Committee of Supply – Head J (Ministry of Defence)

Chairman, the global geopolitical environment is becoming increasingly complex and uncertain. Major power competition has sharpened and long-standing institutions are under strain. Even alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which have underpinned decades of stability, face questions about cohesion and a potential fracture. While Singapore is not party to these alliances, any significant shift in the global security environment will inevitably have wider implications.

Against this backdrop, I would like to ask about whether MINDEF intends to refine its approach to building defence relations with key partners and if so, how it intends to do that?

Singapore's longstanding strategy has been to anchor our security in a strong defence force, supported by a diversified network of defence partnerships. This has served us well. Our close relationships with countries, such as the United States (US) and Australia, have enabled us to expand our training arrangements and to enhance our military's readiness. The Five Power Defence Arrangements continues to provide a practical and flexible platform for interoperability through regular exercises. Within our region, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus bring together ASEAN and key external partners, including China, India, Japan and others, to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in defence and security.

Beyond traditional defence cooperation, we already work closely with partners to address transnational threats. In counterterrorism, Singapore has strengthened information-sharing with regional partners to enhance collective early warning capabilities, including through the ASEAN Our Eyes Initiative. We also contribute to the Counter Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF), working alongside like-minded countries to exchange information and provide early warning of potential terrorist plots. In maritime security, Singapore contributes to the Information Fusion Centre, which facilitates timely information sharing on maritime threats. We also participate in coordinated patrols in the Malacca Straits with Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand and support broader international anti-piracy efforts.

These practical initiatives demonstrate how defence diplomacy and security cooperation can directly enhance our security and regional stability.

As the strategic environment evolves, it may be timely to consider how we can further strengthen and adapt this web of partnerships. Will Singapore explore new partnerships with like-minded nations or find meaningful ways to deepen existing relationships with countries to share our commitment to international law and to dealing with multilateral security frameworks. Are there new areas in which Singapore is looking to collaborate with other countries as well?

Singapore's success as a small nation in a complex world has always depended on one crucial factor – our ability to be trusted by all, while belonging exclusively to no one.

For decades, our strategic value as a neutral convener and reliable partner has served us well. We have consistently championed international law and multilateral frameworks, signalling to our partners that we can be counted on. Our strategic location and world-class infrastructure have made us an ideal host for sensitive international discussions.

The results speak for itself. We successfully hosted the historic Trump-Kim summit in 2018, promoting dialogue in place of conflict. We continue to host the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, where defence ministers from around the world gather for frank discussions on regional security. We have facilitated trilateral exchanges between major powers, proving our professionalism and discretion on the global stage.

However, the rapidly changing security landscape presents a new challenge to sustaining this position. Great power competition is intensifying at an unprecedented pace. Nations are increasingly pressured to choose sides and the middle ground that Singapore has traditionally occupied is shrinking.

We also face new threats that straddle the space between peace and conflict. Such hybrid warfare tactics make neutrality more difficult to define and maintain.

On top of these, technological warfare and cyber threats transcend traditional diplomatic boundaries while economic interdependence creates new vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit.

As a small nation, maintaining our value proposition is not merely advantageous, it is existential. Unlike larger powers that can rely on military might or economic leverage, Singapore's security depends on our ability to remain relevant and trusted by major stakeholders.

Given this, I would like to ask how MINDEF/SAF plans to maintain its relevance and value proposition amidst the evolving security landscape. Apart from preserving our reputation as a key and trusted partner, are there new ways in which we can demonstrate our value-add to others?

Chairman, the world has entered a new era of conflict, one that is more complex, more contested and more technologically driven than anything we have witnessed in generations. In 2024, there were 61 state-based armed conflicts worldwide – the highest number recorded since the Second World War. What makes this moment particularly consequential is not just the number of conflicts, but how they are being fought.

Today, emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, advanced robotics and cyber warfare capabilities are reshaping the character of conflict – how wars are fought, who fights them and where the battlefield lies.

These technologies blur the traditional boundaries between military and civilian domains. Civilian infrastructure, businesses and everyday technology become legitimate targets. In our context, ordinary Singaporeans, especially the vulnerable, could be put directly in harm's way.

We have already seen how these new capabilities have made their way into recent conflicts and changed the way they are fought and won.

Commercial drones – the kind any of us might be able to buy online – can be fitted with AI and turned into precision weapons. They can be coordinated in swarms that may overwhelm even sophisticated air defence systems.

Meanwhile, cyberattacks are achieving what once required bombs and missiles. They can shut down power grids, cripple communications and spread false information to damage public morale. Modern sensors can now see through clouds, track movements in real-time and provide commanders with battlefield awareness that was unimaginable a decade ago.

In the Russia-Ukraine war, both sides deploy drones. Ukraine has even used low-cost naval drones to break Russia's Black Sea blockade and force the withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Crimea, a remarkable feat achieved without conventional warships.

The digital domain has become a full-fledged theatre of conflict. Cyber threats are already at our doorstep. What is most worrying is that these technologies are no longer exclusive to states. Even non-state groups can now access capabilities that were once the preserve of major military powers.

For Singapore, this presents unique challenges. As a highly connected, technology-dependent city-state, the very systems that drive our economic success also create vulnerabilities. Our concentrated urban environment means that attacks using these technologies could have devastating effects.

However, we also have opportunities. Singapore can leverage these same technologies to enhance our capabilities. Our strong technology sector and culture of innovation position us well to develop and deploy emerging technologies for defence purposes, potentially strengthening our defence partnerships in the process.

Indeed, the DSTA has already pivoted decisively toward robotics, drones, autonomy and AI, recognising that the proliferation of drones and autonomous systems is reshaping the physical domain while cyberattacks and disinformation are transforming the digital space.

The SAF has established a Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Development and Operations group and the Air Force has set up a new UAS Warfare and Tactics Centre to drive the development and integration of unmanned platforms across all services.

But staying ahead will require not only technological innovation but also a willingness to continually adapt. We need to constantly monitor technological developments, assess their military potential and anticipate how adversaries might use them against us.

I would like to ask if MINDEF would consider providing greater support for the research into technologies in frontier capabilities that can be developed for defence purposes even if these solutions come from the private sector or to deepen the collaboration with our universities.

Given these rapidly evolving threats and opportunities, I would like to ask the Minister for an update on our strategies to guard against such emerging and disruptive technologies that can be used on the battlefield and how we will ensure that Singapore remains secure in this era of warfare.

Mr Chairman, as a former military service personnel, war is more salient for me than most in this House.

In a recent moving speech at the Kranji War memorial, Senior Minister of State Murali reminded us that "peace is hard won, that war is not a story of the past, but a reality of the present" and that "today, the world is not at peace – a few countries are already at war, others are preparing for it and still others know they must."

Singapore has been in a state of preparedness for all the years of our independence. But the nature of war is fast changing.

Today, unmanned solutions are at the forefront of conflicts. The ongoing war in Ukraine has demonstrated their cost effectiveness dramatically. A drone costing around $20,000 can potentially destroy infrastructure worth millions while forcing defenders to use missiles costing hundreds of thousands of dollars to intercept it.

Looking ahead, can I ask the Minister three related points on manpower, security and supply chain?

First, in light of Singapore's falling birth rate, may I ask the Minister, how is SAF using unmanned technology in local and overseas training to improve effectiveness and reduce manpower reliance? What are some examples of unmanned technologies development strategies or trajectories in the next 10 to 20 years that can truly replace human operators? Can remote unmanned technologies truly fly aircraft, drive tanks and launch bridges? What is MINDEF's projected percentage manpower savings from the use of unmanned systems to mitigate the declining population?

We ought, of course, to avoid a situation where we own many unmanned systems but in the end, manpower needs are not very much reduced. Also, in terms of the split between manned and unmanned defence systems, in terms of capex investment, what is rough proportion now and what will it be in the future?

Second, unmanned technologies are a double-edged sword. The same benefits that help us project war can just as easily be used against us. This dual nature of unmanned technology means we must be both users and defenders against these systems. How does SAF ensure high availability and reliability of unmanned systems, especially on cybersecurity attacks?

Third, as we expand our unmanned capabilities, we must also consider supply chain resilience. Overreliance on any single source or region for these critical systems could create vulnerabilities.

Chairman, as a digital nation, Singapore's strength has also become our vulnerability. We rely heavily on online infrastructure for almost everything in our daily lives: communications, government services, banking, healthcare and commerce. This digital interconnectedness brings tremendous convenience and productivity, but without robust safeguards, it also exposes us to significant systemic risks.

What concerns me most is how cyberattacks can directly disrupt the lives of ordinary Singaporeans, especially our most vulnerable communities. We have seen globally how attacks on power grids and critical infrastructure can trigger widespread blackouts, affecting hospitals where patients depend on life support systems, transport networks that workers rely on, and schools where our children learn.

Cyber threats are no longer abstract. They have very real-world consequences.

On the military front, the stakes are even higher. Cyberattacks can disrupt command and control systems, compromise intelligence and surveillance operations, and undermine the functionality of critical defence platforms. In a crisis, digital paralysis can translate into operational disadvantages.

The pace of technological change is rapid and relentless. Emerging technologies, including AI-enabled cyber tools are reshaping the threat landscape. It is therefore imperative that the SAF continuously adapts to stay ahead of evolving digital threats.

The establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) in 2022 marked a significant milestone in strengthening our defence posture in the digital domain.

Can the Minister provide an update on how the DIS is building deep cyber capabilities, strengthening talent pipelines, and partnering industry and academia to stay ahead of emerging threats? How will these efforts further enhance Singapore's overall cyber defence resilience as part of a whole-of-nation approach?

Chairman, as a small nation, we have always lived with one hard truth – we cannot count on others to defend Singapore. That is why from our earliest years, we invested heavily in building a credible SAF and why defence has always been treated as a long-term business, not an annual shopping list.

Building deterrence takes time. It takes years to develop capabilities, train people and build up infrastructure. And today's security environment is becoming more complex, with cyber threats, disinformation and hybrid tactics that target our systems and our social cohesion, even without a single shot fired.

So, I agree – where necessary, we must invest in new capabilities to keep the SAF agile and resilient.

But at the same time, we owe it to Singaporeans to be prudent. Every dollar for defence is also a dollar not spent on other pressing priorities. People say it is healthcare, education, cost-of-living support and strengthening our social compact.

In that regard, I have two questions for the Minister. First, what is the projection for defence spending this year in absolute terms and as a share of Government expenditure and GDP, and what are the key drivers of any change? Second, how does MINDEF and the SAF ensure cost effectiveness across major procurements and long-term programmes? For example, what stronger "value-for-money" checks are in place? How do we manage cost overruns and lifecycle costs, and how do we retire or refresh legacy systems, so that we do not carry capabilities that no longer match today's threat landscape?

Chairman, Singaporeans support defence spending when it is clearly tied to real capabilities and disciplined stewardship. Our commitment must remain – strong security, but with strong accountability.

Sir, the global defence industrial base is facing unprecedented strain, leading to severe delivery backlogs that threaten operational readiness. In Japan, audits reportedly revealed that military equipment worth nearly US$7 billion remained undelivered five years after contracts were signed, forcing their military to operate with critical capability gaps. Similarly, Taiwan reportedly faces a backlog exceeding $21 billion, with delivery timelines of fighter aircraft and coastal defence systems slipping repeatedly.

These examples serve as a stark warning. Robust procurement budgets cannot purchase security if hardware remains on a distant assembly line. Therein lies the risk of a capability vacuum, if our own high-end platforms do not arrive on time. The operational life of existing assets is not infinite. We cannot afford a security hiatus where our surveillance or ratal defence posture is compromised, because we are waiting in a global queue. Relying on a single source for critical high-end systems may create a strategic vulnerability amidst current global instability. How is MINDEF diversifying and sourcing from a wider range of global partners to mitigate single point failures in the supply chain?

Singapore must be a partner with sufficient leverage to demand delivery certainty for every asset. Does MINDEF have a robust claw back clauses and does it provide for liquidated damages for delays within these high-end contracts? Furthermore, MINDEF must ensure that multi-billion-dollar high end contracts are transparent and accountable. This can be done by ensuring the Auditor-General's office is given full access to audit procurement milestones, contract variations and delivery timelines.

Mr Chairman, National Service is the bedrock of our defence. Every generation of Singaporeans has served, and every generation deserves to know that their time in uniform is used to its fullest. Are we deploying our national servicemen as meaningfully as we can and are the skills they bring being optimised?

