Debated in Parliament on 8 May 2023.
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Minister for Home Affairs.
Order. I propose to take a short break. Okay, I will not take a short break and adjournment. Second Minister for Home Affairs.
Mr Deputy Speaker, my sincere apologies. Nature does call.
Not at all.
Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."
Sir, this Bill is linked to the next Bill on the Order Paper, the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Bill. May I propose that the debates on both Bills take place together?
Please proceed.
Thank you, Sir. We will still have the Second Reading of the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Bill to comply with the procedural requirements.
Sir, scams have become a global problem. Scammers lurk in every corner and victims are often caught unawares. Many scams go unreported, because victims feel embarrassed or do not believe any good will come of their reporting. But even just counting those that were reported, the amount lost to scams worldwide grew by about 16% from 2020 to over $77 billion in 2021.
In Singapore, the number of scams has also increased sharply. Police reported that scam cases exceeded 31,000 in 2022. This is more than a fivefold increase since 2018. Scam cases are now more than one-and-a-half times that of physical crime. Back in 2018, they were only a quarter.
The amount of money lost to scams is staggering. In 2022 alone, victims lost $660 million. Since 2018, close to $2 billion. Many of us know or have personally heard stories of people who have fallen prey. They include elderly Singaporeans who lost their life savings. Younger Singaporeans are not immune. In fact, more than half of scam victims in 2022 were aged 20 to 39. Victims often lose more than money – they lose peace of mind, sense of well-being, relations with family sometimes become very strained and all of these things bring about great distress.
Many scams in Singapore have an overseas nexus. We cannot stop the global tide but must do everything we can to try and keep the scammers far from shore. The Bills we are debating today are part of the Government's multi-pronged strategy to fight scams. We have been educating the public so that they are aware of the signs of scam and know what actions they can take to protect themselves.
Members would have seen the public campaign, "I can ACT against Scams", or hosted outreach sessions by Police officers in their constituency events involving residents. We have taken proactive measures to prevent scammers from being able to reach victims in the first place. For example, the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) has been working with the telcos to block spoofed calls from reaching Singaporeans. Every month, close to 60 million calls are blocked.
We launched the ScamShield app in November 2020, which has been downloaded more than 550,000 times and filtered out more than 7.4 million SMSes that are suspected to be part of a scam. Earlier this Sitting, we tabled the Online Criminal Harms Bill. Among other things, the Online Criminal Harms Bill will help to stop potential scams from taking place, or as soon as they are detected.
We have also made it easier to detect and report scams and follow-up with partners. The Police set up the Anti-Scam Command in 2022 to consolidate expertise and resources in combatting scams. Staff from the major banks are co-located with the Police, so that all the parties can quickly act together to freeze scam-tainted accounts. With the help of our foreign partners, Police brought down 13 scam syndicates in 2022. More than 70 persons based overseas were arrested.
The Bills we are proposing today will add to our suite of anti-scam measures outlined above. We propose to empower the authorities to deal more effectively with money mules and to prevent the abuse of Singpass for scam operations.
First, let me explain the role of money mules. They are individuals who allow criminals to control their bank or other payment accounts. They also include those who use their accounts to receive or transfer monies under the criminals' instructions. Some Members may recall the OCBC phishing scam that occurred between December 2021 and January 2022 – 790 victims fell prey. The total losses amounted to $13.7 million. In this scam, the Police identified more than 120 suspected money mules. More than 120 local bank accounts were used to receive the scam victims' monies.
Why do the scammers need money mules? Scam syndicates typically cultivate a network of money mules to facilitate their crimes or to launder criminal proceeds. The money mules' bank accounts form a web of multiple accounts; scammed monies can be split into different denominations and transferred through these accounts. This process is repeated many times over, so that the monies go through multiple layers of bank accounts, before being transferred out of Singapore into the hands of the syndicate. This tactic of "layering" is designed to make it difficult for the authorities to follow the money trail and to get to the perpetrators.
Between 2020 and 2022, scammers exploited more than 38,000 bank accounts to launder their proceeds from local victims. Over the same period, more than 19,000 money mules were investigated by the Police. One big problem for the Police is that with electronic transactions, all these actions that I described earlier happen very quickly, often in a matter of hours.
