Findings from Keppel Offshore & Marine Corruption Probe

Mr Murali Pillai asked the Prime Minister regarding CPIB's decision not to prosecute six former employees of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited (KOM) due to evidentiary difficulties (a) whether the statement of facts which KOM agreed to as part of a plea agreement with the United States Department of Justice and the admissions made in the United States proceedings by KOM's former legal counsel who is based in Singapore were considered; and (b) if so, why were these considered as insufficient in overcoming the said difficulties.

Mr Pritam Singh asked the Prime Minister what specific difficulties were faced by the Attorney-General's Chambers and Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in considering whether to prefer charges against the officers of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited (KOM) over corrupt payments from KOM to Petrobas and Sete Brasil in Brazil from 2001 to 2014, despite KOM's admissions under both the Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the US Department of Justice and the Brazilian leniency agreement.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Prime Minister why the statement of facts contained in the Deferred Prosecution Agreement concluded between Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited with the United States Department of Justice dated 22 December 2017 is not considered sufficient, available, and appropriate evidence of the six former senior management staff's culpability for them to be charged with corruption in Singapore.

Ms Hazel Poa asked the Prime Minister what information or evidence can be given to reassure the public that the decision not to prosecute the six former staff of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited involved in the S$73 million bribe payments case has nothing to do with their connections and that this is not an example of cronyism.

Ms Hazel Poa asked the Prime Minister whether other agencies apart from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and Attorney-General's Chambers, have been consulted on the issue of the appropriate action to be taken on former staff of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited who are involved in bribe payments and, if so, what are those views.

Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Prime Minister based on investigations into the Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited corruption case conducted by CPIB (a) what are the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 (PCA) that were considered for prosecution for the six individuals; and (b) what is the maximum penalty for these offences under the PCA.

Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Prime Minister in deciding against prosecuting the six individuals involved in the Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited corruption case (a) what weightage has been given to the various relevant factors such as the culpability of each individual, the available evidence and what is appropriate in the circumstances; and (b) whether this is consistent with the Government’s political commitment and leadership and a culture of zero tolerance against corruption.

Mr Murali Pillai asked the Prime Minister regarding CPIB's investigation of six former employees of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited (KOM) for the bribery of Petroleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobas) officials (a) whether KOM’s parent company then, any officer of the parent company at the material time or any other entity or person was investigated for facilitating the bribery of Petrobas officials under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960; (b) if so, what are the findings from the investigations; and (c) what is the conclusion from these investigations.

Ms Sylvia Lim asked the Prime Minister whether the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau's investigations into the bribery scheme by Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited (KOM) to obtain contracts from Petrobas and Sete Brasil in Brazil from 2001 to 2014 show that, apart from the six persons issued warnings by the Bureau, there were officials higher up the hierarchy of KOM who were aware of, or were wilfully ignorant of, the bribery scheme before or during its lifespan.

Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Prime Minister since 2000, how many (i) warnings (ii) stern warnings and (iii) prosecutions have been initiated by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau.

Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Prime Minister regarding the recent case where the CPIB issued stern warnings to six former employees of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited for bribery offences (a) what is the Government’s response to concerns that the penalty is too light, as some offenders have been jailed for much smaller sums of money; and (b) in view of the multinational nature of the alleged transactions, what measures can be taken to improve the deterrence and prosecution of such cross-boundary corruption.

Mr Leon Perera asked the Prime Minister how will the decision not to prosecute the six individuals who were involved in the Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited corruption case in Brazil likely to affect the reputation of Singapore and Singaporean companies for having a policy of zero tolerance towards corruption.

Mr Leon Perera asked the Prime Minister (a) whether the decision not to prosecute the six individuals who are involved in the Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited corruption case in Brazil represents a departure from the Government's stated stance of zero tolerance towards corruption; and (b) whether the said decision will have an impact on deterring Singaporeans at home or abroad from committing corrupt acts in a manner that makes prosecution similarly difficult.

