Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill

Mr Victor Lye.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill but seek proportionality when banking facilities are restricted, whether pending investigations or under the Account Disabling Order (ADO).

I note the Police only freezes bank accounts when there is reasonable suspicion that the accounts involved are involved in illicit activities such as scams. While safeguards exist, I hope we can make these safeguards proportionate and consistent in the extent to which banking access can be restricted.

A person whose account is frozen or disabled may apply for another bank account, but the new bank remains entitled to decline the application based on its own risk assessment. If all banks decline, what avenue does that person have to obtain basic banking facilities to receive salaries, Government payments and pay essential bills? Does the appeal to the Commissioner address this situation and if not, should there be an escalation mechanism for such cases?

Some residents have sought my help after their bank accounts were frozen. Some had only one bank account. They had difficulty opening another account at the same bank or a new account at another bank. Some are not fluent in English. They could not understand the new banking terms and conditions, nor navigate digital channels to seek redress.

I can understand that each bank may have legitimate risk reasons for declining the customer. But if every bank independently reaches the same conclusion, the person can effectively become excluded from basic banking services, with significant consequences for everyday life.

According to the Singapore Police Force's (SPF's) 2025 Scam and Cybercrime Brief, more than 15,000 bank accounts were frozen. Scams involving self-effected transfers form the majority of reported scams. According to SPF's 2026 Mid-Year Scam and Cybercrime Brief, scams involving self-effected transfers rose to 80.8% in the first half of 2026, up from 78.8% in the same period last year.

In most cases, scammers did not gain direct control of victims' accounts but manipulated victims into making monetary transactions through deception and social engineering. Presumably, there are victims whose bank accounts may be frozen. Investigations can take a while. Banking access may be cut off.

Sir, I have three suggestions.

First, define the minimum essential banking access for every person. Given that the facility restriction framework already preserves basic banking access, even for persons assessed to present mule-related risks, could a similar principle apply to any person who cannot obtain an account anywhere? Regardless of which anti-scam or investigative mechanism causes the restriction, can we define the basic services that should remain available, such as receiving verified salary and Government payments, paying essential bills and reasonable access to money for daily expenses?

Second, set up clear resolution channels to avoid the situation when every bank says no. In this way, we ensure that every person will have at least one functioning bank account based on a minimum standard of essential banking access.

Third, monitor the situation to track proportionality. I suggest that we track: one, the number of persons who become unbanked or restricted because their bank accounts are frozen; and two, how long it took for them to remove the restrictions or how long they were unbanked.

Sir, the Bill creates sophisticated ways to restrict financial access. Our safeguards, similarly, should become equally sophisticated so that restricting risky banking functions does not unintentionally become exclusion from our banking system all together.

We should take a broad risk-based approach and ask ourselves such questions: what banking functions create that risk and what minimum access can safely be allowed in the interim? That allows us to protect the public while allowing for essential banking and livelihoods.

Sir, notwithstanding my concerns, I support the Bill.

Ms Gho Sze Kee.

Mr Speaker, I support the objectives of this Bill. Scams move quickly and we want to stop scams before losses actually happen. I agree that the authorities too must be able to intervene quicker and earlier.

But as we move further upstream to keep ahead of the scammers, we find ourselves moving ahead of the traditional thresholds of proof that normally apply in the judicial process. This Bill moves us onto grounds where suspicion alone can trigger consequential action and those consequences can be serious.

We live in a highly connected and digitalised society. Being denied a banking account, phone line or online services is a major handicap. For a business, it can be an outright disaster. It is therefore very important for us to look closely at the evidential threshold for suspicion, the guardrails against excesses and the safeguards around getting things wrong. There is a real potential for excesses and abuse in this Bill if we are not careful.

Sir, in the conventional judicial process, we usually talk about two different thresholds of proof. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases and facts are generally proved on a balance of probabilities in civil proceedings. These differing standards reflect, among other things, the different consequences of factual error, particularly the need in criminal proceedings to minimise the risk of wrongful conviction. [Please refer to the hon Member's clarification later in the debate.]

Clause 7 of the Bill introduces a new Part 2A into the Protection from Scams Act. It inserts new sections providing for Disclosure Orders (DOs), ADOs and Service Limitation Orders (SLOs).

The wording of the new sections 6A and 6B is telling. An officer may act where he suspects or has reason to believe that a service or an account will be or has been used to commit or facilitate a scam-related offence. These are not the conventional standards of proof we ordinarily associate with the determination of civil liability or criminal guilt. They are lower, preventive standards designed to allow intervention before harm is completed.

In that sense, the lower threshold is understandable. The purpose here is not to determine guilt but to prevent or disrupt scams before further loss is caused.

Of course, the threshold for preventive intervention need not be the same as the threshold for establishing liability or guilt. That is not in itself unreasonable. But we must recognise that this cuts both ways. As we strive to intervene faster and earlier to prevent losses, the information that we base our decisions on is necessarily less complete and the risk of getting it wrong becomes correspondingly higher. It makes the safeguards around such powers all the more important. This is where my concern begins.

Mr Speaker, I am concerned that there appears to be more provisions in this Bill that enable rather than guard against excesses in this Bill. For example, there will be two types of ADOs: an order against specific accounts and a criteria-based order against accounts that match a set of given conditions. Under subsection 6A(B) of the new section 6B, we see the disabling conditions of criteria-based ADOs. An account can be disabled if it has carried out a transaction with a specific account or, in the case of a telephone or online account, simply having communicated with the wrong person.

This is concerning because it is essentially the possibility of suspicion by association alone.

It is easy to think of many scenarios where this may fail. A person could have won a World Cup bet with the wrong friend and received his winnings on PayNow from the friend's account or he could have simply had some phone calls or interactions with the wrong friend. There is no way for him to know that that friend might have been a scammer or a mule.

A business too could easily have legitimate transactions with an alleged scammer or mule. And one can easily imagine scenarios where a party could be both a victim and an unwitting accessory to a scam.

Sir, if I may anticipate the Ministry's response to this. Yes, it is true that there are some safeguards built into the Bill such as time and extension limits to the orders. And yes, an appeal mechanism exists for both ADOs and SLOs. And I agree too that we can and indeed we should trust our Police officers to perform their duties professionally and impartially.

But that is not the real concern here. My concern is primarily not the checks and the balances on the authorities, but rather the lack of checks and balances on the banks, financial institutions, telecommunications companies (telcos) and platforms that receive these orders.

Let us consider the new section 6F, which sets out punishment for non-compliance with a given order, with clause 10, which gives immunity to service providers against civil and criminal liabilities in complying with orders. This, together with the new sections 9A and 9B of the Protection from Scams Act.

Section 9B is of particular concern. It allows a bank, telco or platform to take action on its own initiative, without the Police having to issue an order against that specific account so long as its suspicions are drawn, even partly from information obtained from another order. Taken together, it is essentially an encouragement to unilateral action. It is clear that the Bill nudges banks, telcos and service providers to over, rather than under, action.

This is yet another point in the Bill where suspicion alone is sufficient for consequential action, but with an important distinction. In this case, the discretion to act lies not with the authorities, but with private business entities.

Can we ever, in all fairness, expect profit-driven private entities to act with the same fairness and impartiality that we expect of the authorities? The answer is clear to me.

Such a pattern is not unfamiliar in our regulatory environment. Under the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Notice 626, a binding directive to counter money laundering, for example, banks are required to take action when they have suspicions about a customer. Retaining the customer is the exception, rather than the default. If a bank chooses to retain a suspected customer, it has to justify that decision in writing. It does not have to justify simply letting the customer go.

Sir, my point is not that this is unreasonable, but that the incentives are already tilted towards caution. It is reasonable to expect our banks, telcos and platforms to play their part in combating scams. But precisely because we ask this of them, we must be honest and recognise the stark differences between their motivations and considerations and those of the authorities. Under such a regulatory regime, Sir, if you were a bank compliance officer, the path of least resistance would be to freeze and terminate first and to ask questions later. As they say in Mandarin: "宁可杀错，不可放过". It is much easier to be safe than sorry.

