Bus Service Reliability Framework

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Transport with regard to the new Bus Service Reliability Framework (a) what evidence does the LTA rely on to determine that providing financial incentives rather than just penalties to public bus operators to arrive at bus stops on schedule will improve waiting times; and (b) whether the incentive amounts will be funded by taxpayers.

Bus operators have to incur additional costs to monitor and improve en-route reliability and regularity of the trial bus services under the Bus Service Reliability Framework (BSRF). For example, the operators need to hire and train more bus controllers to manage bus services more closely, instruct bus drivers to slow down and mobilise standby buses. The operators may also need to modify and enhance their operations control systems. Hence, there must be some net financial incentive in the design of this Framework.

We have also looked closely at overseas examples, in particular, the London system which has worked well and been carefully refined over many years. For a start, we have modelled our incentive-penalty structure for this BSRF pilot quite closely after the London system, but we will certainly review and improve along the way to make it cost-effective to benefit commuters who have consistently mentioned reliability of buses as a priority area for improvement.

The BSRF will be funded by the Government, as it is a trial to assess whether it can improve the reliability of our bus services.