Ms Hazel Poa asked the Prime Minister (a) whether zero tolerance on corruption remains to be the Government’s position; and (b) if so, whether the decision to issue stern warnings to the six individuals who were formerly senior management staff of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited involved in the bribery case undermines that position and signals a lack of political will to stamp out corruption.

Mr Murali Pillai asked the Prime Minister what is CPIB’s policy in determining the circumstances in which it will investigate foreign bribery cases involving Singapore citizens as provided for in section 37 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960.

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked the Prime Minister in light of the conditional warning in lieu of prosecution against six former senior management staff of Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited over bribe payments, whether the Government will consider amending the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 to expand the powers of the CPIB to facilitate investigations outside of jurisdiction and the available penalties to include compounding offences with profit disgorgement or restitution for appropriate cases.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. My response to these Parliamentary Questions would also effectively address the Parliamentary Questions (PQs) by Members Ms Hazel Poa and Ms He Ting Ru for written answer today; and the PQs by Members Mr Dennis Tan, Mr Gerald Giam, Dr Wan Rizal1 and Ms Poa2 scheduled for subsequent Sittings. The Members may wish to raise any supplementary questions arising therefrom and withdraw the PQs for later Sittings which are answered today.

Mr Speaker, the questions arise from the Public Prosecutor's (PP's), decision to issue stern warnings to six former senior management staff from Keppel Offshore & Marine Limited (KOM), some of whom used to work at KOM's wholly-owned US subsidiary at relevant times.

The questions raised by Members fall into the following broad categories:

(a) why were the six individuals issued with stern warnings instead of being prosecuted;

(b) whether, and if so why, the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) and the accompanying Statement of Facts (SOF) are insufficient to mount a prosecution;

(c) details of the investigations or decision to issue stern warnings;

(d) why the six individuals in question were not named and whether they should be;

(e) statistics on stern warnings and prosecutions;

(f) whether the decision to issue stern warnings, instead of prosecuting, will affect our zero tolerance stance on corruption and reputation;

(g) corruption in foreign jurisdictions; and

(h) sufficiency of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA).

Before I answer these questions, let me deal with a preliminary point. There has been a fair bit of speculation on why the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) did not issue a fuller statement or why the Government is dealing with the matter in Parliament, which is based on a lack of understanding of how these matters are usually dealt with.

First, CPIB had explained the reasons for its decision in its press release. With your leave, Mr Speaker, may I ask the Clerks to distribute copies of the press release to Members?

Members may also access the handout through the SGParl MP mobile app. You would see, at paragraph 5, that CPIB explained: "This case is complex and transnational, involving multiple authorities and witnesses from several countries. There are evidentiary difficulties in cases of such nature. Many of the documents are located in different jurisdictions. In addition, key witnesses are located outside of Singapore and cannot be compelled to give evidence here. The decision whether to prosecute the six individuals for criminal offences has to take into consideration all relevant factors, such as the culpability of each individual, the available evidence and what is appropriate in the circumstances. Having taken these into consideration, stern warnings were issued to the six individuals."

Police and other law enforcement agencies investigate a vast number of cases. When they do not proceed, the standard practice is not to issue any statement.

Where there is public interest in knowing more details, Members may file questions in this House. And the relevant Minister will, after consulting the PP who made the decision independently, answer the questions to the extent permitted in law. That is what is happening here, in this case.

I think Members will agree, in general, when the law enforcement agencies do not proceed to charge someone after completing investigations, it is not expected that the agencies go into details of the decision. But if anyone has questions on the decision, the matter can be raised in Parliament and that is what we are doing now.

Let me deal with questions that I have identified.

First, the reasons for issuing the stern warning rather than prosecution and the sufficiency of DPA and SOF. Decisions on charging are made by the PP. In deciding whether to charge, the PP has to consider whether he has the necessary evidence to prove that those individuals were involved in certain conduct and possessed a certain mental state, to establish the offences. In this case, as CPIB explained in its media release, there are evidentiary difficulties in doing so.