If a service provider decides to simply terminate a customer or refuse service, there may be little anyone can do because it simply remains, in most circumstances, within the business' prerogative to do so.

Which brings us, Sir, to that big elephant in the room – the National Scams List (NSL). The NSL is an operational tool. It sits outside the Bill and does not appear at all in the Bill's text. But the DO, ADO and SLO enabled by this Bill are symbiotic with the NSL. We cannot examine one without considering the other.

There are a lot of clear and obvious operational questions that come to mind when we think of the relationship between these orders and the NSL, but I shall not go over what others will have surely covered.

Instead, considering what we have examined thus far, I want to ask one fundamental question.

What stops the NSL from becoming a unilateral and de facto blacklist for our banks, telcos and platforms? We have already seen how there are strong incentives for them to err on the side of caution. With the NSL, we are giving them information on suspected scam enablers. What do we expect they will do with it?  Will they simply do what an ADO or SLO requires them to do? Or will they use the information independently to freeze accounts, terminate relationships, refuse new accounts or deny services?

When someone successfully appeals against an ADO or SLO, will service providers simply restore the position, or can they still decide that they no longer wish to provide services to that person? What are the consumer safeguards that are in place?

When someone is cleared of any suspicions of wrongdoing and removed from the NSL, what stops the service providers from still erring from the side of caution and continuing to exercise their business prerogative to continue to refuse service? When an ADO or SLO lapses, what stops the consequences from continuing beyond the life of the order?  In fact, what safeguards do we actually have to ensure that attracting an order, or appearing on the NSL, justified or otherwise, does not become a life sentence?

These are uncomfortable questions that the Bill does not address, Mr Speaker, and there are many more. It is clear there are scant guardrails in place against excessive action by service providers. I support this Bill because I recognise the overarching importance of the fight against scams. But this is a serious shortcoming that must be addressed.

Dr Charlene Chen.

Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, during the Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS), from time to time, we encounter residents who have fallen victim to scams. Some were deceived by strangers, others placed their trust in friends, acquaintances or people they have only recently met. By the time they realise something is wrong and make a Police report, the money has already been moved through different accounts or even transferred overseas.

The Police will do their utmost to trace the funds, but the scammers are familiar with the law enforcement methods. They use different bank accounts, telephone numbers, online platforms and intermediaries to move the funds quickly. Most distressingly, some residents lose their life savings and money lost is very difficult to recover.

I therefore support this Bill so that the Police will be able to obtain information more quickly and disable accounts involved in scams. But whether these new powers can truly protect residents depends on three implementation issues.

(In English): First, can we detect scams early enough? The new section 6G allows the Police to issue DOs requiring service providers to disclose information about bank, payment, digital-token, telephone and online accounts.

This addresses a common difficulty. At the beginning, a scam may not look like a scam. An online platform may see messages from a suspicious profile. A telco may see calls from a particular number. One bank may see an unusual transfer. Any one of these clues may be insufficient to justify intervention. But if several victims report the same telephone number, online identity or beneficiary account, the pattern becomes clearer.

My first question is therefore about detection. How will weak or inconclusive signals from different sources be brought together so that an emerging scam can be identified before the losses accumulate?

Section 6G allows a DO to prescribe when information must be provided or how frequently it must be shared. Will there be common response standards across service providers? Where an initial report is inconclusive, will its identifiers still be retained and matched against subsequent reports? The test is whether the system can turn scattered warning signs into an actionable picture early enough.

Second, once detected, can we disrupt the whole network? Detecting a scam and disrupting it are two different operational tasks. Information sharing helps us see the network. Account disabling must then help us break it.

The new section 6B(1) allows the Police to disable a particular account. Section 6B(2) goes further by allowing accounts that meet specified disabling conditions to be disabled. This matters because scammers do not normally depend on only one account. If one beneficiary account is frozen, they may give the victim another. If one online profile is removed, they may create a new profile or move the conversation elsewhere. They may also shift the money through several mule accounts before sending it overseas.

My second question is therefore about disruption: can the intervention dismantle the scammer's operating network or does it merely remove one replaceable account?

The Bill allows disabling conditions to capture transaction patterns and links to specified persons or accounts. Section 9B may also allow a provider to act voluntarily against another related account.

How will these powers be used to identify replacement accounts and recurring scam actors? After an account is disabled, will the authorities monitor whether the same scammer, victim or pattern reappears through another channel? The test is not simply whether one account was closed. It is whether the scam was stopped.

Third, how will accuracy and effectiveness be evaluated? A conditions-based order under section 6B(2) could affect multiple accounts. If the conditions are too narrow, scammers may escape. If they are too broad, legitimate users may be affected. Sections 6D and 6E allow orders to be cancelled or varied and affected persons may appeal. But these safeguards will be meaningful only if errors are reviewed and corrected quickly.

Will the Ministry set service standards for reviewing potentially wrongful disabling and restoring legitimate accounts? More broadly, I hope the Ministry will publish aggregate indicators covering the time from detection to disclosure and disabling; false-positive and restoration rates; estimated losses prevented and evidence that scammers migrated to replacement accounts or services.

The number of orders issued measures enforcement activity. It does not, by itself, tell us whether residents' money was saved. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, this Bill provides the legal tools needed to trace and disrupt scam networks. The key next step is to ensure that different agencies can connect the clues in a timely manner; that after one account is disabled, the scam network behind it can continue to be traced and that any wrongful impact on legitimate users can be corrected quickly.

For residents, what matters most is not how many orders are issued, but whether action can be taken before the money is transferred away. What we must stop is not merely the next transfer but the same scam continuing through a different account or a different platform. I support the Bill.

Ms Elysa Chen.

Mr Speaker, scams are an abhorrent, reprehensible crime. I hate how scammers prey on the most vulnerable. They wipe out the retirement savings of hardworking Singaporeans. They go after the lonely. They exploit the very decency that makes us who we are: our willingness to trust, to help, to believe.

I hate how they keep coming back like zombies – we shut one account down and two more spring up within the hour. I hate how they hide behind others who may be less educated, those who may be deceived and even some who may be coerced.

There are many heart wrenching stories in my own constituency.

A senior who is now estranged from her daughter after having fallen prey to a love scam. The senior refuses to listen to her daughter, grassroots leaders, and even myself because she refuses to accept that the scammer could have been anything but sincere in his affections towards her.

One of my MPS cases involves a widow whose husband died from a terminal illness, who had transferred large sums to a scammer, thinking that he was investing money to leave more for his wife and children.

And I read with horror how a Police full-time national serviceman shot himself with a gun after he fell prey to a scam. He was 21 years old.

Last year alone, there were 37,308 scams cases, with losses totaling $913.1 million. This Bill is a necessary response and I support it. Given its reach, I will organise my observations under three headings: fairness, gaps the Bill has not yet closed and checks on the new powers it creates.

Let me begin with what I support. Like I said earlier, dealing with scammers today can feel like dealing with a horde of zombies. We can close one account but two more spring up again. But clause 7's new orders, reaching bank, payment, telecom and online accounts, in Singapore or overseas, give our officers the speed to keep pace. I likewise support clause 19, allowing AI to help issue Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) directions at the scale this problem now demands and clause 21's financial penalties on platforms that shirk their duties.

My first concern is that the machinery built to catch scammers is not overly punitive, particularly for those who have been deceived or coerced.

I would like to start with the threshold. Under the new sections 6A and 6B, a specified officer may issue an SLO for up to three years, or an ADO for up to 30 days extendable once to 60 days, whenever he suspects or has reason to believe that a person will use, or an account has been used, to facilitate a scam. This threshold is not unfamiliar – OCHA already permits the same low bar for scam-related directions.

But there, the consequence is that a post comes down or a social media account falls silent online. Here, it is a bank account, phone line or credit facility – basically, what someone needs to navigate daily life, that may be switched off for far longer, even reaching into overseas services.

Might reasonable suspicion, the higher bar used elsewhere in our statute book, be a better threshold that justifies the exercise of such power?

