Long-term Strategies for Dealing with Environmental Aspects of Haze

Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources what are the latest measures taken by the Ministry, including collaborations with Indonesia, to improve the haze situation in Singapore, given the recent record-high Pollutant Standards Index readings.

Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong asked the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources what is his assessment of the haze problem that recurs annually and what steps can be taken to ensure that haze at unhealthy levels caused by forest fires in Indonesia will not recur in Singapore again.

Mr Yee Jenn Jong asked the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources (a) whether Singapore is working towards having agricultural companies that frequently use burning to clear land to be independently certified for responsible land clearing practices in order to sell their products here; and (b) what is the progress made since the 14th Meeting of the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze Pollution in October 2012 on the sharing of digital geo-referenced concession maps to allow easier identification of companies with hotspots in their concessions.

Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) what long-term strategies and response plans has the Government put in place since our ratification of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and adoption of ASEAN's Regional Haze Action Plan; (b) how effective has the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre been in giving early warnings on the timing and severity of this year's haze that affected Singapore; and (c) what is the status with regard to establishing a national task force/committee to develop strategies and response plans to deal with fires and smoke haze as mandated in ASEAN's Regional Haze Action Plan.

A major component of my Ministry and that of the NEA's mission is to protect the public health of Singaporeans. What that means is public hygiene, food safety and the quality of air and the water that we all breathe and drink. This is ultimate democracy: the air we all breathe and the water that we all drink.

This commitment also extends to the haze, although, quite frankly, where the haze is concerned, our hands are somewhat more tied than in other areas. With the haze, we have no direct sight of the source at all – it is hundreds of kilometres away and is spread over an area that is many times the size of Singapore.

In fact, various estimates have shown that every year, the area of forest that is burned is probably about seven times the size of Singapore. So, this is on a scale that probably most of us cannot even imagine. Our objectives, therefore, are to detect the fires early to warn if it is imminent and to mitigate the effects of the haze if it does arrive.

Let me get the first slide up [A slide was shown to hon Members]. To detect fires, we use satellite pictures like these. This was the situation on 14 June 2013. You will notice the white clouds: that is not the haze. Those are clouds. And if you look carefully, you will see a few red spots. These are the hotspots. The point I wanted to make with this slide is that even with a satellite picture, if there is local cloud cover, you will not be able to see every hotspot that is burning in there. You will not be able to assess the ferocity of the fires or the density of the plumes.

There is also the subsequent question of wind. As every sailor knows, wind can be both a blessing and a bane. Similarly, when we wake up in the morning and look out of the window, whether it is a blue or a hazy sky depends very much on the location and number of the fires, the density of the smoke and the direction of the wind. We must not forget that while the fires are beyond our immediate sight, actually the haze only takes a few hours to reach us. This

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makes early warning very challenging, even with perfect knowledge of the ground situation and winds. Under ideal conditions, the longest warning that we can have from the time the smoke emerges from the fire to the time the haze hits us, is around six to 10 hours. This helps frame how difficult early warning is.

Ms Irene Ng asked me to share my assessment of the haze situation. Frankly, the haze is not a problem that will go away easily or quickly. This is a complex problem and not least because it originates from the fires on land in another sovereign country.

Let me show you the second slide [A slide was shown to hon Members]. This was the situation on 19 June 2013. This slide shows you quite dramatically the extent of the burning that quite often takes place in Sumatra. You can see many more red spots now. Those are the hotspots. What is most obvious in this picture are the yellow plumes, the haze that is emanating from Sumatra and flowing across the Straits to Singapore.

The problem transcends an environmental solution because the root cause of this is really commercial. Some big-time plantation companies and paper mills have a total disregard for their social and environmental responsibilities and, indeed, of the local Indonesian laws themselves. Their actions have severely affected millions of people in Indonesia itself, in Malaysia and, of course, the five million of us resident in Singapore. My Ministry and the other agencies have been working with Indonesia over the years to press for solutions. But let me also tell you very frankly the improvements have been incremental at best. I will say more about this later.

The recent haze spell was particularly bad three weeks ago because there was a dry spell in Sumatra. Members will also recall there was a dry spell in Singapore as well at that same point in time. And there was also an unfavourable wind. Basically, the wind was blowing from the west, conveying all these smoke plumes across the Straits to Singapore. We were actually gearing up for the onset of the haze season. In fact, this is somewhat earlier than the usual haze season in other years. But the situation deteriorated sharply within a short period. Nonetheless, given the circumstances, our officers acted swiftly and worked very hard to detect, give warning and put in place mitigation measures. Let me go through a chronology of events with Members.

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This slide plots the number of visible hotspots over the course of time from 12 June until 7 July 2013 [Please refer to Annex 1]. It is annotated by key events.

The Inter-Agency Haze Task Force (HTF), which comprises 23 public agencies, was set up in 1994 to coordinate our national action plans to ensure accurate information flow and put in place plans to ensure service continuity. This Task Force met on 29 May 2013, before the haze unfolded, in order to update its plans.

Er Dr Lee asked when my Ministry first alerted the Indonesian Government on the haze. On 14 June 2013, the hotspot count was 46 in Sumatra. Forty-one of these hotspots were in Riau. However, the full extent of hotspot activities could not be determined fully from the satellite images due to the cloudy conditions, as I showed Members earlier on. The PSI readings had moved from Good to Moderate by 1.00 pm on 14 June 2013. That same day, NEA issued a public haze advisory. NEA also updated its website. NEA contacted the Head of the Forest Fires Division of the Indonesian Ministry of Environment to seek an urgent update of the ground situation and to request that urgent measures be taken to mitigate the haze.