Simply put – there is a lack of sufficient evidence either documentary or through witnesses, which would establish any criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt against a specific individual.

The Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) has made a number of mutual legal assistance requests over five years. To date, the findings from these requests are insufficient for prosecution, as I will elaborate later.

Given this reality, I would like to know if any Member thinks that, nevertheless, even without sufficient evidence, the PP should have proceeded to bring charges against individuals who deny the allegations against them. If so, please let me know and the basis on which you say so.

Does the fact that KOM had entered into DPA make a difference in this matter? And would the DPA be enough to, at least, commence prosecution against the specific individuals in question? The answer is no.

The DPA and related documents were entered into between KOM, the US Department of Justice and the US Attorney's Office. KOM USA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of KOM, also entered into a plea bargain agreement with the US authorities. No individuals were parties to these documents. While the documents make reference to the actions of certain individuals, I have been advised that those references, on their own, are insufficient to establish any offences beyond reasonable doubt, without witnesses testifying in Singapore about the context surrounding those actions and the intention behind them.

In short, the agencies do not have sufficient evidence that would show, beyond reasonable doubt that any of the six individuals were guilty of an offence.

CPIB conducted an in-depth investigation within Singapore, within the scope of its legal powers. However, as I said earlier, the difficulty with this case is that several potentially key witnesses are not in Singapore and CPIB has not been able to secure their cooperation or agreement to testify in Singapore.

With the initial assistance of the Brazilian authorities, CPIB made two fact-finding trips to Brazil in May and August 2019.

AGC and CPIB sent three mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests to Brazil to secure the evidence that was needed. AGC and CPIB also sent an MLA request to another relevant foreign authority to interview other potential material witnesses. The contents and outcome of these MLA requests are confidential, but I can inform the House that they have either not yielded evidence that could be used to secure a conviction before our Courts, or the responses have not been helpful in advancing the case.

There is one foreign witness who gave evidence in other proceedings, which could have been relevant in establishing the offences in Singapore. However, that foreign witness is not willing to voluntarily give evidence in Singapore. Neither AGC nor CPIB can compel him to do so.

Some Members may ask whether any prosecution could be advanced arising out of the fact that a particular individual had entered into a plea bargain in another jurisdiction, in relation to his involvement in the KOM bribery. When this individual was investigated by CPIB on his return to Singapore, he denied knowing that commissions paid to the agent in Brazil were paid out as bribes. He did not, during CPIB's investigations, implicate himself or any others in conspiring to pay bribes. Even if the PP applies to a Singapore Court to admit the plea agreement, the agreement did not identify any specific individuals and was made in the context of a plea bargain and will be given limited weight without further supporting evidence and in the face of potentially conflicting oral testimony.

CPIB has conducted as thorough an investigation as it could with the information and powers that it possessed. However, given the cross-border nature of this case and absence of key witnesses, CPIB's investigations could not overcome the evidential difficulties for the purposes of prosecution in a Singapore Court. As such, stern warnings were issued. If, subsequently, new and compelling facts come to light, it remains open for the PP to re-evaluate the decision in the light of the evolving legal and factual matrix.

Ms Hazel Poa asked whether the decision to issue a stern warning was unanimous in AGC and CPIB, and if other agencies were consulted. Mr Louis Chua asked what offences were being considered.

The decision not to charge is made by the PP in the exercise of his discretion and professional judgement, taking into account all relevant considerations. The PP does not tell us whether everyone in AGC agreed with him or if there were differing views, or which agencies he worked with apart from CPIB. Nor is it our task to ask AGC to list all the agencies which were involved. In the end, what matters is the considered view of AGC, working with CPIB.

In response to Mr Chua, I am advised that relevant potential offences were considered by the PP.

Next, on the naming of individuals, Mr Dennis Tan and Mr Gerald Giam asked about the identities or details of the six individuals. Mr Murali Pillai and Ms Sylvia Lim asked whether other entities or persons were involved.