Alternatively, I would ask the Minister to place on record, as the Police's own September 2025 statement on the Facility Restriction Framework did, that the intended targets are those already flagged as high-risk – persons previously dealt with for mule offences, or under investigation and showing a continued pattern of facilitating scams – not a thin, first suspicion.

Next, the kind of restrictions that can be imposed.

Clause 7 already permits an account disabling order to target specific functions, a transfer, a withdrawal, rather than freeze an account outright; and section 6E allows a service limitation order to be varied for continued, conditional access.

Can there be clarity on how these powers will be exercised? To the extent possible, I would urge specific countermeasures be adopted rather than a blanket freeze of an account that this become the default. For instance, a daily transfer cap, well below what a scam typically demands, preserves a person's ability to pay for groceries and school fees while still blunting the syndicate's playbook, with a full freeze kept for the clearest, highest risk cases.

Next, providing opportunities for review. Clauses 8 and 9 allow an appeal only to the Commissioner of Police, or an officer he designates, with no fixed time for a reply, and only for the identified person himself. What if someone was genuinely misled or coerced into handing over his account? I would like to ask for a review avenue outside the Police, or at minimum, a prescribed response time in subsidiary legislation.

The same gap appears in the NSL that I understand the Home Team Science and Technology Agency (HTX) and the Police are developing to share information on flagged accounts with service providers. A person subject to a formal order under this Bill can appeal it; a person merely placed on this list, without being the direct subject of an Order, does not clearly have the same right, even though a bank or telcos seeing that name may simply decline to serve them on the strength of the listing alone.

Who administers this list, how does a name get added and will the person even be told that their name is on this NSL? Being placed on it should carry the same rights of notice and review as a formal order.

Next, the reverse presumption in the new sections 39GA to 39GC of the Miscellaneous Offences Act. I support criminalising the sale of accounts to scam syndicates, but the presumption that a person acted "for any gain" casts a wide net. Take, for example, an elderly aunty deceived into handing over her bank login for a small token payment she believed was legitimate. She would be presumed, until she proves otherwise, to have had reasonable grounds to believe her account would be misused, a presumption she may not have the ability to rebut on her own.

In fairness, caning under these sections requires the prosecution to separately prove actual knowledge or intent, not merely satisfy the presumption, and this safeguard deserves to be on the record. Even so, I would ask for a minimum gain threshold before the "for any gain" limb applies, so a token sum does not sweep in those who have been deceived alongside those who are complicit.

Last, the restriction of access to Singpass. Will this Bill inadvertently cut members of the public off from it? Under the Police's own Facility Restriction Framework, which came before this Bill, Singpass and Corppass access can already be restricted alongside banking and mobile line services. Singpass today is not just one more online account. It is how many of us book a doctor's appointment, apply for a flat or check our Central Provident Fund (CPF). If a person's Singpass access is switched off for months or years, while they are still merely suspected, they may find themselves locked out of the very Government services they need to sort out their affairs, appeal a decision or simply get on with life.

Are there measures in place to guarantee that access to the most essential civic services – voting, healthcare and CPF matters among them – is preserved even while we disable the networks that scammers use to commit their crimes, or for the resulting inconvenience to the individual to be mitigated by way of a more contained restriction on the use of Singpass?

My second concern is that for all its new powers, the Bill leaves at least three gaps where harm can still get through: one at the point of prevention; one at the point of enforcement; and one at the point of redress.

The prevention gap: SPF's Annual Scam and Cybercrime Brief, published in February this year, tells us that 81.8% of last year's scam cases involved victims transferring their own money, having been deceived into doing so willingly. Disabling a mule's account after that transfer has happened does little to bring a victim's money back. Our Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF), which places duties on banks and telcos, was built for a narrower problem – unauthorised transactions, where a scammer hijacks someone's credentials – and does not reach the investment, loan or "Government official" scams that persuade a person to click "transfer" themselves.

Neither, as far as I understand, does it yet place duties on digital payment token providers, even though cryptocurrency now accounts for roughly a fifth of all scam losses – some $182 million last year. As we strengthen the back end by disabling mule accounts, will the Government also widen the Framework's front-end duties to match?

The enforcement gap: the new mule offences only apply to accounts on a service designated under OCHA and that list remains a limited one. This limits our ability to fight scams because syndicates are adaptable. If a designated platform is used only as a funnel, to make first contact before steering a victim toward to some unlisted platform, does the mule who supplied that first account escape these offences simply because the harm was completed elsewhere? If the mischief we are trying to stop is the supply of an account for criminal use, liability should turn on the conduct not which platform the account happens to sit on.

The redress gap: clause 21's financial penalties on non-compliant platforms are welcome. But they flow to the state, not the victim. Will the Government consider a private right of civil action for scam victims against offenders and non-compliant service providers, so that a victim's recourse does not rest on the state's initiative alone? And going further, will the Government consider restitution for victims of scam harm as a result of non-compliant platforms from the monies gathered from these fines, as a form of economic redress. What I am asking for is, under the spirit of fairness and justice, can we consider redistributing the fines collected to the victims of the very scams the platforms were fined for.

My third and final concern is accountability. This Bill hands the state two significant new instruments and I would ask what checks accompany each.

Clause 19 lets a computer program issue OCHA directions on a responsible officer's authority. I understand the appeal of this given the volume of scam accounts our officers now face. But will a human review a batch of directions before, not only after, they are issued, so a pattern-matching algorithm does not sweep an innocent account into this net on a false positive?

Clause 31 creates a new corps of Civilian Specialist Officers (CSOs), with powers of arrest, search and entry similar to a Commercial Affairs Officer. How will they be disciplined and held to account, given they sit outside the disciplinary provisions that apply to police officers?

Mr Speaker, I began by saying I hate scammers, and nothing in the three concerns I have raised changes that. This Bill gives our officers real speed against a threat that regenerates faster than we can strike it down, and a speed that is worth having. But speed and fairness need not be in tension. The measures must strike at the right targets. A syndicate's account can still be disabled without a grieving widow, a deceived aunty or a frightened young man losing their life that they are trying to hold together.

I have asked the Ministry to consider where the presumption falls too widely, where the gaps let harm slip through at prevention, enforcement and redress, and where new powers need new checks to match. These are not objections to the Bill's purpose, but conditions for its success – because a Bill that stops scammers only to catch the vulnerable in the same net will have solved one injustice by creating another.

Mr Speaker, notwithstanding my clarifications, I support this Bill.

Ms Hazlina Abdul Halim.

Mr Speaker, I support the Bill's intention. It allows for faster tools to detect, disrupt and deter scams. But let me make three points today: first, scam prevention efforts must be tailored to different vulnerabilities; second, platforms must share responsibility to keep their users safe; third, safeguards for account disabling and service restrictions.

Mr Speaker, when we refer to "a scam victim" and "the scam" as though there is one archetype. But Members will know, through the appeals and the assistance requests that we receive, this cannot be father from the truth.

Seniors may be targeted through Government-official impersonation or investment scams. Young adults may be targeted through job scams, e-commerce scams, investment scams as well as phishing. Parents may be targeted through fake messages involving their children. Small business owners, meanwhile, may be targeted through impersonation of suppliers, customers or business partners.

The tactics are different because the vulnerabilities are different. And if scammers tailor their approach to their victims, our prevention efforts should also do the same.

For our seniors, scams often exploit fear, authority and trust. A resident may receive a call from someone claiming to be from a Government agency or financial institution. He or she is told that their bank account has been compromised, that he or she is under investigation; or maybe, his or her money needs to be transferred immediately for protection. The scammer creates urgency. The victim is then told not to speak to anyone else. And sometimes, by the time the family finds out, the money is already gone.

Last year, those aged 65 and above accounted for about 15% of scam victims. But what concerns me a little bit more is the scale of their losses. The average amount lost by an elderly victim was more than $37,000 in 2025, and rose to $42,000 in the first half of the year.

Just earlier this week, my Fengshan resident Mr T was really distraught and sought help to recover $40,000 he had inadvertently paid for what he believed was a hire-purchase commitment. He was really nervous and anxious because the investigations were taking time and in the meantime, he still remains the primary caregiver and sole breadwinner in the family, and he still has responsibilities to cater to.