Today, enlistees arrive with increasingly diverse capabilities – from digital skills to technical trades, logistics experience, language abilities and even food and beverage (F&B) or retail operations knowledge. How is MINDEF strengthening the identification and deployment of such capabilities, so that NS becomes not just a duty fulfilled but a period of genuine contribution to our defence?

I would also ask MINDEF to consider greater flexibility during NS. Can we explore Work-Learn schemes that allow servicemen, where operationally feasible, to build career-relevant credentials along their services? Can early enlistment options be made available for those who wish to enter NS before the standard window, giving young men more agency over how they sequence education, service and work?

For our Operationally Ready National Servicemen, I hope MINDEF will look into more structured Expertise Deployment – matching reservists to roles that draw on competencies from their civilian lives. A reservist who is a mechanic, a nurse or a logistics coordinator should be contributing where his skills matter most.

I look forward to MINDEF's update on how we can make every hour of service count.

Sir, in February, the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) disclosed that all four of Singapore's major telcos had been breached by UNC3886. Does the Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) have the talent pipeline fight the next breach?

DIS was established three years ago. The Defence Cyber Command was inaugurated last March. MINDEF has programmes to grow talent from within – the Sentinel Programme for youths, the Cyber Work-Learn Scheme for NSFs, the enhanced expertise deployment scheme for NS men with relevant civilian skills. These are genuine efforts and I acknowledge them.

But the expertise to detect zero-day exploits in network firewalls to identify custom root kits, like MOPSLED and REPTILE, to trace state sponsored command and control infrastructure routed through commercial cloud services, this is predominantly in the private sector at firms, like Cloudstrike, Mandiant, Palo Alto Networks. The response operation Cyber Guardian required coordination across six agencies precisely because no single entity, including DIS, had sufficient depth alone.

The Minister acknowledged last September that military and civilian cyber threats are increasingly blurred. I agree. But if the threat landscape is blurred, the talent pipeline should be too. Our programmes train soldiers to become cyber defenders. We do not seem to have a dedicated pathway for cyber professionals to become soldiers. The barrier is structural. Military service carries entry requirements designed for conventional soldiering – fitness standards, ten weeks of basic training, rigid career tracks and compensation that cannot compete with industry. These are appropriate for infantry, but perhaps counterproductive for recruiting a 40-year-old penetration tester.

Last year, the UK launched the Cyber Direct entry scheme, a fast-track pathway for civilians into military cyber roles. Basic training cut to one month, fitness and medical standards waived, no formal qualifications required, demonstrated skills sufficient, starting salary over $40,000 pounds, with up to $25,000 in additional skills pay.

The first cohort of thirty entered operational roles in late 2025, helping defend UK networks against 90,000 attacks over two years. Will MINDEF consider a cyber direct entry pathway for DIS, allowing mid-career industry professionals to serve in military cyber defence with adapted entry requirements and competitive compensation? Cyber Guardian shows what DIS achieves when it mobilises whole-of-Government. The next step is to draw from whole of industry.

Sir, in December, TikTok user @ruggerbud47 calculated how many McSpicy burgers his NSF allowance could buy and compared it to previous batches at the same rank. The answer: fewer. Despite nominal increases, NSF purchasing power has fallen. Every NSF watching it understood it instantly. In Budget 2026, the Government announced it will raise the local qualifying salary to $1,800. Every worker earning that amount receives Central Provident Fund (CPF) as a matter of law.

A second-year NSF corporal in a combat vocation earns $1,035 a month with zero CPF. If $1,800 is the floor for every worker in Singapore, surely it is the floor for every soldier. In 2024, my colleague Gerald Giam proposed raising NSF allowances to at least the local qualifying salary of $1,600 with CPF contributions. Senior Minister of State Heng Chee How replied that NS is a duty, not employment, but SAF regulars serve the same duty with market salaries and full CPF.

If duty and employment were mutually exclusive, we could not have a professional army. By their second year, NSFs are fully trained and operationally deployed, manning posts, running day to day operations, performing similar tasks as regulars. They should be paid accordingly. Raising second year NSF allowances to the new Local Qualifying Salary (LQS) of $1,800 with employer CPF would cost approximately $150 to $200 million a year, under 1% of a $25 billion defence budget. I ask the Minister: will the Ministry commit to at least the LQS of $1,800 for second year NSFs?

Mr Chairman, National Service (NS) is fundamental to Singapore's defence and continued prosperity. NS is a rite of passage, where young Singaporean men will have to take on the serious responsibility of contributing to our nation’s defence.

During my years serving in the Singapore Police Force, and also in my earlier years doing my National Service in the SAF, I have met many NSmen with a wide variety of skills. Through diverse vocations, ranging from logistics and engineering to cybersecurity and communications, our servicemen develop both hard and soft skills that are transferable to their civilian lives. They gain technical expertise, leadership skills and problem-solving abilities. They also learn to work under pressure, manage resources efficiently and get along with diverse teams across different backgrounds and cultures.

However, Mr Chairman, I have a concern about what happens after our NSmen complete their service. It is one thing for their commanders and superiors to recognise their growth and achievements through awards and various forms of NS-related recognition. But what is more crucial and what will affect these young men's career prospects is whether their future employers will recognise their practical skills that they have acquired during National Service. We need to ensure that employers can make a more holistic assessment on their employability, one that accounts for the skills and experience that they gain during their NS.

To that end, how does MINDEF intend to ensure that the skills acquired by servicemen are duly recognised?

Chairman, peace and prosperity is neither natural nor permanent. Security is not a given. Singapore built deliberately and defended consistently.

In an increasingly complex and multipolar world, Singapore has to maintain the flexibility to work with multiple partners while preserving our sovereignty and independence. How will Singapore strengthen defence cooperation not only with the United States and China, but also with other key strategic partners in our region and beyond, whether through joint exercises, military exchanges, technology collaboration, defence industry partnerships or crisis communication mechanisms? How do these partnerships enhance the SAF's operational readiness while maintaining strategic flexibility? What safeguards are in place to ensure that we do not become overly reliant to any single defence partnership?

Chairman, our external partnerships are only as strong as our internal resilience. Some people I met asked why commitment to Total Defence and National Service (NS) remains relevant.

Singaporeans must view Total Defence and NS as investments in our collective future, not burdensome obligations as how some may have painted. So how can we harmonise aspirations, work and life as well as service and commitment and duty?

Total Defence and NS goes beyond domestic policies – both are strategic assets, enhancing our value as a defence partner. When other countries know Singapore has citizens who participate in national defence across all demographics, and a society that can withstand various pressures, it signals serious business.

NS is the cornerstone of Singapore's defence. Beyond military training – it embodies collective commitment to sovereignty and shared responsibility for the nation's future. When NSFs contribute meaningfully to Singapore's defence, their contributions become part of a larger shared commitment to safeguard our families, communities and our way of life. It is therefore key for Singaporeans, Servicemen and Significant Others to appreciate its intent.

Total Defence has played a significant role in Singapore's security over the past 42 years. At its core, Total Defence recognises that every Singaporean – regardless of race, language and religion – has a part to play in building a strong, secure and cohesive nation.

We saw Total Defence in action during the SARS and COVID-19. It demonstrated how coordinated Government responses, economic support measures, social solidarity and digital solutions can work together to manage national emergencies.

When households participate in Total Defence exercises, they are not just preparing for emergencies at a personal level, they are building a wider foundation of community resilience. However, more needs to be done to help Singaporeans see these connections and understand how their participation strengthens our defence and social fabric.

We need greater community engagement that reaches all segments of our society, including elderly residents, new citizens and families from different backgrounds. We must ensure that Total Defence activities are accessible and meaningful to everyone, regardless of their circumstances.

Could MINDEF please provide an update on participation and outcomes from Total Defence related activities, like Exercise SG Ready, this year? How else is MINDEF planning to strengthen community engagement with defence?

Finally, how is MINDEF, together with other agencies, ensuring a segment who did not choose to be here but are here, understands the expectations of Total Defence? What integration modules, multilingual resources or community initiatives are available to equip these segments with practical crisis response and knowledge?

Ensuring that everyone who calls Singapore home understands their role will strengthen our collective resilience. Deterrence remains the bedrock of our survival. Not just hardware but also mindset, cohesion and shared responsibility. If we are entering a more dangerous world, our greatest strategic asset will not only be a strong SAF, but a society that understands what is at stake and stands ready to defend it. In our national language, Sir, bersatu kita teguh. United we stand.

Chairman, defending our nation, securing our future. I will deliver my speech in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): Defence is not merely a military issue. It concerns whether a nation can survive, whether society has confidence and whether we can continue to function normally when facing external shocks.

In recent years, the security environment has seen three major changes.

First, the international situation is becoming increasingly unstable. Conflicts and tensions are no longer short-term events, but seem to be a permanent backdrop. For an open small state like Singapore, risks will not come from just one direction, but may simultaneously affect transport corridors, energy and food supplies, as well as the stability of financial and digital systems.

Second, the nature of threats is changing. Traditional military threats still exist, but more apparent is the increase in cross-domain risks. Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and attacks on critical infrastructure can all occur during peacetime, with significant effects. Security is no longer just in the battlefield but encompasses the entire social system.

Third, technology is rapidly changing the way defence is built. The development of artificial intelligence, unmanned systems and cyber capabilities is enabling countries to enhance their military capabilities faster. For small states with limited resources, we must be clearer about what matters most – we cannot do everything.

Mr Chairman, Singapore has always emphasised "Total Defence" and values technology as a force multiplier. I support these directions. However, I hope to understand the future priorities more clearly, so I have questions in four areas for the Minister to clarify.

First, regarding national resilience. When risks span multiple domains, no single department can respond alone. The key is overall coordination. I would like to ask, how does the Ministry of Defence establish clearer cooperation frameworks with other key agencies? When facing cross-domain shocks, how do we ensure clear decision-making and smooth coordination to maintain social stability and confidence? My concern is the overall architecture and MINDEF's future role positioning.

Second, regarding technological transformation. Technology investment must be far-sighted; we cannot blindly chase short-term trends. Minister, over the next 10 to 20 years, how do we determine the most important capabilities? How do we ensure that technological development synchronises with operational concepts, rather than merely updating equipment?

At the same time, with technology changing so rapidly, how do we maintain local research and development capabilities? How do we establish long-term, stable cooperative relationships between research institutions, enterprises and defence needs, rather than just doing short-term projects?

Third, regarding manpower planning. For a small state's defence, people are key. Technology can improve efficiency, but talent determines how far we can go. Minister, what kind of talent structure do we need for the future? Particularly for science and technology and engineering talent, what role do they play in our defence?

How do we enable more local talent to see clear development pathways and be willing to commit long-term? At the same time, whilst strengthening high-skilled teams, how do we continue to consolidate the social cohesion and shared sense of responsibility brought by the National Service?

Fourth, regarding fiscal sustainability. I understand that defence spending needs to be stable, because capability building cannot change year by year. But we also face pressures from an ageing population and increasing social expenditure.

Minister, under the premise of fiscal sustainability, how does MINDEF clearly explain long-term planning and prioritisation to Parliament? How do we ensure resources are concentrated on key capabilities, and through more systematic assessment, improve efficiency and effectiveness?

Mr Chairman, security is not a momentary issue, but a responsibility to the next generation. The goal of defence is to ensure that Singapore maintains stability, autonomy and resilience in an era full of uncertainty. Only when a nation is strong, can it stand independently in the world.

Chairman, the Enlistment Act requires males of over 18 years old to have compulsory National Service (NS) – SAF, SPF or SCDF.

NS as an institution has already evolved beyond protection and the defence of Singapore, but also as a social fabric for us to bond together, to understand each other, whether it is race or culture. So, it is a very valuable institution. Beyond the compulsory services, we also have the SAF Volunteer Corps, SPF's Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) and Citizens on Patrol. At the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), we have the Company Emergency Response Team (CERT).

Is it possible for us to not look at this type of services as just purely voluntary services but as an extension of our National Service? If we can do that, then I think we will be able to build a much more cohesive society that people who are not male citizens serving in the compulsory service, females or new citizens can then claim they are serving their National Service. I would like to propose a redefining of National Service to include the voluntary services of this nature, especially the uniformed groups.

I myself serve on Citizens on Patrol (COP). Tonight, I am going to walk up and down the Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats, the HDB car parks. I think that is also contribution to the protection and defence of the community. I would like to encourage, especially in view of total fertility rate (TFR) issues and protection of the neighbourhood, that we encourage the Permanent Residents (PRs) to join in such services and also make it compulsory for new citizens to at least do some of these services when they become a new citizen.