As a matter of policy, CPIB does not disclose the names of individuals unless they are charged in court. This policy is not unique to the CPIB; law enforcement agencies in the US, UK and New Zealand have a similar approach. The principle underlying this policy is to avoid prejudicing that individual's right to due process and also avoid any presumption of guilt in the absence of any formal findings.

If Members feel that hereafter, this practice should be changed and that law enforcement agencies should name all individuals who were investigated, even if in the end no charges are brought, then please say so. That would be a major change of policy. But please note, if Members want to change, then it cannot be only for this case. It must be for all future cases. That is something to think carefully about. Members will recall that about two years ago, a question was in fact raised in this House, asking about the protections available for those whose reputations are affected by media coverage of ongoing trials of certain offences and how such reports are regulated.

Dr Tan Wu Meng sought statistics on prosecutions and stern warnings, and Ms Poa asked if warnings were issued in other corruption cases. From 2017 to 2021, CPIB has issued an average of 138 warnings annually and 139 individuals were prosecuted. Stern warnings are not unusual, being used in cases where there are evidential difficulties or little public interest to prosecute.

Questions have been asked on the impact of Singapore's zero tolerance policy on corruption and reputation. There is no change in Singapore's zero tolerance policy on corruption. I have explained the reasons why no criminal proceedings have been brought in this matter. In having regard to the rules of evidence, CPIB and AGC are observing the basic rules for a fair and just criminal justice system. What can be inferred from this is that while Singapore has zero tolerance on corruption, it also strongly adheres to the rule of law.

Mr Murali Pillai asked in what circumstances CPIB will investigate foreign bribery cases involving Singapore Citizens or companies under section 37 of the PCA. CPIB will investigate all cases whether they happened locally or overseas, as long as the alleged offences fall under the ambit of the PCA and the information is credible and can be pursued. CPIB will investigate and submit its findings and recommendations to the PP, who will then decide if there is sufficient evidence to prosecute.

On Ms He Ting Ru and Ms Hazel Poa's questions regarding Singapore companies being convicted of corruption abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not have such records and CPIB's records do not go as far back as 1965. More recently, in 2015, a Singapore company, Glenn Defense Marine Asia Pte Ltd (GDMA), pleaded guilty in the USA to bribery-related offences. GDMA was not prosecuted in Singapore as key evidence against the company was not available here and GDMA had been dealt with in the USA. However, Gursharan Kaur Sharon Rachael, the Singaporean employee of the US Navy, was prosecuted here as evidence of her corrupt conduct was available to CPIB and she pleaded guilty to those offences.

Mr Zhulkarnain asked if we will amend the PCA to expand the powers of the CPIB to facilitate investigations outside jurisdiction. CPIB's powers under the PCA allow it to investigate offences committed by Singaporeans abroad but the investigations have to be conducted in Singapore. CPIB cannot conduct investigations abroad. And regardless of what our law says, it is not possible for our agencies to exercise police powers in another country. That would not be allowed or tolerated by any other country, just like we would never allow a foreign investigative agency to exercise police powers in Singapore.

Think of it this way – do you think Singaporeans will or should accept that a regional police force can come into Singapore and interrogate Singaporeans?

Hence, when evidence resides outside Singapore, our agencies are dependent on international cooperation and foreign authorities to facilitate their investigations and secure the relevant evidence. This Parliament cannot legislate to empower CPIB to conduct investigations in foreign jurisdictions because that would run afoul of territorial sovereignty.

Therefore, Members need to be realistic about what we can and cannot do. Singapore companies who operate overseas do so in myriad environments, where all kinds of business practices prevail. We cannot police all of them. However, what we can and should do is to insulate our companies and our system against corruption. Our companies must find a way to do business cleanly, wherever they do business and people must know that is how we operate.

In conclusion, the PP decided not to prosecute the six individuals because the evidence available in Singapore does not provide sufficient evidential basis to prosecute, bearing in mind the Prosecution's burden is to establish the ingredients of each offence beyond reasonable doubt. The CPIB has done its best, including working with international partners to uncover such evidence.