Unfortunately, the situation worsened on 17 June 2013. Satellite pictures now showed 113 hotspots in Sumatra, of which 106 were in Riau, and the 24-hour PSI at 3.00 pm on 17 June 2013 had increased to between 67 and 80, that is, in the moderate range. At this point, NEA issued another public haze advisory.

The CEO of NEA sent an official note to the Deputy Minister of the Indonesian Ministry of Environment on 17 June 2013 to warn of an alarming increase in the number of hotspots in Sumatra and sought Indonesia's assistance to enforce the appropriate legislation on plantation companies to prohibit slash-and-burn. The CEO of NEA also wrote to the Malaysian Department of Environment because the Malaysians are currently the host of the next Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze and he requested the Malaysians to advance the meeting.

On 18 June 2013, the next day, the satellite pictures showed 187 hotspots in Sumatra. The PSI was now 115 to 127, in the unhealthy range. That same day, I telephoned my counterpart, the Indonesian Environment Minister Balthasar Kambuaya to express my grave concern. I requested Indonesia to take action to put out the fires and offered our assistance. I also requested him to publish the concession maps – this has been something I have been urging for a very long time – so that we could identify the companies and the persons who were

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responsible for these fires. Our Foreign Minister Shanmugam separately called the Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa the same day. I followed up with a letter to Minister Kambuaya on 19 June 2013 to reiterate our grave concerns and to re-offer assistance.

In response to our calls, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry called for an emergency meeting with Singapore on 20 June 2013 in Jakarta. Despite the short notice, our delegation, led by the CEO of NEA and comprising staff from MEWR, NEA and MFA, attended the meeting. We reiterated our concerns, offered assistance and called on Indonesia to take further actions to address the haze. The Indonesian officials conveyed that they were taking action at the provincial level in tackling the on-going fires.

To further underscore the seriousness of the situation, Prime Minister Lee sent me to Jakarta as his Special Envoy on 21 June 2013 to convey his personal letter to Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The letter stressed the following:

First, this is a recurring problem with regional implications.

Second, strong and effective action is needed to be taken against the companies involved in illegal land clearing practices.

Third, if any Singapore-linked companies were involved, Indonesia should share with us the evidence so that we could pursue the matter.

Fourth, that countries in the region had to work together to overcome the problem, and

Fifth, Singapore stood ready to cooperate fully with Indonesia. This included renewing the environmental collaboration between Singapore and Jambi province or, indeed, expanding that cooperation to other provinces as well.

As with previous years, we offered a haze assistance package that included aircraft for cloud seeding, satellite imagery and hotspot coordinates. The Environment Minister of Indonesia received the letter on President Yudhoyono's behalf.

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President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono replied formally to Prime Minister Lee on 3 July 2013. He acknowledged the seriousness of the situation this year, and informed Prime Minister Lee that the Indonesian authorities would undertake comprehensive investigations so that "those responsible are firmly held to account". He highlighted Indonesia's fire-fighting efforts to reduce the number of hotspots. The President also stated that the government of Indonesia had been in the final stages of resubmitting the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution to Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) for ratification by the House. The President also very graciously reiterated his apologies and reassured us that they would spare no effort to address this problem.

On the domestic front, my colleague, the Minister for Defence, has explained the convening and the actions of the Crisis Management Group. As Members are also aware, Prime Minister Lee appointed the Haze Inter-Ministerial Committee led by Dr Ng Eng Hen on 20 June 2013 to coordinate a whole-of-Government response.

From this chronology of events, you will see that the Government has been monitoring the haze situation closely over many years, and more closely over the last one month, and we did our best to get the Indonesian authorities to deal with the source of the problem, even as we geared up to take protective action locally.

I said earlier that we have been working with the Indonesian government to try to improve the situation on the ground. Let me give Members some idea of the current state of play at the ground, including at the provincial level.

First, at the government-to-government level, we need Indonesia and other like-minded countries to commit more seriously to work together to tackle transboundary haze. Mr Muhamad Faisal Manap and Mr Yee asked about the progress of the regional agreements and the platforms established to address transboundary haze. The ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) was endorsed by the ASEAN Environment Ministers in December 1997 – a long time ago – arising from the period of intense fire and transboundary haze pollution that year. This has since been superseded by the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution formulated in 2002. The latter built on the ideas from the RHAP, such as monitoring, assessment and prevention, technical cooperation and scientific research, and mechanisms for coordination.

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Under this framework, Singapore hosts the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) that monitors the regional hotspot situation and provides early warning to all affected countries – it is not just for Singapore; this is a regional centre – when the ASMC observes a significant rise in hotspot counts. Meanwhile, an ASEAN Coordinating Centre (ACC) facilitates the channelling of regional resources to countries requesting for assistance to combat fires. However, the 2002 ASEAN agreement has yet to be ratified by Indonesia. I hope this agreement will be ratified by the time the ASEAN Environment Ministers meet in October this year. The credibility of ASEAN depends very much on the willingness of its individual members to live up to our international obligations. However, whilst Indonesia's ratification of the treaty will send a strong signal of high-level political commitment, this, in itself, may not be sufficient to prevent the haze if the measures taken on the ground – investigations and enforcement – remain weak.

