Debated in Parliament on 10 Sep 2026.
Dr Neo Kok Beng asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information in respect of the Guiding Principles for Underwater Infrastructure Defence Exchanges (GUIDE) (a) how many incidents of denial of services were attempted; (b) what are the surveillance and monitoring mechanisms that are in place; and (c) what are the strategies and measures to ensure resiliency of services.
The Senior Minister of State for Digital Development and Information (Mr Tan Kiat How) (for the Minister for Digital Development and Information): Globally, most submarine cable disruptions result from accidental damage caused by fishing and anchoring activities. Industry data indicates about 100 to 200 such incidents occurring worldwide each year. Singapore's international connectivity has nevertheless remained resilient due to the diversity and volume of our connections to other countries. [Please refer to "Clarification by Senior Minister of State for Digital Development and Information", Official Report, 10 September 2026, Vol 96, Issue 37, Correction By Written Statement section.]
International cooperation is essential because submarine cables span multiple jurisdictions and issues can be transboundary. For example, the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) has information-sharing arrangements with partner governments and industry stakeholders to monitor submarine cable systems. Operators must also promptly notify IMDA of cable incidents affecting their systems, and repair cable cuts and restore affected services expeditiously.
Dr Neo.
I thank the Senior Minister of State. I have two supplementary questions.
First, since the submarine cables is very important in the resiliency of our data services and our digital infrastructure, I would like to ask what enforceable measures are available to us, in the case that it is damaged in the international waters.
The second supplementary question, I understand that the guide is a non-legally binding voluntary measures as initiated by the Ministry of Defence. I would not ask the Ministry of Defence, but I will still ask the Senior Minister of State: is there any way that we can turn this agreement into a formal treatise, so that we have much more legal power on this?
Sir, I thank the Member Dr Neo for his two supplementary questions. Let me just take a step back to provide more some context to this matter.
Firstly, I agree with Dr Neo that international connectivity through submarine cables is critical. It is important for our digital economy and very important for many aspects of the industry and our daily lives even. Every time we download something or we talked about social media, what my colleague Ms Rahayu spoke about, requires data to flow and data flows across the world through submarine cables primarily.
Our approach has been two-fold. One, is to enhance resilience through diversity and connectivity because we cannot control whether the cables will be cut in which part of the world. The cables are transboundary, they go through different jurisdictions and we cannot control things outside our jurisdiction. So, first and foremost, to minimise disruption, we are building up diversity of our submarine cables that come through Singapore and interconnect one another and build up the volume, so that if one cable is cut somewhere in the world, cable operators have the option of diverting traffic to other options that they have. Through the Digital Connectivity Blueprint that we launched in 2023, we had indicated that Singapore is committed to provide landing space and resources to enable submarine cable landings to double within the next 10 years. From 2023, the next 10 years.
So, building up the diversity and resilience. That is the first point.
The second is that we also work closely with the industry and we require cable operators to monitor cables for faults, report them within an hour of detection and ensure speedy repairs. That is one of the obligations that we have placed on our cable operators, even though some of the cuts may be outside our territorial waters, but those obligations still apply on our cable operators.
Thirdly, we are working with like-minded countries, for example, in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), IMDA chairs the ASEAN Working Group of Submarine Cables, and is a member of the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience. Both platforms seek to strengthen cooperation on submarine cable protection, resilience and repair, as well as promote information sharing and exchange of best practices. We had a fuller reply in January this year on our cooperation with neighbouring countries. [Please refer to "Clarification by Senior Minister of State for Digital Development and Information", Official Report, 10 September 2026, Vol 96, Issue 37, Correction By Written Statement section.]
That is important, because I mentioned earlier the cable cuts, may, most of the time, happen outside our jurisdiction and we have to work very closely with all like-minded parties and it is a shared outcome, a mutual interest that we will work on.
Lastly, on the point of GUIDE, I just to add on that GUIDE brings countries which agree on shared principles and potential areas of defence, where defence establishments could collaborate on enhancing the security of critical underwater infrastructure. It has been signed by 17 countries, including Singapore, and we will continue to work closely with countries that have expressed interest to sign up.
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