Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Sir, Singapore is one of the most land-scarce cities in the world. Within our small island, we must accommodate housing, industry, commerce, transport, defence, green spaces, water catchment and more – all of the infrastructure necessary for a modern city-state.

Singapore's land constraints shape our approach towards the use of land and property in a very fundamental way. Land in Singapore is a scarce and finite national resource. It is therefore critical that we facilitate the renewal and rejuvenation of our urban environment so that our tight land resources can accommodate the evolving needs of Singaporeans.

Buildings, like all physical things, they age. And as they age, the maintenance and upkeep become increasingly pressing: in the early years of a development, maintenance is more manageable and costs, perhaps, more predictable. But over time, major components reach the end of their service lives; repair bills grow larger and more frequent; and the fabric of the building – its structure, its systems, its common areas – will require even greater investment, simply to remain functional and liveable.

There comes a point, in the life of any ageing development where the question is: whether it is feasible or sustainable to continue investing in major renovations and upkeep; or whether the land can be put to better use through renewal and redevelopment. Sir, that is the question at the heart of this Bill.

As many examples from around the world show, older developments that cannot be renewed do not simply stay as they are. Unless effort is put in to properly maintain such developments, they are likely to enter a gradual cycle of decline. Practically, maintenance becomes harder to fund and harder to agree upon collectively. The physical environment deteriorates and this impacts quality of life for both the residents as well as occupants.

The vibrancy of the surrounding area declines. Owners often find themselves stuck, unable to maintain their properties adequately, but also unable to move forward with renewal. That is not a good outcome for residents and it is also not a good outcome for Singapore.

This Bill builds upon previous efforts to ensure that our framework for urban renewal remains fit for purpose – to cater for ageing developments a viable pathway forward where there is support amongst owners for redevelopment and allow for Singapore's urban landscape to continue to renew itself in an orderly and sustainable fashion.

It is with these objectives in mind that the collective sale regime under the Land Titles (Strata) Act was introduced some 27 years ago.

Sir, property rights are a very important fundamental right. But in a strata development, ownership is not only about the individual strata title owner. As explained in this House when the Bill was moved in 1998 to introduce the collective sale regime for the first time, and let me quote: "Strata developments, unlike landed developments, are founded on the concept of community living, shared ownership of common property in designated values and individual ownership of strata title which is essentially air space. All these distinguishing features of strata developments support the new approach based on majority consent for en bloc sales."

When you own a unit in a condominium, you own your unit, but you are also a co-owner of the common property, together with every other unit owner. Responsibility for the upkeep and for the maintenance of the common property, the shared infrastructure, rests not with any one owner, but with all owners, collectively. This collective character of strata ownership means that the rights of individual owners, whilst real and important, cannot be viewed entirely in isolation. These rights exist within a framework of shared ownership, shared responsibility and shared decision-making, and must be balanced against the collective interest.

When a significant majority of owners in a development reach a view about the future of that development, including to pursue collective sale, that majority view carries legitimate weight.

Prior to 1999, however, the law did not reflect this. A collective sale could only proceed with the unanimous agreement of all owners. Every single owner had to consent. A single holdout – for whatever reason, whether principled or otherwise – could thwart the wishes of all the other owners and prevent the sale from proceeding with entirely.

This held back the much-needed rejuvenation and renewal of many developments. Buildings could not take advantage of enhanced plot ratios to realise their full development potential. Older developments that could have been rejuvenated through the collective sale process were unable to do so. And there was uncertainty, delay and in some cases, acrimony, whilst the property aged.

The Government had received many appeals from frustrated owners whose desires to sell en bloc had been thwarted.

The law was therefore changed. In 1999, Parliament amended the Land Titles (Strata) Act to allow collective sales if: 80% consent was obtained for developments aged 10 years or more, and 90% for those less than 10 years old.

This was a significant policy choice. It recognised that in a strata development, the rights of the collective must be weighed against the rights of the individual.

The Select Committee that examined the Bill in 1998 before it was passed made an observation that is directly relevant to what we are doing today. It noted that the consent threshold should be pegged to the age of the development, because older developments are more likely to be sub-optimally utilised, have a higher repair bill and are more likely to have more unit owners in favour of en bloc sales. That principle – that age matters, and that the framework should reflect it – has been embedded in the regime from the very beginning.

In land-scarce Singapore, the 1999 amendments were, as explained to this House, "even more imperative" than they might have been elsewhere in the world. Removing the unanimity requirement would make available more prime land for higher-intensity development and that rationale has not diminished. If anything, today, that has grown stronger.

The regime has, over the past 27 years, delivered real and tangible benefits for owners, for the urban landscape and for Singapore. Collective sales have enabled the renewal of ageing developments and the creation of new homes in established, well-connected locations. They have refreshed neighbourhoods and also improved liveability.

They have allowed Singapore's limited land resources to keep pace with a growing economy and the housing needs of successive generations. Some notable examples include the Golden Mile Complex, which I am sure Members would be familiar with. It was sold collectively in 2022. It is being conserved and adaptively reused, preserving an architecturally significant building, whilst at the same time, unlocking its development potential and delivering new homes in the heart of the city.

Another example is Gillman Heights, a former Housing and Urban Development Company (HUDC) estate with 607 homes. Sold collectively in 2007, the site was renewed and intensified, giving rise to The Interlace, a modern, architecturally iconic development with 1,040 new homes.

These two are examples where owners were able to unlock the value and potential of their older developments, intensify them, and that has also facilitated the renewal of our urban landscape.

When the regime was introduced in 1999, Singapore's stock of private strata developments were, on the whole, still relatively young. The oldest then were, on average, about two to three decades old. The picture today, however, is different, and it will be increasingly so. Approximately one in 20 non-landed private residential units are now aged 40 years or older, and that is around 20,000 dwelling units in close to 250 developments. That is the number today.

This number will only grow due to the developments that took place during Singapore's rapid urbanisation in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Over time, more owners will have to deal with the question of whether it remains feasible or sustainable to invest in the maintenance and upkeep of their property.

To understand why, it is useful to know what ageing means for a reinforced concrete building, which is typical of most high-rise residential developments in Singapore.

Buildings do not have expiry dates. A well-maintained reinforced concrete building can continue to stand and function relatively safely beyond any age. What changes over time is the nature and the cost of what is required to keep that building in good condition.

Whilst ageing is more of a gradual process than a cliff edge, professional engineering and structural design standards, including Singapore's own, recognise that beyond a certain point, a building begins to require more than just routine maintenance. Cracking and spalling of concrete become more frequent. Structural repairs become more extensive. The building continues to stand, but the cost and the complexity of keeping it in genuinely good condition will rise significantly, and the returns on continued investments just to upkeep and maintain it, will begin to diminish.

It is this trajectory of rising cost and diminishing returns that frames the challenges that this Bill seeks to address.

Major building components also have their own lifecycle costs that compound this picture. Take lifts as an example.

The Building and Construction Authority's (BCA's) guidelines on lift modernisation recommends building owners to start assessing their lifts' condition and planning for modernisation programmes around the 15th year of operation, so that upgrading needs can be anticipated and budgeted for in advance.

The estimated cost of modernising a single lift starts from $120,000. Full replacement costs lie somewhere between $200,000 and $300,000 per lift. For a development with multiple lift shafts, that is a significant capital outlay – and it is one that recurs, because even a modernised lift has a finite service life.

And lifts, as Members know, are just one component of many. Repainting works can cost several millions in larger developments. The cost of mandatory façade inspections, spalling concrete repairs, waterproofing and structural inspections will all need to be factored in as well.

As a development ages, the demands of all these works on the sinking fund and the management corporation grows larger and more frequent. To fund this, it is only logical for maintenance fees and sinking fund contributions to be raised significantly as developments age – in some cases by as much as 50%.

