Efforts to Resolve Transboundary Haze Problem

Mr Yee Jenn Jong asked  the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources if the Ministry will consider (i) publishing the identity of errant companies which it is aware of that have been found to be conducting illegal burning activities in neighbouring ASEAN countries; and (ii) taking action against any of the companies identified if the company or its subsidiaries are registered, listed or operating in Singapore and, if so, by what legal means.

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Transboundary smoke haze is usually brought over by prevailing southern or south-westerly winds from the land and forest fires in Sumatra, and usually at this time of the year when the weather is drier.

Singapore has been actively promoting regional collaboration to address this problem in the southern ASEAN region since 1997. This culminated in the signing of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002, that is, 10 years ago, and its subsequent ratification by all ASEAN Member States, except Indonesia. In 2006, Singapore initiated the sub-regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze Pollution and this group comprises Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand and focuses specifically on the problem of haze in the Southern ASEAN region. Members meet twice a year to discuss measures to prevent, monitor and mitigate land and forest fires in the region.

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Since taking over as MSC Chair in 2010, Singapore has facilitated various initiatives targeted at enhancing fire detection, prevention, monitoring and suppression, as well as building capacity within the countries, to tackle this problem. For example, to improve the early warning and fire prevention systems, Indonesia and Malaysia are refining the Fire Danger Rating System (FDRS) through the addition of more automatic weather stations for data-gathering. To strengthen the early warning system further, we have established the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC), which is hosted in Singapore, and this has promoted closer collaboration and, just as important, information sharing through a stronger network amongst the environment and meteorological agencies of the countries.

Singapore has also initiated and hosted the first MSC Forum in October 2009 to facilitate the sharing of best practices, to promote collaboration with external partners and to assist in resource mobilisation. During our 10 years as Chairman, a second Forum was also held in May 2012, which provided a forum for countries to explore public-private partnerships as well as innovative financial schemes to promote sustainable forest management and to mitigate undesirable land clearing practices.

Er Dr Lee has specifically asked about the Regional Haze Training Network (RHTN). This network serves for haze-related collaboration and training, as well as a central depository of information on the resources and the expertise of our countries, to tackle the haze. Since the network's inception in February 2011, two training courses have been conducted for 26 officials from all the MSC countries. A course on the "Interpretation of Satellite Imagery" was conducted in November 2011, and another course on "Peatland and Haze Management" was jointly organised by the Singapore Environment Institute and the Environment Institute of Malaysia in May 2012. Going forward, this network will organise more workshops, to focus on air quality monitoring and haze control.

The Indonesian government has allocated funds to fire-prone provinces and initiated several pilot projects to assist in preventing land and forest fires. This, in fact, resulted in a steady reduction in the number of hotspots since 2006. Unfortunately, this year, there has been a spike in the number of hotspots, and the figures for this year now exceed that of 2006. So, there has been considerable backsliding.

Progress in the region's fight against this continued chronic problem requires strong commitment from all ASEAN countries, effective enforcement of laws on the ground, close and cooperative partnerships among the countries, and the support and the pressure that international and non-government organisations can bring to bear on the stakeholders.

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Going forward, our countries would need to scale up successful practices and projects where applicable. We will work with Malaysia and Indonesia on joint collaborations in the Jambi and Riau provinces, which are the provinces closest to us, in order to build up their capabilities for fire detection and suppression.

At the recent 8th Conference of the Party (COP8) to the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution which was held in Bangkok just last month, the ASEAN Ministers agreed to work to ensure that plantation companies utilise zero-burning techniques for land clearing. We are also exploring the use of satellite imagery over-laid on concession maps in order to identify those companies whose concession areas experience excessive hotspot activities which, whilst not necessarily conclusive, would certainly be suggestive that they are using fire clearing as a cheap way to clear land before planting.

All commercial companies must comply with the laws of their host countries and be held accountable if they cause transboundary haze pollution. They will face both potential legal prosecution at the local level as well as adverse consumer reactions internationally. We need to bring appropriate pressure to bear in order to deal with this intractable recurrent problem.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. I thank the Minister for the comprehensive reply. While pre-warning systems and information sharing are useful, what Singaporeans are more concerned about is the haze problem that happens every time there is burning in Sumatra. The moment they burn, we will have to pray that the wind will blow it away, pray that there is more rain! With the recent increase in hotspots exceeding that of 2006, is there anything else that we can do to further reduce this?

