Breach at Woodlands Checkpoint

Assoc Prof Tan Kheng Boon Eugene asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs if he can provide an update on the investigation over the breach at Woodlands Checkpoint on 17 January 2014 and the subsequent inadequate response actions by ICA and the Police; and (b) what immediate corrective measures have been taken to improve security at all checkpoints and improve coordination and response by the Home Team agencies to security breaches.

Ms Lee Li Lian asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (a) what is the type of alert raised by the immigration authorities to the Police and security forces upon finding out that a vehicle has illegally entered Singapore on 17 January 2014; (b) whether it is a high-priority warning and, if not, why not; and (c) what are the specific actions taken after such an alert is out.

Ms Lee Li Lian asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (a) in the past three years, how many cases of attempted immigration checkpoint evasions occurred; (b) how long did the authorities take to solve these cases; (c) what are the penalties meted out to these perpetrators; (d) whether there are any new procedures introduced to prevent recurrences; and (e) whether the current number of immigration officers is enough to deal with the surge in travellers during peak seasons.

Mr Yee Jenn Jong asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs with regard to immigration and security functions at our checkpoints (a) what percentage of the work is outsourced to Auxiliary Police or private entities and for what types of job functions; (b) what percentage of the officers in charge of checkpoint clearances are outsourced personnel; (c) what training and supervision are given to outsourced staff to ensure

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compliance with checkpoint procedures; and (d) whether outsourced functions are being reviewed in light of the alleged security breach at the Woodlands Checkpoint on 17 January 2014.

Thank you. Mdm Speaker, on 17 January 2013 at 1.58 pm, a woman arrived at Woodlands Checkpoint in her Malaysian car. She drove past the ICA officer without going through the mandatory checks by tailgating the car immediately in front of hers, and slipping past the drop-arm barrier. The ICA officer did not immediately trigger an alert.

The car then proceeded to the secondary checking area for security checks to be carried out by an Auxiliary Police Officer (APO). The car did not stop for the APO to carry out his checks and the APO also did not sound the alarm.

Mdm Speaker, there are alarms installed at all immigration counters and also the secondary clearance area. The immediate activation of such alarms, as required in the Standard Operating Procedures at the checkpoints, is critical to stopping cars that evade immigration and security checks.

If the ICA officer had sounded the alarm faster than the two and a half minutes she took, it would have triggered a lock down which would have stopped the car from leaving the checkpoint. This was compounded by the APO not raising the alarm when the car did not stop for secondary security checks. Indeed, the prompt triggering of the alarm by the officer on duty was how similar previous attempts to evade immigration and security checks – either intentionally or inadvertently – at the checkpoint have been stopped in the past.

If, however, a vehicle does make an unauthorised exit from the checkpoint, there is a security protocol for Police and ICA to treat the incident as a breach of border security and issue a high-priority alert to all ground resources.

In this case, however, the ICA and Police ground commanders did not follow the protocol. They made an error of judgement and classified the incident as a less serious one – as an immigration offence. As a result, Police did not

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trigger an alert that would have immediately directed patrol cars to mount road blocks at possible travel routes of the car in major parts of Singapore. ICA and Police also did not issue a heightened and persistent alert with the description of the car and driver that would have alerted all ground forces to continue looking for them when they conducted vehicular searches, checks and screening.

Three days later on 20 January 2014 at 1.32 pm, Police received a "999" call from a taxi driver who said that he was being followed by a Malaysian car. On Police's advice, the taxi driver drove to a location outside the Police Cantonment Complex with the Malaysian car continuing to follow him. When police officers tried to engage the female driver of the Malaysian car, she was unresponsive and then drove off. The police officers decided not to pursue her and missed the opportunity to detain the driver for further checks. The officers showed weak situational awareness and exercised poor judgement.

Forty-five minutes later, at about 2.18 pm, the same driver and car intruded into the MFA compound by tailgating another car. MFA's security officers stopped the car in the compound and arrested the driver for criminal trespass.