For the owners, this represents a real and growing burden. At some stage, continued investment in upkeep yields diminishing returns and owners who wish to pursue renewal may nonetheless find themselves unable to do so under the existing framework.

When we do a horizon scan internationally, we see that Singapore is not alone in grappling with this challenge. Hong Kong, Japan, many states in Australia, have similar legislative frameworks that deal with the issue of ageing multi-owner developments that cannot be renewed.

Hong Kong is an example of a land-scarce city which faces a similar challenge as we do. Their equivalent of the collective sale regime is the compulsory sale regime for redevelopment – the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance – that, like Singapore's collective sale regime, came into effect in 1999.

Whilst there are, of course, broad differences between Singapore's framework and Hong Kong's, broadly speaking, Hong Kong's framework originally required an applicant to have assembled no less than 90% of all undivided shares for all classes of lots, before making a compulsory sale application.

Hong Kong first lowered its thresholds in 2010 for certain specified classes of lots, including lots where each building was issued with an occupation permit of at least 50 years. The thresholds were more recently further lowered in 2024, under a new framework that takes into account both age as well as, in their case, geographic location, with buildings aged 50 to 59 years within certain designated areas requiring 70%, and buildings aged 60 years or more within certain designated areas requiring 65%. So, broadly a framework that is not dissimilar to what we have proposed in this Bill.

Like Singapore, Hong Kong is a densely populated and land-scarce jurisdiction. They have had to grapple seriously with the renewal of old developments. And they have found that their framework needed to be recalibrated as their building stock ages.

There have been similar shifts in other jurisdictions, where in those cases, land might not be as scarce as in Singapore.

In Australia, both New South Wales as well as Queensland have also updated their legislation in recent years, to provide new pathways for collective sale, redevelopment or termination of multi-owner developments without requiring unanimity. And Japan has also recently revised legislation to relax the rules for collective sale or rebuilding of condominium buildings.

These are jurisdictions that do not face the same land constraints as we do, at least not as acutely as we do in Singapore. But they too have found it necessary to introduce lower thresholds, to expand pathways, to deal with the issue of renewal.

Sir, it was against this backdrop of both ageing stock as well as the increasingly rising maintenance costs that we undertook a very careful review and also extensive consultation. Over the years, there have been quite extensive feedback that we have received from individual property owners on their experiences as well as giving their suggestions on the collective sale regime.

Since 2023, we have also actively engaged a broad range of other stakeholders to better understand the issues with the current framework and what possible enhancements might look like. Two clear threads emerged from the views shared with us.

The first was a call to update the consent thresholds to facilitate the renewal of older developments. Let me just read to you, verbatim, feedback from an owner which I think sums up the issue quite succinctly: "while the existing two-tiered consent thresholds were novel, innovative and necessary in 1999, conditions have changed since then. It cannot be right that a 10-year-old development and a 44-year-old development continue to face the same threshold."

The second thread which emerged from these consultations came from owners in developments who worry about being subjected to repeated and protracted collective sale attempts that disrupt the harmony of community that is in the condominium and create prolonged uncertainty.

Sir, the Bill therefore proposes amendments in two broad areas: first, supporting the renewal of ageing developments; and second, strengthening safeguards for non-consenting owners. Let me take Members through each bucket of changes in turn.

To support renewal, we propose to recalibrate the consent thresholds for collective sales in older developments. The Bill introduces two new tiers: for developments aged 40 to 59 years, a new threshold of 70%; for developments aged 60 years and older, a new threshold of 65%. The existing 90% and 80% consent thresholds that you see today in the legislation will continue to apply to newer developments, those below 10 years old and those from 10 to 39 years old, respectively.

In summary, Sir, we are not adjusting the consent thresholds for these newer developments. We are introducing two additional tiers to facilitate the renewal of older developments. The rationale behind the age bands is quite straightforward. As I have explained, the older a development, the more acute its maintenance challenges are likely to be and the stronger the case for enabling renewal. This is consistent with the principle that Parliament endorsed in 1999, that the consent threshold should reflect the age and the circumstances of the development.

At the same time, we have been careful to ensure that even for the oldest developments, those aged 60 years and above, a significant majority is still required before any sale can proceed. Collective sale remains a majority choice and the framework respects the owners who choose not to sell.

The second set of amendments, therefore, deal with strengthening of safeguards for non-consenting owners. For a non-consenting owner, a collective sale exercise is not an abstract legal process. It is a period of real uncertainty, unfolding in the place where they call home.

The existing regime already contains procedural and substantive protections for non-consenting owners, including the requirement for a sale to be approved by a Strata Titles Board (STB) or the General Division of the High Court, which must be satisfied that the transaction is in good faith, taking into account factors like the method of apportionment of sale proceeds.

In addition, a sale cannot proceed if an objector will suffer financial loss, or if the proceeds of sale to be received by any objector are insufficient to redeem any mortgage or charge in respect of his or her unit. These are protections which currently exist in our legislation today and they remain fully in place. Our proposed amendments build on this foundation.

We will introduce three additional safeguards that directly address the concerns we heard during the consultations, about the ease with which collective sale attempts can be initiated, the duration of the process and the potential for repeated attempts in developments for which there is really no genuine majority support.

First, we are raising the threshold to initiate a collective sale attempt. Currently, a requisition to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting for the formation of a Collective Sale Committee (CSC) must be signed by 20% of owners by share value, or 25% of owners by number of units. The Bill raises this to 35% of owners by share value or number of units. This ensures that collective sale exercises are only initiated where there is serious intent and support, reducing the risk of owners being subjected to a prolonged and disruptive process that is not likely to succeed.

Second, we are reducing the time period that CSCs have to obtain signatures to the Collective Sale Agreement (CSA), from 12 months to six months. The duration of the signature collection window is not simply about how long proponents have to collect signatures. It is also about how long owners should be expected to live with uncertainty.

This is a period where owners can be subject to significant pressure, either from fellow owners; or sometimes, from professionals appointed in the collective sale, to sign the CSA. Non-consenting owners who have made their position clear sometimes find themselves subject to persistent lobbying throughout this entire period.  And I am sure some of my colleagues in this House would have read reports or have had personal experiences in your own constituencies of such instances over the years. Shortening the window will help to mitigate this.

Based on feedback received as well as the data that we have collected from recent successful collective sale exercises, we have assessed that six months is a reasonable period for owners to consider and decide on whether to sign and this includes in the case of larger developments as well. A shorter signing window will provide greater certainty to all owners, who will know sooner whether there is sufficient support for the sale. It also reduces the gap between the start of signature collection and the launch of the development for collective sale, which, in turn, then reduces the likelihood of market fluctuations after owners have started committing to the CSA.

Third, we are extending the restriction period after a failed collective sale attempt from two years to three years. Where support is insufficient, owners should not be subjected to repeated attempts for a collective sale soon after. During the three-year restriction period, any attempt to convene a general meeting to form a new CSC will be subject to heightened requisition thresholds.

As with the current legislation, the first attempt during the restriction period will continue to require support from at least 50% of owners by share value or number of units. For any second or subsequent attempt, the requisition threshold will be aligned to the applicable overall consent threshold based on the age of the development. So, in this case, 70% for developments aged 40 to 59 years old, and 65% for developments aged 60 years and above.

The new restriction period of three years, therefore, gives owners a longer window of certainty whilst preserving a route forward if sufficient support genuinely subsequently emerges. The intention is that owners should honour not just the letter of these requirements, but also the spirit.

The STB can invalidate a collective sale application if it is satisfied that there has been non-compliance with the requirements in the Land Titles (Strata) Act that prejudices the interest of any person. This can include conduct that approximates what a collective sale process would involve, such as setting up a pro-tem committee or by any other name, a committee equivalent to a CSC, or doing something similar to a CSC, without obtaining the requisite thresholds prescribed in legislation.