Mr Zaqy Mohamad has asked whether there had been any progress in tackling the haze issue since October 2012. In 2006, Singapore initiated a sub-regional grouping – the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze Pollution – which comprises Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The MSC has met 14 times since then, focusing on assisting Indonesia in implementing its Plan of Action to combat haze. At the last meeting, which was held in October 2012, the Ministers agreed to explore sharing concession maps and using satellite and mapping technologies to monitor hotspots in order to hold plantation companies and land owners accountable for their land-clearing practices. A technical task force – currently led by Singapore and comprising experts from other MSC countries – is now studying the implementation details. The technology platform will be ready soon. What we need now is for all the countries to provide official, accurate concession maps and we will push for this urgently at the upcoming MSC meeting next week.

To make a stronger push for concrete actions, I would be seeking clear deliverables from next week's MSC meeting. To Singapore, the key outcomes we want for next week are the following.

First, that MSC countries submit their concession maps and agree to a date for the public launch of the ASEAN Sub-Regional Haze Monitoring System platform that will enable the identification of errant companies.

Second, that MSC countries involve high-level officials from all relevant Ministries and agencies from each country. The reason for this is because this is not a pure environmental problem. We need, in the case of Indonesia, to have

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the cooperation and full support of other Ministries like the Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Natural Resources, and this requires a whole-of-Government approach, a whole-of-government commitment, and not just one confined to the Ministry of Environment

Third, we hope that Indonesia will agree to renew the collaboration that we have successfully had in Jambi and in other provinces, if possible.

And fourth, that Indonesia commits to ratify the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Agreement as soon as possible.

Let me now move on to bilateral collaboration which Mr Ang has asked about. I had mentioned briefly our collaboration with the province of Jambi. I would characterise this as one of our more successful efforts and, indeed, we did observe a greater reduction in the number of hotspots in Jambi Province during our years of collaboration, compared to other fire-prone provinces in Sumatra. The action programmes benefited the local authorities and communities by enhancing their capabilities and knowledge in the area of fire prevention, fire suppression and alternative livelihoods. I should say that a major success factor was the strong support given by the then Governor of Jambi, Pak Zulkifli Nurdin. This illustrates the necessity for political buy-in and commitment at the provincial level and on the ground. Unfortunately, this collaboration was not renewed after 2011.

If you look very carefully at this picture, you will see a tall pole, that is the meteorological pole which helps gather meteorological data – wind direction, moisture, rain and so on. If you look even more closely, you will see a little small box in which are analysers for air quality. These were provided to our colleagues in Jambi by the Singapore Government, but all technology requires maintenance and requires repair. Unfortunately, this is now not working and we have not been able to gain access to fix it, but we hope the Indonesian government will renew this agreement and allow us to do more work at a local level on a mutually beneficial basis.

We have conveyed to Indonesia that we want to renew this collaboration and we also want to undertake projects which promote sustainable agricultural practices. In fact, President Yudhoyono had already agreed to support this when he met Prime Minister Lee in April this year and we have been awaiting confirmation from our Indonesian counterparts. We stand ready to replicate this project in Jambi in other fire-prone provinces, such as Riau, which was the

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source of most of the haze that hit us this time round.

Secondly, beyond government-to-government engagement, my Ministry has also been engaging stakeholders and interest groups ranging from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and think-tanks to companies. We believe that this is a useful and essential complement to the inter-governmental processes. For this reason, at the sub-regional level, we have initiated a forum that will enable the MSC countries to reach out to existing and potential stakeholders, to exchange best practices and to form new partnerships. My Ministry organised and hosted the first MSC Forum in 2009. In 2012, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) supported Brunei in hosting the second MSC Forum. This forum involves NGOs, academics, companies and other relevant stakeholders. So, it is a process that exists in parallel to inter-government processes.

My Ministry has also been identifying and will be approaching the companies themselves to encourage them to establish a positive model in the operation and the management of plantations. We want to show that such responsible practices are workable, practical, sustainable and viable, and we hope that this will become the accepted way of doing business and will be replicated across the industry.

Thirdly, I would like to respond to Mr Nicholas Fang and Ms Irene Ng who asked about the steps other stakeholders, including Singaporeans, can take to ensure a long-term solution. Every one of us, as a consumer, has the power to influence the behaviour of a company. A key cause of the haze is the clearance of plantation land by burning because this is the cheapest way to do so. Let me give Members an idea of the scale. To pay someone and give that person a jerry can of kerosene to burn one hectare of forest cost about S$6. If you pay a team of contractors to use chain saws to cut forest, tractors and bulldozers to clear the logs and then plough the ground, it would cost you thousands of dollars more. Between $6 and thousands of dollars, that is the profit motive, that is where the source of the haze lies. That is why we need, not only legislation, but we also need consumer pressure to be applied, otherwise, the temptation to go for the cheapest way or the most unsustainable and irresponsible way, that temptation would be too great.

Through our purchasing decisions, we can punish businesses that undertake illegal burning and reward those which adopt sustainable practices. The supply chain also has a role here. I was very encouraged to learn that the Singapore Manufacturers' Federation (SMa) urged its members not to have any business dealings with errant organisations and their subsidiaries involved in

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these illegal fires. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) has also called on five of its members alleged to have been involved in illegal land clearing in Indonesia to submit digital maps of their plantations and aid its investigations. I encourage more of such ground-up, non-governmental approaches to hold people accountable and to ensure that transparency and data are available.

Let me conclude by saying that my Ministry's core mission in the haze has been to detect, to warn and to mitigate. In the areas of detection and warning, the Meteorological Service of Singapore (MSS) of NEA is looking to enhance its capabilities for the early warning of haze. This includes making use of more meteorological data, finer resolution satellite imagery, enhanced dispersion modelling capabilities, and installation of more sensors. Let me try to explain what all that means.