CPIB and AGC have undertaken a careful and thorough review of the documents, including the DPAs and plea bargains and the PP has advised that those are insufficient to meet the burden of proof. But if subsequently new and compelling evidence comes up, the PP can and will re-evaluate the decision. The PP's decision to issue stern warnings should be understood in that context.

Mr Speaker, Singapore's success arises in no small part because of its policy in upholding the rule of law and adopting a zero tolerance policy to corruption. Both are necessary factors and our zero tolerance policy must be upheld in a manner that complies with the rule of law. The PP has acknowledged this and this is exactly what the PP has done on the facts – to uphold the rule of law.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have two questions for the Minister. I refer to the Minister's extended reply in January 2018, shortly after news of the deferred prosecution agreement came to light and the Workers' Party Members of Parliament filed a series of questions in Parliament and the Minister replied to those.

Arising out of that Sitting, I had a supplementary question about the knowledge of the Keppel Board of Directors. The Minister replied to say that the current Board of the Directors of Keppel Corporation and its unit, KOM, "were not aware of the legal payments made to secure projects in Brazil." Can I confirm if investigations included determining the constructive knowledge of Keppel Board of Directors at the material time that corrupt payments were made to secure contracts in Brazil? That is the first question. I can repeat the question. I would like to confirm if Police and CPIB investigations included determining the constructive knowledge of Keppel Board of Directors at the material time? That means, not the current board that the Minister referred to in 2018, but at the material time when corrupt payments were made to secure contracts in Brazil. That is the first question.

The second supplementary question pertains to Member of Parliament for Hougang, Mr Dennis Tan, who had filed three separate PQs seeking an update on the Keppel case in 2018, 2019 and 2022. In the final reply, the Government said that it had requested for further mutual legal assistance from foreign authorities to obtain additional information from the witnesses and the Government was still awaiting a response.

All in all, how many mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests were made by the Government to various governments? And was the nature of the information sought, such that it would suggest a successful prosecution would have been possible? Because from some of these earlier replies, it would appear that a witness testimony was forthcoming but that further clarifications were required. So, was it a case that there were repeated MLAs that could have helped? Or was it a case that the Government concluded this is not going anywhere?

With respect to the last question on whether a successful prosecution could have been mounted depending on the nature of the information, the short answer is: you do not know until you actually get the information. How would you know what that person would say? So, the short outcome of the request for mutual legal assistance is, as I explained in my earlier answer, that they either have not yielded evidence that could be used to secure conviction before the Courts or the responses have not been helpful in advancing the case.

I do not know all the details of the MLA, but I do know that the latest ones, there have been no response.

So, I mean, if the Member is asking what could have been done, the answer is, we do not know because they made the request and they have not been able to get the evidence that is needed.

Then, with respect to the first question about whether CPIB had investigated the constructive knowledge at the material time of the Board, can I just seek to understand: is the Leader of the Opposition indicating or suggesting that constructive knowledge is an offence under the PCA?

I thank the Leader of the Opposition for his clarification. I cannot answer for Keppel. In the answer that I had given previously, I had directed the Members to the Keppel press release which talked about the then current Board.

But coming back to Mr Singh's question, that is why I asked him whether he is suggesting that constructive knowledge is an offence. Because CPIB only investigates offences. Therefore, if the question is whether the investigation included determining if there was constructive knowledge, the answer is: if constructive knowledge is not an offence then there is no reason for CPIB to be investigating this. CPIB investigates offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and that is what they have done. And in this case, unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence for them to mount a prosecution.

Earlier on in my answer, I had said that AGC has sent three mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests to Brazil to secure evidence that was needed. And AGC and CPIB also sent an MLA request to another relevant foreign authority to interview other potential material witnesses. So, I think what we have from my previous answer is three to Brazil and one other, since I said, "sent an MLA request to another foreign authority". And, as I explained earlier, they have not yielded the evidence that could be used to secure a conviction or the responses have not been helpful. And I do understand that, at least, for one or two of them, the latest ones, there have been no response.