Chairman, recent conflicts overseas remind us that national defence is not carried by the military alone. In Ukraine, ordinary citizens have played important roles, countering misinformation, supporting one another and sustaining national morale even under prolonged crisis.

These experiences underscore an enduring lesson – resilience ultimately rests on the preparedness and resolve of the whole society.

Military capability remains essential. But behind every capable armed force is a population that understands the risks it faces and is prepared to respond collectively when crisis happen.

In Singapore, building such preparedness begins with awareness. Many Singaporeans have grown up in peace and stability, and as a result, security threats can sometimes feel distant or abstract. Strengthening national resilience therefore requires continued efforts to deepen public understanding of why defence matters and how every segment of society has a role to play.

MINDEF and the SAF have laid strong foundations. Total Defence education in schools and National Service remain central pillars of our defence system. For many Singaporeans, National Service is where responsibility, teamwork and commitment to country become tangible realities.

At the same time, opportunities exist to broaden engagement across society.

Women, who make up half our population, may wish to contribute beyond supporting family members in service. Likewise, young people, new citizens and others may be keen but uncertain about how they can meaningfully participate in strengthening national resilience.

In this regard, I would like to ask three clarifications.

First, how does MINDEF envision the role of the wider population evolving within Singapore's defence ecosystem over the longer term, particularly as demographics change and fewer citizens may have direct experience of National Service? Second, beyond preparedness exercises and participation schemes, how is MINDEF working across the Government and society to ensure that, in a national crisis, Singapore can mobilise quickly with public trust, cohesion and shared resolve already in place? Third, as the nature of conflict evolves beyond conventional warfare to include hybrid, informational and societal dimensions, how is MINDEF strengthening Singapore's overall whole-of-nation resilience framework so that our defence posture remains credible not only militarily, but also socially and psychologically?

Chairman, started in 2014, the Singapore Armed Forces Volunteer Corps (SAFVC) stands as a vital avenue for new citizens, first‑generation Permanent Residents, Singaporean women and those without National Service obligations to step forward, serve alongside our full-time national servicemen (NSFs), National Servicemen (NSmen) and regulars.

The SAFVC has grown steadily, offering more than 30 meaningful roles across the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Digital and Intelligence Service – from security, naval operations to engineering and legal work. Volunteers undergo rigorous training to ensure they are ready to take on responsibilities that support operations and training.

Above all, the SAFVC reflects the spirit of shared duty of ordinary people stepping forward in extraordinary ways. Each volunteer strengthens our defence network and reinforces the message that keeping Singapore safe is a collective responsibility.

Last year marked a meaningful milestone for our defence community, SAFVC. Celebrating its 10th anniversary, a decade that saw over 1,500 volunteers that stepped forward to serve. Their commitment reminds us that contributing to defence extends well beyond National Service obligations. It is a shared responsibility anchored in values, trust and the willingness to step up.

From the outset, SAF was built on a powerful idea – to give more people an avenue to contribute to national defence and deepen the understanding of what it takes to keep Singapore safe.

Last year, the SAFVC also participated for the first time in Exercise Wallaby, Singapore's largest unilateral overseas military exercise, where volunteers in the Forward Support Group provided medical, logistics, maintenance and transportation support to the training units. These experiences sharpen skills, builds confidence and deepens appreciation of the complex behind-the-scenes work that keeps our nation secure.

We should recognise the sacrifice our volunteers make. Many juggle careers and family responsibilities while serving.

Internationally, Singapore is not alone in engaging civilians in defence.

Estonia's Cyber Defence League mobilises IT professionals to help protect national cyber infrastructure. In the United Kingdom and Australia, the army reserve harnesses civilian expertise through more formal military structures, enabling citizens to contribute while maintaining their civilian careers.

These models reaffirm the value of flexible pathways that connect civilian skills to defence needs.

Looking ahead, as Singapore's society becomes more diverse and as more individuals without formal NS obligations express the desire to serve, the question is, how will SAFVC expand opportunities for volunteerism and what new roles could emerge to meet evolving operational needs from cyber and data to medical, logistics and community engagement?

If we continue to train progressively, deploy meaningfully and recognise generously, we will keep strengthening a defence ecosystem where every capable pair of hands and every willing heart can contribute to Singapore's security.

Since 1972, the Singapore Armed Forces Reservists Association (SAFRA) has been more than just a provider of gyms and swimming pools. It has been the home away from camp for our NSmen. Today, with seven clubs spanning from Jurong to Punggol, SAFRA stands as a tangible thank you from the nation to those who serve.

On a personal note, I have seen how these spaces have evolved. Since my younger days, SAFRA Tampines was where I headed to for a game of squash or badminton and my regular swims. Today, I see NSmen bringing their toddlers to the enrichment centres and their elderly parents to the restaurants. SAFRA has successfully mirrored the life stages of our servicemen, moving from a space for the boys to a space for the family.

The last time I popped into SAFRA was at SAFRA Tampines again, but with my son, for bowling; and recently in December, for a joint community event between my Pioneer Coordinating Arts and Culture Club and SAFRA Jurong.

To remain relevant in 2026 and beyond, SAFRA must continue to bridge the gap between "serving time" and "belonging."

My first clarification relates to the NS community's changing needs.

While the new Choa Chu Kang clubhouse is a masterpiece of modern integration, our NSFs and pre-enlistees have different digital and social habits compared to my generation. What upcoming initiatives or infrastructure improvements can the NS community look forward to? Specifically, how will SAFRA ensure that its offerings remain bespoke for different segments, from the pre-enlistee looking for fitness prep, to the NSF seeking respite, to the former NSman who still wishes to maintain that link to the SAF fraternity?

Sir, the security landscape has shifted. We are no longer just looking at borders. We are looking at hybrid threats – misinformation, cyberattacks and threats to our social cohesion. SAFRA's vision is for every NSman to be committed to Total Defence. But in a hybrid world, the commitment of the NSman alone is not enough. We need the commitment of the entire public.

Public support is the "fuel" for our defence engine. It is what makes the "whole-of-society" mentality possible. If the public does not understand the why behind our defence spending or the sacrifice of our servicemen, our national resilience weakens.

Chairman, currently, SAFRA serves the NS community. But I believe SAFRA's expertise in community building is a really untapped resource for broader national engagement. Can we leverage SAFRA's network and facilities to engage the wider Singapore public on defence matters? Are there plans to use SAFRA as a platform where non-servicemen – could be spouses, children and new citizens – so that they can better appreciate the contributions of our NSmen and learn how they too can play a part in Total Defence? By opening SAFRA's "doors", both physical and metaphorical wider, we do not just celebrate our soldiers; we strengthen our society.

Chairman, Total Defence has never been just about equipment. It has always been about people. And it is about whether every Singaporean understands his or her stake in this country and appreciates the role that NS plays in keeping Singapore safe.

Operational readiness remains critical of course. But without sustained community support and identification with the institution of NS, our defence posture will gradually hollow out. As our society continues to evolve and becomes more prosperous and comfortable, defence concerns can easily slip to the back of our minds. Families today juggle work pressures, children’s education, caregiving for elderly parents and of course, rising costs of living. Young professionals are focused on career advancement and personal aspirations. It is natural that defence issues do not feature prominently in daily conversation.

The peace and stability we have enjoyed for decades also make existential threats feel distant. Security becomes assumed rather than consciously valued. This is precisely why community institutions matter more now than ever. They bridge the gap between our defence needs and everyday life. They keep defence awareness alive in spaces where Singaporeans already gather.

Therefore, SAFRA is one such important institution. It has clubhouses across the island and a large membership base. It is where NSmen meet friends, where families send their children for classes, where people exercise, dine and unwind. I have personally spent time at SAFRA facilities with my family as many Members would have. These are ordinary moments, but they are also opportunities. Around us are NSmen who have trained together, served together and carry stories of hardship, camaraderie and pride.

We hear conversations about friendships forged in outfield conditions, about the satisfaction of completing a demanding exercise, about the quiet pride in wearing the uniform and doing one's part. And, of course, when NSmen meet, complain about tough training as well. These lived experiences are powerful ones. They humanise defence. They remind us that security is not an abstract idea. It is built by sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, fathers, colleagues.

My question therefore is how MINDEF can deepen partnerships with organisations like SAFRA so that they go beyond just being facilities for recreation. Would there be plans to develop programmes within these community platforms that will actively foster intergenerational understanding of NS? For example, perhaps dialogues where veterans and younger Singaporeans can share perspectives on NS, preparedness workshops that involve entire families, activities that integrate the messages of Total Defence into everyday community life.

How can SAFRA and similar institutions better engage not only our NSmen, but also spouses, their children and our new citizens as well?

Many new Singaporeans may not have grown up with NS is a formative experience. Yet, their sense of belonging and commitment is equally important for us. Can these platforms help them understand our defence story and feel invested in protecting their newly adopted home?

Ultimately, defence in the community should be visible in small but telling ways. Parents who instinctively teach their children resilience and preparedness, neighbours who check on one another during crises, young Singaporeans who see NS not merely as an obligation, but as a shared rite of passage, and new citizens who speak of Singapore's security as their responsibility as well.

If we are intentional in leveraging the reach and influence of institutions like SAFRA, we can ensure that Total Defence can remain a lived national commitment and not confined to the uniformed services or to our schools. I would appreciate if the Ministry could share what outcomes MINDEF will track to assess whether defence is truly anchored in the community and what more can be done to strengthen this vital pillar of national resilience.

Mr Chairman, Singapore's Total Defence framework has always recognised that a strong defence system is multi-faceted and goes beyond the military. The six pillars of defence include, the military, civil, economic, social, digital and psychological defence. To this end, while belabouring the point, I would like to join my Parliamentary colleagues, Mr Patrick Tay and my only namesake in the House Mr Alex Yam, to speak about SAFRA.

SAFRA National Service Association is a familiar and accessible platform for NSmen, their families and the wider community to come together to participate in Total Defence activities.

Today, SAFRA has seven clubhouses spread across Singapore and more than 475,000 members.  With its strong infrastructure and extensive member network, I believe more can be done to mobilise this platform. For example, just earlier this month, as part of Exercise SG Ready 2026, simulated disruption activities and programmes to commemorate Total Defence were held at SAFRA clubhouses for NSmen and their families to learn about readiness for power outages and disrupted digital connectivity.

MINDEF could consider working with SAFRA to hold more regular community dialogue sessions on disinformation, resilience workshops and curated content on threats facing Singapore with a focus on engaging the wider community.

SAFRA's extensive network of members and suite of infrastructure, present a wealth of resource and opportunities for us to leverage. Its wide reach makes it a potentially formidable tool to strengthen our Total Defence strategy, as a strategic defence engagement platform that can raise awareness and deepen ties in the community.

In the premises, I would like to ask the Minister whether MINDEF have plans to better leverage SAFRA's existing infrastructure and network to build stronger ties and raise Total Defence awareness in the community.

Chair, let me first thank Members for their interest and support for MINDEF and SAF. Chair, we live in unprecedented and increasingly dangerous times. Yet, Singapore has enjoyed another year of relative peace and economic prosperity. We do not, should not and must not take this for granted. Even if we had been lucky, luck favours only the prepared. We must be prepared.

The world, as Members have said, is undergoing rapid and disruptive structural changes. Many of our old assumptions about the world and how it works are less or no longer relevant.

To secure our place in the world, we must anticipate, adapt and develop capabilities ahead of time, to pre-empt the new threats and developments, even as we continue to manage the existing and enduring ones. If we fail, we risk irrelevance and heightened insecurity.

What are our security challenges? Let me group them into three kinds: the enduring, the emergent and the evolving.

First, our enduring challenges. Singapore's strategic realities are our geography, manpower and constrained resources. These immutable truths have set the foundations for our approach to defence.

Geographically, we are a small country. We have no hinterland for early warning. We do not have the option of falling back and regrouping to come back from an attack. We are also air- and sea-locked. Our lifelines go through other countries' air and sea space to reach international space to connect with the world. We cannot allow ourselves to be physically and digitally cut-off from the rest of the world. Therefore, we have built the SAF and developed operational concepts to overturn these vulnerabilities.

Our lack of domestic resources also makes us susceptible to external disruptions, because we rely on international trade to sustain ourselves. To overcome this limitation, we must strengthen our resilience to withstand and outlast any pressure from external forces. This is not just an SAF responsibility but a whole-of-society effort through Total Defence.

Manpower is our third constraint. With our small population size, we can never rely on a fully Regular or volunteer force large enough for our defence needs. We need National Service (NS). Beyond numbers, we must also be able to harness and deploy our whole-of-nation talent effectively.