For instance, by next year, and certainly by 2015, we will be gaining feeds from new satellites which have greater resolution. We need resolution down to the range of about 1 km to 2 km to be able to identify hotspots. The new satellites will also have greater spectral sensitivity, which means you can also see fires in an early stage or maybe even if they are underground. Third, we need more wind sensors, not only in Singapore, but, indeed, in the Straits and in the shores beyond ours. These wind sensors will input into the more complicated computer models which predict weather patterns, whether there will be rain or drought, winds, speed of the wind which determines how fast the haze features are, directions of the wind, which is the difference between why we had a clear Saturday on 22 June while Muar in Johor was completely overcome by haze. These sophisticated computer models are still in a state of development.

As Dr Ng Eng Hen said just now, what we need is to be able to predict the haze, the density, not one hour from now, and not 24 hours ago, but the next 24 hours. In the same way, people have gotten used to weather forecasts and we will have to upgrade our capability to be able to give you haze forecasts, because these forecasts are how you will plan your day, what activities businesses need to take, schools, hospitals – everything depends on a forward-looking prediction. I cannot give you the assurance that it can be 100% accurate. It is not possible. Everyone who engages in weather forecasting knows that, but we can improve the precision of our forecasts. That is something which we are going to work very hard on over the next one or two years.

I also cannot emphasise enough that, for a lasting and permanent solution, we need the firm commitment and resolute action by the Indonesian

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government at all levels. We appreciate that the President of Indonesia has acknowledged the severity of the situation and has given his commitment to tackle the issue. Quite frankly, I think it was his apology and his commitment that made a difference on the ground, and helped to reduce or at least prevented people from starting more fires without having to worry about consequences. Of course, we were helped by the rains which have now fallen over Sumatra over the last one week. We will stand ready to work and to do our best with Indonesia as a close neighbour and as a partner in ASEAN.

The haze situation today has improved a lot compared with what we faced three weeks ago. But I also want to be honest with Singaporeans and tell you that this beautiful day which we have now could be only a temporary respite. The dry season is not over yet, and we need continued vigilance and decisive action by the Indonesian authorities to prevent another recurrence of the haze over the next two to three months.

MEWR and NEA will do our part to detect and give warning of the haze and to mitigate its impact, but we need the support and cooperation of all stakeholders. I also want to end by thanking Singaporeans for their calmness, their patience and the fact that they refused to get rattled by the situation. It is that ability to respond sensibly, rationally, cohesively and collectively as a people that makes the difference, and makes me confident that we will get through this together, whatever happens.

A supplementary question for Dr Ng. I note that national resilience and psychological defence are, indeed, very important, not just for haze, but also if there is another round of SARS or a MERS virus crisis. I also note that the Minister said that 80% had expressed confidence in the way the Government is dealing with the haze. I think that is creditable. Is there anything about the 20% who had expressed a lack of confidence, is there anything we can learn from them? Secondly, in terms of preparing for crises, had the haze been prolonged, it would be a very different crisis. Can the Minister speak on how we will respond to a prolonged crisis?

Mdm Speaker, I thank Mr Foo for the questions. On whether we can learn anything from the 20%: yes,

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there are always lessons from every crisis.

Information management is something we are always updating, always thinking how do you respond too much, too little, what can you improve, why was there a run on masks, why could we have not predicted and so on and so forth. The answer is "yes".

I did not give that figure so much just as a quantitative measure but to give us a sense that there has to be a certain inbuilt resilience of the people if Singapore is to withstand greater shocks. That resilience, that confidence, is built up with each episode. Every time we overcome a crisis – SARS, H5N1, haze – we have that confidence. I said that there are two essential elements: first, trust – trust between the people and the leaders, and in each other and, second, care. To me, if we can build a community that trusts and cares for one another, then we have great advantage in weathering whatever difficulties. That is something that we continue to have to cultivate. As I have said, during the hot and dry months, the Inter-Ministerial Committee will continue to remain watchful and will continue to learn the lessons that we need to learn to maintain that confidence in our people.

Madam, I have two questions for the Minister of Defence. First, one of the big causes of anxiety among Singaporeans was the unavailability of N95 masks at the height of the haze. How will the Government ensure in the future that its stockpile of face masks gets to the distribution points faster? Secondly, are there any laws in place that require retailers to ration the sale of essential products the moment such emergencies break out, rather than a few days after the fact, so as to mitigate the effects of hoarding, and to ensure that the genuinely vulnerable people get the necessary protection that they need?

These are relevant questions. In terms of anti-hoarding laws, I will leave it to MTI to answer, because there are some Parliamentary Questions based on that subject. What have we learnt from the run on masks or the panic buying of masks? If you look at what happened, based on that particular day – 21 June – the number of people that really ought to have been wearing masks was nowhere near the masks that were sold. This was anticipated demand, exactly as the Member has said. They were thinking, "What if the haze lasts for a week and I am the last one without a mask in Singapore?"

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That fed into a frenzy.

Why was there a difficulty in getting the masks from these warehouses where we had nine million to the distributors? There was a reason. The masks that were stocked up by MOH were not for the public. They were for their healthcare workers. By the way, that stockpile is quite important, in case the MERS viruses come here and infect us. So, they were meant for health workers to make sure that there was sustainability and the way that they were stored, and so on and so forth, assumptions were made on a particular rate of use. There are very few systems that are prepared for a situation where from one day to the next, your demand of masks is 5,000 and the next day, one million. Very few distributors will stock that amount. If they do that as a business model, many of you would say that they would not survive. There are reasons for it.