Another problem is that when interviewed by the Police, most of the money mules claimed they did not know that they were handling illegal funds. They claimed not to have known the identity of the person who instructed them, nor the identity of the bank account holders whom they were receiving funds from or transferring funds to. Many agreed to facilitate these money transfers because they were paid to do so. They claimed that they did not think that they were doing anything illegal and did not know they were dealing with criminal proceeds.
The fact is, however, that their actions caused great harm to scam victims, whose monies have been moved beyond reach, beyond our ability to recover. Besides money mules, the Police have also observed a trend of scam syndicates abusing Singpass to facilitate their criminal activities. For example, syndicates recruit Singpass users with the promise of monetary gain and then use the Singpass accounts to further their schemes.
Scam syndicates who get hold of another person's Singpass credentials can use them to open bank accounts, which are then used to receive and transfer funds obtained through scams. Irresponsible Singpass users have facilitated this by selling or sharing their Singpass credentials, such as their Singpass password and SMS one-time password. Scam syndicates effectively assume the identity of a Singpass user for their criminal activities and exploit the Singpass account to commit criminal activities while hiding their own tracks. As a result, these scam syndicates are extremely difficult to pursue.
Sir, we must do everything we can to prevent scams from harming Singaporeans. This includes recognising the limitations of current laws, which make it difficult to take the money mules to task. It requires the Prosecution to prove that the money mule had knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that the monies transacted through his bank account are linked to criminal activity. As a result of these difficulties, of the 19,000 money mules investigated by Police from 2020 to 2022, fewer than 250 money mules were eventually prosecuted. Out of 19,000, fewer than 250 ended up being prosecuted.
In the OCBC phishing scam which I mentioned earlier, out of the 120 suspected money mules, only nine could be charged for money mule offences. Think about that, it is fewer than one in 10. Similarly, it has been challenging to prove the wrongful intention of those who give up their Singpass credentials under existing laws like the Computer Misuse Act.
Clearly, there is a gap that has allowed money mules to continue abetting scammers at little cost to themselves. Why should they be deterred if they can evade prosecution by simply claiming ignorance?
The two sets of amendments we are proposing are, therefore, intended to strengthen our collective defence against scams.
First, it sets guardrails on the use of bank and Singpass accounts. Bank account holders and Singpass users must be careful and exercise diligence regarding their bank accounts and Singpass credentials. Our bank accounts and Singpass accounts are for our own use. We should not allow them to be used by another person, especially if we do not know who the other party is or what the transactions are for.
Second, the amendments will empower the Police to act more effectively against those who blatantly ignore these guardrails, and abuse or allow to be abused, their bank accounts and Singpass credentials to perpetrate scams and other crimes.
I will first explain the proposed amendments to the CDSA. Clauses 3 to 6 of the CDSA Bill amend sections 50, 51, 53 and 54 to introduce the offences of rash and negligent money laundering. "Rash" and "negligent" are not new concepts. They are defined in sections 26(E) and 26(F) of the existing Penal Code and are also applied in the Road Traffic Act.
A person can be liable for rash money laundering if he proceeded to carry out a transaction while he had some suspicions about the transaction, but did not make further enquiries to address those suspicions. A person can be liable for negligent money laundering if he continued with a transaction despite the presence of red flags or suspicious indicators, which would be noticeable by an ordinary, reasonable person.
These changes will allow a money laundering offence to be made out against an individual at a lower level of culpability, compared with the current laws. Which of these offences are made out, if any, will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. Let me share an example where a money mule can be held liable for a rash money laundering offence.
Person A responds to an online job advertisement seeking to hire an accounts manager. A was told that he would be paid $2,000 a month to receive money using his personal bank account and all he had to do was to transfer sums of more than $100,000 to other bank accounts weekly. That is all the job requires, allowing the bank account to be used for transfer of monies. It is nothing like the kind of work that would justify a monthly salary of $2,000 that we would normally expect.