Finally, the Bill also raises the limit on Court-ordered increases to the sale proceeds paid to objectors, from 0.25% to 0.5% of the sale proceeds for each unit, or $2,000 for each unit, whichever is higher.

Sir, this provision was first introduced in 2007 as a protection for objectors. It applies where objectors' circumstances are such that the General Division of the High Court is satisfied that it would be just and equitable to order an increase in the proceeds of sale to be received by the objectors. Raising this limit provides greater protection to non-consenting owners in such cases, for example, an objector who had invested significantly in renovation works just prior to the collective sale exercise.

Sir, the two sets of amendments that I have just outlined form an integrated package that facilitates the renewal of older developments, whilst at the same time, providing greater certainty and also stronger protections for non-consenting owners.

The lower consent thresholds make broad-based renewal more accessible for genuinely ageing developments where there is support amongst the owners. At the same time, the higher initiation threshold, shorter signature window and extended restriction period ensure that the framework cannot be used to mount repeated, disruptive attempts in developments for which there is really insufficient majority support. These two sets of measures are meant to be taken together, as a whole, for balance.

The amendments also build on the existing substantive protections in the regime – the good faith requirements, the financial loss safeguards, the oversight of the STB as well as the General Division of the High Court, all of which remain fully intact. What this Bill does is add on to the existing framework.

Sir, in addition to the two broad areas of change, this Bill also makes amendments to expand the collective sale regime for non-strata-titled private residential developments. Specifically, the new section 84FC will allow collective sales when the consent thresholds based on the age of the development are met for private wholly residential non-strata-titled developments, where flat owners hold a leasehold tenure of less than 850 years in their units, but do not own the underlying land.

Today, such developments are not covered by the collective sale regime. A collective sale is only possible in these cases if there is unanimous agreement among flat and landowners, the pre-1999 scenario that I talked about for strata-titled developments.

The new provision changes this. The collective sale can now proceed based on the revised consent thresholds, subject to safeguards to protect the landowner's interests. The provision is framed generally and will apply to any development that satisfies the statutory criteria.

Based on our scan, only a small number of developments will come under the new section 84FC. Specifically, five developments where the land is owned by the Minister for Finance, as incorporated under the Minister for Finance (Incorporation) Act 1959 (or MOF (Inc)). These were developments that were sold as public sector staff benefits many decades ago or owned by Government for security reasons. These five are: Neptune Court, Townhouse Apartments, Orchard Court, One Tree Hill Mansions and Paterson Court. They are all older developments, above 40 years old. MOF (Inc) is prepared to divest its interest in these developments at fair market value.

At this point, Sir, I would like to declare that Neptune Court falls within my own constituency at Joo Chiat and I have been engaging with residents there over a period of time, including on the subject of a collective sale, and have also reflected their views and suggestions to the Government.

What the Bill does is to ensure that owners, such as owners in Neptune Court, along with the others, like owners in any other private development, have access to a fair and workable process, with proper protections on all sides. But what it does not do is to pre-determine the outcome. That still remains a choice and a decision for the owners themselves to make.

I should also note that the pool of developments covered by section 84FC is limited and should diminish over time if any of these developments are redeveloped, either in a manner which has been outlined or in some other way. Developments on land owned by Housing and Development Board (HDB) are excluded from section 84FC. The rejuvenation of developments on HDB land is undertaken through frameworks which consider broader public housing policies and considerations.

Finally, Sir, let me briefly touch on the transitional arrangements to deal with developments which are in the midst of collective sale exercises.

Owners who have already signed a CSA should not find that the rules have changed midstream. Hence, the transitional arrangements provide that the existing collective sale framework will continue to apply where signature collection has already begun.

However, for developments aged 40 years and older that are currently in the midst of gathering signatures, which means that you already collected the first signature and you are in the middle of the process, there is an opt-in route that this Bill contemplates, if they wish to avail themselves of the new framework to be introduced in this Bill, if it is passed.

They may in this case convene a general meeting to decide whether to terminate the existing CSA and proceed afresh under the new framework. In which case they will have seven months from the commencement date to achieve the requisite consent threshold. This provides Collective Sales Committees with a meaningful opportunity to opt into the new framework if they are currently in midstream, whilst ensuring that owners who do not wish to sell are not subjected to a prolonged process.

Sir, let me conclude by returning to where we began. The fundamental policy impetus at the heart of this Bill is the same one that Parliament endorsed when it introduced the collective sale regime back in 1999 – that Singapore's land scarcity makes urban renewal not merely desirable, but really imperative.

Parliament made a deliberate choice to move away from unanimity – recognising that the consent threshold should reflect the age and the circumstances of the development – because older developments are more likely to need renewal. Lowering the thresholds for older developments now is really a logical step, which coheres with the original design intent. The stock of developments in Singapore has aged. The challenges that Parliament anticipated even back then in 1999 is now a present one and it will grow more pressing with each passing year.

These amendments recalibrate the framework accordingly – making renewal more accessible where there is genuine majority support, whilst at the same time, ensuring that owners are protected from repeated and disruptive attempts where there is not. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Mr Alex Yeo.

Mr Deputy Speaker, this Bill seeks to update the collective sale regime to better support the renewal of ageing strata-titled private developments and optimise land use. The key change is in the calibration of the consent thresholds for collective sales. The practical effect is this: a smaller majority of owners will now be able to push through a collective sale if their strata-titled developments are 40 years or older.

Putting aside urban renewal, a key concern of private strata-titled developments is the rising costs of maintenance and depleting sinking funds. Lift replacements, for example, is a costly capital expense. Estates need to be maintained and upgraded, to be safe, liveable and meet residents' needs, particularly for seniors.

A lowering of the consent thresholds seeks to provide owners of older developments with a practical solution or option, if there is broad support. However, the reality is that owners of older developments are really caught between a rock and a hard place.

Let us look at an illustration of an elderly retired couple who live in a small apartment on a high floor of a multi-block, 50-year-old development. The lifts, for example, in all the blocks in the developments are old and often break down. Upgrading or replacements will cost say, more than $2 million. The sinking fund cannot cover this cost and there are other major works required in the development to the plumbing and electrical systems. The MCST is considering having owners pay special levies for the urgent works.

In the face of such maintenance cost pressures and a lower consent threshold for a collective sale, would some home owners, like the elderly couple, be left with no other choice but to accept lower and less competitive collective sale bids? We should avoid a scenario where the collective sale of older developments becomes a fait accompli.

In this context, I wish to raise three issues in relation to the Bill: first, to consider further equitable safeguards for the larger minority of non-consenting owners; second, expediting upstream changes to the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act to mitigate the issue of inadequate sinking funds for maintenance and repair; third, whether these amendments are sufficient for strata-titled developments where subsidiary proprietors own a lease of 99 years or more but there is an ultimate developer landowner who owns the freehold tenure.

Mr Deputy Speaker, let me start with strengthening safeguards. The Bill, as it stands, seeks to enhance safeguards for non-consenting owners. These safeguards are to minimise the duration and frequency of collective sale exercises, especially where there is unlikely to be sufficient support.

Strengthening these procedural safeguards are important. However, if we anticipate that lowering the consent threshold could result in some downward pressure on the sale price, the Government should explore putting in place more equitable safeguards to ensure that the now larger minority non-consenting home owners are not unduly prejudiced.

Currently, section 84A(7) and (8) of the Act, together with the Fourth Schedule, offers protection from "financial loss" for home owners subject to a collective sale. In short, any home owner, who will suffer a financial loss or if the sale proceeds are insufficient to redeem a mortgage or charge, can object to the collective sale. Section 84A(8) deems a home owner to have suffered a financial loss if the proceeds from the sale, after considering any stamp duty, legal fees or costs related to the collective sale, exceeds the original purchase price. Would the Minister consider expanding the range of associated costs taken into consideration in the Fourth Schedule?