Mdm Speaker, when the driver and vehicle evaded the required checks, they should have been stopped within the checkpoint. This is a serious security breach. It is also unacceptable that the woman was only arrested three days later, after she had intruded into the MFA compound. On receiving the incident reports, I expressed my deep dissatisfaction to the Commissioners of ICA and Police at the way the incident was handled. I directed them to conduct a thorough investigation, report to me how this happened and recommend corrective actions to prevent a recurrence.

Mdm Speaker, the Commissioners of ICA and the Police have presented to me their recommendations on the corrective actions. I have accepted the findings and recommendations and have directed ICA and Police to implement these measures.

ICA and Police will work closely to improve their coordination and responses, and ensure that such lapses do not occur again. Existing SOPs will be thoroughly reviewed to ensure officers act quickly and effectively to deal with such security threats at the checkpoints. Police will treat all checkpoint security breach cases as high-level security threats and take all necessary steps to locate the intruder, until such time the threat no longer exists. Both departments will also conduct more frequent drills and joint exercises at the

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land checkpoints to maintain the officers' vigilance and validate the emergency response plans.

ICA will also use more advanced technology as it becomes available, improve infrastructural design to depend less on the reaction of the officers on duty and enhance the overall security of the checkpoint.

While the bulk of the critical immigration and security functions at the checkpoint are performed by officers from ICA and the other Home Team agencies, APOs are an integral part of checkpoint operations. They constitute about 20% of the officers deployed at Woodlands Checkpoint for immigration and security clearance functions. The APOs are trained and equipped to carry out specific security functions. ICA conducts regular drills, exercises and audits to maintain the vigilance of the APOs, and reviews the operational procedures and responses regularly. In light of this incident, ICA will also enhance the supervision and deployment of the APOs to ensure that they carry out their duties in accordance with established procedures.

In the past three years till the end of 2013, there have been 26 cases of attempted or inadvertent evasion of immigration checks at Woodlands Checkpoint. Twenty five of these cases were stopped immediately within the checkpoint upon the prompt activation of the alarm. The last such case before this incident occurred on 29 December 2013. The most recent case was on 14 February 2014, just last Friday, when an APO gestured to the driver to stop for checks but the driver drove on. The APO then activated the alarm and the entire arrival car zone was locked down and the vehicle stopped within the checkpoint, as per the SOP. The matter was investigated and it was determined that the driver had inadvertently driven on, with no malicious intent. The vehicle and driver were allowed to proceed after the investigation.

Mdm Speaker, every such case is investigated thoroughly. Most of the 25 cases were found not to have malicious intent. In four cases, the offence was committed without mitigating factors and the subjects involved were prosecuted. The maximum punishment is imprisonment of six months.

The one previous case in the last three years that ICA failed to stop within the checkpoint involved a subject who crashed through a security barrier and exited Woodlands Checkpoint through the staff access lane. The driver was detained within two hours, prosecuted and sentenced to 12 weeks' imprisonment for offences under the Immigration Act, Penal Code and Road

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Traffic Act.

Mdm Speaker, the security breach at Woodlands Checkpoint on 17 January 2014 and the subsequent actions taken until her arrest on 20 January 2014 are not acceptable. I have described the measures – technical, infrastructural, procedural training and exercises – that ICA and Police together are taking to prevent a recurrence.

Lapses can fall into two categories. The first is when there is some negligence on the part of one or more ground officers in carrying out their tasks. The second, and more serious situation, is when there has been a serious error of judgement. This occurred in the current case.

The ICA and Police ground commanders made a serious error of judgement in deciding to treat this intrusion as a less serious immigration offence, instead of a serious breach of border security, as required in the protocol. This was a major reason for the subsequent inadequate response which resulted in the vehicle and driver not being detected and arrested much earlier. Both ground commanders have been redeployed to non-operational posts pending disciplinary action. Their supervising officers overseeing operations should also have realised this and acted to rectify the situation. They will be subject to the appropriate disciplinary action, along with other officers involved in the incident.