Next, our emergent challenges. It has become clear that the longstanding norms that have governed international relations have reached a turning point. Singapore and much of the world have benefitted from the multilateral rules-based order. This order prioritised collective problem-solving and rules of behaviour in the global commons, as well as serving as guardrails against military escalation.

However, we can no longer expect countries to work within international laws and norms as a default. Rules that once restrained behaviours are being tested and, in some cases, deliberately ignored.

When norms erode, behaviours become unpredictable, leading to greater insecurity in the global environment. Indeed, countries everywhere are re-evaluating their relationships, to see who they can work with in the new environment.

These developments accelerate a return to a "might makes right" world. For small countries like Singapore, this shift puts pressure on our autonomy and sovereignty. It is in such times, more than ever, that we need a strong and capable defence to secure our national interests. On the international stage, Singapore must also make clear our value proposition so that we remain a relevant and valued partner.

Third, our evolving challenges. While conventional conflict has not gone away, what continues to change is how else conflict can be conducted. There are two dimensions to this evolution.

The first dimension is the ongoing technological disruption, which has transformed the speed, scale and cost of conventional conflict.

Take drones as an example which many Members have raised. The rapid tech development cycle today has ramped up the pace of innovation in drone technology, making them more accessible and faster to operationalise as a capability for offence.

What once required advanced and costly military platforms can now sometimes be achieved more quickly and at lower cost by integrating commercial off-the-shelf drone systems with artificial intelligence (AI). In Ukraine, we have already seen how drones are scaled and weaponised to inflict disproportionate damage on a bigger and stronger aggressor.

While these technologies present challenges, they also present opportunities for resource-deficient countries to use them to complement conventional platforms and sensors.

The second dimension is the spectrum on which conflict occurs. Threat actors no longer need to resort to war to achieve their outcomes. Instead, we are seeing more hostile actions taken along the entire spectrum from peace to war. And as we have said before, we are not exactly at peace; neither are we at war.

For example, cyber and digital tools are increasingly preferred by state and non-state actors to exert pressure just short of full-scale war. As a highly digital country, we have a large surface area of attack as our systems are tightly coupled. This deep integration also means that the lines between civilian and military targets are blurred, and we are no strangers to such tactics being deployed against us.

Such tactics are designed to induce pressure on their targets while mitigating the chances of triggering full-scale military responses, as it is always difficult to attribute responsibility. They also exploit legal and operational ambiguities that could delay responses. Ultimately, these attacks create uncertainty and seek to undermine confidence and disrupt our society’s ways of life.

In the face of these wide-ranging challenges, how can we continue to defend Singapore and protect our way of life?

One thing remains clear. The world does not owe us a living or our survival. We can rely only on ourselves and not on the security guarantees of anyone else. We must therefore devote attention and resources to our security and relevance and to stand on our own feet.

To Mr Yip Hon Weng’s question, let me highlight our four-pronged approach to tackle the challenges we face: capabilities, commitment, contributions and connections.

First, capabilities for the SAF to be a credible armed force. A well-equipped SAF is one that can defend Singapore against a spectrum of threats. As the ultimate backstop for war, the SAF must have robust conventional capabilities. But the SAF must also have other calibrated options in response to an expanded range of scenarios beyond and below the threshold of war.

This is why MINDEF/SAF will build up a suite of capabilities comprising: conventional, cheap-asymmetric, cyber and classified capabilities.

Having robust conventional capabilities remains core to a strong and credible deterrence. We must continue to modernise and upgrade them to keep pace with the threats around us. For example, the RSAF will acquire three Gulfstream G550-Maritime Surveillance Aircraft (MSA), to complement the Boeing P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft. This supports the SAF’s mission in safeguarding Singapore’s Sea Lines of Communication as part of Singapore’s maritime security surveillance network.

The SAF will also continue to scale the use of unmanned platforms for new concepts of operations and pair them with manned platforms.

If I may just make a point here. Many Members have talked about unmanned platforms. "Unmanned platforms" does not mean it does not require manpower. I always thought that a more appropriate term is “remotely piloted platforms” in scale or individually. They need manpower, they need different types of manpower.

The Navy’s Victory-class Multi-Role Combat Vessel (MRCV) will be equipped with the combat capability of a modern frigate. But it will also be a “mothership” for unmanned systems. The second MRCV is on track to be launched in the third quarter of 2026.

On Ms Joan Pereira and Ms Poh Li San’s point, beyond the conventional, the rise of cheap-asymmetric capabilities, including drones, will present both threats and opportunities. The SAF will develop a “high-low” mix of capabilities, complementing high-end conventional systems with cheap, dual-use systems available in the commercial market, especially in the drone and digital areas. We will also be focusing our efforts to integrate both manned and unmanned operations as a system.

As to the mix between manned and unmanned, that will be a dynamic equilibrium determined by the rate of technological progress. For example, we can use low-cost naval swarm drones for maritime security. This builds agility in our processes so that we can rapidly adapt to the changing battlefield and technological landscape. As we speak today, we already have unmanned surface vessels patrolling the Singapore Straits together with our manned or crewed vessels.

We are also cognisant that beyond manned and unmanned systems, modern warfare is also a contest of resilience, and this is where we will also increase our efforts to make sure that our systems are resilient as a whole. We will also respond to threats emanating from cheaper unmanned platforms in a way that does not pose significant cost asymmetry. In other words, we cannot use a missile to take down every drone that comes at us.

Ms Yeo Wan Ling asked about beyond the physical hardware, what else must we do? And we agree. We must also continue focusing on building our capabilities in the cyber domain. We must keep pace with the rapidly evolving technology and threats that we encounter daily. To do so, we must continue to experiment and innovate our cyber training practices.

The Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) will thus reposition the Cyber Defence Test and Evaluation Centre (CyTEC) as a Cyber Defence Test and Experimentation Centre. Beyond training our cyber defenders, CyTEC will be equipped with cutting-edge technologies to facilitate innovation and strengthen our cybersecurity.

Like other professional armed forces around the world, SAF does not disclose every capability we develop or deploy. What I can say is that the SAF will continue to invest in capabilities ahead of future threats. This will give us the decisive edge and allow us to overcome our security challenges. The SAF will continue to announce our acquisitions at a time of our choosing when such disclosures are operationally useful.

So far, I have spoken about technology and hard capabilities, which are critical force multipliers for SAF. Yet beyond and behind each capability is our people, and it is equally important that the SAF trains our people for a much more complex environment. For example, we will strengthen our soldiering fundamentals of live-firing and better prepare them against future threats and a wider range of operational scenarios.

Since 2013, the Multi Mission Range Complex (MMRC) at Pasir Laba has been used by generations of NSmen to hone their marksmanship. For more of our soldiers to use such facilities, the Army will build a second MMRC at Bedok Camp.

Beyond just increased capacity, MMRC 2 will allow our soldiers to train more realistically and precisely across more scenarios and different domains via the new Video Targetry System (VTS) and MMRC 2 will also allow our soldiers to hone their counter drone techniques.

MMRC 2 will free up land currently occupied by six baffled ranges, which can be repurposed for our other training needs.

It will also be easier for our soldiers to train at MMRC 2 NSmen can simply book ranges for training conveniently through the OneNS app without having to go through their parent unit. And it has always been my own personal vision that our NSmen can go into a range to hone their skill, just as they go to a bowling alley.

I will make another point on capabilities. We have and we will continue to invest steadily in conventional, cheap-asymmetric, cyber and classified capabilities. We will also train our people well to maximise their capabilities. We will focus not only on the "teeth" in terms of the inducting new weapon system, but also on the "tail" in terms of improving resilience of our supply chains.

However, we must guard against complacency. We must strive to develop capabilities for the next bound instead of the last conflict. Adaptation and agility must be built into the SAF DNA. We do not want to be caught in a situation where we are fundamentally surprised by developments that we should have seen coming.

The task of building up the SAF is never ending. We must continue to stay ahead of the changing threat landscape. If we stand still, we fall behind. If we become complacent, we become irrelevant.

And I am happy to report to the House that when I returned to MINDEF last year, I continued to see this spirit.

In 1997, then a Major Chan Chun Sing was writing about the use of unmanned drones in swarms. We were talking about computer viruses because, for those of you who remember WordPerfect, some of you will know that you can play aircraft simulation if you know the correct code behind WordPerfect. This has already told us what could come many years later. In 2000, before I left SAF, we were talking about classified projects that, today, are coming to fruition when I returned to MINDEF. Defence is a long-term business. And I am glad that today when I returned to SAF, I am seeing my men and women of SAF, not just the talking and thinking about the challenges today, but what are the challenges that could emerge in 10 or 20 years' time. That is and that must be the spirit of SAF.

Next, our defence capability, in my mind, must be manifested in six arms. Beyond the Army, Air Force, Navy and DIS, it must also include our defence and technology community, and it must also include our defence industries. We have judiciously invested in the DSO National Laboratories and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) over the years, building a corps of scientists and engineers with expertise that money cannot buy.

In our quest for resilience and to strengthen our ability to scale at speed, we must also have a strong and reliable local defence industry. This is especially for classified capabilities. Our local defence industry gives us resilience, the ability to scale and, most importantly, the ability to develop capabilities that we cannot buy. Their credible capabilities also allow us to be a partner of choice for others to want to work with us. That strengthens our relevance and value proposition.

For the second "c", let me touch on the commitments to Singapore's defence. This commitment by our political leadership and whole of society is expressed in various forms. To Dr Wan Rizal's point, our first commitment is a steady, consistent and disciplined way that we approach our defence expenditure. Various Members have asked about how we apply our resources judiciously and apply them in a disciplined way. This was supposed to be an answer that I will give to Ms Valerie Lee, who has posed a Parliamentary Question, but I thought it is perhaps useful for me to share my seven golden rules of defence expenditure and how we spend money.

Rule number one, operational needs first and last. Our top priority always goes to our operational needs, both current and emerging. All other considerations are secondary.

Second, we must be clear-eyed on our life-cycle cost. We plan our investment with full consideration of life-cycle cost and long-term sustainability, taking into account the financial and manpower resources needed in acquiring, establishing, developing and maintaining that capability.

Third, we take an integrated system view. We acquire and develop capabilities not in isolation, but with a view towards them being a part of the larger integrated system within SAF. This ensures that the SAF's capability is more than the sum of its individual parts.

Rule number four, consistency is key. As developing integrated systems and real capabilities take time and consistent effort, we invest steadily in technology and our people's skills and competencies over the long term. We eschew a feast and famine approach to defence spending.

Rule number five, resilience matters. It is important for SAF to build resilience against disruptions. We achieve this through means such as the ability to adapt to our unique needs, ensuring adequate stockpile and having alternative sources of supplies.

Rule number six, best solution mindset. We acquire the most cost-effective system to meet our operational needs, guided by robust professional assessment, rather than being tied to any single source or solution. Where we need to achieve greater resilience or customise to our own unique needs, we may develop our own unique systems.

Rule number seven, last but not least, goes back to the first – operational needs, always. Our operational needs remain our foremost and utmost consideration so that we can build a strong SAF, equip our war fighters with the best systems available against today's and tomorrow's challenges.

Going forward, I expect the growth in defence spending to keep pace with GDP, barring major shocks. However, if the need arises, we are prepared to spend more.

Next is our commitment to National Service (NS), which is essential for generating the force required to meet our critical needs for national security and survival. The service and support of our Full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) and NSmen are vital to this effort. Our people are at the core of what we do, and the fighting spirit of our people determines how successful we are.

MINDEF and SAF does not take the commitment of our NSmen and NSFs lightly. We are invested in making the most of their time in NS and during their ORNS cycle. We strive to bring out the best in every serviceman so that they can contribute more meaningfully and effectively with their abilities. This is especially so, since today's SAF has a greater variety of roles to deal with an expanded spectrum of operations. Many of these new roles no longer depends solely on traditional notions of physical or operational fitness.

This will require a mindset shift on how we think about the abilities of our servicemen. Combat categorisation in the past tended to stream our servicemen based on what our people could not do. But we can unlock our people's potential if we shift our focus to what they can do.

To this end, MINDEF will review our Medical Classification System (MCS) to be more precise. This will allow better characterisation of the medical fitness of our servicemen, and how that affects their ability to undertake various tasks.

Coupled with continuous efforts to redesign roles and vocations, the MCS will enable our servicemen to be more meaningfully and effectively deployed. Some may also be deployed to vocations that they were previously not eligible for.