Back to the Member's question on how do we plan ahead: first, we have stocked up our masks, not only for the haze, but for contingencies like MERS or SARS or other infectious diseases. Secondly, MOH will be looking at packaging and see how we can roll it out in terms of our distributorship chains. All in all, it did not reflect badly on our system that we were able to react fairly quickly, including using the SAF to move the masks from the warehouses to the constituencies, and retailers like NTUC Fairprice activating their supply chain to get the masks straight from the warehouses to their retail outlets, including to other retailers. This shows that there is a certain nimbleness or robustness in our system. We can do better but we did not do that badly.

Mdm Speaker, the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources said that the root cause of the haze problem was commercial. If that is the case, would the Minister agree that Singapore needs to be bolder in its efforts to place commercial pressure on the errant plantation companies? What Singaporeans can do as consumers and investors is to boycott products that come from these companies responsible for the transboundary haze and to demand for products that come from sustainable sources.

Can I ask the Minister when can he provide information on the companies responsible for the haze so that we can take such actions as consumers and investors, and if he could provide the information obtained not only from Indonesia but perhaps also by NGOs on the ground?

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Mdm Speaker, I would like to thank the Minister for his chronology of meetings that took place and actions that were taken in the recent haze situation. Like him, I appreciate that the haze sends us a reminder not to take our fresh air for granted. I also appreciate that it is a yearly reminder. We know that an Inter-Ministerial Task Force was set up in 1994 and that that Task Force drew up a national haze plan of action with responses in Government actions at different ranges of PSI. We were reassured in 2006 that we have a haze action plan to protect and inform Singaporeans in the event of haze.

So, I would like to ask the Minister: these actions that we took this year, were they actions taken under the 1994 plan that was drawn up? Was that plan in force during the week of 17 June? If so, could the Government not have publicised that haze plan, more so that we could all have planned better our own efforts to deal with the haze?

Mr Chen's questions relate to whether our plans since the Haze Task Force was set up in 1994 were robust enough, what did we learn if there were gaps. I would say "yes". The 23-agency Haze Task Force – as Dr Vivian Balakrishnan has pointed out – was set up for this particular haze episode two weeks before the peak of the haze on 21 June, because there was this Haze Task Force coordinating across the agencies. MEWR was able to respond with its outlines of various measures, including contacting the Indonesians even before our PSI reached unhealthy levels. It was actually at the moderate level but we could see the hot spots, and so we informed the Indonesians. At the same time, there was an advisory issued. But it was really the sharp spike on 21 June that got Singaporeans' attention and the run on masks because of that became a public event. I have responded to Mr Gerald Giam on how we dealt with that and how we have learned from that.

Let me just make a general point. I do not think it is possible in emergency planning to have a set of rules that covers every specific threat, whether it is haze or something else. I have dealt with SARS, H5N1 and H1N1 in various Ministries. You have to customise your plans. Because some of the threats are known but they come in variations, and there are different threats each time. I would be very worried if we just stuck to drawer plans, and say "I am supposed to do this now" and ignore the situation on the ground. The fact that we mobilised the SAF was a decision made because we realised that we needed to.

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The fact that we used the People's Association to distribute the masks to the vulnerable and the poor was made on the spot. The fact that we utilised retailers to push out their masks – another three million masks so that people could get access – was also a decision made on the spot.

To be able to do that, you need a leadership and a government that is on the ball, that is able to focus sharply on things, aided by a network of agencies that are already assembled, as in the Haze Task Force, as in the Inter-Ministerial Committee, and able to move quickly when you need to.

Is this saying that we are very satisfied with our performance? Obviously not. We learn with each episode, and we are always mindful that the next more severe national threat may be one that – as Members have pointed out – is longer, larger and may be more challenging for Singapore. Our basic structure is comprehensive and sound but we should always learn from every episode.

Mdm Speaker, a supplementary question for Dr Ng Eng Hen. Every setback gives us an opportunity to up our knowledge quotient and emergency readiness quotient, as well as national resilience. My question is: in the case of haze, what is the one lesson that the PMO would like Singaporeans to remember? In the case of the 911 incident, the chief lesson that people took back was the ability to differentiate between extremists and people who are just religious. In the case of SARS, the handwashing gesture is something that we still remember till today. In the case of the haze threat, what is the one message and one knowledge piece that we want our people to remember?

It is almost a philosophical question. So, I will just answer it from my point of view. I would not speak on behalf of the agencies. The common lesson from all these episodes, whether it is SARs, 911 or haze. It is trust and care. If there is trust between the leadership and the people, we can do a lot. If there is care and concern between people, we can even do more. But when trust breaks down, when people start disbelieving the leadership or each other, then I think you are fighting fires every day.

If, for instance, we had distributed one million masks and if there was suspicion that the grassroots networks would not distribute the masks but keep them for themselves and then profit later, the announcements would not have been met with acceptance. It would have been met with suspicion and cynicism, as has happened in many countries when you talk about a distribution exercise.

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The natural response is, "Oh, this is an excuse for something."

Many things that we do in Singapore are accepted because time and time again when we say that we will distribute something to the poor and vulnerable, it actually goes into the hands of the poor and vulnerable. The day we lose that trust – either between the people and the leaders, or between people and people – the day we stop caring, then I say, any crisis would be too big for us. But if we maintain it, then I am confident that we are able to meet even more challenges.

Mdm Speaker, I would like to ask Minister this: the distribution of the masks for the needy was indeed a very much appreciated move. I would like to ask if the decision was due to a concern of prolonged high PSI levels or was it due to a shortage of masks in the retail market, or that the cost of the masks was beyond the affordability of the needy? If the same considerations were to come back again, would the Government repeat this distribution of masks to the needy?

