Debated in Parliament on 7 Aug 2024.
Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for Home Affairs in light of five social media platforms directed to block a network of 95 accounts (a) what were the reach of the posts containing videos on the leadership transition in Singapore; (b) whether any of the three accounts that belonged to Himalaya Singapore were operated by residents or foreigners stationed in Singapore; (c) whether there were additional posts initiated by the said 95 accounts after 10 May 2024 on Singapore's leadership transition; and (d) what were the lessons learnt from this episode.
Sir, there was low reach in our local information space. After 10 May 2024, we did not detect any further posts from the network of 95 accounts carrying malicious narratives on Singapore's leadership transition. Our investigations have not found any evidence that Singaporeans or persons based in Singapore are responsible for the 95 accounts.
[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]
This episode is a reminder that Singapore is vulnerable to Hostile Information Campaigns (HICs) because of our small, open and highly digitally connected society. The ubiquity of technologies, such as the Internet, social media and artificial intelligence (AI), has made preparing for and carrying out HICs much easier. HIC tactics range from polarising societies by exploiting fault lines and manipulating public opinion on sensitive issues, to undermining trust in the Government and institutions.
Legislative levers, such as the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, or FICA, to prevent, detect and disrupt HICs, are important. However, this alone will not be enough. Public vigilance against foreign interference is equally important. We urge Singaporeans to be discerning when consuming and disseminating information online. We should always fact-check the information, to see if it is accurate and authentic, against a credible source.
Mr Ang Wei Neng.
Mr Deputy Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for the comprehensive reply. I have a few supplementary questions. Firstly, can the Minister of State reveal what are the resources devoted to monitor such hostile interference and how would the Ministry of Home Affairs scale up the resources in a sensitive period? Thirdly, are there other hostile interferences, maybe not as large scale as the one that was just mentioned, but especially of those sponsored by the state?
I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. We monitor the online space and we will not hesitate to use appropriate levers, including the use of our FICA directions. For national security reasons, we are not able to disclose details of operations against foreign interference in Singapore.
Ms Hazel Poa, next question.
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