In Western Australia, for example, their equivalent legislation, takes into consideration, the tax burdens and legal costs associated with the creation or discharge of mortgages, including for the acquisition of any replacement property. The intention, I gather, is to better support non-consenting owners who do not profit from the collective sale and ensure that they are not unduly out-of-pocket in having to move and purchase a replacement home.

Also, home owners in Singapore are subject to seller's stamp duty if their property is sold within four years of purchase. Home owners, who object to a collective sale are also subject to this, if the collective sale take place within those four years. Would the Minister consider exempting this class of home owners from seller's stamp duty, particularly if they had purchased their homes before the announcement of the lowering of the consent threshold?

As the Minister had shared, in 2024, Hong Kong similarly reduced the consent thresholds for collective sales. Alongside its changes, a dedicated office of Support Services for Minority Owners under Compulsory Sale was set up to provide minority non-consenting owners professional advice, mediation assistance and assistance in finding alternative accommodation. While the needs of non-consenting home owners in Singapore may differ, would the Minister consider setting up a support mechanism to provide assistance, particularly for senior home owners who may require advice and support on their rights and relocation prospects in the collective sale process?

Mr Deputy Speaker, as I mentioned earlier, in a collective sale exercise for an ageing strata-titled development, home owners may find themselves having to consider a lower reserve price when faced with the alternatives of high maintenance fees or the prospect of a special levy to top up the sinking fund.

The question for such home owners is no longer sell or stay, but sell or pay costly fees for maintenance. This could be mitigated, however, by corresponding upstream changes to the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act to require MCSTs to build up and maintain their sinking funds for upgrading and maintenance works and/or ringfence monies for costly works, such as lift replacements. While these changes may not come soon enough to address the current ageing developments, it could go some way to mitigate the issue for newer developments as they age over time.

This is not a novel idea. Town Councils for example are required to ring-fence a percentage of all Service and Conservancy Charges (S&CC) collections into a lift replacement fund and a minimum percentage of the same into an ordinary sinking fund. If MCSTs are required to do the same, home owners of older strata-titled developments will face less pressure to press for a collective sale and hopefully be able to achieve a reserve price that is more equitable to both consenting and non-consenting home owners.

In fact, earlier this year, the Government had announced a review of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act to address these issues, I would like to ask if the Minister could share if more details will be forthcoming soon and ideally, in tandem with the changes proposed here for the collective sale regime.

Lastly, Sir, I would like to highlight that class of strata-titled developments where the landowner developer of freehold land, develops and sells leasehold strata-titled units to home owners while retaining the reversion.

These do not represent a large stock of our private strata-titled developments, but significantly, unlike leasehold developments on Government land put out to tender for development, there is no valuation mechanism for a topping up of the lease, which is a crucial element in the viability of collective sale exercises.

For these developments, the landowner of the freehold land has the ultimate power on the price of the top-up or whether to give any top-up at all. The landowner can effectively hold any collective sale attempt to ransom. They can demand an unrealistic sum to make any collective sale unviable or simply refuse to top-up.

In such instances, ageing developments that fall into this class may be at an impasse, with rising maintenance costs and no prospect of a collective sale, even with the revised consent threshold. For such developments, I would like to ask the Minister if there are plans to address the situation, such as by setting a valuation-based mechanism, which mandates that the landowner either re-acquires the development by collective sale or agrees to top-up the lease.

Mr Deputy Speaker, notwithstanding the points I have raised above, I support the Bill.

Mr Fadli Fawzi.

Mr Deputy Speaker, this Bill represents a critical and timely recalibration of Singapore's urban renewal framework. By adjusting the consent thresholds required for collective sales based on the age of development, we are providing owners of older properties with a far more realistic and practical avenue to consider redevelopment. At the same time, the Bill introduces vital safeguards to protect dissenting home owners who, for good reason, wish to safeguard their living spaces. Striking this delicate balance between enabling necessary rejuvenation and protecting private property rights is complex, but the Bill moves our property regulations firmly in the right direction.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Singapore is ageing rapidly and so is our built environment.

Today, about one in 20 private non-landed residential units are over 40 years of age, while more than 1,000 of Singapore's 3,750 private residential developments are at least 30 years old. In many of these older estates, critical infrastructure is reaching the absolute end of its design life. Lifts breakdown, water proofing systems deteriorate leading to persistent ceiling leaks and structural spalling concrete, and fire safety systems need to be upgraded.

Fixing these systemic issues requires massive capital injection yet not all estates have accumulated sufficient sinking funds or reserve funds over decades to undertake such extensive overhaul works. This presents a financial predicament for many residents, particularly older retired home owners living on fixed incomes. They might be rich in equity, but cash poor, lacking the free cash flow needed to pay heavy special levies, which can easily run into thousands of dollars per household to top-up depleted sinking funds.

The resale market for very old condos may also shrink, making it harder for owners to sell and move away from older estates. As condo estates get older, a collective sale or en bloc can be a vital welcome lifeline that grants them an exit route that frees up locked in equity to support their retirement, downsize to a more manageable unit or transition into housing better suited for their twilight years.

Lower thresholds for collective sales in older developments are not just about market efficiency. They are about pragmatic compassion for home owners caught in ageing buildings. From a broader nation-building perspective, it also makes sense to recalibrate the thresholds for collective sales. Many older private residential projects, such as the former HUDC estates sit on sprawling low density land parcels located in mature, well-connected townships. If redeveloped efficiently, these under-utilised sites could yield significantly more homes to meet the pressing housing demand of current and future generations of Singaporeans.

In Aljunied Group Representation Constituency (GRC) for example, Affinity at Serangoon and The Minton were both redeveloped with more than 1,000 units, each on former HUDC estates that had 244 units and 342 units respectively. It is far better for Singapore to focus our development energies on redeveloping low density, aged, brownfield housing estates than to continually clear precious greenfield sites, like Maju Forest.

Recycling land that already possesses established transport links, utility networks and community infrastructure is the essence of sustainable urban planning.

At this juncture, I would also like to call upon the Ministry of National Development (MND) to actively assess whether plot ratios for select older private developments can be selectively increased in future masterplan reviews. Enhancing the development baseline for older sub-optimally used plots would boost redevelopment potential, making en bloc sales far more financially viable for property developers while offering home owners fair compensation to facilitate their relocation.

Sir, while I support lowering the en bloc thresholds for older estates, we must remember that a home is not just a financial asset. Homes are locations where families are built. They are places that carry deep emotional weight, stability and memories.

While some owners wish to liquidate, others deeply cherish the spacious layouts and large land offered by older developments. These are luxuries rarely seen in modern private condominiums. For many long-term residents, even with a successful en bloc payout, it may be virtually impossible to purchase a unit of comparable size, character and location in today's property market.

Thus, I welcome the safeguards built into this Bill to protect dissenting or hesitant home owners, such as a shorter timeframe that CSCs have to collect signatures for a CSA and an extended restriction period to prohibit repeated aggressive en bloc attempts where underlying support remains insufficient. Raising the threshold required to initiate subsequent attempts prevents minority owners from facing persistent harassment year after year.

However, Mr Deputy Speaker, I wish to highlight a practical concern regarding the shortened six-month signature period, specifically as it applies to larger developments. In large condominiums with hundreds or even over a thousand strata units, the administrative burden on the volunteer CSC is immense. Gathering signatures is not merely a matter of sending an email. It involves door-to-door verification, coordinating with overseas owners, navigating complex probate matters for deceased owners and holding multiple town hall discussions to address individual anxieties.

A rigid six-month window may inadvertently penalise large estates where a vast majority of owners may actually favour a sale, but where the sheer logistics may prevent the committee from reaching the final finish line in time.

To resolve the issue without compromising the intent of the law, I urge the Government to consider two potential refinements.

Firstly, the Ministry of Law (MinLaw) could consider tiered timelines based on the size of the estate. It may be better to calibrate the signature collection period based on the unit count. For example, the signature collection period could be maintained at six months for smaller developments, but MinLaw could allow nine months for estates with more than 300 or 500 units to collect the requisite number of signatures.