The earlier questions were leading to the last big question, which was really what the Member wanted to ask. My reply to the first three questions is "All of the above". We did not know how long the haze would last; there was not really a shortage of masks; there was enough but yes, there was a concern that poorer income households and the vulnerable would not be able to get the masks. We met that day and all the Ministries decided that we would push the button and push the masks out. If there is a prolonged haze, will we do more for the people? Our record as a government speaks for itself, whether it is SARS, prolonged hardships from a number of episodes, this Government has always stepped up to help its people when they need it – whether it is business or individual households. I would say that our record speaks for itself. Just see what we have done and when we need to, we will do more.

Madam, just to answer Ms Irene Ng's supplementary question. First, I want to say I totally agree with her. That is why we are pushing and are demanding that official concession maps be published because with those maps, we can overlay with the satellite maps, we can inform these companies, "Look, there is a fire in your area. Did you start it, or have you taken any efforts to put it out? What are your plans to prevent such fires from

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going on?"

I would also add that it is not so straightforward because apart from land which they have a concession on, many of these large plantation companies also buy or source palm oil from small holders on the margins of their larger estates. So, they will fold their arms and say, "No, that's not on my land" but, actually, because they are part of the same supply chain, it is complicit in the irresponsible clearance and of illegal fire setting. So, getting this trail of accountability, joining the dots, is a challenge. Nevertheless, we will make a start by demanding that official concession maps be published; and that companies be held accountable for it.

I agree with her that consumers do need to exert pressure through our purchasing decisions as to which companies we want to do business with. I would also highlight the role of NGOs. For instance, during this crisis, World Resources Institute (WRI) published a map, which is available on the Internet, of concession maps according to their own sources of information and overlaid that with satellite hot spots that we had provided. You cannot use these as evidence in court but, nevertheless, prima facie, there is a cause for questions to be asked and for the companies to feel that they have to account for it. So, we need more of such actions on the part of governments, NGOs and consumers in order to make these companies behave themselves and act responsibly.

One of the sentences that I put in a Facebook post, I think, got a few Indonesian authorities upset. I said, "No country or company has a right to profit at the expense of the well-being and health of Singaporeans." It got some of them irritated and probably contributed to raising the political temperature a bit, but I stand by that statement and I think as Members in this House, regardless of which party we are from, our first and primary duty is to protect the well-being and health of Singaporeans.

Thank you, Madam. In his replies to my two PQs last year on this same issue, the Minister had spoken on how we could use positive actions and commercial pressures on agricultural companies. The Minister spoke about asking companies here with operations in Indonesia to open up their operations to verify for sustainable and responsible way of doing business. I would like to ask: what is the progress? How many companies here have already been approached since last year, and what were their replies to the Minister?

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I would also like to know if we will soon be able to see independent verifications and labelling on agricultural products that are susceptible to the use of burning for land clearance.

Lastly, I would like to ask if it is possible for us to mobilise this effort to extend to other ASEAN countries.

Last year, in my reply to the Member, I did mention that we needed both – positive affirmation as well as negative pressure on errant companies. That is why since last year – in fact, since the year before that – I have been pushing for the publication of concession maps, because without those maps, it is very difficult for me to point fingers, and to point fingers authoritatively, bearing in mind that these activities occur in another sovereign land, and we are not down there to see who has paid who to light that particular fire on that particular piece of land. Yes, we have a view from the sky, from the satellite picture which shows the hot spots, but that is not enough evidence for me to point fingers. It is also the reason why in Prime Minister Lee's letter to the President, he said that if there are any Singapore-linked companies, please give us the evidence so that we can consider taking action against them. We are still waiting for that information or evidence, if any.

On the positive side, I will share one positive anecdote. Very earlier on in this episode, when I made this statement that we have to hold errant companies responsible, some netizens emailed me to say, "You better watch out! How dare you say that? For all you know, Temasek has invested in some of these companies." Well, Temasek invested in a company called Cargill and I made discreet enquiries. Cargill's plantations are all in south of Sumatra, and there was no satellite hot spot in that area. But that was not enough. I will let you in on a little secret. Temasek actually sent executives to go and visit the ground, took photographs of nice, beautiful blue skies to show me, that this was not happening, that there are companies worth investing in, who are doing the right thing and behaving responsibly, and this can work. So, this is a positive example, but we need more positive examples and we need to highlight and ultimately, we need to give these positive companies a commercial advantage.

That is where this point about labeling, about transparency and Ms Irene Ng's point about consumer pressure and consumer choice be brought to bear is relevant. If we can get this going in Singapore and, frankly, I think this may be best done through a non-government group, through consumer groups, through NGOs, and this is also the best way to regionalise or internationalise this. There are some of us here who are from NGOs and I hope you will see that this is one way you can make a positive difference for the environment and for

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the health of our people.

Thank you, Mdm Speaker. Given the political situation in Indonesia, I understand that it may be difficult for the Singapore Government to resolve the haze problems once and for all, soon. I understand from the Minister's speech earlier, Singapore has offered assistance to Indonesia, like the cloud seeding operations as well as providing satellite images. What other assistance has Singapore offered to Indonesia to fight the haze which was rejected by the Indonesian government?

Every year, around this time, we write a letter to say hot spots are increasing, we stand ready to help with cloud seeding, perhaps even fire fighting if they need help, and logistics support. We have had a positive collaboration in Jambi and we want to renew it. The sensors that we installed need to be repaired; we are waiting for their signal to be able to go in to do the repairs. Let me be brutally frank with this House – the answers from the Indonesian Ministers, sometimes in their unguarded moments, they just tell us, "Look, Indonesia is 240 million people. Our GDP is multiples of yours." So, that comment is: "If it is a few dollars, keep it, we do not need it."