The review of the MCS is being done in consultation with public medical specialists and members of our specialist advisory boards. With greater precision, this ensures that our servicemen are deployed only to vocations that they are medically assessed to be suited for. The robust safety and training system in MINDEF/SAF will continue to ensure that our servicemen in redesigned roles can train and operate safely.

We also want to better harness the talents of our National Servicemen with specific expertise. Mr Kenneth Tiong asked about the talent pipeline into the DIS to tackle threats on our critical information infrastructure (CII).

MINDEF recognises that many of our National Servicemen have honed their skills in the fast-changing cyber and tech domains through their private sector careers. They have valuable experience we can tap on to augment the defence of Singapore's critical networks.

The DIS will thus better organise our National Servicemen with relevant cyber expertise, into Sectoral Cyber Defence Teams. These teams are aligned to our CII sectors and will aim to strengthen the resilience of our CIIs. Senior Minister of State Zaqy will elaborate more on these NS cyber units in his speech.

Third is our commitment to the share of talent that MINDEF/SAF receives. I am thankful that the public service continues to allocate top talents to MINDEF/SAF so that they can lead the SAF to be ready for today's and tomorrow's challenges. I am also grateful to parents for continuing to entrust their sons and daughters to the SAF, and to schools for grooming the next generation of leaders. Altogether, these expressions of commitment send a powerful signal of strong, whole-of-nation support for Singapore's defence to potential adversaries.

The third "c" is contributions from our wider community that lend strength to the SAF. This strength can be seen through a model of concentric circles.

At the centre of the SAF is the high-readiness core of active-duty personnel, who will respond first in any contingency. The second ring is the SAF's full-force potential, comprising 250,000 NSmen who can be mobilised when required. Thus far, we have talked about how we will better support the first two rings.

The third ring of support is the wider NS community – comprising some 750,000 former NSmen, as well as the 2.5 million families and employers supporting them. The importance of the third ring cannot be understated – the extent of support they offer to our second ring directly affects the commitment of our full fighting force.

The final ring represents our entire society. We must remember that a strong SAF cannot fight alone if our society has already crumbled under pressure. It is also important that we continue to build the resilience of our population to external forces and disruptions.

MINDEF will therefore step up engagements with these broader segments of society, to cultivate an entire population that is committed and prepared to defend Singapore, as part of wider Total Defence efforts.

In support of this objective, SAFRA will review its mission to extend its engagement beyond active NSmen. We will reimagine SAFRA as a platform for defence engagement to include our former NSmen and their families. Minister of State Desmond Choo will speak about this later.

Dr Neo Kok Beng asked if we should redefine National Service to include voluntary services in all uniformed groups, and to allow new citizens to participate. While National Service is the bedrock of our defence and will remain so, we can do more to encourage a culture of participation in defence through volunteerism. Everyone has a part to play, and everyone who lives in Singapore should have opportunities to volunteer in some way.

Volunteers play a key role in supporting the SAF and Singapore's defence by taking on meaningful roles that complement the work of Regular personnel. Today, the defence volunteer base is more diverse and dynamic than ever. Many of our volunteers, some of whom are also our Operationally Ready National Servicemen, have valuable real-world experiences and industry expertise.

Having a strong volunteer core also adds to our deterrence. Potential adversaries would think twice if they knew they would face a populace that is committed, skilled and prepared to defend Singapore. And the more Singaporeans who volunteer with their time and service, the more powerful our deterrence will be.

That is why MINDEF will strengthen the Defence Volunteer Ecosystem through the SG Defence Volunteer Network and SAF Volunteer Corps. Senior Minister of State Zaqy will speak more about this in greater detail on how we intend to expand the size and scope of the SAF Volunteer Corps.

The fourth "c" has to do with connections – our diversified portfolio of international partnerships, which have advanced Singapore's and SAF's interests in crucial ways. Our fundamental ability to build connections and partnerships rests on a capable and credible SAF. No one will want to partner someone who is unable or unwilling to pull their own weight and make a contribution.

Thus far, our partnerships have provided valuable opportunities, such as opening up new training areas overseas. This has allowed us to overcome our space constraints for complex, large-scale exercises. These partnerships also provide access to advanced defence technologies to equip our warfighters.

Mr Vikram Nair and Mr Shawn Huang asked about MINDEF's approach to building defence relations in a more volatile and complex landscape. My response is that we cannot take our connections and value to others for granted. We must strengthen our value proposition to others as their needs will also shift and, for that, we must keep evolving our approaches with them for us to remain relevant.

First and fundamentally, we must develop a clear eyed perspective of their challenges, their needs, for us to be able to come up with compelling value propositions to partner them. As a small country, we cannot simply be "neutral". Staying neutral will induce greater pressure on us from others to take their side and narrow our strategic space.

We do not want to "choose sides" either, which makes us a proxy for others, takes away our agency and renders us irrelevant.

The only way is to develop an approach based on consistent principles that we believe in and are good for Singapore. We must convince others that our view of the world serves their interests too, so that they will want to work with us. In a more unpredictable environment, it is all the more important for our views to be principled and consistent. They signal to others that we will be steady and reliable partners despite changing circumstances.

Second, we must capitalise on Singapore's unique value proposition.

For instance, it has become even more important now for countries to communicate and share their concerns candidly. We have been able to convene dialogue and encourage common understanding on issues, often away from the public glare.

Where we can be useful, Singapore is glad to play our part in providing a space for open and meaningful discussions amongst other partners.

But key to our value proposition here is that we must maintain our reputation as a trusted and reliable partner.

On Mr Gerald Giam's point, the new threats on the horizon also present new opportunities to find common ground with non-traditional partners and open up new areas for collaboration.

The threats that AI and cyber tools can pose are almost universal to every country. The problem today is that many of these technologies are being militarised and deployed faster than norms can be developed to guide their use.

But this also means that we can collaborate with new partners from anywhere in the world, so long as they share the same views as us and want to shape the norms responsibly.

There are several other examples of shared interests, such as counter-information campaigns and the protection of critical underwater infrastructure (CUI). These are areas where we can work with other like-minded states to learn from their experiences, and for us to share ours, for our mutual benefit. On CUI specifically, we are tapping the expertise of newer partners, like Finland, Estonia and the Netherlands, to develop principles and best practices for defence cooperation that can be adapted to our region.

Another area where we can work with new partners is in defence technology. MINDEF has been diversifying our global partnerships to mitigate single-point supply chain failures. Indeed, the more uncertain geostrategic environment has also raised the risk of supply chain disruptions but it has also presented new opportunities for us to be able to work with partners that previously may not have considered us as their partner of choice.

Other countries recognise the same challenge and that is why in this environment, we will also see a more diverse global defence industry. Advanced science and tech innovation is now pursued by a wider range of countries, as well as companies – not just traditional defence companies, but also start-up firms and tech giants, especially for dual-use technologies.

These developments all present new opportunities for MINDEF to work with them. For instance, we have expanded our defence tech partnerships with various countries. Recently, we have seen an increased interest by various countries to partner Singapore through initiatives, like the Defence Industry Day, where we bring together the defence industries of different countries.

These developments show how we have found opportunities to work with new partners to shore up and strengthen our resilience in areas that meet our needs.

To do all these, we need to ensure that our people deeply understand the world as it is, and are able to pinpoint the concerns and aspirations of others. This is so that we can develop value propositions to work with them in the evolving context.

In conclusion, MINDEF and the SAF will continue to transform itself to defend Singapore against tomorrow's threats.

But as I have stated earlier, defence cannot be achieved by MINDEF/SAF alone. National defence is a national endeavour. It belongs to the whole of society – to every Singaporean, in every sector, in every community. We can train with the most advanced capabilities, invest billions in our defence infrastructure. But all of that will count for nothing if we are not vigilant, if we allow ourselves to be fundamentally surprised because we have been lulled into complacency.

The recent conflicts have presented many examples where, even when confronted with clear intelligence of threats, capable and technologically advanced militaries failed to respond because they convinced themselves that it would not happen to them or that it could not happen to them. They did not fail in technology, equipping or training. They failed to challenge their mindsets, they failed to guard against complacency, and they fell into denial of the harsh possibilities of conflict.

These are all warning lessons for us. Every day of peace is another day where the dangers of complacency heighten, as Mr Alex Yam mentioned. We must never let this happen under our watch.

Thank you, Chair, and Members of the House, for your continued support for MINDEF/SAF.

Mr Chairman, as Defence Minister Mr Chan has outlined, we face an increasingly complex world. Peace is not guaranteed. Singapore has reaped the peace dividend as a result of constant vigilance, diplomacy and active risk management. Our defence must continue to stand strong on lasting foundations and National Service (NS) remains the cornerstone of Singapore's defence.

As our world changes, we will continue to enhance the SAF and we must keep strengthening NS to stay effective.

Let me begin with our goal in mind – we want to enable our NSmen to contribute meaningfully at every stage of their NS journey. From enlistment, through full-time service, through to as Operationally Ready Servicemen and even beyond their active years. We want to optimise how people can contribute to Singapore's security throughout their entire NS journey.

Mr Henry Kwek asked about how we are going to do so.

Firstly, we provide opportunities for our National Servicemen to develop their potential, and even their careers early. Since 2023, we have created Work-Learn Schemes that let selected polytechnic students enlist a year early. They complete their final-year internship while serving in the SAF. This means that they can pursue their studies whilst putting their learning into practice in NS. We now have five such schemes, including our newest partnership with Ngee Ann Polytechnic launched last year. This latest tie-up trains students as Army Engineers.

Other servicemen can also take up Work-Learn Schemes after they enlist. These programmes, run with our Institutes of Higher Learning, let servicemen serve full-time NS while earning diplomas or university credits. They focus on areas vital to SAF capabilities – AI, engineering and others.

We have introduced 10 Work-Learn Schemes to date. Our most recent tie-up was launched last year with the Singapore Maritime Academy, where it trains Naval Warfare System Specialists in marine systems.

As we create more opportunities for servicemen to gain skills during NS, these skills must be recognised beyond their service. Mr Melvin Yong asked how this is being done.

MINDEF and SAF are partnering SkillsFuture Singapore to include NS certificates in the Careers and Skills Passport. We will start a trial with selected SAF Training Institutes from the second half of this year. Industry-relevant skills will be mapped in each serviceman's passport. This provides Government-verified records of the skills they have attained in NS and this will help boost their employability.

Mr Kenneth Tiong asked whether NS allowances can be pegged to labour market standards such as the Local Qualifying Salary (LQS). Let me first assure Members that we deeply value our National Servicemen's commitment and contributions in defending Singapore. MINDEF regularly reviews allowances and incentives for our National Servicemen, and we will continue to do so.

Over the past decade, we have conducted four reviews of NS allowances – in 2015, 2020, 2023 and most recently, last year in July 2025. As an example, the allowance for a Recruit in Basic Military Training increased 65% in the last 10 years.

But NS allowances are just one part of many initiatives to recognise National Servicemen, which are not available to Regulars. For example, NS HOME – HOME stands for HOusing, Medical, Education – which is designed to support housing, healthcare and education needs of our National Servicemen through top-ups to their Central Provident Fund, Post-Secondary Education Accounts (PSEA) accounts and LifeSG credits. Servicemen receive up to $6,500 upon completion of full-time NS – on the question of CPF, of that amount, CPF comes to about $5,500 – and up to $18,500 total after completing their Operationally Ready NS training.

NSmen and their families also enjoy annual tax relief.

So, now, on the comparison to Local Qualifying Salary. We must also understand what the LQS is and what the LQS is not. As the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) has explained, the LQS determines the number of local employees counted towards a firm's Work Permit and S Pass quota entitlement. The LQS is an administrative tool that ensures local workers are employed and paid meaningfully in the employment context. It is not a minimum wage or general salary benchmark for all forms of service in Singapore.

We should not draw equivalence between salaries and NS allowances because there is a fundamental difference between the two. A salary is a transaction for labour services rendered by a worker to compensate for work done, and meet living expenses and commitments. NS is a unique civic duty and contribution by all able-bodied Singaporean men. It is not a transaction.

While we acknowledge that serving NS involves opportunity cost, we should not erode our social compact and the ethos of service by casting it as an employer-employee relationship.

For NSFs, the state takes care of the vast majority of their basic needs such as accommodation, food and equipping. The NS allowances, which we regularly review, are designed to support NSFs' personal upkeep and other incidentals.

NSFs who require further financial assistance due to personal circumstances are supported through the financial assistance schemes in the SAF. These are layered upon what they can also get outside through the MSF's ComCare schemes. I encourage any NSF facing difficulties to speak with their commanders. I can assure them that the SAF will do its utmost to assist.