Mdm Speaker, as seen in this episode, the way that our officers and our commanders carry out their duties, their vigilance, diligence, sense of urgency, operational instincts and judgement are key to operational effectiveness.

I do not under-estimate the challenges our officers face at Woodlands Checkpoint. It is one of the world's busiest land checkpoints, with more than 300,000 people and 130,000 vehicles passing through each day. I will repeat those numbers: 300,000 people and 130,000 vehicles passing through Woodlands Checkpoint each day.

The security regime there is multi-agency and multi-level, involving various Government agencies such as ICA, Police, Central Narcotics Bureau, Singapore Customs and LTA, as well as the Auxiliary Police Forces. This incident shows that the coordination between ICA and Police at the checkpoint needs to be further strengthened.

It is important that Home Team departments work together closely in carrying out their duties. They must ensure that the concept of a Home Team is

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fully internalised and operationalised, both on the ground and by commanders at all levels, to tackle our security challenges as one united entity.

Mdm Speaker, the public expects us to do our job well. MHA holds our Home Team officers to a high standard of professionalism and takes a very serious view of the security lapses that occurred during this episode.

I have had a thorough discussion with the Commissioners of ICA and Police, and their senior leadership. They acknowledged and apologised for the shortcomings and are implementing the remedial measures. Apart from the physical and procedural measures, they recognise the need to set the tone from the leadership through to every ground unit, and every officer, that we have to remain vigilant and alert, and not let our guard down in the face of the serious threats that can arise.

Mdm Speaker, I have worked closely with our Home Team officers for some three years. I have met and talked with many of our officers on the ground to understand the work that they do, and what they need to carry out their duties better. I appreciate the good work of our officers. They have a good record in ensuring the safety and security of Singapore and Singaporeans. Our overall crime rate is at its lowest in 30 years. The number of immigration offenders arrested has been declining since 2001 and is less than half of what it was five years ago.

I have made it clear to the Heads of all our Home Team agencies and departments that when officers perform well, I will recognise their good work and commend them publicly. If they act professionally and discharge their duties properly and to the best of their abilities, but the outcome does not turn out so good, I will speak for them and support them publicly – for this is the difficult and challenging nature of the job that our Home Team officers are called upon to do, and we all need to support and encourage them.

However, if they have not discharged their duties properly and have fallen short of the required performance standards, as some officers have done in this episode, I will hold them accountable and where warranted, admonish and discipline them. Acknowledging mistakes allows our officers and our organisations to learn and improve.

Mdm Speaker, when Home Team officers report for duty, when they put on their uniforms, they carry a heavy responsibility. The duties they discharge, the decisions they make every day can have immediate and serious consequences

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on the safety and security of their fellow Singaporeans and Singapore. We all depend on them and place our trust in them to do their duty well. And this is a trust that has to be earned in all that our officers do, every day.

Mdm Speaker, I would like to thank the Deputy Prime Minister for the update. I have three supplementary questions. First, why did both the officers allow the car to go through without raising an alarm? Secondly, whether any attempts were made to locate the car while it was in Singapore for the three days and why those attempts were not successful? Finally, I understand that disciplinary proceedings are in motion; I would like to ask how many officers will be subject to disciplinary proceedings for this incident.

First, why did the officers not sound the alarm, I think they made a mistake. As far as we know, the first officer at the counter consulted another officer, and hesitated and took two and a half minutes, instead of sounding the alarm immediately. So, that caused a problem. The second officer at the secondary security checkpoint did not do so either. I do not know the reasons why he did not raise the alarm.

The officers are not new officers; they have been on duty and in the service for some years. Looking back at their records, they have generally been good officers. So, we do not know the reasons why they did not sound the alarm immediately, but they had been trained to do so.

As I had explained, it is not a frequent occurrence, but it is not infrequent either. It occurs once in every couple of months. So, officers who have been on duty or have been in the service for some years, would more likely than not have experienced this occurrence, which is not unusual.