For some seniors, the scams may wipe out their life savings – losing that $40,000 is not a financial hit, it is losing their means to living and their security.

So, I ask the Minister whether we can make our anti-scam education more targeted for seniors? Instead of telling seniors just "to be careful", how do we increase efforts to show examples of what these scams look like and sounds like in their vernacular languages?

What does a fake investment advertisement look like? How do we make them realise "too good to be true" is often the case is? How does an impersonation call sound like? What will a legitimate Government agency never ask them to do? On that note, I appreciate there is a lot more intentionality to have these disclosures and disclaimers, but I do believe they exist more online, where our seniors are more real life.

The objective should also be to make the warning familiar before the scammer makes contact. There is also a role for families and trusted community networks. We know that some victims – or many victims – may be embarrassed to tell their children that they have been scammed. Others may be persuaded by the scammer not to speak to their family at all. Could the Government consider how do we involve trusted family members, caregivers and community partners when there are strong indicators that elderly persons may be under scam manipulation?

I understand that this involves a very delicate balance. We want to protect seniors without undermining their agency and also, uplifting their dignity. But perhaps the principle should be to intervene early enough to prevent irreversible harm, but carefully enough to respect the dignity and independence of the individual.

For young adults though, the approach must be different. Last year, those aged 20 to 29 accounted for almost one in five scam cases. They are not necessarily less digitally savvy. In fact, their familiarity with technology may create a different vulnerability.

They look for jobs online. They buy and sell things online. The young also communicate through messaging platforms, and discover products and opportunities through social media. The same digital familiarity creates convenience but also create opportunities for scammers. So, anti-scam education should be incorporated more systematically into curriculums, career preparation programmes and perhaps, familiar youth platforms. Digital literacy cannot only mean knowing how to use technology but also knowing when not to trust what technology is showing us.

Platforms must also carry responsibility, Mr Speaker. Responsibility for scams cannot rest only on individuals.

Last year, online platforms were used by scammers to reach victims in around more than 84% of all scam cases. This tells us something important – the environment in which scams take place matters.

A person can exercise caution. Families can look out for one another. The Government can do its best to educate the public. But if fraudulent accounts, scam advertisements and impersonation pages can be created faster than they can be detected and removed, then individual vigilance will always be fighting an uphill battle.

This is why I support the Bill's strengthening of OCHA. The Bill raises the maximum financial penalty for certain non-compliance to up to $10 million for each instance. These are significant penalties. They send an important signal: protecting users from scams must be treated as a core responsibility for operating a digital platform and not simply as another cost of doing business.

But I would also like to understand how these penalties will work in practice. What factors will the competent authority consider when determining the quantum of penalty? For example, will it consider the scale of exposure, duration of non-compliance, and whether the provider had previously been warned and how quickly this corrective action was taken? And how will an "instance of non-compliance" be assessed where a systemic failure affects thousands of users or pieces of scam content?

Clear expectations matter. They matter not only for enforcement, but also for platforms that genuinely want to comply.

I also support the SLO framework. Scams frequently rely on interconnected digital services operating at speed and across multiple channels. The ability to act against services that facilitate scam activity is therefore an important complement to existing enforcement powers. In being firm with platforms, we should also be precise about what we expect from them. It is a partnership.

Mr Speaker, the proposed DOs, ADOs and SLOs will allow the authorities to act quickly against scam enablers. This is important because scammers move money and shift platforms at extraordinary speed. But speed must not come at the expense of accuracy.

Under the Bill, an ADO may last for up to 30 days, with a further extension. For someone operating a business online, an account may not simply be a social media profile. It could be their livelihood. It could be how they communicate with and serve customers. It could be how they receive income.

So, I ask whether there will be an expedited review mechanism for someone who believes that an account has been wrongly disabled. What would be the expected timeframe for such a review? Where an account is found to have been wrongly disabled, what steps will be taken to minimise the harm caused and to support the user?

The same principle also applies to automated enforcement. Scammers can generate fraudulent accounts, websites and advertisements at a scale that humans cannot realistically review one by one. We need technology to fight technology. But the more powerful our automated systems become, the more important human accountability also becomes. If an automated system gets something wrong, who reviews this decision? How quickly can the affected party seek human review? How will the authorities ensure that these systems remain accurate, fair and within the law?

The answer should not be to avoid automation. The answer should be to build responsible automation.

Mr Speaker, I would also like to suggest that we think carefully about how we measure the success of the Bill. We should certainly track the number of accounts disabled, directions issued and enforcement actions taken. But these are inputs and outputs. Ultimately, it is the outcome we care about.

The outcome we should care about is whether fewer Singaporeans lose their hard-earned savings, whether scam content is removed before it reaches thousands of people, and whether suspicious accounts are detected before money is transferred. Whether an elderly resident keeps their retirement savings that took decades to build, whether a young person does not lose his first month's salary to a fake job offer and whether a working professional does not lose significant capital to an investment scam, which may then have knock-on effects, including defaulted mortgages, arrears and bills.

We cannot simply tell Singaporeans to be more careful. We must also make the digital environment around them safer. And this responsibility, Mr Speaker, Sir, must be shared. Mr Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Scams do not take place through just one channel or platform. Today, their methods are becoming increasingly sophisticated. For example, a scam may begin with the victim being contacted through social media, before the conversation is moved to a messaging app. The victim is then asked to transfer money to a bank account, while phone numbers registered under other people's names may also be used. As a result, the trail left by a scam may sometimes reveal only a small part of the overall picture.

I therefore support the amendments that will enable the Police to obtain information more quickly and block accounts used for scam activities.

In combating scams, time is critical. If each organisation acts separately, the victim's money may already have been transferred several times or moved out of Singapore. However, I would like to highlight one important point.

Not all scam victims are vulnerable in the same way. Seniors are certainly a high-risk group, as I mentioned earlier in my English speech. However, we must not assume that young people are immune.

Nearly 20% of scam victims are between 20 and 29 years old. Many are vulnerable to job scams, online shopping scams and phishing because they spend much of their lives online. So, what safeguards should we put in place to protect these different groups effectively?

For seniors, anti-scam education needs to be more practical. It should go beyond reminders and provide more examples of how scams work – whether through advertisements or scammers impersonating government representatives, for example. For youths and young people, anti-scam education should begin earlier, from their school years, so that they are not too trusting when looking for jobs or interacting online and learn to think more critically.

Mr Speaker, the responsibility for combating scams cannot be borne by any one party alone. It is a shared responsibility.

Last year, more than 84% of scam cases started online. Digital platforms that fail to fulfil their responsibilities can face penalties of up to $10 million. This is not simply about punishment. It is about ensuring that user safety is a fundamental responsibility of platforms, rather than merely a cost of doing business.

May I also ask the Ministry to explain the factors considered in determining the amount of the penalty, including the duration of the offence, the number of users affected and the corrective action taken?

Finally, Mr Speaker, I turn to the use of automated systems to speed up action against scam content. I recognise that scammers move at the speed of technology and therefore, enforcement must be able to move just as quickly. However, it is also increasingly important to have an appeals framework in place where necessary. The same applies to ADOs. These powers are important, but I suggest an expedited review process for those who believe their accounts have been blocked incorrectly.

I often receive appeals from my Fengshan residents who find themselves in difficult situations because they are unable to access their funds. At the same time, for victims who are left in dire straits by scams, where can they turn for help? Several Members of Parliament who spoke earlier offered suggestions which I support, including providing an avenue for victims to access temporary funds.

Mr Speaker, effectiveness should not be measured simply by the number of accounts blocked or orders issued. True success is when scam content can be removed earlier, when fewer Singaporeans lose their hard-earned money, and when families no longer lose savings accumulated over a lifetime.

Scammers will continue to change their tactics. Our laws must therefore continue to evolve – supported by more targeted education, more responsible platforms and systems that can act quickly without compromising fairness.

(In English): Mr Speaker, scammers are constantly adapting. Today, it is a phone call. Tomorrow, a convincing social media advertisement, a deepfake video, a fraudulent website or even a message from someone we know. Our laws must therefore keep pace.