Because you would recall earlier, when PQs were asked, or I think, in Committee of Supply (COS), I had said they were pending responses – if you recall. There has been no further response since then.

The other question that the Leader of the Opposition asked, the thrust of his question on the Board of Directors, was whether or not there was anything in the investigations with Keppel that could lead to more evidence with respect to the individuals. This much I can say – whatever CPIB has been able to do or to uncover or to ask in its investigations in Singapore with respect to Keppel, it has done. But the problem is not so much what they had been doing the investigations here. The problem is that key material witnesses are not available. And that is the problem. That is the hurdle that they have not been able to overcome. And that is why charges have not been proffered.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister for her detailed answer. I have Clementi residents, some who worked for Keppel in the early days of Singapore's developments, and they and their families are saddened and distressed to hear about what happened with Keppel Offshore & Marine.

Can I raise two supplementary questions?

Firstly, Mr Speaker, can I refer to what the Prime Minister said on 18 September 2012 on the 60th anniversary of CPIB. The Prime Minister said, and I quote, "We will never tolerate corruption. We will not accept any slackening or lowering of standards. Anyone who breaks the rules will be caught and punished."

In conjunction with this, can I confirm with the Minister that every effort will continue to be made internationally through MLAs as needed, working with other overseas authorities, to obtain additional facts as needed that may be required to bring persons responsible to justice as far as it is possible within Singapore's laws and legal ambit?

Secondly, can I also highlight the speech by the current Attorney-General (AG) at the Singapore Law Review Lecture 2017 on "prosecution in the public interest". In particular, the current AG said, and I quote, "If we are convinced that a serious offence has been committed, we will not hesitate to act, simply because securing a conviction may be an uphill task."

Can I ask the Minister if we are aware of the assessment by the AG and the Public Prosecutor – the Minister said it did not reach the threshold for beyond reasonable doubt – was it assessed that the prosecution would be an uphill task in and of itself or outright impossible given the available facts?

I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. Let me start first with his reference to the speech by the Attorney-General (AG). In that speech, in the same speech, the AG actually said this. He said – he was describing the kind of internal process that the AGC goes through – and he said, "At the end of this internal Inquiry, we make an assessment of whether we are likely to have a reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction. Only when we are convinced that the evidence and the law disclose a criminal offence do we even begin to consider whether prosecutorial discretion should be exercised. It would be a subversion of the rule of law and a waste of valuable public resources for us to pursue prosecution in the absence of a reasonable prospect of conviction. In fact, many of the files that were considered in my Chambers are closed at the first stage of assessment because the facts of the law do not disclose any criminal offence that can be proved in a Court of Law."

And the background of that speech was that the AG was actually talking about the context of offences against minors, where it is particularly difficult to get evidence. That was the overall context he was talking about.

So, the question is not whether or not it was a choice between an uphill task – in other words, do not do it just because it is a bit difficult or – the other, that it is outright impossible. The correct test is what the AG has described – it is that there must be a reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction. Because there must be a certain threshold. Otherwise, if you just go around filing charges with insufficient basis, that will not make for a strong justice system. And that is the threshold that AGC feels that it is not able to get over, in this particular case.

Thank you, Speaker. I have two clarifications for the Minister. Earlier, in her answer, she stressed on the fact that CPIB and AGC's assessment were that there was unavailable evidence, unavailable witnesses in jurisdiction. But I think she will appreciate that under our law, confessions actually are a useful piece of evidence on which prosecutions can be mounted. So, I would like to ask Minister, first, did CPIB interview all the six persons who were warned personally in Singapore? And secondly, in relation to this, was CPIB not able to obtain any incriminating statement from these six persons? That is the first clarification.