We also emphasise to our officers that if they err on the side of caution and sound the alarm, no action will be taken against them because they are actually safeguarding Singaporeans' safety.

With regard to disciplinary proceedings, I have pointed out a number of officers who have failed in their duties quite clearly. Disciplinary action will be taken against both officers. There are a number of other officers in the operational supervisory chain who could have and should have noticed and rectified the situation. But they did not. And so, we will assess and see what is the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken. The officers, of course, will have the opportunity to explain and defend themselves. So, I would not want to go

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into numbers right now.

What efforts were taken to locate the car over the three days, as I had explained, the major factor in this was a misclassification of the incident of the breach as an immigration offence and not a major security breach. As a result of it not being classified as a major security breach, the Police did not put out a high-level persistent alert to all ground forces. Therefore, they were not looking for the vehicle and the driver as actively and vigorously as they should have.

Thank you, Madam. Two supplementary questions. The first is from my original Question No 4 on the Order Paper, part (e): whether the current number of immigration officers is enough to deal with the surge in travellers during peak seasons. The second question: what has been done to ensure that the attention of immigration officers is not compromised as a result of tiredness and/or long working hours?

Mdm Speaker, as I have said in my reply earlier, I do not underestimate the challenges of our officers working at the Woodlands Checkpoint. It is one of the busiest land checkpoints in the world. There are 300,000 people and 130,000 vehicles passing though every day. The workload is high, and officers need to remain vigilant and alert at all times.

To manage this, we have, over the years, put more resources into Woodlands Checkpoint. For example, we have increased the manpower at Woodlands Checkpoint by 42% in 2009 as a result of a study that was conducted on workload and work factors at the Woodlands Checkpoint in 2008. So, in 2009, we increased the Woodlands Checkpoint's manpower by 42%. Over the last few years, we have added another 11% bringing the total increase between 2008 and now to 58%.

During the same period, the total increase in travellers and vehicles is 26% and 36% respectively.

In addition, ICA has leveraged on technology and expanded the physical clearance capacity of Woodlands. ICA introduced the enhanced Automated Clearance System (eIACS) and the Biometric Identification of Motorbikes (BIKES) system in 2006. Both eIACS and BIKES are self-service immigration lanes that offer secure immigration clearance by biometric identifiers. Today, eIACS and BIKES are available to Singapore citizens, PRs, Long-Term Visit Pass holders and Malaysian nationals who qualify as frequent travellers. In 2013, 50% of bus and train passengers passing through the land checkpoints used the eIACS, and

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30% of motorcyclists used BIKES. More can still be done to push up the usage rate. ICA will continue to channel passengers and vehicles to use these self-service modes.

Other examples of how ICA leverages on technology include the installation of flexible immigration counters which can switch between manual and automated clearance modes depending on traveller volume.

ICA has also increased the clearance capacity at Woodlands. The current Woodlands Checkpoint was commissioned more than 10 years ago in 1999. It had 40 counters for cars, 12 counters for lorries and 30 counters for motorcycles. I repeat that – 40 for cars, 30 for motorcycles and 12 for lorries.

To alleviate congestion at the Woodlands Checkpoints, ICA re-activated the old Woodlands Checkpoint for lorries, with four additional lanes to add to the 12 in December 2008 and added 20 counters to add to the 30 for motorcycles in 2009.

In the next phase, we will see 30 car counters to add to the 40 we currently have. So, we will have 70 car counters in total, which are expected to be operationalised in 2016. The lorries and motorcycle counters are already in place.

Since the reactivation of old Woodlands Checkpoint, we have seen an improvement in the waiting time for vehicles at the checkpoint. We will continue to monitor the situation at Woodlands Checkpoint.

The crossings are very susceptible to peaks. For example, on a given day, there are very sharp peaks at times when workers come to work or when Singaporeans go across. There are peaks during public holidays. ICA tries to man the counters to the full extent possible. It also means our officers work a bit longer and also on public holidays but peaks being what they are, it is very difficult to design a checkpoint or a system to cater to the peaks, and especially the peak of peaks. So, there will be some delays, but it is also important to understand that security is very important. Even during the peaks, we maintain security.