But laws alone will not be enough, Mr Speaker, Sir. We need smarter prevention, more targeted education, greater responsibility from platforms and faster intervention. And more importantly, support to victims when a scam inadvertently takes place.

Ultimately, the fight against scams is a fight to protect something very human – trust. Trust in our institutions, trust in our digital spaces, trust in the people around us, and trust that when something goes wrong, our systems will be there to protect and help Singaporeans. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Ms Diana Pang.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill.

Scams today are sophisticated, organised and constantly evolving. In minutes, scammers can wipe out what a family take years, decades to save – money meant for retirement, medical expenses or a child's education.

The harm is not just financial. Victims often blame themselves, lose confidence in their judgement and become afraid to trust even genuine phone calls and messages. Our authorities therefore need stronger tools to intervene earlier, act faster and disrupt the network supporting this crime.

I support the measures in this Bill. But stronger powers must also come with practical safeguards.

At the heart of every successful scam is one objective: to move the victim's money into the hands of the criminal. Stopping the first transfer is therefore critical. But our efforts cannot end here. We must also dismantle the wider money laundering networks that make scams profitable by enabling criminal proceeds to be transferred, layered and concealed.

This requires a framework that can trace and disrupt suspicious fund flows across banks, payment providers and digital asset platforms in near real time.

At the same time, our law should distinguish between passive money mules and those who knowingly recruit other account holders, manage a network of accounts and professionally layer and conceal the scam proceeds. The latter are not just participants. They are key enablers of criminal enterprises and should face appropriate, severe consequences.

However, in pursuing money mules, we must guard against being overzealous. Not every person whose account receives suspicious funds have the same degree of knowing or culpability. Restrictions should therefore be proportionate to the person's conduct and the risk he or she continues to pose. There should be clear avenues for affected persons to seek review, demonstrate that they were deceived and have ceased their involvement, and regain access to essential financial services where appropriate.

Our response must be firm against against deliberate facilitators without permanently excluding the unwittingly vulnerable or rehabilitated into ordinary financial life. An account may be frozen, but life goes on. Life does not freeze.

At my MPS in Geylang Serai, I have met residents who are unable to access their existing bank accounts or open new accounts due to scam-related transactions being performed on their accounts. One resident's account had been frozen for a prolonged period. He did not understand why and how to resolve it. Another had served his sentence for a scam-related offence and found employment. He is trying to rebuild his life and yet he cannot open a basic bank account.

A bank account is not just convenient, it is essential for daily life. Singapore's moving rapidly towards digital and cashless payment. Today, we use electronic payments to buy meals, take transport, pay bills, purchase groceries and many other everyday transactions. Salaries and Government payouts are also credited directly into the bank account.

In an increasingly cashless Singapore, how is someone without access to a bank account expected to live? An account may be frozen, but like what I said, life does not freeze with it. Rent and bills remain due. Children still need food and transport. A person still needs to get to work.

When I previously raised this issue in this House, I was told that an affected person could apply to Court for access to funds for basic living expenses. But one resident who came and see me with this problem could not even afford a lawyer, precisely because his money was frozen. He needed money to apply for access for the money that he could not use.

This can effectively cut off not only access to banking, but also access to justice.

Could there be a simpler, more accessible and expedited process for people in such situations? Where it is operationally safe, could verified salaries and Government payouts be released for essential expenses? If one account is suspected of receiving scam proceeds, should a separate account used for salary and household expenses automatically be affected? Can safeguards be applied before such accounts are restricted or frozen?

We must stop suspicious funds from moving, but restrictions should be calibrated to the actual risks posed, not wider or longer than necessary.

Where a bank independently restricts an account, will the customer be told, as far as investigation permits, whether the restriction comes from the Police or the bank? Whom can they approach and when can they expect a review?

While information sharing is vital, mistakes can also spread quickly. A resident may resolve an issue with one bank, only to find that another institution is still relying on the outdated information. If the information is found to be inaccurate, there must be a coordinated way to correct it across every institution that receives or relies on it.

Banks and financial institutions must clearly distinguish between a person in an investigation, the person being charged and the person who is being convicted. These are distinct legal statuses that should not be treated as interchangeable. Any restriction imposed on an affected person's banking services should be proportionate to their circumstances, conduct and assessed risk. Longer strictions should also require regular review.

SLOs may last up to three years. That is a very long time for someone trying to remain employed, support a family or rebuild a life. Will there be periodic reviews to assess whether the restriction remains necessary instead of leaving it entirely to the affected person to seek reconsideration repeatedly? When an investigation concludes or new evidence emerges, will the need for restriction be assessed promptly? When the basis no longer exists, how quickly will access be restored?

Residents facing immediate hardship also need one clear point of contact. They should not be sent repeatedly from the banks to the Police, with neither side able to help to solve the problem.

For those who have served their sentences, reinstating their basic banking access is also part of the process of rehabilitation. We cannot expect people to find work and rebuild their lives while denying them the means to receive a salary and participate in an increasingly cashless society.

I support using technology to respond faster to scam websites, advertisements and online accounts. But automated systems can also reproduce mistakes at scale. For a small business, even a short, small, wrongful restriction on its online account can disrupt orders, revenues and customer relationships. As a small and medium enterprise (SME) owner myself, I understand how damaging this can be.

When an automated direction is challenged, will there be meaningful human review of the outcome, of the evidence? Will systems be audited for recurring errors? If a flawed rule is discovered, will the authorities proactively review other cases affected by it?

Technology can make enforcement faster, stronger. But clear human responsibility must remain. We can automate parts of enforcement, but we must never, ever automate accountability out of the process.

I also support bringing specialised technical expertise into the Police. However, CSOs may exercise significant powers, including arrest, search and seizure. How will members of public verify that such an officer is genuine? Especially when impersonation of public officers itself is a common scam tactic. This officer should carry clear identification and residents should have a simple and independent way to verify them. No one should feel that asking for verification is being uncooperative.

Technical expertise alone is not enough. I therefore hope that there will be a vigorous training, clear operational standards, effective supervision and accessible complaints process for anyone who believes that a CSO has acted improperly. These safeguards protect not only individuals but also public confidence in the system. If the CSOs are given police-like powers, the public must trust that those powers must be exercised lawfully, proportionately and accountably.

Mr Speaker, Sir, scams cause enormous financial and emotional harm. They also erode trust in our financial and digital systems. They exploit speed, technology and gaps in between institutions. We must respond with equal speed and coordination. I therefore hope this framework will deliver four outcomes.

First, faster tracing of scam proceeds across the financial institutions. Second, restrictions that are calibrated to allow persons to access funds needed for essential living expenses where it is safe to do so. Third, meaningful human review and prompt correction whenever computerised issued directions are imposed mistakenly or are no longer justified. Fourth, rigorous training and proper accountability for a CSO entrusted with significant powers under this Bill.

To conclude, let me say this. Access to banking facilities is a privilege and not a right. This privilege carries responsibilities. It must not be abused to facilitate scams or launder their proceeds. I support this Bill for reinforcing the message and for giving our officers a tool to stop scammers quickly and follow the money effectively.

Singaporeans deserve protection from malicious scams. We must therefore come down hard on these scammers and those who knowingly assist them. At the same time, we must also ensure that innocent people, victims and those who genuinely rehabilitated do not fall through cracks created by these stringent measures. A strong system must be capable, not only on imposing restrictions swiftly but also putting matters right just as swiftly when the restriction is mistaken or no longer necessary. With these observations, I support the Bill.

Senior Minister of State Goh Pei Ming.

Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their thoughtful questions and their strong support for this Bill. Across the House yesterday and today, there has been broad agreement that scams continue to cause serious harm in Singapore, to Singaporeans and their families, and more must be done to protect Singaporeans. Members also raised important points on how we ensure that these powers are exercised responsibly and fairly.