It is not very diplomatic, but Singaporeans should draw the correct lessons from this episode. We are small; we are open; we are vulnerable. We are surrounded by much bigger countries which have their own political agendas and their own priorities. So, I think it is necessary for us to have a realistic and humble sense of where we are in the world and, therefore, what we need to do if we are going to remain special and if we are going to be able to punch above our own weight. The first thing is to know the nature, the character and the dynamics of the other people and other countries that we are negotiating with or that we are hoping to have significant collaborations with.

Thank you, Mdm Speaker. The Straits Times reported that Indonesia had named several companies which were involved in this illegal burning, of which two were Singapore-based. May I ask the Minister whether the Government has any follow-up in the investigation against these companies? The other point is whether Temasek-linked companies and Government-linked companies would also join the Government's efforts to conduct a boycott or refuse to do business with any companies that have been identified to be involved in this illegal burning that has contributed to the haze.

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The final point is that the Consumers Association of Singapore (CASE), of which I am the President, had said that we are prepared to do a boycott of companies that can be identified. So, I want to repeat this in this House to say that we will support the Government's actions, but we will need some form of Government assistance to help us identify the companies that we should take action against.

I am so glad that the Member brought up that point. Let me deal with that point first. First, I am glad that CASE has taken the position that they would like to take action against companies. But you notice that CASE has turned around and asked the Government, "Can you please provide us information so that we can act on it?"

Well, unfortunately, here the tables are turned also, and we also have to ask the Indonesians: "Please give us the information on the errant companies." On 21 June, I went to Jakarta and had a private meeting with the Environment Minister. He showed me his file and said, "My investigators have found eight companies, but do not worry, none of them are from Singapore." So I said, "Actually, I just want to know which are the companies, whether they are Singapore-owned, Singapore-based, Singapore-linked or not, we will do our best to take any possible action within our laws against them." But he said, "No, they are not from Singapore." So, this is what I was told on 21 June. Subsequently, some other Ministers came up with another list, ostensibly perhaps naming some companies which may have links with Singapore. Minister Shanmugam has asked officially for the list, "Please tell us who really is a suspect and who you have evidence on, so that we can take action." We are still waiting for that. So, like CASE, we are still waiting for information so that we can take appropriate action against these companies.

I cannot speak on behalf of Temasek. However, I have shared a small anecdote just now which I think very clearly illustrates Temasek's attitude to this business of protecting and looking out for the long-term interests of Singaporeans.

Thank you, Mdm Speaker. I would like to thank the Minister for taking prompt action, especially since 14 June. But I would say that in order to solve this haze problem, we need the Indonesian government to do more in Indonesia.

I have two supplementary questions. Why was the collaboration in Jambi not renewed when it lapsed in 2011. Was it because the Indonesian side was

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not interested to renew it at all? Was there a change in the local official or they think that this haze problem is not important at all?

The second supplementary question is on the PSI readings. There were quite a lot of suggestions from residents to give hourly PSI readings. Will the Ministry consider this request?

The question of why the collaboration in Jambi was not renewed is, I think, a combination of local factors. Change in governorship may have had some role in it. Perhaps, this sense that, well, haze is something that occurs every year in Riau and it is not necessarily at the top of their political agenda. And thirdly, I think we need to appreciate that when you want to go to your neighbour's house, even if it is for collaboration, you need permission. And you need a relationship that is functional, that is based on mutual trust and mutual benefit.

So, we cannot presume to go in there and say, "Well, you know, we installed it. Now it is out of order, we are sending people in to go and fix it." That will be wrong. In fact, if we behave that way, that would put paid to any future collaboration. So, I appeal for certain amount of patience and sensitivity in managing these dynamic relationships.

We have forgotten how big Indonesia is. From Banda Aceh to Papua, I think it is the distance from London to Baghdad. Indonesia has a population of 240 million. It is the fourth largest country in the world. It has got at least three time zones. With greater political decentralisation, we have to deal with multiple levels of government.

I am saying that we will keep trying but I cannot promise you an instant answer. By next week, I will have an answer as to whether they have agreed to renew the collaboration in Jambi. Hopefully, even to offer collaborations with other provinces which we will be keen to do.

The question on readings is one which that came up quite often during the crisis and even my mail box was filled with multiple queries on that. So, if you do not mind, let me give you a somewhat detailed answer to it.

First, I do believe that we should provide more data. More data, if for no other reason but to prove the point that this is a Government with nothing to hide; this is a Government that is credible; this is a Government that is obsessed with accuracy. As Minister Ng said just now, trust is that intangible crucial

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ingredient to Singapore's success. Without trust in the Government, anything we say would not be believed; anything we do cannot be implemented. That is my starting point – more information, greater transparency – better.

But let me tell you my considerations. Actually, our pollution index system is in a state of transition. The PSI system has been around since the 1990s and it needed to be updated. We were in the process of updating it. That is why Members may recall that NEA started publishing PM2.5 data since August last year. The reason I wanted to publish that data – because it was not currently sufficiently captured in the PSI data – was to prepare us to move to a new system.

It is also important to understand that deciding environmental standards is not a purely environmental decision. It has got impact on industry; it has got impact on health; it has got impact on trade. There are many dimensions to it. This is not a decision which you enter into lightly. We were in a state of transition and then this question came up – how about publishing real-time data or raw data instantly? I decided, after carefully thinking through it, not to do so at that point in time. Why? I decided not to do so because the risk of confusion or worse, publishing unverified or inaccurate data was too high. I could not take that risk in the middle of a crisis. After the crisis is over, when we all have time to look, contemplate, decide, we can do so; but not in the middle of a crisis with the risk of confusion being so high.