Secondly, the MinLaw could consider introducing automatic grace period extensions to the signature collection period. For example, if a CSC manages to reach within five percentage points of the requisite consent threshold at the end of the initial six months, they could automatically receive a one-off three-month extension to secure the remaining signatures. Would the Government consider these adjustments to ensure that larger estates are not unfairly penalised in obtaining the requisite number of signatures?

Mr Deputy Speaker, urban renewal is a continuous journey. Redevelopment is a crucial pathway in ensuring that our housing stock remains safe, modern and sustainably built. This Bill strikes a crucial balance stance. It gives older developments a viable mechanism to redevelopment and relieve asset-rich, cash-poor owners from crushing maintenance costs, while protecting home owners from unrelenting pressure. However, to further enhance the effectiveness of this Bill, it should be coupled with active upzoning to create additional incentives for home owners and property developers to redevelop ageing developments and increase the availability of housing in mature estates throughout Singapore.

Mr Deputy Speaker, notwithstanding my clarifications, I support the Bill.

Dr Wan Rizal.

Mr Deputy Speaker, the Bill addresses a real and growing challenge. Singapore's private housing stock is ageing. Some older developments require substantial expenditure on maintenance and other essential infrastructure. Where there is broad support, collective redevelopment can renew these estates, make more efficient use of scarce land and provide more homes for future generations.

The Bill therefore lowers the collective sale consent threshold to 70% or 65%, depending on the development's age. At the same time, it offers counter-balancing safeguards. It raises the level of support required to initiate the process, lengthens the cooling-off period following an unsuccessful attempt, shortens the signature period from 12 months to six months, and increases the percentage limit relevant to the Court's power to increase the proceeds payable to objectors.

These measures seek to balance urban renewal with owner protection and I support that objective. However, lowering the consent threshold does not merely make collective sales easier. It also enlarges the minority that can ultimately be required to sell without having consented. We must therefore examine not only whether the process is efficient, but whether its safeguards remain sufficiently robust.

My first concern is the uniform six-month period of obtaining signatures. Six months may be adequate for a smaller development where owners are easily contacted and the issues are relatively straightforward. It may be considerably more challenging for an estate with several hundred units, owners who are constantly overseas, elderly owners who require much assistance, complicated powers of attorney or a mixture of residential and commercial interest.

A shorter period may reduce prolonged uncertainty and campaigning, but an unrealistically short period could also create pressure to obtain signatures quickly, increases the tension between neighbours and reduces the time available for owners to understand the valuation method of apportionment and replacement housing implications.

So, I ask whether the Ministry will monitor the effects of this change and consider a limited extension mechanism for an exceptionally large or complex development. Such an extension could be subject to objective criteria and a firm maximum period so that it does not recreate the uncertainty of the present system.

My second and most important concern relates to elderly and vulnerable owner-occupiers who I met over this weekend, mainly from my constituency.

Some elderly residents have lived in the same home for several decades. They may have fully paid for it and plan to spend the rest of their life there. Some have limited mobility too. Their homes may already be adapted to their needs. Their neighbours may form part of their informal care network, while their doctors, markets, transport routes and family support are all nearby.

For these residents, their home is not simply a financial asset. It is part of their care infrastructure, independence and a sense of security. A collective sale premium may compensate for the market value of the property, but it does not automatically compensate for the difficulty of moving, the loss of familiar support networks or the challenge of finding accessible replacement home easily.

So, I ask whether the Government will introduce a vulnerable owner protection protocol for the elderly, for those who are disabled and immobile owner occupiers. Could this include early identification of residents requiring support? And with that we allow a dedicated relocation case officer who could offer independent advice and assist in finding an accessible replacement home.

I was asked whether severe non-financial relocation hardship should be expressly considered within the approval or objection process. I am not proposing an automatic veto based on age. This could make redevelopment practically impossible and may not serve the wider interest of an ageing estate, but residents with the least ability to relocate should not be left to manage the consequences alone.

My third concern is the method of apportionment. Our existing law already provides important safeguards. The method of distributing sale proceeds forms part of the good faith scrutiny exercise by the STB and the Court. CSCs and their professional advisors are also expected to act transparently and even-handedly.

The question is whether these safeguards are sufficiently understandable and accessible to ordinary owners when as much as 35% of them may not be compelled to sell? Will the Government consider requiring a standard simple plain language explanation of apportionment method, including how strata area, share value and valuation affect different categories of units?

Owners should also be told why the selected method was preferred over reasonable alternatives, how the resulting premiums differ among unit types and whether there are relevant commission arrangements or conflicts of interest. Such disclosure would not dictate one compulsory formula. It would help owners make informed decisions and allow questionable arrangements to be identified earlier.

My fourth concern is replacement affordability. Residents of older developments may occupy homes that are substantially larger than newer ones. Even a seemingly attractive collective sales payment may not enable an elderly couple or multi-generational family to purchase a reasonably comparable home in the same area. I ask whether the Government has studied the replacement outcomes of owners affected by collective sales, including legal expenses, renovation costs, financing constraint and any Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) exposure not covered by existing remission arrangements?

Finally, will the Government commit to review these reforms after three years? The review should examine the number and success rate of collective sale attempts, disputes between owners, the use of shorter signature period outcomes for dissenting and vulnerable residents, and whether owners were able to secure suitable replacement housing.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, urban renewal and home owner protection are not competing objectives. A legitimate and durable collective sales system requires both. We should facilitate the renewal of ageing developments where broad support exists. But we should also remember that for an elderly resident, a home is not merely a parcel of redevelopment value. It may be the place that a resident hopes to live safely, independently and with dignity for the remaining years of his or her life.

With these questions and proposed safeguards, I support the Bill.

Mr Andre Low.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the principle of lower collective sale thresholds for older developments. Owners facing rising maintenance costs and major repairs should have a workable route to renewal. However, lowering the thresholds also allows a smaller majority through the statutory process to require unwilling owners to sell their homes. Parliament must therefore consider the safeguards that should accompany that change.

Last September, I raised in Parliament questions around issues of voting fairness and replacement housing under the forthcoming Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme (VERS). The decisions we make on this Bill will, in all likelihood, also inform how we approach similar questions in public housing as well.

First, I would like to ask the Government to explain what MinLaw expects these lower thresholds to deliver. This Bill lowers the consent thresholds to 70% for developments from 40 to under 60 years old; and to 65% from 60 years old onwards. What evidence supports these particular threshold amounts and which developments are likely to be affected?

Recent debates over Maju and Gillman Forest has also shown how much Singaporeans care about our natural spaces around us. The proposed Western Island has also raised concerns about our marine habitats. As we plan for further growth for Singapore, we should also examine how much more we can accommodate on land that we have already developed before accepting the loss of places that would be difficult to replace. That gives us a very strong reason to make urban renewal work.

Redeveloping ageing developments can provide more homes where infrastructure already exists and may ease pressure to develop other land. But securing enough signatures alone is only part of the task of urban renewal. An estate still needs a purchaser willing to proceed on acceptable terms. So, I ask if the Government has assessed how far lower consent thresholds alone can encourage urban renewal?

Increasing plot ratios or building smaller units may also help make more redevelopment viable, but there are limits to the density that our neighbourhoods can accommodate, and how small we should expect homes to become. New private developments are already launching at eye-watering prices, even outside the central region. How much further can we expect home buyers to stretch to make redevelopment viable?

Where a project needs selling prices that buyers cannot afford, developers may offer existing owners less or decline to bid on collective sales altogether. What wider approach does the Government envisage for ageing estates that cannot attract a viable redevelopment? Will this include support for major refurbishment works where rebuilding is unsuitable?