Let me now address the key issues. There were several questions relating to ADOs, DOs and SLOs. These fall in three broad categories: one, on information exchange between the Police and service providers; two, on the issuance of, and obligations imposed by, these orders; and three, on the safeguards to ensure speedy recourse for persons whose accounts are disabled or restricted under these orders, but who may be victims themselves and who require access to their accounts for their basic needs.

First, on information exchange. Dr Charlene Chen asked how weak or inconclusive signals from different sources will be used to identify emerging scams. She also asked whether there will be common information disclosure standards across service providers, and whether information disclosed will be retained even if it was initially inconclusive.

Where the Police receives weak or inconclusive scam signals, the Police will draw on information shared by service providers and its own data sources, including Police reports and ScamShield reports, to piece the whole picture together. We will work together with service providers to implement robust information disclosure standards that are operationally feasible. And we will only retain information for as long as it is operationally necessary.

Ms Elysa Chen asked who will administer and disseminate information to service providers on the NSL and whether an individual whose name has been shared with service providers will be notified. The Police will issue and inform service providers of ADOs, DOs and SLOs. We will not notify individuals that their details have been shared with service providers. Doing so would be counterproductive as it may prematurely inform or alert scammers and their mules that their criminal activities have been detected.

Ms Diana Pang asked if the exchange information framework will strengthen our ability to track the flow of scam proceeds across financial institutions in real time. Fund tracing is critical to the recovery of scam proceeds. However, the primary purpose of the information exchange supported by this Bill is to intervene upstream to identify and disrupt scam-linked accounts even before they are being used to receive scam proceeds. Meanwhile, I assure the Member that we are actively working to improve our fund tracing capabilities.

Many Members may be familiar with the Anti-Scam Centre, which has co-located banks with the Police since 2019 to facilitate real time coordination in fund recovery efforts. Since March 2025, the Anti-Scam Centre has operationalised the crypto-tracing team to address the emerging threat of scam proceeds being rapidly dissipated via cryptocurrencies. In 2025, the crypto-tracing teams successfully recovered $22.8 million worth of virtual assets across 1,800 cases and helped prevent $8.8 million in losses through 360 victim interventions.

Second, Ms Diana Pang and Ms Elysa Chen asked about the thresholds that will be applied before an ADO or SLO is issued. An ADO may be issued if there is suspicion or reason to believe that an account has been or will be used preparatory to, or in furtherance of, scam-related offences. SLOs may be issued if the Police suspect or have reason to believe that an identified individual or entity will use a scam-enabling service to commit or facilitate a scam-related offence. The threshold of suspicion or reason to believe strikes the right balance between enabling early intervention to prevent scams, while maintaining a sufficiently high evidentiary threshold. The Police will independently assess the facts and circumstances of every case to ensure that the legal threshold is met before issuing an order.

I would like to emphasise that this is no different from assessments that the Police make today when exercising existing powers under the Criminal Procedure Code.

To Ms Elysa Chen and Mr Fadli Fawzi's queries, SLOs will be used only against mules under investigation who are at risk of further facilitating scams, and mules who have been warned, issued composition fines, prosecuted, or convicted.

Ms Diana Pang asked if individuals whose bank accounts have been disabled will know that the account was disabled pursuant to an order from the Police or voluntarily by the service provider. The Police will inform affected account holders of an ADO through appropriate channels as soon as practicable after it is issued. We are working with sector regulators to operationalise this. An appeal channel will also be made available.

Mr Jackson Lam asked how quickly service providers will be expected to act against suspicious accounts flagged by an order and whether there will be a common standard across service providers. The turnaround time for orders will be determined in consultation with service providers, balancing the need for swift response with operational feasibility for our industry partners.

Mr Abdul Muhaimin asked why the Government decided to set the duration of an ADO at 30 days. The period of 30 days is operationally necessary for scam disruption. This includes providing enough time for the Police to assess if further action on the account is required. To be clear, ADOs can impose a requirement to disable the specified account for up to 30 days. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Police may specify a shorter duration or cancel the ADO ahead of its expiry if it is no longer necessary.

I agree with Dr Charlene Chen that merely targeting individual accounts via ADOs is insufficient to effectively dismantle a scammer’s network. The data sharing ecosystem that this Bill supports goes beyond that. When the Police issue an ADO to a service provider, the Police may also share information relating to that account with other relevant service providers. Service providers can in turn identify and review associated accounts within their own ecosystems for any scam-related activity, such as accounts which may have transacted with the disabled account. And if a service provider identifies an associated account that meets the conditions specified by the Police in a DO, it is required to provide the relevant information to the Police. The Police will then assess the information, and if appropriate, share it further with other service providers for review and action.

This process will continue and can continue to repeat as we map out and take down the scammers' entire ecosystem of enablers. This "fanning out" process strengthens our ability to uncover and dismantle wider scam account networks beyond disabling individual accounts.

Third, I will touch on the recourse available to those whose accounts were disabled or restricted. However, before that, allow me to reiterate why we need to take a firm stand on this. Members are right to ask about the risks of moving quickly against suspected scam activity and the corrective measures that will be in place. No one wants to inadvertently affect or inconvenience persons who may not have been involved in scam activity.

Sir, at the same time, disrupting scams quickly and decisively is essential. In a recent case, scammers deceived a 68-year-old victim into believing that he was working remotely under the employment of a legitimate company. By the time officers engaged the victim, the victim had already transferred 80% of his life savings, or approximately $128,000 in cryptocurrency, to the scammer. He was also on the verge of transferring another $64,000 of borrowed funds to the scammer. The money was not recovered.

Such cases remind us that scam losses are often deeply personal and can have lasting consequences for the victim and their families. On average, about $2 million was lost to scams every day, in the first half of this year. Members would have heard and have heard similar cases when engaging your residents or within this House over yesterday and today. The orders enable us to constrict the supply of scam enablers and disable them before they can be used. This is ultimately to protect our citizens. Our task here is to intervene early while ensuring adequate safeguards against innocent accounts being affected by these orders.

Ms Diana Pang rightly pointed out that even as we enhance information sharing on scam intelligence across institutions, we must correct erroneous information and inform relevant institutions of the correction quickly. We will work with service providers to operationalise this.

Ms Pang also asked if there will be periodic reviews to assess whether restrictions remain necessary. Prof Kenneth Poon and Mr Fadli Fawzi also asked how legislative levers will be applied to individuals who were manipulated into being scam mules. The Government takes a firm stand, a firm approach towards scam mules. Those who enable or facilitate scams will face the full force of the law. That said, we agree that penalties must be proportionate to the level of culpability.

In relation to SLOs, although three years is the maximum duration allowed by law, the actual duration will depend on the individual's circumstances and assessed scam risk. First-time mules will generally face one year of restrictions, while longer durations may be warranted for repeat offenders or those assessed to pose a sustained scam risk.

Let me share one example, in 2024, before the introduction of the current Facility Restriction Framework, one individual received a conditional warning after allowing her bank account to be used for the receipt and transfer of scam proceeds. After the case concluded, she then allowed her accounts with two other banks to be used in a similar manner, with one of these accounts later receiving $8,000 in proceeds from another scam victim. Placing such individuals on SLOs not only better protects the public from scams, but also prevents these individuals from being drawn further into unlawful activities by scammers and getting themselves into further trouble.

Mr Gabriel Lam, Mr Jackson Lam, Dr Charlene Chen, Ms Diana Pang and Ms Hazlina Halim asked if an expedited appeal mechanism can be established where an ADO or SLO materially affects a person's livelihood, or where an innocent person's account was disabled. Ms Elysa Chen suggested having an independent appeal channel outside the Police or having a prescribed appeal response time in subsidiary legislation.

A swift and decisive approach to disrupting scams networks is necessary to protect Singaporeans and at the same time, we recognise that some individuals may genuinely require and depend on these accounts affected by the orders for their livelihoods or daily expenses. It is thus important that we assess appeals fairly and as quickly as possible. We will share more details on the appeal mechanism, including the appeal timeline before operationalisation of these orders. This needs careful consideration as we have seen cases of scammers coaching victims on what to say to bank staff to evade detection when they transfer money to the scammer. We should similarly expect scammers to coach mules to file a successful appeal to regain access to their accounts.