At the heart of this problem is not the environment. It is economics. It is far cheaper for these companies to pay someone a few dollars and for a jerry can of fuel to clear the forests. The only problem is these forests which are being cleared are on peatland, which has millions of years' worth of organic materials trapped in the soil. So, when you burn a forest on peatland, you also set alight organic carbon which has accumulated over millions of years. It is, therefore, extremely tragic that the widespread clearance of forests in Borneo and Sumatra for the sake of plantations has, in fact, led to far greater carbon released into the air than any potential savings from the use of bio-fuels or alternative uses of the agricultural products.

Sir, I state this as a context so that Members understand that it is really economics which is driving this. Until and unless economic pressure is felt by the companies that are operating these, they will not change their behaviour. What we can do now with current technology, with the ready availability of satellite imagery and of real-time hot-spot monitoring and then persuading the Indonesian government to release and publish those concession maps, it now allows us to ask relevant questions to the relevant companies, "Why are there so many hotspots in your areas?" Of course, there will be times when this is purely the result of an act of nature. Beyond a certain point, we really have to make the point that this is a man-made disaster. And it is a man-made disaster that is occurring because of short-term gains and the greed on the part of operators on the ground; making the rest of us pay the price in health and in the environment, because of this greed and short-term actions. What we can do more of now is to introduce more transparency, list out who owns which pieces of land, list out the number of hotspots which are occurring in real time in those pieces of land, and then, after that, this requires the involvement of consumer groups, non-government organisations and international organisations who all have a stake in this value chain. I think that is the only effective way, because you can pass all the laws you like in the respective governments, but if you cannot enforce your laws and you cannot ensure that people comply with regulations and rules which are common sense, this problem will keep recurring.

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I just want to explain that there are limits to how much we can do from the point of view of the Government of Singapore. We will do our part to work with a larger network of stakeholders to try to mitigate this problem.

Yes, Sir, I do have some supplementary questions. I thank the Minister for answering the questions. At last month's meeting, it was said that the ASEAN Environment Ministers met and talked about the identifications of these companies. I would like to know if in the identification of these companies, are any of these companies listed in Singapore or are owned by Singaporeans or have their subsidiaries based in Singapore. What can the Singapore Government do to these companies that are Singapore-owned or Singapore-operated? Also, what particular methods can we use to prosecute these companies?

Sir, as I said earlier, there are several evidential difficulties with this. First, if you looked at the list of concessionaries, you would realise that there is a whole web of companies, shell companies, subsidiaries, joint ventures and a variety of business arrangements behind the clearing of land and the planting of oil palms. So, that is the first level. At the second level, in order to achieve prosecution in court, you need to have caught the person in the act. Circumstantial evidence, probability, may not be sufficient.

The third difficulty is that these are local crimes and need to be prosecuted in local jurisdictions. In this case, the jurisdiction is that of Indonesia. We do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction as far as haze and environmental concerns go, at this point in time. Therefore, I do not want to jump the gun and I do not want to make promises or threats which we cannot fulfil. But I think we need to accumulate evidence and there needs to be transparency, public pressure and, ultimately, commercial pressure – meaning which products are bought or not bought, knowing the origins and how the products are made. This is an approach that has worked very well for the timber industry. In the case of the timber industry, with DNA analysis these days, they can analyse which forest the wood in this table came from. This has put the commercial loggers on notice that they have to embark on and pursue business in a sustainable and responsible way, otherwise, they face commercial sanctions. We have to explore using this approach to apply relevant, subtle, or maybe not so subtle, commercial pressure on these companies to clean up their act.

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I hope the Member appreciates that there is a limit to how much we can do but we will work with our partners in the region to maximise the pressures on these companies. Another thing which we can do is to also highlight positive examples. For instance, there are Singapore-based companies with operations in these regions. We need to approach them and say, "Well, are you willing to open up your operations and subject them to scrutiny and certification perhaps by a non-governmental organisation, who will vouch for your sustainable and responsible way of doing business?" That way, you start encouraging some who are already complying to do more, to do it better. And you will then put more pressure on those who are not yet willing to subject themselves to that level of scrutiny. I am afraid that there is no magic bullet to this problem.

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