We deeply value the contributions that our National Servicemen play in defending Singapore, and we remain committed in ensuring that our allowances and support measures remain relevant and meaningful.

Moving on to our NSmen. When servicemen transition to their ten-year Operationally Ready NS journey, they are building expertise in their civilian careers in a variety of sectors and exposures. Today, they can serve in NS roles that draw on the skills that they have gained in their jobs. We do this through the Enhanced Expertise Deployment Scheme (EEDS).

About 850 NSmen have been redeployed into roles better aligned with their professional expertise. This covers more than 20 areas such as legal, cyber, strategic communications and more.

Take ME4A(NS) Aslam Bin Mohamed Johan, for example. Aslam is a Software Engineer with the Government Technology Agency (GovTech) who specialises in system design and the development of digital solutions. Aslam previously served as a driver in the 1st SAF Transport Battalion. He was redeployed to the SAF C4 and Digitalisation Command in 2024, where he now applies his technical expertise to strengthen the SAF's digital systems and enhance operational effectiveness.

This is what we mean by optimising our servicemen's contributions. Instead of a one-size-fits-all deployment, we are matching individuals' professional expertise with roles where their skills can best serve Singapore's defence needs.

Another area where we are harnessing niche skills is cyber defence. Many of our NSmen today are skilled cybersecurity professionals who bring valuable real-world experience and industry expertise. We are all aware of how critical cyberwarfare is to a country's national security and we have seen how Singapore's critical infrastructure comes under threat from time to time. We are not immune to these attacks and we need to draw on the best talents that Singapore can provide among our NSmen.

I am pleased to say that many have come forward to offer their skills to defend Singapore. Their expertise matters and can make a real difference – not just to the SAF, but to Singapore's broader cyber defence.

From June this year, the SAF will deploy NSmen with cyber expertise into Sectoral Cyber Defence Teams (SCDT). These teams will strengthen our capabilities, bring new ideas and approaches, and complement existing forces. We will deploy them to support the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore in defending Singapore's critical information infrastructure. This covers vital sectors such as telecommunications, power and transport.

One such example is ME4(NS) Lye Han Wei. He is a manager in Cyber Threat Intelligence and Response from the Infocomm Media Development Authority. He will be part of the Telecommunications SCDT, bringing expertise and experience in niche areas such as operational technology, cybersecurity governance and threat detection.

NSmen like Han Wei will contribute meaningfully to our national efforts to strengthen our cyber defence, offering specialised knowledge that would be difficult to replicate through traditional military training alone. This represents a more coordinated, proactive approach against increasingly sophisticated cyber threats.

Chairman, we are enabling better skills-matched deployment of our NSmen. These pathways enable NSmen to contribute more meaningfully to national defence by applying the expertise that they have developed in their civilian careers.

Mr Lee Hong Chuang and Miss Rachel Ong asked about how we are involving the community and wider society. The defence of our nation is a shared endeavour that goes beyond those who serve National Service. Our deterrence and mission success, if ever called upon, relies on the understanding and support of the wider Singapore society.

Whether at the National Day Parade or at the recent Singapore Airshow, you can see Singaporeans from all walks of life show their sense of pride, embodying the spirit of Total Defence. Many Singaporeans and residents want to contribute to our defence in different ways. They want to play a meaningful role in keeping Singapore safe. So, beyond NS, we will be expanding avenues for women, Permanent Residents, new citizens and foreigners to step forward and play their part. Just as NS has served Singapore well to foster cohesion and a sense of national identity through their service to defence, we want to expand the opportunity and potential to do the same with this initiative.

MINDEF and SAF will establish the SG Defence Volunteer Network this year. This brings all volunteers in MINDEF, SAF and our related organisations under one common identity. It strengthens our volunteer ecosystem. The SG Defence Volunteer Network will focus on two key areas initially.

First, we will expand civilian volunteer pathways by creating new opportunities across MINDEF, SAFRA, Defence Collective Singapore and our other agencies. Volunteers can contribute in ways that better match their skills, interests and life stages.

Today, we already have volunteers contributing specialist skills in military law, defence science, strategic communications and even museum guiding.

This year, we started the National Education (NE) Ambassadors scheme that lets individuals with a passion for Total Defence speak to students, youths and the public, covering all six pillars of Total Defence. MINDEF now has more than 100 NE Ambassadors from various professional backgrounds.

We also started the Total Defence Champions initiative this year to engage communities on how to respond during crises and disruptions.

Second, we will enhance military volunteer pathways through the SAF Volunteer Corps (SAFVC). The SAFVC lets Singaporean women as well as PRs deepen their understanding of national defence. They contribute directly to Singapore's security, strengthening our collective sense of ownership and responsibility.

Mr Sanjeev Kumar asked for an update on the SAFVC and whether MINDEF and SAF intend to expand opportunities for volunteerism.

The SAFVC marked its 10th anniversary last year. Since its formation, more than 1,500 SAFVC volunteers have been trained and served Singapore. Moving ahead, we will enhance the SAFVC to enable more people to serve in a wider range of roles. We will integrate the SAFVC more closely into SAF units to fulfil operational tasks alongside SAF personnel beyond peacetime support functions.

I am glad that Mr Sanjeev has also noted how our SAFVC were deployed side by side alongside our SAF troops in Exercise Wallaby last year. This shows how more of our volunteer schemes can be put to support the core of the SAF.

We will also introduce a new non-uniformed military volunteer scheme with new roles. This gives volunteers a better understanding of how the SAF operates and lets them contribute practically.

As we expand these opportunities, we welcome Singaporean women, new citizens and PRs aged 18 to 45 who wish to serve. They can find inspiration from the many SAFVC Volunteers (SVs) today who serve with deep commitment.

One example is SV2 Delhaye Geoffrey Jean-Raphael Georges, an Auxiliary Security Trooper, and his wife, SV1 Felicia Ang, who serves as a Bridge Watchkeeper. Both of them joined the SAFVC to do their part for Singapore and serve as positive role models for their three children. For Delhaye, volunteering was also a way for him to deepen his roots in Singapore.

Since 2023, Delhaye has been based in Dubai for work. He relocated there with Felicia and their three children. Despite being overseas, both continue to serve whenever they are back in Singapore and they have contributed significant service days over the years. Their commitment reflects strong dedication to Singapore, regardless of where life or work takes them.

Another example is SV2 Diana Lau, a nurse with Alexandra Hospital's Urgent Care Centre. She volunteers as a medical trainer in the SAF. During a training session, she noticed a trainee showing signs of heat stress. She drew on her nursing background to help the medical team provide timely care. Her swift actions helped to ensure training could continue safely and effectively. Diana continues to serve passionately with the SAF. She volunteers significant time each year while balancing a demanding nursing career.

Our volunteers play an important role in strengthening Singapore's defence and resilience. But safeguarding Singapore ultimately requires a whole-of-society effort, especially during crises.

Beyond operational roles in the SAFVC and specialist roles in MINDEF, we are expanding community-level volunteer participation through Total Defence initiatives. Ms Hazlina and Miss Rachel Ong asked about these efforts. One key example is Exercise SG Ready, our annual Total Defence exercise. It strengthens the preparedness of Singaporeans and communities to respond to crises and disruption. Members in this House and their residents can also participate to prepare our communities and households for such situations.

This year's Exercise SG Ready was held over two weeks earlier this month, with more than 1,000 agencies, businesses and community organisations taking part. It focused on readiness for degraded digital connectivity and prolonged power outages – things that we often take for granted.

But in an actual hybrid conflict, communications and power, are exactly the first two things any aggressor would want to take out. Why? Because society can go into panic. But the question is: is Singapore ready?

So, this exercise provided a timely platform for whole-of-Government agencies as well as some businesses to test their plans and pilot new capabilities. It encouraged everyone – individuals, community groups, businesses and students – to plan for disruptions, prepare to respond and play a part to keep Singapore strong.

As part of the launch, the Public Warning System "Important Message" signal was broadcast nationwide. Vehicles island-wide received broadcast alerts on their ERP2.0 On-Board Units – the first public testing of this capability.

A pilot community mobilisation activity was conducted at two Housing and Development Boards blocks in Tampines. Total Defence Champions and PA Community Emergency Response Team Volunteers engaged residents and shared what to do during disruptions and prolonged outages.

More than 250 schools simulated disruptions to get students to think about their roles in Total Defence. Many businesses used the exercise scenario to conduct table-top exercises or simulate disruptions at their premises. Over 500 organisations revised their Business Continuity Plans and close to 140 companies participated in a phishing exercise which saw more than 8,500 phishing emails sent to employees. These efforts, let their employees, and sometime, members of the public, better appreciate how such disruptions affect life.

To Ms Hazlina's point about people not being born here but choose to be here, I assure her that many of these participations in Exercise SG Ready also include permanent residents (PRs) and foreigners who work alongside Singaporeans, especially during our business tabletop exercises to develop Business Continuity Plans. So, this is one way in which we involve the wider community, whether they are Singaporeans, PRs or foreigners, living here, to be prepared for any disruption that may come.

Through these experiences, we strengthened our resilience against unexpected situations. These examples reflect the growing ways Singaporeans and residents can contribute to defence.

Mr Chairman, when we introduced National Service in 1967, we proved that a small nation's defence could rest on the commitment of all its people. Today, as cyber threats and hybrid warfare challenge us in new ways, we must call again on the whole-of-society and use all skills available to defend Singapore.

Our Pioneers built our nation and our defence over the years. Today, we are transforming defence from the duty of our National Servicemen and our Regulars, into the responsibility of everyone. To our National Servicemen and Regulars, your service remains our foundation. To every woman, PR and new citizen ready to serve, your commitment to volunteer contributes to our Total Defence efforts. Together, we do not just defend our sovereignty. We defend the Singapore promise, that everyone who calls this home has a part in keeping it safe.

Chairman, the Minister of State will next speak on how we continue to support the NS community and strengthen community support for defence. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, when we discuss national security in this Chamber, we often focus on the hardware. We talk about the next-generation platforms, digital threats, and shifting geopolitical tides. But the true foundation of our defence does not lie in our armouries, and as our security landscape transforms, the institutions that connect our National Service (NS) community with the broader society must transform as well.

Mr Patrick Tay asked about plans for SAFRA to better engage our wider Singaporean public. Today, I will outline SAFRA's evolving role in strengthening Singapore's defence ecosystem, transforming from what was once seen primarily as a social club into a part of a vital, nation-wide defence movement.

The strength of NS as an institution has always rested on the contributions of our NSmen and the unwavering support of their families. NS is a compact of our society. It is the worker who puts down his tools, the teacher who leaves his classroom, and the father in the heartlands who trades his weekends for a uniform. That is why SAFRA was built in 1972, not just as a collection of buildings for social purposes, but as a testimony to our shared recognition and support, and a place to celebrate the enduring bonds forged through service to Singapore.

After operating out of a temporary space in Prince Edward Lane, SAFRA's first purpose-built clubhouse opened in Toa Payoh in 1975. This was during the formative years of Singapore, when social amenities remained modest and country club memberships were exclusive, expensive and out of reach for most Singaporeans. From the very beginning, SAFRA has made its membership accessible to every NSman, a recognition of our fundamental belief that service to nation deserves recognition.

When then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew opened the first clubhouse, he shared his vision for SAFRA. He stated that more clubhouses would be established in key residential areas because "the well-being of the SAF reservist includes the well-being of his family". That insight remains as relevant today as it was then. By the mid-1970s, membership quickly pushed to 10,000. Over the following decades, SAFRA expanded to increase accessibility, increasing its network of seven clubhouses across Singapore to now serving more than 400,000 members, including Full-time NSmen.

SAFRA has adapted and innovated with each new clubhouse, ensuring that it stayed true to its mission by providing relevant, affordable and accessible offerings. Each clubhouse has developed amenities and programmes to suit the region it serves. But buildings and membership numbers are not and should not be the true measure of SAFRA's success and performance. The true measure lies in whether our servicemen feel supported, whether their families feel appreciated, whether Singaporeans understand and believe that NS is not an abstract policy, but a shared responsibility.

The security landscape around us is changing rapidly. Threats are no longer confined to conventional battlefields. We face cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and attempts by foreign actors to exploit social divisions and erode trust in public institutions. These threats are designed not only to weaken our capabilities, but to weaken our cohesion. And in such an environment, the strength of our defence depends not only on the SAF's operational readiness. It depends on trust, between servicemen and society, between institutions and citizens.

Mr Alex Yam asked how we can ensure defence remains a shared national commitment across generations. This is where SAFRA's role becomes even more critical. It must become an organisation that empowers NSmen to build trust and community-wide support for defence.