Hence, my primary consideration was the following. First, were we publishing accurate data? That means, are those machines on the five rooftops of the recording stations that we have in Singapore – are the machines accurate, updated? Do the technicians who are operating them understand those machines? And the answer was "yes" – the readings from those machines were accurate.

The second question: is the data that we are getting giving us enough signals to provide practical advice to Singaporeans, meaning, what impact does it have on your work, what impact does it on schools, on health and so on and so forth? Is it accurate? Is it actionable? And the answer to both these questions was "yes". We found that publishing the 24-hour PSI, the 24-hour rolling average PM2.5 and the 3-hour PSI gave us all the signals that we needed. In fact, when we plotted the shape of the graphs – 3-hour and 1-hour – the graphs were virtually identical. It would not have made a difference to our recommendations.

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Then there was a question about PM2.5 versus PM10. As a doctor, I am fully aware that the more significant pollutant, as far as health is concerned, is PM2.5. There is sufficient medical and health evidence to that effect. But – and this is an important "but" – we need to distinguish between pollution from particulate matter and that from a viral disease like SARS or MERS. Again, it is something which I understand intimately.

In the case of a virus, one or a few particles that get into me could potentially kill me. In the case of particulate matter, the science is a bit more complicated because it is not just a matter of spot exposure – that means what have I breathed now. It is really a function of duration, how long am I breathing it; the dosage of exposure, how high is the pollutant? The third factor is my own state of health – do I have lung or cardiac disease? Fourth, my level of activity. There is a big difference between staying indoors and running a marathon under the same conditions. There are four separate factors that determine the impact of particulate matter pollution on health.

Now, apart from that, there is another very practical matter which I should highlight. In those satellite pictures which I showed Members a while ago, the way to understand haze is to think about a cigarette. If you stand beside a person who has lit a cigarette, the cigarette smoke does not come to you in one uniform dose. It is a plume of smoke. It comes to you in waves, depending on whether the guy blew in your direction or whether there is a wind blowing in your direction. Now, the same phenomenon is occurring for haze. It arrives in Singapore in waves and according to the wind.

Many people said, "Look, the number you are publishing is not what I see out of my window." We have five recording stations: north, south, east, west and in the centre of the island. At any one point in time, the readings are very volatile, depending on whether you got a fresh dose of a plume. The readings between the five places can also be very different – sometimes by the order of a magnitude of hundreds of micrograms. The point is any number that NEA publishes, by definition, will always be an average across space and time. And I tell you honestly, I cannot give you a precise estimate of the haze outside your particular window. But that is precisely the reason why reputable agencies like the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) use a 24-hour rolling average to calculate the index of risk which is what the PSI or the AQI is meant to be. It is an index. That means you take a number, you put it into a formula, you come up with a number which is supposed to give you an estimate of risk.

The USEPA specifies that a 24-hour ambient exposure of less than 35 micrograms per cubic metre is healthy. As a comparison, today in Singapore,

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even at the highest point – I cannot remember which part of Singapore this is right now – it is nine micrograms. So, we are well within the healthy range.

But during the crisis, I had people taking spot data, putting it into a formula which expects a 24-hour rolling average and then jumping to the wrong conclusions. We also had people pointing out to other websites which ostensibly are providing real-time data. Then I discovered, yes, that website is taking data published hourly by us based on rolling 24-hour averages but people mistakenly believed that they were somehow providing more information than NEA. It cannot be. The information is from NEA.

Now, having said all that, I just want to emphasise again that there is no reason for us to give misleading data. We are all in this together. We are all breathing in the same air. But in a crisis, it is important to be consistent. It is important to be accurate. We tried to do that. As Minister Ng said just now, by 20 June, we had switched from just looking at PSI backwards, we said we are going to give you a 24-hour advisory prospectively. That means, we are going to look at hotspots, wind, rain and the readings from different parts of Singapore and give you our best estimate of what the ambient pollution level will be tomorrow so that you can plan accordingly.

Having said that, we are also monitoring the spot data and if there is any sudden change, we will intervene. We did that twice. On 22 June, Saturday, in the morning, there were huge queues for masks. In Bukit Panjang, I had 400 people in a queue. I had to speak to them. Yet, when I walked out of the Bukit Panjang Plaza that afternoon, the sky miraculously became blue because the wind changed from west to south and blew all the haze, unfortunately, to our friends in Muar in southern Johor. So, we had to issue an update to say, "Things have changed. Conditions have improved."

Similarly, last Sunday, the conditions continued to improve and at 12 midnight, after reviewing all the data, we felt confident. We issued a release to say schools would reopen on 1 July. In fact, our air was in the healthy range. This is the way we will operate from now on – continue to provide data which is internationally comparable, which gives you an index of risk and continue to watch short-term trends. The moment that anything changes for the better or for worse we will keep Singaporeans informed. So, I give you that assurance that we will be accurate, we will be transparent and we will be practical.

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A question for the Minister. On the subject of engaging all levels of government in Indonesia, since the Minister said that the ratification of the ASEAN Haze Agreement is being held up not by Indonesians' central government, but by the Indonesian House of Representatives, the DPR, are there any plans to engage the Indonesian legislators directly to persuade them to ratify the agreement expeditiously, for example, by engaging them at the upcoming ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly?

Unfortunately, my colleague from Foreign Affairs is not here but certainly, if Members of this House meet your colleagues in DPR, by all means, please persuade them of the wisdom of ratifying that agreement.