The second clarification is, in her answer, she also referred to a foreign witness whom she mentioned could have provided useful evidence in Court. May I ask her to confirm that she is referring to the former Head of Legal of KOM? And if that is so, is she saying that whatever he told the US court, in terms of the fact that he drafted agreements to facilitate the bribery scheme in conjunction with approval from his seniors, whoever they are, he is repudiating all that now in front of CPIB?

In response to Ms Sylvia Lim's first question as to whether CPIB has been able to obtain admissions or confessions for those six persons, my understanding is that CPIB has not had any admissions or confessions from the six persons.

The second one, when she asked about the foreign witness, I will refer back to my earlier answer where I actually said two things. I said there is one foreign witness who gave evidence in other proceedings which could have been relevant to establishing offences in Singapore, but that foreign witness is not willing to voluntarily give evidence in Singapore. That is number one.

Number two: she said that some Members may ask whether prosecution could be advanced arising out of the fact that a particular individual had entered into a plea bargain in another jurisdiction – so, that is a separate individual – in relation to his involvement in the KOM bribery. And when this individual was investigated by CPIB on his return to Singapore, he denied knowing that commissions paid to the agent in Brazil were paid out as bribes. And he did not, during CPIB's investigations here, implicate himself or others in conspiring to paid bribes.

So, the question is, has he said something different here? I think the answer is yes. But I will not go into details. Firstly, I do not have details of what exactly was said. What I do know, and I am able to say based on what has been informed to me, is that in this particular case, what was said in the US and what has been told to CPIB, there are differences.

Mr Speaker, Sir, two supplementary questions.

But first, a point of clarification. The hon Minister referred to my PQ and said I asked what was the policy of CPIB, in relation to dealing with foreign bribery vis-à-vis citizens of Singapore and companies. I just want to clarify that my PQ was only in relation to citizens of Singapore – and that is because section 37 of PCA excludes companies.

My first supplementary question is whether it may be an opportune time to review section 37 to include legal persons, such as companies, to give better bite to the rationale behind section 37 – dealing with foreign bribery?

The second supplementary question concerns the office of the Attorney-General. Here, it is clear that the Attorney-General, in his discretion, made the decision not to proceed with prosecution. Given that he occupies a high constitutional office, the importance of trust between the Attorney-General's Office and the people of Singapore cannot be overstated. For the Judiciary, they can explain their decisions through judgments. I wonder whether structurally anything can be done to allow the Attorney-General to explain his decisions in certain cases, such that the trust between the people and the Attorney-General is always maintained.

I thank Mr Murali for his questions.

With respect to review of the PCA, our general assessment is that the PCA does have sufficient powers. But if there is anything that can be usefully reviewed, anything that we feel can be enhanced or improved, we are always open to suggestions.

On the second, on the Office of the Attorney-General, it is an office which carries a heavy responsibility. In discharging that responsibility, the Attorney-General has to be quite careful of what he says or does not say in public, particularly with respect to decisions because you do not know whether further down along the line, a certain further action may have to be taken. So, what I have said earlier is that, in this case, they have put out as much as they thought would be appropriate to do so. But you really do not want a system where, every single case, the investigations are discussed in detail and where it then becomes an exercise of the public determining guilt or innocence in the absence of proper due process.

The first is whether or not the six executives involved, authorised the payment of the bribes? And second, are they aware of the payment of the bribes? And if they are, what did they do with the information?

The short answer is, I do not know. I do not know because I did not conduct the investigations. And what I do understand from the investigations is that CPIB says that the six have not made any admissions.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, I just have one supplementary question. Has the Government ever been aware of Singaporeans paying bribes to foreign officials but decided not to take them to task on the basis that bribery is sometimes seen as necessary to win contracts in countries where corruption is rife and that winning these contracts benefit Singaporean companies and Singaporean employees?

I think I can say this much in response to that question – which is that if it comes to the attention of our authorities that an act of bribery or an offence has occurred, it will be investigated. And if there is sufficient evidence to pursue that and to bring it to Court, then they will do so.

If the suggestion is that we are somehow condoning bribery overseas, the answer is no.