To put this into context, as I have said, we had about 26 such incidents of checkpoint breach by vehicles over the last three years. There are about 50 million vehicles per year coming through the Woodlands Checkpoint. So, 25 to 26 breaches over slightly more than three years translates to one breach in

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every five million vehicles, which is contained within the checkpoint. And for about every 75 million vehicles, there is one breach that goes beyond the checkpoint for which a fuller response is required.

That is one of the challenges: how to maintain a system which is able to manage a very high throughput and at the same time respond immediately to an abnormal incident in the checkpoint and an even more abnormal one beyond the checkpoint, without clogging up the whole checkpoint. This is a big challenge for us.

Madam, I have three supplementary questions for the Deputy Prime Minister. First, I fail to understand how the investigation could have classified the security breach as an error of judgement by the officers concerned, given that the alleged intruder jumped both immigration and custom clearance. Is it because to classify it as a major security breach, rather than a less serious immigration offence, would entail a lot more consequences for the officers responsible? So, is this a question of officers trying to downgrade the seriousness of the breach?

Secondly, this incident revealed systemic issues within the Home Team. The intruder had gone undetected for three days until a taxi driver made a "999" complaint. I just fail to understand how is it that the different agencies could not coordinate in a situation like this.

Finally, this is a very embarrassing incident. I certainly hope that the disciplinary action that will be meted out will not dampen the morale of the Home Team because I think they do do a good job. Nonetheless, I am unable to appreciate how this lapse could have occurred, in light of many other incidents involving the Home Team.

Well, I certainly agree with Assoc Prof Eugene Tan. I find the decision that was made by the ground commanders unacceptable. There is a protocol to classify these as security breaches. This was an error of judgement made by the officers, as this is a major security breach. It was also a breach of protocol, which was supposed to be observed. It is not that I have misclassified it as an error of judgement. That is what the officers did on the ground. They made an error. That was the judgment they made. It was wrong, and not only that, they breached the protocol. Therefore, it is a serious error on their part.

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Thank you, Madam. I have four related supplementary questions. The first is: what is the kind of arrangements between the Home Team and the private security company in ensuring the suitability of the APOs for the various types of job functions? The second is: what sort of decisions go into deciding what type of job functions can be outsourced? The third is: is the training the same for the APOs and full-time officers performing the same duty? The fourth is whether any of the APOs are allowed to start their work before completing all the trainings required of them.

Well, none of the APOs can start their duties without having completed their training. None of the ICA officers can either. The APOs are deployed to carry out certain specific functions. In the case of this particular APO at the checkpoint, although this is the green lane, his duty is to make sure of two things. One, that the number of passengers in the car tallies with the number cleared through the immigration checkpoint. Second, do a security check of the boot and other things in the car to make sure that the security of Singapore is maintained. These are very specific functions and the APOs are trained to do this before they go on duty.

In general, we will employ APOs where there are very specific functions to be carried out. Where there are functions which would require a broader range of judgement, or a broader application of policies, then we will employ our own Home Team officers who will be able to understand and apply these more complicated and complex protocols in a better way. That is roughly the apportionment between them.

Mdm Speaker, one supplementary clarification for the Deputy Prime Minister. I appreciate the fact that the officers on the ground had chosen to report this as an immigration offence as opposed to a breach of border security. Does this mean that the particulars of the driver and vehicle were then not circulated to all the other ground forces? Is that the reason why, at Cantonment Complex, when the officers responded to the "999" call by the taxi driver initially, and then at MFA, the officers failed to respond or recognise immediately that this was a vehicle involved in the breach three days earlier?

Exactly so. That is why the mistake in classifying the incident was a major factor in the subsequent inadequate response. But even

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on its own, when a suspicious incident does occur, even without any of these other precursors, the officers at Cantonment Complex could have responded better.