Despite the exceptional attractiveness of this job, which should have raised suspicions, A did not verify the source of the funds he was receiving, the purpose of the transfers nor the authenticity of his purported employer. Due to the frequency and amount of money transacted, A suspected that the monies could be criminal proceeds, but he chose to carry on without further checks and the money was eventually found to be criminal proceeds from scam victims.
I will also share an example of negligent money laundering.
Person B responded to an online advertisement on a social media platform calling for people to "rent out" their bank accounts; it literally used those terms – "rent out". B provided the Internet banking login details for his personal bank account to an unknown subject and was paid $800 to let his personal bank account be used by that subject. B did not know what his bank account was used for. B claimed that he did not suspect anything wrong with the arrangement despite receiving this quite easy $800. Investigations found that his bank account was used to receive about $20,000 from a Singaporean victim of a love scam. To an ordinary reasonable person, this offer would have sounded suspicious and really "too good to be true".
Sir, the offence of rash money laundering will carry a fine of up to $250,000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both. The offence of negligent money laundering will carry a fine of up to $150,000 or imprisonment of up to three years, or both.
Based on investigations into scams, the Police have observed conduct common among money mules in facilitating a scam.
Hence, clause 7 of the Bill adds a new section 55A which introduces a new offence of assisting another person to retain benefits from criminal conduct. A money mule can be held liable for this offence if his conduct falls within any of the following four circumstances.
One, the value of the property he dealt with is disproportionate to his known sources of income; or two, he allowed another person, or persons, to access, operate or control his payment account and failed to take reasonable steps to find out the purpose of this arrangement; or three, he received or transferred money using his payment account and failed to take reasonable steps to find out the source or destination of the money; or four, he received money from or transferred money to another person or persons and failed to take reasonable steps to find out that person's identity and physical location.
I will cite an example to illustrate the above offence.
Person C responded to a job advertisement by a company. C is told he will earn $100 a day for using his own bank account to receive money from the company's customers and transfer the money to the company's bank account. All these from a purported employer whom he does not ever meet. As unusual as the job may have sounded, C did not question why he needed to use his personal account to receive and transfer money from the company's customers. He did not take steps to find out where the money was coming from or going to. After all, the effort required of him is quite minimal.
Why do all these details matter then?
Sir, to stop the build-up of such a network of money mules, this new section 55A could render a person like C liable for an offence of assisting another person to retain benefits from criminal conduct.
While clause 7 provides that a person could be liable for an offence under any of the four circumstances I described earlier, clause 7 also provides in the new subsection 55A that it is a defence if the person is able to prove that he did not know and had no reason to believe that the property he had dealt with directly through his account, or indirectly, was criminal proceeds.
The offence of assisting another person to retain benefits from criminal conduct will carry a fine of up to $50,000 or imprisonment of up to three years, or both.
Let me move now to explain the second set of proposed amendments, the amendments to the Computer Misuse Act (CMA).
I mentioned the worrying trend of Singpass users who give away their Singpass credentials, often for money. The actions of such errant Singpass users facilitate scams and other criminal conduct. They undermine Singpass as our national digital identity service which many people have come to depend on for digital transactions.
However, it is challenging to take such errant Singpass users to task. For example, under the CMA today, it must be proven that the Singpass user knowingly disclosed his credentials for wrongful gain or an unlawful purpose, or that it would cause wrongful loss, which is difficult to do.
In one recent case, one Singpass user who had sold his login credentials subsequently pretended to be a victim and came to the Police, claiming that he had been deceived into giving up his Singpass credentials.
It was only through extensive investigations, taking up enormous Police resources, that the Singpass user eventually admitted to have sold his credentials, knowing that his Singpass would be used for criminal activities. The authorities managed to crack this case. But in many others, the Singpass users are uncooperative in investigations and fabricate stories about how their Singpass came to be abused. This situation favours the scammers and it is highly unsatisfactory.
Therefore, clause 4 of the CMA Bill introduces a new offence in the form of a new section 8A in the CMA, to address the conduct of Singpass users who deliberately give their credentials to other persons, which are then used to facilitate criminal activities.