What sets SAFRA apart from the other social clubs is its deep association with NS. It draws upon bonds forged in uniform – bonds of shared hardship, shared responsibility and shared pride.

Today, SAFRA's clubhouses are vibrant community spaces. But as our operating environment evolves, SAFRA too must evolve. It cannot remain only a provider of lifestyle and recreational facilities. It must become a bridge, connecting our citizen soldiers with the broader community they protect. It must help every Singaporean understand that defence is not the responsibility of a few. It is the mission of all.

Mr Alex Yam also asked how MINDEF can work with organisations like SAFRA to ensure that defence remains a shared national commitment for the whole-of-society. SAFRA has always been dedicated to serving the NS community. It will do more and differently by strengthening support for NSmen across every stage of their life. Its programmes and engagement will serve NSmen for each stage of their lives as they progress.

For pre-enlistees, the transition into NS can be daunting. It marks a significant milestone, one that demands maturity, resilience and sacrifice. SAFRA will continue to support this transition through pre-NS engagement programmes and initiatives, such as water confidence courses and pre-NS talks, helping young men build familiarity and confidence before enlistment.

For those transitioning after full-time NS, SAFRA hosts quarterly SkillsFuture@NS Fairs that connect them with career and education opportunities. These fairs also serve NSmen who are seeking new employment. Moving forward, SAFRA will deepen and enhance partnership with agencies, such as NTUC's Employment and Employability Institute (e2i) to strengthen career support for NSmen.

For NSmen with young families, we recognise the unique opportunity to connect generations through shared understanding of NS. Many of us in this Chamber know the reality of the work cadence today, missing the occasional full-day family outing, or coming home late from camp. It is this quiet, steadfast support at home that keeps our servicemen and women going.

To bridge this gap, SAFRA currently runs two types of NS Experience camps: the BMT Kids Camp and the NS Family Experience Camp. These camps provide families with a meaningful glimpse into NS experience while introducing the concept of Total Defence to children from an early age. These camps also create valuable opportunities for NSmen fathers to share their NS journey with the next generation, explaining not just what they do in NS, but why they serve, and who they serve.

What started out as pilots in 2023 have now become heavily demanded. Many participating families have expressed their appreciation, with some even becoming "repeat customers". Building on this success, SAFRA will expand its partnership with the SAF and other organisations to develop new variants of the NS Experience camp. This includes a one-day NS for Everyone programme and a two-day Empowering NS for Women camp. When these programmes are ready, SAFRA will also invite NSmen and other volunteers to support as facilitators, ambassadors and storytellers. These NS Experience camps foster deeper understanding of an NSman’s contributions, and will strengthen the community's appreciation of the values of service and sacrifice that underpin our defence.

Even when NSmen complete their Operationally-Ready National Service training, their journey with SAFRA continues. For these former NSmen or "NS alumni", as we call them, SAFRA is developing an initiative that goes beyond simply providing event spaces. It will partner with the SAF to create meaningful sessions where senior commanders share the latest developments in defence and strategic insights. These cohesions will serve a dual purpose: maintaining the social bonds forged during service, while strengthening our broader defence network by keeping NS alumni informed and connected to the current defence issues. This ensures that the bonds and commitment forged during NS remain a vital part of our national defence fabric long after active duty ends.

We also know some of the most meaningful support from the NS community does not come from just programmes alone. It comes from peers. NSmen bring with them diverse professional experience, such as finance, technology, healthcare and education. For example, since 2023, one NSman, LTC(NS) William Koh, has volunteered his expertise in financial planning, benefiting over 650 fellow NSmen through workshops and one-on-one coaching. This is defence in action – servicemen supporting servicemen.

SAFRA will expand such peer-to-peer platforms, encouraging more NSmen to step forward as mentors, facilitators and industry connectors. In doing so, we strengthen not only individual livelihoods, but also the bonds that underpin our defence community.

I have spoken about how SAFRA will strengthen its support for the NS community by curating engagements across life stages. SAFRA will continue to enhance the way we serve the NS community by delivering good, accessible and quality lifestyle offerings and recreational facilities. The upcoming SAFRA Bayshore is an example of this commitment.

Next, let me turn to how SAFRA will deepen community engagement through NSmen. We will be taking two approaches.

First, SAFRA will go beyond lifestyle offerings to bridge defence and community. While access to military camps must understandably remain controlled, we can bring defence closer to the community.

Mr Alex Yeo asked about MINDEF’s plans to leverage SAFRA's network to raise defence awareness in the community. In the coming years, SAFRA clubhouses will house defence heritage galleries that will tell the stories of our Services and Formations through its walls and spaces. Our NSmen and their contributions will not be forgotten. It will also engage club tenants as partners, inviting them to become defence advocates through partnership programmes and exclusive promotions that celebrate our defence heritage.

Our goal is simple: everyone who visits a SAFRA clubhouse in future should leave feeling more connected with Singapore’s defence story.

SAFRA will also work with community and defence partners to organise road shows for the public to learn more about the various aspects of defence. This will include supporting the SAF in scaling up its SAF-School Partnership Programme (SSPP). SSPP was started in the 2000s to deepen students’ understanding of the SAF through interactions at school visits or experiential learning by visiting camps.

The public can look forward to the inaugural SAFRA Community Defence and Resilience Festival in early 2027. To be held at multiple sites across Singapore, this Festival will feature defence-themed activities for the masses, engaging up to 80,000 participants. This will be accompanied by showcases of military equipment from the SAF and include exhibits where the community can learn more about our defence capabilities.

For the fitness enthusiasts – and there are many in this Chamber – you can look forward to an NS-inspired Fitness Festival in the later part of this year, complete with NS-themed obstacle courses. It is our version of Hyrox. It will comprise a fitness race for 3,000 participants, as well as a series of programmes in the lead up to the race. These programmes will be co-organised with the People’s Association and the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), and we expect this to reach another 27,000 participants across the island. We will be mindful to invite Mr Alex Yeo, Mr Alex Yam and Mr Patrick Tay to join us in our version of Hyrox. Of course, all Members are welcome too. They are very fit, by the way.

We know that, ultimately, building community support for defence requires leadership from those who have served. Today, NSmen volunteer across SAFRA’s steering committees and regional initiatives. They shape programmes, organise outreach, and build partnerships with grassroots organisations, schools and local businesses.

SAFRA will expand opportunities for NSmen to lead regional engagement efforts, strengthening ties between defence and community networks. In partnership with Nexus’ Engagement and Volunteer Office and as part of the broader SG Defence Volunteers Network which Senior Minister of State Zaqy had mentioned earlier, SAFRA will also create pathways for youths, women, and other members of the community to contribute to defence-related initiatives.

Through these expanded volunteer networks, we are building something more than a collection of programmes. We are strengthening a culture, a culture where service is valued, where sacrifice is understood and where defence is embraced as a shared mission. We are strengthening the very foundation of our national defence.

In the face of new and evolving security challenges, NS is vital to our nation’s survival. SAFRA’s evolution is about helping every Singaporean understand their stake in our nation’s defence. We will achieve this with SAFRA serving as a bridge connecting our citizen soldiers with the wider community. When NSmen volunteer in their communities, when families participate in defence activities, when businesses support our servicemen, we create a nation where defence truly becomes everyone’s mission.

Mr Chairman, this is how we strengthen the bonds between NSmen and their communities, building a more resilient Singapore. I am confident that together, we can and will succeed in this vital defence movement that our nation’s security depends on.

Thank you, Chairman. Minister highlighted that strong, conventional capabilities remain central to a credible deterrence. We have also heard about how the SAF is adapting to emerging threats. Can MINDEF also provide an update on how the SAF plans to stay capable and technologically advanced, particularly in terms of its higher end capabilities?

Chair, if I may make a couple of points in response to Mr Yip Hon Weng's clarification. First, I do not intend to list out all the conventional capabilities and their timeline. I think we will do that in good time. As I mentioned, we will only reveal the capabilities at a time of our choosing, when it is operationally useful. First point.

The second point, I think we also would encourage everyone to move beyond the concept of what we call conventional and non-conventional capabilities. As far as SAF is concerned, they are just capabilities. There will be a spectrum of capabilities that will be required to meet our enduring, emergent and evolving challenges. In the past, the type of scenarios that MINDEF/SAF has to contend with is probably fair to say, a bit more limited. Today, the range of scenarios that MINDEF/SAF has to contend with has expanded greatly. Within these expanded scenarios and each of the different scenarios, we will need a mix of different capabilities to respond. That includes what we call conventional capabilities, classified capabilities, cyber capabilities and including the cheap asymmetric capabilities.

We will continue to renew many of our platforms, be it armoured fighting vehicles, ships or planes. These are things that people can see. These are things that our potential adversaries will also take notice. But what is beyond these conventional capabilities will be the other capabilities that I have alluded to, which we may not always reveal to others. Nevertheless, as I have mentioned, it is important for us to keep looking ahead, not just to look at the threat horizon in the next one to two years, but in the next 10 to 20 years.

Previously I have mentioned that some of the ideas that we have worked on started some 10, 20 years ago. And sometimes for some of these classified capabilities, it is the length of time required for us to develop breakthroughs in the science and technology for us to develop such capabilities. So, at a time where it is appropriate, we will reveal more of such capabilities.

But as far as the conventional platforms are concerned, we will use our budget wisely to upgrade those where we can and to acquire new ones when we need to.

We do not always acquire new weapons systems only. For example, recently, we have acquired four second-hand C130 to be refurbished to meet our operational needs, to stretch our defence dollar. So, I want to assure Members of the House, it is not just about acquiring new, shiny platforms. Very often, we acquire platforms that meet our needs and we retrofit them according to our operational needs, just as we have done for the C130s, the Leopards and other platforms.

Thank you, Sir. Thank you, Minister, for a comprehensive overview. I had filed this as a Parliamentary Question later, but I thought I would raise it today. First on capabilities, as we modernise the SAF, what is the Minister's assessment of the introduction of weapon types not previously present in Southeast Asia, specifically modern ballistic missiles, following Indonesia's acquisition of the KHAN from Türkiye? Does our current modernisation roadmap address this?

Another group of clarifications on NSF compensation. Senior Minister of State Zaqy said we should not erode the social compact and the ethos of service by casting NS as an employer-employee relationship. But SAF regulars serve the same mission and they are paid market rate salaries and CPF, so it does not erode their ethos of service. I do not think duty and compensation are incompatible at all. The fact is that people who have no choice get paid less than people who do.

The Senior Minister of State also framed accommodation, food, equipping as part of the compensation package. I would respectfully disagree. I think these are just simply operational necessities for the SAF. The army feeds soldiers because hungry soldiers do need to fight. It houses them because you need them in camp at 5.30 am, and it gives them equipment because you cannot send someone outfield in civilian clothing. It is less than 1% of the defence budget. Why can we not find it to pay our soldiers fairly?

Chair, let me respond to both questions. Chair, I understand Mr Tiong has filed a Parliamentary Question and we intend to answer the Parliamentary Question subsequently. But I would just like to say three things, since this is raised now instead of the Parliamentary Question.

First, ballistic missiles threat is not new, and it can emanate from within and beyond this region. It has existed for a long time, and SAF will continue to build up our capabilities ahead of time.

The second thing I will say is that we do not discuss specific threat scenarios in this Chamber, because we do not want to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Number three, we do not discuss specific operational response in this Chamber either, because we do not need others to know what we can do and where our gaps might be. That has guided how I was brought up in the SAF and that will be how I continue to lead MINDEF/SAF.

Perhaps to share a story with the Members of the House. I have regularly visited our soldiers, including NSFs serving across the entire MINDEF/SAF establishment. Many of them work in classified units. Whenever I meet soldiers, 19-, 20-year-old, working in a classified unit, I will ask them this question, "What do you tell your parents about what you are doing?" I am proud to say I have consistently heard only one answer, and they do not have to rehearse this because I am the Minister for Defence. They are matured enough to tell me that they will just tell their parents that they are serving their country, full stop.

Sometimes, those who know the most say the least. Sometimes, those who do the most say the least. And I think those are wise responses from our NSFs.

The SAF works on the basis that many of our systems, classified systems, are operated by NSFs and NSmen. We do not disclose our capabilities and over the years it has been quite amazing that how generations of NSmen have been able to operationalise such capabilities without having to tell the world. And I am proud of them, and I think this must continue to be the culture that we have in the SAF.