Mr Victor Lye, Mr Fadli Fawzi and Ms Diana Pang asked about having stronger safeguards to ensure that individuals who are subject to banking restrictions continue to have access to basic banking services for daily living. Ms Diana Pang and Prof Kenneth Poon asked if restrictions to stop suspicious transactions will still allow essential living needs to be met and if arrangements could be made for verified payments to go through while suspicious transactions are restricted. Mr Fadli Fawzi and Ms Elysa Chen suggested that as a default, these individuals should still be allowed to make basic transactions subject to a daily cap, with a full freeze reserved only for clearly high-risk cases. Ms He Ting Ru asked about the banking restrictions imposed on individuals whose accounts have been restricted under the Facility Restricted Framework.

I wish to reassure the House that we will not prevent individuals from accessing funds that they genuinely need for daily living. Individuals subject to banking restrictions under SLOs may still transact personally at the bank, over the counter. We will only restrict access to self-service banking services, like Internet banking, mobile banking or ATM services, which are more prone to being exploited for scams. Incoming transactions, such as salaries and Government payouts, will continue to be processed as usual.

Where the individual needs access to funds in an account disabled by an ADO, the individual may apply to the Police for access for a reasonable amount of money for daily expenses. This individual may similarly apply to the Police for access to additional amounts of money for necessary expenses, such as utilities and rental payments. Requests will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and may be submitted and assessed independently of an appeal against the order.

We are mindful that if the individual is a scam mule, the funds within the disabled account may in fact not belong to him, but to other scam victims. Nevertheless, once the Police have assessed that the individual should be allowed access to funds, the Police will work with banks to enable this as quickly as possible.

MAS is also working with banks to preserve access to basic banking services for individuals whose accounts have been closed. In 2025, major retail banks offered close to 8,300 Limited Purpose Banking Accounts (LPBAs). We will enhance this from October 2026. Going forward, the local banks will offer an LPBA or an alternative basic bank account to every affected Singapore Citizen or Permanent Resident, except in very limited cases. Examples of such exclusions include individuals who are subject to financial sanctions imposed by the United Nations, have been involved in terrorism financing or refuse to cooperate with banks' customer due diligence processes. MAS will continue to monitor instances of unbanked individuals and work with banks to minimise undue financial exclusion.

Ms Gho Sze Kee asked about safeguards against service providers refusing service to individuals who have appeared on the NSL, or who have been the subject of an ADO or SLO. Ms Elysa Chen and Ms Diana Pang also asked whether such individuals will have the same right of appeal as subjects of ADOs or SLOs.

Members have rightly pointed out that service providers may voluntarily decide to disable the accounts of individuals whose details have been shared with them. We strongly encourage service providers to proactively act against scam accounts, without waiting to be compelled by a formal order.

We understand Members' reservations about encouraging private entities to take voluntary action. Indeed, these entities may not be held to the same fiduciary duties or public accountability that Government agencies have. But let me make two points here.

First, the sharing of an individual’s information with a service provider for the purpose of crime prevention is not new. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Police may already freeze bank accounts or phone lines. The possibility of service providers denying service to individuals linked to such accounts or phone lines on their own accord, even after the conclusion of their case, therefore already exists. What the Bill does is to lower the threshold for sharing such information with service providers, and to act swiftly against suspected scam activity.

Second, the question before us is fundamentally whether we are prepared to intervene early enough to prevent harm. If we are serious about doing this, we cannot expect the Police or Government to do this alone. Service providers are often best placed to detect suspicious activity first because they operate the platforms, systems and accounts that are being exploited by scammers.

In an NSL pilot trial conducted with the banking sector, every suspicious bank account shared with participating banks led, on average, to the proactive detection of one additional suspicious account by the banks. This shows how much more we can do together if industry, too, plays a more proactive and upstream role in detecting and acting against suspected scam activities, with appropriate safeguards in place for sure.

The proposed provisions in the Bill are intended to strike a careful balance between giving service providers sufficient latitude to act against scams without fear of liability, while providing guardrails to prevent abuse. For example, the protection from civil liability for voluntary actions only apply where the service provider acts in good faith and reasonable care; and for the purpose of preventing or detecting scam-related offences. This means service providers cannot act arbitrarily or with improper motive and still claim protection.

Service providers also remain subject to the oversight of their respective sectoral regulators, such as MAS for financial institutions and the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) for telcos. Any pattern of abuse or reckless handling of consumers' data or information may still attract regulatory scrutiny and where appropriate, enforcement action under the relevant sectoral regime.

To the Members' question on appeals, if a service provider decides to disable an account on its own accord, the service provider may review and decide whether to reinstate the account.

Ms Elysa Chen asked whether Singpass restrictions imposed under the Facility Restriction Framework may inadvertently lock individuals out of key Government services. I assure the Member that this is not the case. The Singpass restrictions will only be targeted at services that are at higher risk of being exploited for scams, such as opening a bank account. Services listed by the Member, namely voting, healthcare and CPF matters, remain fully accessible. Even for restricted services, individuals are not locked out entirely. It is possible to open a bank account without Singpass.

Mr Gabriel Lam, Dr Charlene Chen, Ms He Ting Ru and Mr Jackson Lam asked if statistics on ADOs and SLOs, and on appeals filed against these orders, will be published. Mr Fadli Fawzi asked if statistics on bank accounts frozen by the Police could be published. Mr Victor Lye suggested collecting data on the number of individuals who become unbanked or remain subject to banking restrictions following the Police's intervention measures, as well as the duration of such restrictions. I thank the Members for the suggestions, which we will consider.

Next, on the new offences targeting misuse of online accounts.

Dealing with the network of scam accounts is a crucial anti-scam strategy since these accounts are essential for scammers. Criminalising the misuse of online accounts addresses a scam modus operandi that we are already seeing in practice. In one case, a 30-year-old man came across a post on Telegram, soliciting Carousell account holders who were willing to let their accounts be used for "business purposes". Enticed by the promise of fast cash, he contacted the buyer and subsequently converted his Carousell account into a professional account, which required the completion of verification by linking his Singpass account. He also replaced the registered email address of the Carousell account and subsequently surrendered the login credentials to the buyer. The account was subsequently misused to facilitate scams.

Ms Elysa Chen suggested setting a minimum gain threshold, such that the presumption will only apply if the person provided their personal information or supplied an online account in exchange for gain that exceeds this threshold. We have concerns with such an approach. Whatever gain threshold that we set, scam mules are likely to endeavour to go below it to escape liability and frustrate law enforcement efforts. The Government's view is that the presumption should apply so long as there is gain, no matter how small.

Ms Chen also asked if a situation where a mule supplies an account on a designated online service to a scammer, but where the account is only used to establish contact with the victim but not for the actual commission of the scam, and would that be covered by the new offences. Section 39GA criminalises the supplying of a designated online account if the person knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the account would be used to commit or facilitate the commission by any person of any offence. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that a specific offence occurred.

Ms Diana Pang asked if the penalties are tiered based on the degree of the offender's involvement and if the penalties are sufficiently deterrent. The Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA's) assessment is that the current penalties are adequately tiered and sufficiently deterrent. We enhanced the penalties in October 2025, when MHA introduced caning as a penalty for scam mules, with higher penalties for scammers and members or recruiters of scam syndicates.

The Sentencing Advisory Panel has also published sentencing guidelines for scams related offences to provide clarity on the recommended sentences for scam related offenders. To send a strong deterrent signal, the guidelines recommend that custodial sentences should be the norm and lay out the aggravating factors that will warrant an uplift in sentencing.

Let me now move on to the questions relating to OCHA.

First, on the amendment allowing a computer program to issue OCHA directions. Ms Elysa Chen, Ms Diana Pang, Ms Hazlina Halim, Ms He Ting Ru, Mr Abdul Muhaimin and Mr Jackson Lam asked about the safeguards in place to ensure that the computer program operates accurately, fairly and according to law. The program has been trained on clear criteria for identifying scam content and tested in parallel with human supervision to ensure a high level of accuracy. Any future program that we may use will need similar levels of rigour, if not higher.