We are concerned with the behaviour of Singpass users who disclose their Singpass passwords or access codes, or who provide any means of accessing their Singpass accounts in situations where the credentials can then be used to facilitate criminal conduct.
In my speech, for ease of reference, I will refer to all of these types of acts collectively as "disclosing Singpass credentials".
To combat such behaviour, it will now be an offence for a Singpass user to disclose his Singpass credentials, if he did so knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that the purpose of the disclosure is for any person to commit, or facilitate the commission by any person, of any offence under any written law.
The intent of this change is not to make legitimate users of Singpass fearful of disclosing their credentials. They should, however, be aware that in certain situations, the disclosure could be an offence if, one, the disclosure was carried out for any form of gain; two, the disclosure was carried out with the knowledge it would likely cause wrongful loss to any person; or three, the disclosure was carried out but without reasonable steps being taken to find out the identity and physical location of the person to whom the credentials were disclosed.
These proposed provisions are based on actual situations Police have observed, where individuals have deliberately sold or disclosed their Singpass credentials to criminal syndicates.
The offence of disclosing an individual's own Singpass credentials will carry a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to three years, or both.
Again, to be abundantly clear, it is not our intent to criminalise situations where there is a genuine need to share credentials for legitimate transactions. For instance, seniors may, in some situations, need the help of their family members to make Singpass transactions. The new provisions are also not intended to capture persons who were genuinely tricked into giving up their Singpass credentials.
Clause 4 of the CMA Bill also introduces a new offence in the form of a section 8B in the CMA, which criminalises acts of obtaining, retaining or dealing in another person's Singpass credentials. This is to deal with those who purchase Singpass credentials and syndicates which trade the Singpass credentials.
The Bill introduces provisions in section 8B to clarify the scope of this new offence. It is not an offence if an individual obtained or retained another person's Singpass credentials for a legitimate purpose. It is also not an offence if an individual supplied, offered to supply, transmitted or made available the Singpass credentials of another person for a legitimate purpose and the individual did not know or have reason to believe that those credentials will be or are likely to be used to commit an offence.
The offence of obtaining or dealing in Singpass credentials will carry a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to three years, or both, for a first offence. For a second or subsequent offence, the penalty will be a fine of up to $20,000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both.
In addition, clause 5 amends section 13 of the CMA so that the two new offences will apply and our Courts will have jurisdiction over the offences, even if they are committed outside of Singapore.
The nature of scam syndicates is that they operate mostly from overseas. Regardless of where these offences are committed, it is critical for us to prevent conduct that amounts to an abuse of Singpass to facilitate scams and other criminal activities and to protect Singpass as Singapore's national digital identity service.
Mr Deputy Speaker, these two Bills are necessary to strengthen our collective defence against scams. They seek to disrupt the operations of criminals preying on Singaporeans by acting as guardrails for the use of payment accounts and Singpass credentials and allowing Police to better act against money mules and those who abuse Singpass to perpetrate scams and other crimes. Sir, I beg to move.
Question proposed.
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.
Mr Deputy Speaker, I stand in support of the amendment Bills which will help to further strengthen our vigilance against online scams and enforcement against money mules and abuses of Singpass accounts.
With the increase in instances of reported cases of scams both globally and in Singapore, our fellow Singaporeans are even more susceptible to risks of being scammed and taken advantage of as unwitting money mules.
We have heard from the Minister just now on the facts and figures. In the last two years, Singapore has lost about $1.2 billion to scams. Scam cases are now more than 1.5 times in number, compared to physical crimes.
While we can increase public vigilance and awareness in our defence against scams, we need our legislative framework to remain up to date with technological developments in order to disrupt the operations of scammers, which are increasingly more sophisticated and challenging.
One aspect is the use of money mules as a means to facilitate scams and getting scam proceeds out of Singapore.
Currently, between 2020 and 2022, out of the more than 19,000 money mule cases investigated by the Police, only less than 250 cases were eventually prosecuted, as explained by the hon Minister. These cases involved amounts of more than $440 million. That is almost 20% of the entire scams in terms of quantum.
Money mules are a key part of scammers' operations here in Singapore and I agree that there is a lacuna in the law that needs to be plugged.