Secondly, a successful collective sale can still leave a household struggling to afford a move. Owners may have good reasons to support a sale, whether they want to avoid major repairs, move to a more manageable home or realise the value of their property. Under existing safeguards, owners approve the CSA, including the reserve price and the apportionment of proceeds. The process includes a public tender or auction, an independent valuation at tender close and scrutiny of good faith. Objectors also have protections against statutory financial loss or being unable to redeem a mortgage or charge on their property.

However, because the financial-loss test is principally tied to the original purchase price of the property, an owner may clear the test and the mortgage, and yet, still have too little left for suitable replacement property somewhere else. For an older owner, making up the shortfall could mean drawing further on retirement savings; and a younger family with limited savings may need substantial new borrowing, if they can obtain a loan at all.

For a household that opposes a collective sale, it may still have to bear these costs despite wishing to remain in their home. I therefore ask whether the Government has assessed how many affected owners could clear the existing financial-loss and mortgage tests, yet still face difficulties? What safeguards does it consider adequate for them?

I note that the Bill also expands the aggregate pool available for certain adjustments to sale proceeds, from 0.25% to 0.5%, while retaining the $2,000 floor as an alternative. How was this increase calibrated and what does experience with the existing mechanism tell us about the difficulties it may address? Does the increase go far enough to address the legitimate concerns of objecting households, especially seeing that now there may be more of them?

I also ask the Government to consider requiring a standardised disclosure of the likely financial and rehousing consequences before owners sign the CSA. Owners should be able to see indicative net proceeds based on the reserve price and apportionment method, with sale costs and relevant mortgage and Central Provident Fund (CPF) implications clearly explained. Realistic replacement-housing scenarios should also be modelled and show possible top-ups, and the financing or eligibility conditions that may affect the home owners' options.

Owners also need the relevant maintenance and planned work costs for the existing development to compare the cost of staying versus selling. Since management corporations already hold much of this information, including sinking fund records, the disclosure should draw on these existing records to avoid the expense of duplicate work.

CSCs and their advisers could prepare the disclosures using prescribed formats, based on a format that the Government has suggests, obtaining independent input on material assumptions where required. The Government should keep the scope proportionate and examine the additional cost before deciding what to require.

The figures would begin as estimates, which the committee and its advisers should update when an actual offer becomes available. And owners should be able to seek advice independent of the bidder about how those figures apply to their circumstances, while keeping their household financials confidential. With this information, owners could then reconsider the reserve price, seek more time to move or decide against launching a sale.

There will also be households whose difficulties require support beyond better information. My colleague Ms He Ting Ru will develop that issue and its implications for urban renewal in her subsequent speech.

Mr Deputy Speaker, finally, I come to the issue of VERS. When I asked about VERS last September, I raised the position of seniors who expected to remain in their flats for life. How would we protect those who might have to draw on retirement savings for replacement accommodation? And how would the needs of residents who disagreed be met if a majority voted to proceed?

The Minister for National Development then agreed that voting required careful consideration because the stakes were higher than in an upgrading exercise and said that relocation options were also being studied.

The Bill before us today puts a closely related decision in Parliament's hands, about how far to lower the barrier to renewal and what safeguards should accompany the greater power of a majority to require others to leave. VERS will involve public funding, housing subsidy and state land. So, this Bill does not settle its eventual rules, as there are different considerations at play. But the principles we accept here will nevertheless be instructive when we reconsider that scheme.

In particular, the concern I raised last September about affording a replacement home also arises under this Bill. A majority may favour renewal while some of the households required to move face substantial new debt or a draw on retirement savings. How we address that difficulty here today will help establish what Singaporeans can expect of other renewal schemes in the future.

Parliament should, therefore, scrutinise these lower thresholds together with the protections for affected households, conscious that our decisions will have implications beyond this Bill.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I ask the Government to explain whether the safeguards accompanying these lower thresholds adequately protect unwilling home owners and to consider the disclosure requirements I have suggested.

As Singapore's housing estates age and as more competing demands for limited land and the needs of the environment come to the fore, we will face more decisions about renewal and the people it requires to move. We should take care now to establish a fair approach that can guide those decisions, including when we return to VERS in the coming years.

Ms He Ting Ru.

Mr Deputy Speaker, this Bill proposes to lower consent thresholds for developments of different ages, streamline certain procedures pertaining to strata sales and clarify provisions for collective sales in complex cases. I believe this lowering of consent thresholds is the most consequential from a national, public policy perspective and I will concentrate my remarks in this area.

The Bill deals with two fundamental principles, which both lie at the heart of modern capitalism: property rights and urbanisation.

First, we wish to ensure the security of rights over property, in this case, real estate. Evidence shows that protection from expropriation of property can affect economic growth in the long run. Efforts that weaken these rights should thus only be undertaken under certain circumstances.

Pulling against this is how urbanisation has become a core part of modernisation and urban renewal is central to the continued vibrancy of cities. Vibrant cities promote creativity, foster knowledge and spur economic activity. A small handful of owners who hold out, even for justifiable reasons, may end up causing regions to fall behind, with knock-on adverse effects on the district and also country.

Both of these principles are thus important and necessary. Our debate today should consider how we balance these competing interests and to minimise the impact on the minority who disagree and may otherwise feel bullied into having to accept the decision of the majority.

My Sengkang colleague, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim had in the 2024 Committee of Supply debates, suggested proposed lowered consent thresholds as a property's lease winds down, with 75% supermajority for a remaining 50-year lease, and a simple majority for one when the lease has just 25 years to go. The lowered thresholds would only apply for sufficiently old leases. And to me, this makes sense in the name of urban renewal, because decisions for upkeep and maintenance of property would ultimately also be taken to effect, with an eye on the number of years left in a lease.

The proposed new thresholds in the Bill retain the existing threshold of 90% and 80% for titles less than 10 and 40 years old, but we now add a new, lower 70% threshold for leases between 40 and 60 years old, and another 65% level for developments over 60 years old.

Owners of properties who may have expected to hold on to their homes for the indefinite future, that is, those of 999-year and freehold leases, will, with these new, lower thresholds, be subject to greater uncertainty of a potentially early lease termination. In such cases, the individual property rights run more forcefully against the public interest.

A Parliamentary Question, filed in 2025, indicated that approximately 14% of landed housing stock sit on 999-year leases; and 73% on freehold leases. Could the Minister clarify what this percentage is for non-landed private properties, to give us a better idea of the effect that the changes will have on existing properties?

A second concern is how we deal with owners who, under the new rules, might be compelled to sell their flats despite being unwilling to do so, because the relevant threshold was reached. When we discuss this, it is helpful to consider the two main reasons leaseholders may not wish to sell.

First, those who hold out in the hope of getting a higher price. We can assume that their resistance is a financial one, and that if the price is high enough, they would eventually agree to sell. In these cases, redevelopment would eventually go ahead, and developers and contractors would just have to deal with the possibility of lower profits.

Second, those who may feel there are no housing alternatives. They may be elderly, in poor health or vulnerable in other ways. Whatever we think of the reasons they are holding out, they may feel that they are being dispossessed of their home against their will. For them, no amount of money would truly be able to make up for what they see as their loss.

This is where the Government can be more proactive.

The recent removal of the 15-month wait-out period to purchase HDB flats will certainly help these owners to find a new home. But can the Minister clarify: what specific bridging support or relocation assistance, if any, can be extended to elderly or vulnerable minority owners who did not consent to the sale, but are nonetheless compelled to give up their primary home under these lowered thresholds?

Additionally, will the Government establish a dedicated, independent mediation mechanism, together with a proper framework of financial and psychological support, to accompany this legislation? Transition support cannot simply only be measured in just dollars and cents. Feelings and the well-being of such owners are also important. Psychologists have noted that moving house is a highly stressful life event. Being made to move against one's will would undoubtedly make the experience even harder. There is an emotional toll that is extracted from them, which cannot be measured by or compensated away with money.

