areas for foreign workers; the need for more CCTVs in the area; more frequent visits by uniformed officers and engagement with foreign workers on crime-related issues; frequent engagement with dormitory management on security-related matters. We are also stepping up on enforcement efforts against anti-social behaviour, such as littering and urinating in public.
So, it is a combined effort to keep the situation in check. But from a broader perspective, I think the solution really is to enhance these facilities in dormitories around the country so that the workers themselves have access to these dormitories. In fact, from our survey, we have found that many workers do actually stay on in the dormitories, in large part because one of their objectives in coming to Singapore is to work hard and remit monies back home. And one way is to save money. Some of them, from time to time, will go out, but when there is good access to some of these facilities within the dormitories, many of them do stay within their dormitories. So, that is the approach that we are taking, going forward. But, meanwhile, in areas where there are disamenities that are happening, we work closely with the local communities and other agencies to minimise disruption and inconveniences to residents.
Deputy Prime Minister.
Thank you, Madam. With your permission, I will respond to Mr Patrick Tay and then I will take a few minutes to round up.
Yes, please.
The Gurkha contingent was alerted and put on standby on the night of the riot. As the situation was brought under control speedily by the SOC when it arrived at the scene, it was assessed that the deployment of the Gurkha contingent was not necessary.
Generally, if a large-scale public order incident occurs, the SOC troops will be activated in the first instance to handle the incident. The Gurkha contingent may be activated to provide additional support if the public order situation escalates and more forces are required, for example, in a very large-scale incident involving very many people or if there are a number of incidents occurring in different areas.
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As for the SAF, we generally do not deploy military forces in peacetime for public order duties. As the situation was brought speedily under control that night, it was not appropriate and also not necessary to activate the SAF. In very serious situations where the resources of the Police, including the Police divisional forces, the SOC and the Gurkha contingent, are not sufficient, there are laws to provide for the civil authority to call upon SAF resources to assist and support the civil authority to maintain public order. But I must emphasise that this will only arise in very serious situations.
Mdm Speaker, I thank Members for their support for the Government's response to the COI report. Their comments and suggestions have helped to bring out key points and allowed Mr Tan Chuan-Jin and myself to explain the pertinent issues more thoroughly. And thank you for letting me wrap up this important discussion by making a few observations.
Mdm Speaker, on the night of 8 December 2013, a riot broke out following a fatal road traffic accident and it was the worst public order incident in Singapore in more than four decades. The COI report described what happened that night but, as several Members have pointed out, it is also important to recall what did not happen that night. The COI pointed out that while the riot was a shock to many Singaporeans, there was no loss of life, no prolonged fighting between Police and the rioters and it was dispersed relatively quickly. The riot remained contained in a small area. Arson of private property and looting did not occur. No shots were fired by the Police and neither tear gas nor water cannon was used on the rioters.
Mdm Speaker, the situation would have been totally different if we had woken up the next morning and the "Nos" in my previous sentence had been "Yeses". Singaporeans and our foreign workforce could have been deeply traumatised. The news would have echoed around the world. We would be grappling today with whether the use of force could have been avoided.
Mdm Speaker, a riot on the streets of Singapore is unacceptable, even with all the "Nos".
I would like to thank the Chairman and the members of the COI once again for its thorough and comprehensive report.
The Government accepts all of the COI's recommendations and will implement them vigorously. The actions that my colleague the Minister of Manpower and I have detailed today to implement the recommendations will enable us to minimise the likelihood of a riot occurring and improve our capability to deal effectively with a riot, if it does.
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Mdm Speaker, one recurring theme in our deliberations today and also in the COI's proceedings and report, is the dedication and the quality of our officers. Beyond quantity, it is, ultimately, quality that counts. It is the quality of the officers and their dedication and commitment that make the key difference. That night, the commanders and officers responded to the call and rushed to the scene, arriving as quickly as they could. They showed dedication to duty and courage as they faced a large, emotionally-charged crowd with a volatile temperament – a crowd whose mood and actions could have suddenly changed with any new trigger, misinformation or misunderstanding.
Our officers and commanders were steadfast in carrying out their mission. They responded when called upon, worked together with their fellow officers, and put themselves in harm's way to manage, contain and eventually quell the riot – a difficult task in the circumstances they faced.
On behalf of the officers in the Home Team, I would like to express my thanks to the Members who have offered encouragement and expressed their appreciation to our Home Team officers and to their commanders.
Several Members have suggested that we recognise the officers for their dedication to duty that night. The Government will consider recognising the Home Team officers who answered the call to action to quell the riot that night in the face of personal danger and under difficult circumstances. We will also see how we can recognise particular officers who stood out for their outstanding response during the riot.
Mdm Speaker, the work of our Home Team officers is difficult and challenging. They work round-the-clock and often put themselves in harm's way to keep Singapore and all of us and our families safe and secure. The encouragement and support from Members of this House and from Singaporeans make a real and positive difference, not just to those who were called to action that night but to all Home Team officers. It means a lot to them that their efforts are appreciated and recognised. I am confident that, with your support, they will continue to do their utmost to keep us safe and secure.
The Home Team and other Government agencies, we have all learnt valuable lessons from this incident. By implementing the COI's recommendations, we will be better prepared – the Home Team, the Government as well as Singapore will emerge readier and stronger from this incident. Mdm Speaker, thank you.
Order. I propose to take the break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 5.10 pm.
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Sitting accordingly suspended
at 4.50 pm until 5.10 pm.
Sitting resumed at 5.10 pm
[Mdm Speaker in the Chair]
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PAPERCUTS