Currently, the evidential challenge is to prove that money mules have actual knowledge or intent to facilitate such criminal activities. Further, money mules are currently charged under the Computer Misuse Act for abetting a person to gain access to the bank account without authority. This provision does not seem the most appropriate for the acts committed. Hence, I welcome the changes proposed by the Bill and their direct intervention in this regard.
My firm is part of the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme (CLAS) acting for accused persons on a pro bono basis and we see some of these cases. From experience, not all alleged money mules fit the typical stereotype of a criminal scammer. Some of them claim or maybe are as much victims of circumstances as the scammed victims themselves.
If I may share a case about one such young accused person that walked through our office doors. Aged 19, he was serving his NS. He saw a job advertisement and responded to it with the intention of working to support his family of seven and supplement the income of the sole breadwinner. He ended up giving up control of his bank account and Singpass to an unknown person in return for payment. He thought this is his income or salary. Easy come, easy go. But it was too good to be true. Call it youthful brashfulness. He faces charges now, accused of being a money mule.
Besides that case, I have also received appeals during my Meet-the-People Sessions from families in Keat Hong who also faced similar situations. Mostly, these money mules were lured by the prospect of job opportunities and some were scammed out of their savings and forced to act as money mules in order to regain some of those monies back. We must ensure that the amendments strike a balance between protecting the public and also meting out the appropriate penalties commensurate to the crime and culpability.
The proposed amendments to the law will place the burden on the accused money mule to prove that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure of his or her Singpass was lawful and to take reasonable steps to ascertain the purpose of the person accessing the account and the source of funds and/or the person's identity in relation to the bank account. I think this is commonsensical. In practice, it is likely that the person will face difficulty to prove otherwise and may be found guilty under the amended provisions. This is despite the fact that he or she may not have had any knowledge as to how the bank account was being used.
There are various offences, such as rash or negligent money laundering, where the accused money mule has a suspicion that the monies could be criminal proceeds but chose not to verify the legitimacy of such funds. If I may ask, what would be the reasonable steps that a person can take to make such verifications? Perhaps, the Ministry can consider forming a public reporting office which provides an avenue through the anti-scam hotline or an enhancement on the ScamShield app for members of the public and those who genuinely intend to make such verifications. This way, a person can just make a call, alert the agencies or banks of such offer or make verifications for such transactions before it is being made. This can come under the suspicious transactions reporting office for AML transactions, something which our ordinary members of the public may not be aware of.
Next, the burden of proof is about to shift, some say, in a drastic manner. I wonder if the Ministry may wish to consider delaying the implementation of the amendments while carrying out public education events as to the seriousness of such offences. Because the advertisements are framed as job advertisements, many young persons or even older ones may not appreciate that. Just by letting another person access their Singpass or bank account, they are committing a serious offence. Or as the Minister mentioned, the disclosing of their Singpass credentials.
In addition, such awareness campaigns should be done in concert with the banks and financial institutions, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and potential employers as well. The risk and dangers of being used as money mules can be amplified through our job seeking portals to alert potential jobseekers of the scams and pitfalls out there.
Lastly, I agree with the amendments under the Computer Misuse Act to protect the use of our Singpass credentials. In this regard, may I also suggest that for vulnerable members of our society, like the elderly and adults with special needs, that any changes or unauthorised access to their Singpass accounts also be notified to their next-of-kin, guardian or adult children.
I raised in this House previously about one of my Keat Hong residents, who is an adult with special needs, and how he was scammed into signing up for various phone lines by scammers and that his elderly parents were helpless to prevent the scam. We need to have a more robust way of protecting the vulnerable groups of our society. Perhaps, the use of data analytics to see the pattern of access by such groups can also help alert or red flag any sudden unathorised access. What are the steps that the Ministry will take to bolster such protection? Perhaps, before any changes to access to such Singpass accounts can be made, there can be a two-factor authentication to be approved by the next-of-kin, guardian or their adult children.
I thank the Minister for clarifying about the cases of sharing Singpass credentials for genuine legitimate purposes and also where the elderly seek help to access their Singpass accounts. So, when I do my house visits and my AICs, the volunteers are quite aware in this regard.