Mr Deputy Speaker, an additional effect is that these new thresholds also might have implications on urban renewal of our public housing stock, especially given upcoming programmes, such as VERS. While details of VERS are still unavailable today, I believe we should similarly think about how we balance the interests of displaced residents against the need for urban renewal, which will be especially pertinent in the case of public housing. The question about whether the staggered, new lowered thresholds will be ported over to public housing in the form of VERS is already a question that was asked last month in the Business Times.

The proportion of lower-income elderly with few other options is only likely to increase in the case of public housing. Many HDB flat owners decided to buy their flats decades ago with an eye to live in those units for the remainder of their time on earth. This is especially for those who may have only bought one flat in their entire lifetime or those who downgraded, buying a flat that they believed would be their final home.

This raises a natural question. It is not too early to ask what redevelopment strategy will VERS adopt. Would VERS be done at a cluster-level rather than block-by-block basis, as was previously suggested by the Minister? If so, how would the thresholds be calculated?

Even amongst existing public housing redevelopment schemes, how thresholds are calculated differ. The Home Improvement Programme (HIP) requires 75% in each block, while the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP) takes a cluster view of the threshold. To help the public understand why this is the case, we should clearly explain the reasoning behind such differences, including for VERS.

While such questions may be argued to go beyond the direct scope of the Bill before us, we must take note if there is a chance that if the principles voted upon today will carry over to how we design VERS. Would property age-linked voting thresholds apply to VERS as well, and what does the Government envisage the starting thresholds to be? Does MinLaw work with MND to use lessons learnt in these new thresholds to inform the design of what will eventually comprise VERS? This is especially more important when you consider the lessons that were learnt from issues beyond dollars and cents.

A 70% threshold for flats between 40 and 60 years old may already be a high bar to clear. This is especially if you consider that for public housing, displacement would be even more disruptive, particularly for residents who bought their flats with no intention of moving again.

There is a further complication. Unlike private en bloc sales where premiums over valuation can be substantial, the Government has already signalled that this would probably not be so for VERS. This may mean that HDB flat owners may be even more reluctant to sell. We saw this during the Ang Mo Kio's Selective En bloc Redevelopment Scheme episode where some owners were concerned to hear that they had to pay cash in order to buy a replacement flat of the same size nearby even though the economics may eventually have ultimately worked in their favour.

Relocation assistance for those who vote against a VERS redevelopment will thus be an important safeguard. This could take the form of a dedicated department within HDB that matches these families with replacement housing in other matured estates not slated for redevelopment. This can be done just as HDB already manages its stock of Sale of Balance Flats, opening booking flats or even rental units.

Mr Deputy Speaker, this Bill is consequential for more than one reason. It does not just set out a voting framework to govern the redevelopment of private housing in Singapore. The decisions we make today may also be a precedent for how we handle ageing public housing stock which makes up a super-majority of how we house our citizens.

Today's debate should thus not foreclose a fuller separate examination of the parametres that should apply to VERS and public housing redevelopment when that time comes. The considerations at play there will be different and they deserve to be considered on their own terms. Mr Deputy Speaker, notwithstanding what I just said, I support the Bill.

Ms Cassandra Lee.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill. This Bill deals with the collective sales of private property. It is not a debate on VERS. VERS is also a matter for MND, not MinLaw.

But the policy thinking behind this Bill has implications on how we eventually design VERS. I would like to make two main points.

First, if we accept a tiered approach to redevelopment for private housing, we should consider whether the same approach should apply to public housing under VERS. Second, if age matters in deciding when private estates should have an easier pathway to redevelopment, we should also ask whether flats' age of 70 years should remain the starting point contemplated for VERS.

This Bill recognises a simple reality. As buildings age, the balance changes. Maintenance becomes more costly. Repairs become more frequent. Upgrading becomes harder and takes longer. At some point, redevelopment starts to make more sense than maintenance.

I hear this directly from residents. When I visit residents living in condominiums in West Coast and Pasir Panjang, those in developments approaching 30 years old, or already in their 30s, tell me that the costs of upkeep and upgrading are getting harder to keep up with. The Bill responds to this by introducing a tiered framework.

For developments between 40 and 59 years old, the consent threshold falls to 70%. For those aged 60 years and above, it falls further to 65%. There is a logic to this, which is informed by the increased cost of maintaining older developments, and the need for urban renewal. My question is whether that same logic should inform VERS.

Conceptually, the thinking behind VERS is very similar – to provide a voluntary pathway for the redevelopment of ageing homes. This being the case, I ask that when MND develops the VERS framework, it considers whether the same percentages and tiered approach can apply to public housing.

Of course, private and public housing are not identical. Public housing serves wider social objectives. The Government also has different responsibilities towards HDB home owners. It takes the lead in maintaining HDB flats and renewing HDB estates, which it does not do for private housing.

But where the policy objective is the voluntary redevelopment of an ageing estate, any significant difference in treatment should have a clear policy basis. Otherwise, residents may reasonably ask why a 60-year-old private estate has a 65% pathway to redevelopment, while a 60-year-old public estate has no such pathway under VERS.

This brings me to my second point. Under this Bill, collective sale remains available to private developments throughout their lifespans. The threshold becomes progressively lower once a development reaches 40 years.

VERS, based on what has been announced so far, is intended for selected HDB precincts around the age of 70. That is a significant difference.

The oldest HDB estates in Ayer Rajah are not yet 50 years old. Yet even today, I can see the challenges that come with ageing homes. And I am not just talking about spalling concrete. Residents tell me about leakages which return every few years, cracks that need to be repaired again, older flats where sound travels so easily that residents can hear what their neighbours two floors up are doing, older pipes and installations which no longer meet the needs of today's households, but which still need to be maintained.

Problems recur. We repair them. But several years later, they return. Because repairs can only last so long. It is for this reason that many residents of mine are interested in VERS applying to them.

This is why I think we need to look at the economics of ageing estates more broadly. We have HIP. We have had Lift Upgrading Programme (LUP). We have NRP and other upgrading programmes. These programmes have made a real difference to residents. They remain important. But when does it come to a point when we should ask a different question – not what do we need to repair, or what should we upgrade next, but when does the comprehensive redevelopment make better sense?

Repeated repairs and successive upgrading programmes carry costs. There is the direct financial cost. There is also the repeated disruption to residents, not just in having to provide access to contractors, but also in the effect on our residents' general quality of life, and indeed, in some cases, their safety.

And there is the opportunity cost of continuing to extend older infrastructure when comprehensive redevelopment could give the estate a new lease of life. This is especially relevant because our older estates were built for a very different Singapore. Teban and Pandan Gardens, for example, were developed in the 1970s by JTC, originally in connection with the Jurong Industrial Estate. The needs of those communities today are very different from those of almost 50 years ago.

Redevelopment allows us to do things that upgrading cannot always achieve. We can reconsider density, we can reconsider connectivity, we can reconsider community spaces, housing layouts, accessibility, infrastructure. We can ask how the land should serve residents for the next 50 years, rather than only how we can extend the life of what has been designed 50 years ago.

So, as VERS is developed, I hope we do not treat 70 years as an automatic starting point simply because that was the age first contemplated. Instead, we should look at the economics across the full life of an estate.

What will repeated HIP, NRP, LUP and other upgrading interventions cost? How frequently are the same problems recurring?How well does the existing infrastructure still meet residents' needs? And what value could comprehensive rejuvenation unlock?These considerations should help determine when VERS becomes available.

There is one further issue arising from these changes which I hope MND will study, perhaps jointly with MinLaw.

The 15-month wait-out period for eligible private home owners buying non-subsidised HDB resale flats has recently been removed. At the same time, this Bill seeks to make collective sales more accessible for older private developments. Both changes have their own policy rationale. But we should also consider their combined effect. If more older private estates go en bloc, some owners may then enter the HDB resale market with substantial funds. Where will that demand go?