On NSF compensation, let me say that having served both National Service full-time and as a regular, I will be the first one to champion that we recognise the contributions of our NSFs and NSmen appropriately. But I choose my words very carefully. I say "recognise". I think those of us who have served in National Service will be very careful to not use the word "compensate", because in truth, no amount of monetary compensation can be equated with the contributions of our NSmen. It is not just the two years that they serve. It is the two years and beyond. And many of our NSmen serve even beyond the two plus 10 years – they volunteer their services.

What is the ultimate price for all this contribution? It is not how much money we give them. Ultimately, it is the security and survival of Singapore that we are defending. Yes, we will take care of our NSmen. And it is not just about NSF allowance. We will take care of our NSmen, we will take care of our NSFs in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, where the budget space allows. We contribute to their HOME account, which takes care of their housing, their medical, their education. And when we have the budget space, we will do more, and I will be the first one to champion that we do more.

But I do not want us to get into the wrong concept that this is a transactional relationship. I have never seen it so and I hope that generations of Singaporeans will continue to not see it so. It is not in our interest to cause invidious comparison or to bring this down, this sacred duty of serving our country into a transaction.

Of course, we will take care of our NSmen. Of course, we will regularly review our NSF allowances. Of course, we will do more for the HOME awards. Of course, we will do more for the NS credits, the tax incentive, wherever we can. You can have my assurance. We will take care of our NSmen. But I appeal to Members of this House not to conflate duty with transaction. [Applause.]

Thank you, Chairman. Minister, I think some of the threats I had discussed, including terrorism and cybersecurity, are likely to be cross domain and involve other Ministries, such as the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), and potentially, the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI). Could the Minister share how MINDEF works with other Ministries to deal with these threats?

Chair, indeed, as Mr Vikram Nair said, many of these threats are cross domain. They do not just emanate from within the security domain. They can cross into the civilian domains. And MINDEF will continue to work very closely with our MHA counterparts, MDDI. In fact, across the whole of agencies. How do we do this? We have various standing arrangements from committees that look into the future to operational committees that look at actual operations, so that we can be ready, not just to handle the current ops, but also to anticipate the future ops.

Let me give some examples. For example, in the recent cyber attacks that we have seen, the agencies involved will include assets and capabilities from MINDEF, MHA, the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, the Infocomm Media Development Authority and also other various related sectors. We will continue to do this, as to who takes the lead and who is the first among equals, it will depend on the operational context. In certain instances, the civilian agencies will front it. The rest of the Government agencies, including MINDEF, will continue to support as a whole-of-Government, whole-of-nation effort.

In other more serious contingencies where MINDEF needs to front it, the other contingents will continue to support and we have standing operational structures on how we continue to operate this.

Having said that, I must emphasise that it is not just about dealing with the contingencies, just as the recent cyber attacks have shown. What we also need to do as a whole-of-Government is to deploy our resources to help our various agencies build up their capabilities.

So, for example, in the recent issue with the critical information infrastructure, while we are managing the incident real time, we are also conducting exercises and trainings to help the various telco to build up their capabilities, because at the end of the day when an attack is on a part of the network, the strength of our defence is always contingent on the weakest link and we want to level up the capabilities across the entire nation.

Likewise, when it comes to the issue of counter terrorism, it is not just about MINDEF or MHA capabilities. Actually, what is the terrorist trying to do? They are trying to psychologically shake us and take away the sense of normalcy that we have.

One of the most important thing that we need to do if we were ever under attack is to never allow the terrorists to achieve their aim of disrupting our way of life. The psychological defence part is so important, which goes beyond MINDEF and SAF. It requires a whole of society effort for us to make sure that we are inoculated.

We have seen how the experiences of other countries have done. In fact, there is one particular country which has a standing policy. Whenever they are faced with a terrorist attack, and if the terrorist were successful in killing someone or bombing somewhere, they made it a point that within a few hours, they will make sure that the place is entirely cleaned up and people will go on with their life as per normal. Because to them, that is how you defeat the terrorists and tell them that, "You may kill or harm a few of us, but you will never rob us of our peace". And that, I think, is an aspirational standard that we should also strive towards.

Sir, I thank the Minister for his response to my questions about diversifying our defence partners. However, I seek his response regarding defence procurement audits by the Auditor-General's Office (AGO). A best solution mindset, which he mentioned, also requires external accountability and appropriate transparency. How does MINDEF ensure that even the most expensive defence procurement, including lifecycle cost and delivery timeline, is properly audited, while ensuring that operational secrecy is not compromised?

Second, in view of emergent and evolving threats, is MINDEF looking beyond the DSTA, DSO and ST Engineering to collaborate with local entrepreneurs on dual use technologies? What specific initiatives exist to help startups pivot innovative solutions to bolster both national defence and commercial exports?

Chair, let me first assure Members of this House that the audit system in MINDEF is multi-layered and robust. Actually, the AGO does audit MINDEF and the AGO has submitted reports to this House before of its audit of MINDEF processes. Even for classified projects, there is a system for us to audit classified projects to make sure that money is well spent.

And that is done by various different classified agencies to cross audit one another. It will also require oversight from authorities beyond the direction of command.

This is how we ensure that we get bang for the buck. This process is robust, is rigorous, and the best testimony or a benchmark or an indicator is that you often hear that contractors complain about MINDEF/SAF. And that is because we drive the hardest bargain.

In fact, recently I was overseas for a meeting and I met up with one of the global defence majors. He gave me a back-handed compliment. He says, "Your people are very tough. They negotiate very hard. But you know why I still want your business? Because if I can get the MINDEF/SAF business, you are my reference customer." So, I quickly asked him, "so does that mean that I get a better price?"

And indeed, MINDEF/SAF is often a reference customer and we want to maintain and upkeep our reputation. Because they know that when MINDEF buys something, the process is robust. And we have those rules that I mentioned: operations come first, operations come last. The start and end of everything has to do with our operational needs and no other considerations. No political interference, no political considerations, no other pecuniary things.

In order to negotiate such a deal to ensure our resilience, it is not just the upfront purchase. Many countries, many militaries will buy things upfront. We do not consider that as adequate. We want to make sure that there is a after-sales service and we want to assure ourselves if the lifecycle of that platform is for 20 years, we have the capability and the assurance and the spares to make sure that, that will work for 20 years. Even if one day the supplier goes away, we must have the technical capability to continue to upgrade those platforms for the 20 years and beyond. That is the DNA within MINDEF.

On the Member's second point about working with research agencies beyond MINDEF, DSTA and DSO. Indeed, we have done that systematically over the years. We have established relationships, established labs with our own universities and also some overseas universities. But I would just say that we will have to be very careful with how we handle such relationships. While increasingly, there are a lot of technologies that can be dual use, not every technology provider will be comfortable with such a posture. When we approach partners to work with MINDEF, we must do it sensitively, respecting their comfort zone. And we should also be careful not to put our partners in positions that they find difficult.

When we secure any technologies, we must also protect the intellectual property and respect the conditions upon which those technologies have been shared with us. We must respect that. Otherwise, nobody will want to work with us. So, it is not just established companies, it is not just startups, it is also research labs in Singapore and beyond.

Thank you, Chairman. The Minister updated the House earlier about the importance of keeping pace with technological advancements as well as hybrid threats, especially in the cyber domain. While we have talked a lot about how we grow defence internally and get our people on board, could I ask the Minister if he could share with the House, what is the status of our international cooperation in terms of defence, growing our defence capability and also threat assessments?

Chair, if I may build on the point that I have raised in my answer. Yes, the threats have broadened and deepened, but I must say that the opportunities for us to work with new partners have also expanded. Perhaps I illustrate this with my recent trip to the Munich Security Conference.

I am one of the few Asian representatives in a otherwise mainly European conference. The question is what are we doing there? Why are we there? But more importantly, what can we offer there? And before I go for any conference, I always ask myself this question, "Why do people want to talk to us?" The fact that we want to talk to people is quite obvious, but why do people want to talk to us? And after meeting them, will they still want to talk to us? And that goes to the core of the value proposition.

For example, on the cyber front. A cyberattack on one part of the system is an attack on the entire network and we will pitch to other partners that our defence is better when we do it collectively. We might be geographically distanced. We might be geographically far apart. But we share the same challenges when it comes to cyber.

Another example, information warfare: where people use information to try and divide societies. Today, there are no shortage of examples and live operations in Europe, the Baltic Scandinavian countries. And suddenly, they find that there are partners that can work with them are beyond their European region.

And that was why last year, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, we saw the highest participation of the European countries in our Shangri-La Dialogue for many years. Because they now see opportunities to work with credible, trusted and reliable partners – and Singapore is one of them. And suddenly, we find that we have new opportunities.

A third area, critical underwater infrastructure. Today we have heard of many stories of the challenges that the European countries face, the Middle Eastern countries face. And now we are thinking through how we can convene like-minded partners to come together to develop some norms for the protection of our critical underwater infrastructure. Because under international laws there is a lacuna on what can be done and who should be responsible for what. But we have heard enough interest from our partners from Australia, New Zealand, North East Asia, Europe and even America, to want to talk about this topic and to explore how we can work collectively to share information, share best practices and perhaps, narrow the international legal lacuna.

These are just examples of how we are able to look for new opportunities to work with new partners. But all these are contingent on this basic: we must clearly understand what people are thinking and why are they thinking what they are thinking, so that we can come up with a timely value proposition, so that I can answer the two questions that I always challenge myself before I go into a meeting: "Why does he want to talk to me? And will he still want to talk to me after the meeting?

I have a clarification for the Minister. It is clear that the international environment we are used to operating in is at a turning point. As strategic competition between the US and China intensifies, other countries and middle powers are also repositioning themselves. So, what is our strategy for navigating this increasingly complex geopolitical landscape? And as Singaporeans, how can individuals and the broader society stay prepared and play a part?

Chair, I thank Mr Yip for his clarification.

I have a simple rule that I encourage everyone in the Public Service, and all the men and women at SAF to do, to contribute to how Singapore can continue to strengthen our relevance to the world.

Singaporeans, we travel widely. We go to many countries. Every time I talk to my servicemen, I talk to my Public Service officers, I always ask them to come back and tell me three things, wherever they go, in that country: what has remained the same, what has changed and what do you think is going to change?

I see this as a discipline that all of us as Singaporeans can contribute to. Because in today's uncertainties, it is not just the role of MINDEF and MFA to sense-make what is happening around the world. All of us as fellow Singaporeans, all of us can make a contribution, no matter which corner of the world we go to. Understand the world deeply. Do not understand just what they do but understand why they do what they do. And always come back, tell us the three things: what has not changed, what has changed and what will change? Because we will constantly need to find new value propositions, be it major powers or China.

We do not take a moralistic attitude towards other people's foreign policy or military posture, but I take a very realistic view of what they do and to understand why they do what they do.

So, for the US, China and other middle powers, we never take it as a given that they will continue to want to engage with Singapore. What has worked in the past may no longer work, going forward. So, constantly, regularly, when I meet my US counterparts and my Chinese counterparts, it is the same approach. I try to understand what is going on in their thinking, where we can partner them to make a contribution for our mutual shared interests. And if there are differences that we need to manage, how can we manage them sensitively while we continue to manage to hold on to the big picture to work for each other's mutual benefit. It is the same for the US; it is the same for China.

And at every stage of their development, there will be evolving priorities that we need to keep, we need to be sensitive to and we need to keep finding those new value propositions. And it is with that spirit that I think we can stay vigilant to the challenges and also be ready to seize the opportunities.

If there is one thing that we share between the MINDEF and SAF speeches today is that, yes, the world is in a state of flux. There are many challenges, but that does not mean that we have no agency. That does not mean that there are no new opportunities for us to entrench our relevance to the world. So long as we go in with our eyes open, take a realistic approach to what the world is, constantly challenge ourselves to find and create those value propositions, we will be in good stead.

Last but not least, I must say this. It is one thing to have ideas on how we can be relevant, how we can make a value contribution. But ultimately, nobody will partner Singapore if we are not reliable, trustworthy nor capable.

Today, the SAF is opening up many new opportunities to work with new partners because they find the SAF a credible institution. They find us serious-minded, thinking long term and honest with integrity. These are valuable attributes that we must continue to hold in order for us to entrench our position as a credible partner with real capabilities.

Nobody will talk seriously to anyone without real capabilities. When we say we want to partner another defence establishment to develop science and technology or do research in a particular area, we must inspire confidence in others that we will deliver. And we will deliver. And that is the basis upon which we will continue to build our relationships with the rest of the world, continue to entrench our relevance.

And on that note, I thank Members of the House for your support for our defence – National Service, and may we continue to work on this together to build Singapore for the next lap. [Applause.]