In conclusion, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, we are working and walking in the right direction to stop the scourge of scams in our midst. This does not just affect the elderly but also the young who are looking for jobs and to earn a decent and honest living, and maybe may not have had the full brunt of life experiences before them. Our people's hard-earned money and lifesavings are at risk and at stake and, with that, their hopes and aspirations for a better future. I stand in support of the Bills.
Ms Sylvia Lim.
Sir, in the past few years, Members of Parliament have encountered residents whose lives have been devastated by online crimes, such as scams. Not only have these victims lost significant amounts of hard-earned monies or retirement savings, they also lived with the mental anguish and guilt of being gullible enough to fall for such deception. Often, the victims were vulnerable in certain ways and susceptible to exploitation, such as those who live alone and are desperate for friends to chat with, or those searching for a life partner, who then become the victim of a love scam.
Some may blame the victims for being foolish or authors of their own misfortune. But this ignores the fact that we are dealing here with perpetrators who are parts of organised syndicates who appear well-trained to find targets. Their criminal behaviour is truly despicable.
After their ordeals, victims usually report the matter to the Police, hoping that their monies can be recovered or, at the very least, that the perpetrators would be arrested, prosecuted and punished. Due to the organised nature of scams, which are often transnational, Police have the unenviable task of informing victims that their chances of recovering their monies are often slim. Such news to a younger victim is certainly bad news, but at least he or she has the potential to recover from the loss. Such news to a retiree, however, can be crushing.
Scams have become a major crime issue in Singapore, warranting the Police to issue separate scam updates in their annual crime reporting since last year. Sir, I, therefore, support the rationale for the CMA and CDSA (Amendment) Bills. These Bills tighten the net around those who facilitate money laundering, including letting their bank accounts and Singpass accounts be used for fund transfers.
Reducing the opportunities for syndicates to redirect the fruits of crime is a step in the right direction. As to how effective these provisions will be to disrupt the operations of criminal syndicates, only time will tell.
That said, I have three clarifications and concerns about the CDSA (Amendment) Bill.
First, on the difficulties of prosecuting money mules currently. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) press release of 18 April 2023, a large number of money mules arrested by Police could not be prosecuted due to difficulties in proving their intent to facilitate criminal activities. It was highlighted that between 2020 and 2022, more than 19,000 money mules were investigated but fewer than 250 cases were eventually prosecuted. I believe the Second Minister stated these statistics earlier as well.
This works out to a prosecution rate of just 1.3%. Could MHA clarify whether the balance 98.7% of cases were all not prosecuted due to the difficulties in proving intention or does this number include non-prosecutions due to other grounds as well?
Secondly, on the likely effect of the proposed amendments to reduce the mental element required to prosecute money mules. Clauses 3 to 6 of the CDSA Bill will amend sections 50, 51, 53 and 54 to criminalise acts of money laundering done unintentionally or unknowingly, if rashness or negligence can be shown. The punishment for such acts of rashness or negligence will be lower than for acts done deliberately or with knowledge.
Coming back to the earlier statistic of not being able to prosecute more than 98% of money mules investigated in the last three years, what is MHA's assessment of how these changes will improve prosecution rates in future?
Finally, on the new CDSA offence of assisting another person to retain the proceeds of crime under the proposed section 55A. It is stated in the explanatory statement to the Bill that the new section 55A is meant to criminalise certain acts that facilitate money laundering "regardless of a person's mental state". My concern here is about persons who may be manipulated into letting others use their bank accounts to transfer money.
I encountered one resident recently who told me that her bank account had been frozen by Police as it had apparently been used to make or receive some suspicious funds. I tried asking her how her account got compromised, but she was unable to answer coherently. She appeared, to me at least, to be a person who was easily confused and cognitively impaired, and may have been made use of.
I note that the proposed section 55A(3) and (4) provide a defence to a charge under section 55A if the person did not know or had no reasonable grounds to believe that the funds concerned were the proceeds of crime. Under the law then, a suspected money mule is expected to make some sort of reasoned assessment about the nature of the transaction.