Post-deployment, we will maintain oversight of the program through measures such as human intervention on low-confidence cases, audit checks on blocked websites and periodic reviews of the program’s performance based on metrics such as precision rate, to ensure that it continues to operate as intended. Designated Officers remain responsible and accountable for the directions issued by the program. We are confident that the program will be able to continue maintaining a high level of accuracy when issuing OCHA directions.

The number of reconsideration requests received for OCHA directions presently is very low. Out of over 70,000 website blocking directions issued in 2026, the Police only received six reconsideration requests. Six out of 70,000. Seeing this 70,000 number, I cannot help but be reminded of Ms Elysa Chen's zombie analogy, that when you kill one, more pop up. Therefore, we need to be able to use AI technology to be able to fight this scourge.

The Government has been exploring the application of AI for scam disruption for a long time now, before this was raised in the Workers' Party manifesto in 2025. For example, the AI powered classifier for ScamShield was developed in the first quarter of 2024 and operationalised a few months later. This has helped identify scam content submitted by users with a high precision rate and gives us confidence as we explore expanding AI use cases in scam disruption in areas where speed and scale are critical.

Several Members asked about the review process for appeals against any OCHA direction, including those given by a computer program. The existing appeal mechanism continues to apply.

We understand OCHA directions can have a serious impact on affected individuals and businesses, and we are committed to reviewing appeals expeditiously. While the time taken for appeals depend on the nature and complexity of the appeals, the review can be expected to be completed within seven days for straightforward and unambiguous appeals. For more complex cases, a longer timeline may be required.

Ms He Ting Ru asked if the Government would publicise performance indicators on directions issued by computer program in the future. I thank her for the suggestion, which we will consider.

Next, I will address queries relating to enhance penalty regime for the Codes of Practice and Implementation Directives. Mr Jackson Lam asked how the Code of Practice framework deals with content generated using AI. I agree with the Member that we must take an outcome-based approach, and indeed our Codes of Practice prescribe outcomes which designated online services are required to meet. We have taken care to prescribe these outcomes in a technologically neutral manner so that they remain relevant regardless of whether a scam is conducted using AI.

Mr Gabriel Lam asked how the powers under the enhanced enforcement regime will be used in practice. Ms Hazlina Halim asked about the factors that the competent authority will consider in deciding the quantum of the financial penalty. The decision to issue a financial penalty or direct the platform to rectify the non-compliance, as well as the quantum of financial penalty to impose, will depend on a variety of factors. This includes the nature and severity of the non-compliance, and the culpability and compliance track record of the platform. Our objective is for platforms to rectify their non-compliance, and the appropriate course of action will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Mr Gabriel Lam also asked if we have considered a shared responsibility model where banks, telcos and online platforms each have statutory duties to prevent scams within their own ecosystems. I agree that tackling scams must be a shared responsibility. This principle underpins our anti-scam strategy and is reflected throughout this Bill. The Government, banks, telcos, online platforms and individuals all have a role to play in preventing scams and reducing harm. While the enhanced OCHA enforcement regime applies to designated online services, we already have legal powers to take enforcement action against banks and telcos if necessary, whether through criminal offences or through MAS' and IMDA's regulatory regimes.

Ms Hazlina Halim asked how an instance of non-compliance will be assessed in practice. This will depend on the requirement in question. For example, if a service provider is required to meet a certain outcome, each failure to meet the outcome may be considered a separate instance. Designated online service providers should therefore rectify non-compliance as quickly as possible, to avoid new penalties arising from further instances of non-compliance.

Allow me to now move to the next set of issues on CSOs.

Mr Abdul Muhaimin asked where CSOs will be deployed and where CSOs will be recruited from. I thank the Member for recognising the strain that our law enforcement resources are placed under. CSOs may be recruited directly from the market, or may be seconded from other public agencies, such as the Cyber Security Agency. CSOs will be deployed to complement police resources in existing units, starting from the Cyber Command. CSOs will fall under the prevailing Police command structures and will be recruited through established channels to bring in specialised civilian expertise that can augment Police's operational capabilities.

Ms Elysa Chen, Mr Jackson Lam and Ms Diana Pang sought assurance on safeguards to ensure that CSOs can be entrusted with sensitive investigations. Similar to Commercial Affairs Officers today, CSOs will undergo the necessary operational and investigative training, and will be carefully selected based on their suitability for investigation work and relevant technical expertise. They remain subject to the same oversight, accountability and command structures as other investigation officers.

To Ms Diana Pang's further query, members of the public can identify CSOs by their warrant cards, similar to plainclothes police officers and Commercial Affairs Officers today. If unsure, members of the public may call the police hotline to verify the CSO's legitimacy.

Ms He Ting Ru asked what additional prescribed information banks may be required to provide under clause 6 of the Bill. The provision allows Police to obtain necessary information to notify persons who have been issued a restriction order. These persons have been identified to be at risk of falling prey to a scam, so any prescribed information will be in service of this narrow intent of preventing harm to a potential scam victim. The wider principle of banking secrecy remains unaffected.

Finally, allow me to address questions relating to other aspects of our anti-scam strategy.

Mr Abdul Muhaimin asked if there are any service standards governing the lifting of accounts frozen for investigations pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code. The duration for which an account is frozen varies from case to case depending on the duration required for investigations or court proceedings. As a safeguard, the Criminal Procedure Code requires that the Police make a report of seizure to the relevant Court once the property is no longer required for investigations or court proceedings, or within one year after the date of seizure, whichever is earlier. Once the freeze is no longer required, the Police will apply to the Court for an order to lift the freeze. Banks are expected to give effect to court orders as soon as practicable upon receipt. Individuals whose bank accounts are frozen can also apply to the Courts for the release of funds to pay for basic living expenses or other essential spending.

Mr Fadli Fawzi asked if the Police intend to continue using Criminal Procedure Code powers to freeze bank accounts, or if the Police will use ADOs instead. We see ADOs as complementary to Criminal Procedure Code powers. Criminal Procedure Code powers are primarily investigative in nature and are generally exercised when there is sufficient evidence linking an account to an offence. On the other hand, ADOs can be exercised at a lower threshold to allow the Police to keep pace with the speed at which scam syndicates can create and replace accounts.

Ms He Ting Ru asked about the average processing time for request to withdraw funds for accounts subjected to a restriction order today, and whether the Government will work with banks to develop a system that allows for graduated restrictions. To the former, request relating to funds for legitimate purposes, such as daily expenses and bills, are processed quickly to minimise inconvenience to restriction order recipients. To the latter, I will refer her to MHA's response to a similar Parliamentary Question filed by Mr Kenneth Tiong for the Sitting on 4 March 2026.

Recipients of restriction orders may access funds for legitimate purposes amid safeguards against further transfers to scammers. We have therefore assessed that graduated restrictions are not necessary for now.

Ms Hazlina Halim and Ms He Ting Ru asked if anti-scam public education is tailored for different demographic segments such as seniors and young adults. Ms Jessica Tan also spoke about the importance of investing in public education, community outreach and digital literacy programmes. The Government has rolled out targeted public education efforts. For example, to make anti-scam public education material more elderly-friendly, the Police have published material with bite-sized messages in vernacular languages, using larger fonts and clear visuals. The Police have also worked closely with Government agencies such as the Agency for Integrated Care to deliver anti-scam public education through touch points frequented by the elderly. We even inject scam messages into getai performances and we have similar outreach efforts for other groups such as our youths.

We also recently concluded the National Simulated Scams Exercise held between March and August this year, which involved the use of robo-callers to simulate calls from scammers to strengthen participants’ anti-scam resilience. We will continue to invest in anti-scam public education as a key safeguard against scams as this is what we need to do to protect our population. And a vigilant population is ultimately the most important safeguard.

Senior Minister of State Goh, if I may interrupt you – and this is not a scam message. You are approaching close to 40 minutes, so if you are able to finish soon, I will let you continue. If not, I will get Leader to move a Motion. Are you able to finish soon?

I will request for an extension.

Alright. Leader.