In fact, I would direct the Member to the answer that I gave earlier on – and it bears repeating – where I said that Members need to be realistic about what we can and cannot do. Singapore companies that operate overseas do so in myriad environments, where all kinds of business practices prevail. We cannot police all of them. However, what we can do and we should do is insulate our companies and our system against corruption. Our companies must find a way to do business cleanly wherever they do business and people must know that is how we operate.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. Sir, in the 2022 Transparency International report “Exporting Corruption Abroad”, Singapore is actually ranked in lowest category with little or no law enforcement against acts of corruption committed abroad. There are 20 countries in that category; there are 27 countries who are doing a bit better in categories 3, 2 and 1.

My question here is what are the plans of the Government to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement so that cases like these in future are less likely to slip through the cracks? So far, in all the replies given by the Minister, I have not heard any concrete plan to improve the extent of law enforcement against acts committed abroad, not domestically. I think, domestically, we are doing well, in terms of the Transparency International reporting. But what are we going to do differently and do better in terms of enforcing the law aboard?

My second supplementary question is, we have talked about the insufficiency of evidence to mount charges. What then is the basis on which the stern warnings were issued?

With respect to the first question on what can be done with respect to acts committed abroad, the first thing to remember is that the Singapore Government does not run these private companies that operate abroad. This is a matter for the companies own corporate governance. But as a Government, what we do is that we make sure our laws are directed at ensuring that you have good corporate governance; we also encourage programmes which require good corporate governance; we have a very strong stance on anti-corruption; all the signals that we send as a Government is to tell our companies, "Please – do business properly".

It is incumbent upon those companies – not the Government – to ensure that their staff, their practices are clean and above board, and in accordance with proper governance.

On the second question, I am not sure I got that. Can you repeat the second question?

The answer to that is, a stern warning is given when you feel that you cannot say that you give a complete clean bill of health. But at the same time, you do not have enough to clear that evidentiary huddle. So, what are the choices?

The choices are: do nothing at all or bring charges when you know you do not have sufficient evidence; or is there something in between? The stern warning device is the something in between. It signals; it is an expression of AGC's position that: "We do not think that you are completely off the hook, but we do not have enough to charge you; and I want you to know this. I am putting down a marker, a marker that there is something not entirely right. But this is the only device available to the AGC." So, that is what it does.

It would be a very different thing, for example, if AGC had just thrown up its hands and said, "Okay, close investigation; do not do anything." That, too, would not have been the correct thing to do.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I appreciate the Minister's response that it is impossible to entirely govern the way that private companies may conduct their businesses abroad. But by the same token, perhaps, part of the concern here is that Keppel is a government-linked corporation (GLC). I wonder if there are any general stipulations or guidelines that the Government does provide to government-linked companies about the appropriate conduct of their businesses abroad, above and beyond just saying that it is up to their own individual corporate governance.

I will give the reference in a minute. On the facts of this particular case for Keppel, as part of the DPA, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim may not recall this, but Members who were present in 2018, when I responded to this in Parliament, will recall.

Under the DPA, one of the requirements or the conditions for the Deferred Prosecution, was that Keppel would have to continue to implement compliance and ethics programmes designed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws. And they also undertook to review their internal accounting controls, policies and procedures regarding compliance with the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws. They also agreed to modify their compliance programme, including internal controls, compliance policies and procedures.

So, in this particular case, conditions were imposed; and it is my understanding that they have indeed been carried out because the DPA has been successfully concluded.

At that time, if I recall correctly, Temasek, as well as Keppel, also stated that they carry out programmes which are designed to make their staff and their companies aware of the need for good corporate governance; and that they had education programmes. I think the same would be true of all other multinational corporations (MNCs). They understand the need for this. I would agree with Assoc Prof Jamus Lim that it is very important because directors, boards, offices of companies especially large ones and especially those operating in other jurisdictions do need to be aware of the need of proper governance, anti-corruption and good controls.