Blocking of Websites Linked to Misinformation Campaigns and Subsequent Appeals Process

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) does not set a threshold of reach or impact in assessing whether to pre-emptively act against threats of hostile information campaigns (HICs).

In the case of 10 inauthentic websites that were blocked on 22 October 2024, the level of exposure of Singaporeans to these 10 websites were assessed to be low. However, based on our investigations, they could potentially be used by foreign actors to mount HICs against Singapore. Most of these websites are associated with global networks of inauthentic news websites that have been reported by cybersecurity researchers to have conducted HICs and influence campaigns in other countries.

The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) had considered the MHA’s findings and was satisfied that it was in the public interest to take pre-emptive action and not wait until a HIC is mounted before acting against these websites.

Singaporeans should continue to remain vigilant when consuming online content and be alert to such inauthentic websites and the threat that they pose. The directions to Internet Access Service Providers to disable access to the 10 inauthentic websites were issued with the intent of protecting users in Singapore from accessing and potentially being misled by these inauthentic websites. However, if individuals choose to circumvent these protections and use virtual private networks or other means to access dubious content, they do so at their own risk. We cannot protect people who deliberately avoid the protection.

Under section 59 of the Broadcasting Act, any licensee aggrieved by any decision of the IMDA may appeal to the Minister.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister of State for her reply. Blocking websites is a very powerful tool, but it also can have unintended consequences, such as driving traffic underground. How will the Ministry monitor this and deal with these unintended consequences? Are there complementary strategies to address misinformation besides blocking websites?

I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. The objective of issuing directions to the inauthentic websites is to protect users in Singapore from accessing and potentially being misled by them, and to raise public awareness of such foreign interference risks. So, by issuing a direction, by blocking access to these websites, we would have achieved these objectives.

I take the point that the Member mentioned that there could be users, audiences in Singapore who would try other ways and means to get access to this content. I had shared in my main reply that we cannot prevent them from doing so, but we would have achieved our purpose of highlighting to these users already the risk of accessing such content.

Beyond what we can do in the areas of issuing directions, I think what is most important is that we need to remind members of the public that they have to remain aware and vigilant against potential foreign interference activity.

The Government has conducted public education efforts and communication campaigns. We will continue to do so. These include the National Library Board's SURE campaign, which stands for Source, Understand, Research and Evaluate, to impart critical thinking skills to help Singaporeans discern the reliability of information, as well as the annual Total Defence campaign that reminds Singaporeans of the part that they need to play to counter hybrid threats. Lastly, the media also plays an important role by increasing the audience's awareness of the threat of foreign interference. I thank the Member for his questions.