Sir, while we certainly want to curtail scams and money laundering, we also need to be fair to suspects who may also be victims themselves.
Ms Janet Ang.
Mr Deputy Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to join in this debate. The current situation is very concerning on several counts. Firstly, the increased number of persons being scammed to release their Singpass and/or personal banking credentials and the value involved give cause for grave concern.
Secondly, that Singaporeans are becoming money mules who knowingly participate in the criminal activities involving their Singpass and/or personal banking credentials is even more concerning as it points to potential waning of Singapore's high integrity value system. Maybe I am watching too many Mediacorp programmes, but are we seeing the return of triads, only this time, triads in digital skin?
So, with the amendments to the CDSA and CMA Bills, it will give the appropriate power to the authorities to take action and I hope will also deter persons who think this is easy money to recognise the severity of their actions.
At the same time, we do not want Singaporeans to lose confidence in moving to digital. Digital is here to stay and, in fact, will accelerate and become more pervasive in our lives. So, it becomes even more important for Singaporeans to be digital first, even if not digital only. The Minister has assured us in previous speeches that, for Singapore, we are definitely going to take care of those who are less digitally savvy but it does not mean that we are going to go back to the old ages of totally non-digital just because we have such situations going on.
That said, I do have a few questions for the Minister.
(a) What are the challenges envisaged by the Ministry with regard to enforcement of the law and how does the Ministry intend to address those challenges?
(b) There has been a lot of efforts in driving awareness of importance and responsibility of protecting one's digital identity and digital footprint across the board, from banking access to social media and so on. What else is the Government planning to do to increase the effectiveness of these initiatives and what else needs to be done by the banks, financial services institutions, the community and the rest of Government?
(c) Is the Government considering additional levels of authentication, for example, using biometrics identification, AI-generated questions, to authenticate that the individual using the identification is really who they say they are? It is probably no longer secure enough to use a login with simply a password and a one-time password (OTP). All this, of course, leads to more costs being involved and more steps. But it looks to me that this may be required. So, how is the Government planning to fight this kind of crime?
(d) As this inevitably always involves the banks, the proposed set-up of COSMIC, the FI-to-FI information sharing services platform, which will be debated under the amendment to the Financial Services and Markets Bill will, I believe, be pertinent because everything flows through the banking system. In lieu of COSMIC going online, what data will the Government use to strengthen enforcement of this Bill?
(e) Enforcement of Computer Misuse legislation can be challenging due to several factors, including the rapidly evolving technology. So, how is Singapore planning to keep pace with new forms of cybercrime and methods of committing offences and enable MHA to be able to identify and prosecute perpetrators and the syndicates involved?
(f) With the Internet enabling global communication and transactions as we have seen in past cases, cybercrimes often occur across multiple jurisdictions, making it challenging to identify and prosecute offenders. How does MHA involve INTERPOL and their overseas counterparts to ensure that the Bill can be enforced effectively?
(g) Most important are the poor victims. The victims need to be protected as much as possible and, where possible, the victims are supported as much as possible with recovering the monies that have been scammed. What else beyond the initiatives already in place will the Government be planning to put into action that can help the victims recover as much of the monies that have been scammed? And perhaps a little bit of compassion from the banks would help, because, in fact, in 2021, a very good friend of mine had somebody, her friend who was totally scammed and then the bank locked down all her bank accounts and she was left borrowing money from other friends. So, certainly, we hope that we need to have a little bit of compassion for the victims and ensure that there is a systematic approach to helping them and supporting them. But, of course, the most important help is to tell them not to give away their identity.
So, in conclusion, to overcome these challenges, MHA and Anti-Scam Centre Singapore as well as CSA need to work closely with technology experts, cybersecurity professionals and other stakeholders like the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the banks as well as international communities to stay abreast of emerging threats and develop effective strategies for preventing and prosecuting computer misuse crimes. This will involve investing in new technology, enhancing international cooperation and improving training and resources for all personnel involved. Notwithstanding my clarifications, Mr Deputy Speaker, I stand in support of the Bill.
Minister Josephine Teo. Would you like to adjourn the debate?
PAPERCUTS