Analysts have suggested that former private home owners may gravitate towards larger HDB flats. That is understandable. Someone who has lived for many years in an older, larger condominium may still want to live in a home with comparable living space. But these are also the homes that our larger families need.

At the National Day Rally, the Prime Minister spoke about making Singapore more family-friendly. Housing was an important part of that. Prime Minister recognised that larger families often need bigger homes, which cost more, and asked MND to consider additional housing support for them. I support this direction, but we should make sure that developments elsewhere in our housing market do not inadvertently work against it.

For a family with three or four children, or a multi-generational household, an additional bedroom may be more a genuine housing need than a luxury. And there may be an imbalance in purchasing power. Someone coming out of a successful en bloc sale may have substantial funds to purchase their next home. A young family trying to move from a smaller HDB flat into a larger one may not. I support former private home owners being able to buy HDB flats. However, I am concerned that the combined effect of these policies could increase competition for our limited stock of larger HDB flats – whether larger families may find it more difficult to afford the space they genuinely need.

As supporting growing families with their housing needs is a national priority, I ask that we watch this carefully.

Mr Deputy Speaker, this Bill recognises that age changes the balance between continued maintenance and redevelopment. It responds with a calibrated, tiered framework. I think there is merit in that approach. When MND finalises VERS, I hope we can apply the same logic to public housing. Consider similarly tiered consent thresholds, consider whether 70 years should be the point at which the VERS option arises, and consider the total cost of repeatedly upgrading an ageing estate against the benefits of rejuvenating the land and rebuilding for the needs of the next generation.

I recognise that this is a MinLaw Bill, while many of the issues I have raised ultimately fall within MND's purview. But that is also my point. The policy choices we make for private and public housing affect each other. We should design them with that in mind. Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Ang Wei Neng.

Mr Deputy Speaker, I rise today in support of the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill 2026. But before I speak about percentages, procedures and schedules, I would like to talk about one person.

Mdm May Phua is 78 years old. She owns a top-floor, walk-up apartment in the East. Forty years ago, when Mdm Phua bought her apartment, she was young and energetic. Climbing four storeys was not a problem. Even carrying a heavy load of groceries up the stairs was simply part of everyday life.

She loved her spacious three-bedroom apartment. She loved its familiar surroundings and its proximity to East Coast Park. For four decades, this apartment has been more than a property. It has been her home, her neighbourhood and a place filled with memories.

But time has changed things. Today, at 78, Mdm Phua finds it increasingly difficult to climb four flights of stairs, even without groceries. And the challenges do not stop there. She recently had to spend thousands of dollars renovating her toilets because of water seepage and complaints from her downstairs neighbours. She has also noticed water marks on her ceiling, suggesting possible water leakage from the rooftop.

For a younger home owner, these may be manageable inconveniences. For an elderly home owner living on the fourth floor of a walk-up apartment, they can become a daily burden.

Mdm Phua had hoped that a collective sale might provide a way forward. Unfortunately, the last attempt by the CSC failed because the required 80% consent could not be obtained. Mdm Phua was disappointed, but with this Bill, her hope has been rekindled.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, Mdm Phua is not alone. Many private property owners live in developments that are now 40, 50 and even 60 years old or more. As buildings age, pipes deteriorate, waterproofing fails, roofs leak and lifts become increasingly expensive to maintain or replace. For some elderly residents, maintaining an ageing property is no longer simply a question of convenience. It becomes a question of whether they can continue to live comfortably and safely in a home they have owned for decades.

This is why I believe the relaxation of the collective sale threshold is both timely and necessary. It gives owners another option. It does not force anyone to sell. It simply gives owners a better chance of reaching a collective decision when an ageing development has become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain.

Many property owners and industry players I have spoken to therefore welcome the relaxation of the collective sale criteria.

At the same time, they have raised some practical questions and concerns about other aspects of the Bill. I believe these concerns are worth considering because the objective should not merely be to make collective sales easier. We should make the process fair, workable and practical for all parties.

First, the First Schedule, paragraph 2(1)(a), reduces the period available to the CSC to obtain signatures to the CSA, from 12 months to six months. I understand the rationale. We do not want non-consenting owners to be subjected to prolonged pressure. Their interests must be protected. However, developments are not all the same. A development with 50 units and one with 500 units may both be given six months under the law, but the practical challenges are very different.

In a large development, the CSC may have to engage hundreds of owners. Some may be overseas. Some may act through powers of attorney. Some properties may be held through estates or other arrangements. Reaching every owner, explaining the proposal, answering questions and giving owners sufficient time to make an informed decision takes time.

Therefore, I respectfully suggest that the Minister consider a mechanism allowing larger developments, for example, those with 250 or 500 units and above, to apply for an extension, perhaps up to nine months, where there are genuine practical difficulties. This would strike a reasonable balance: protecting non-consenting owners from unnecessary prolonged pressure, while recognising that large developments should not necessarily be treated in exactly the same way as small ones.

Second, I commend the Bill for embracing technology. The Second Schedule provides for electronic communication, virtual meetings and electronic voting. This is a progressive step. The COVID-19 experience has shown us that many things can be done securely and effectively without requiring people to be physically present.

In the same spirit, may I seek clarification from the Minister on whether remote witnessing of the signing of a CSA by an appointed solicitor through livestreaming could be accepted, subject to appropriate safeguards? These could include proper identity verification, confirmation of the document being executed and maintenance of a clear audit trail. This would be particularly helpful for owners living overseas, as well as elderly or mobility-impaired owners who may find it difficult to travel. If we are prepared to embrace electronic communication and electronic voting, we should also consider whether technology can remove unnecessary barriers to participation, while preserving the integrity of the collective sale process.

Third, I welcome the introduction of section 84FC. This is an important provision because it creates a collective sale mechanism for certain legacy residential developments where flat proprietors do not own the underlying land, such as Neptune Court, Paterson Court and Townhouse Apartments, to name a few. Section 84FC(2) provides that proprietors of 25% of the flats may apply to the Registrar for notional shares in the land to be assigned to each flat, based on the method used by the Commissioner for the allocation of share values.

I would like to seek clarification from the Minister on whether this necessarily requires a fresh survey. Could existing official records, approved plans or other reliable records of unit floor areas be relied upon where appropriate? If a fresh survey is mandatory in every case, it could add significant time and cost. Where reliable records already exist, I hope the Ministry can consider allowing them to be used, subject to the necessary verification and safeguards.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, before I end, let me bring the House back to Mdm Phua and to my own experience. More than 25 years ago, my family bought an apartment in a development that was already around 30 years old. We encountered many of the problems associated with ageing developments: sewage problems, water leakage, rubbish bin choking and even a costly lift replacement programme. Like many other owners, we hoped that one day the development could undergo a collective sale. But despite our hopes, we could never obtain the required 80% consensus.

Eventually, my family sold the apartment three years ago. It was not an easy decision. We loved the charm of the development. We loved the location. Most of all, we liked our neighbours and the community. We did not sell the apartment because we stopped loving the place. We sold the flat because the building was ageing, maintenance was becoming increasingly difficult and costly, and the existing collective sale framework did not give owners a realistic path forward.

If this Bill is passed today, many of my former neighbours may finally have that opportunity. For them, reducing the collective sale threshold to 70% is not merely a change in number. It may mean relief from years of uncertainty. It may mean relief from escalating maintenance costs. And it may mean that owners who have lived in an ageing development for decades finally have a genuine choice about their future.

For someone like 78-year-old Mdm Phua, it may mean that she no longer has to face another 10 years of climbing four flights of stairs, dealing with leaks and paying for increasingly expensive repairs simply because a collective sale could not previously obtain the required consensus.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, we must, of course, protect the rights of those who do not wish to sell. Collective sale legislation must always strike a careful balance between the interests of the majority and the rights of the minority. But fairness should also mean recognising the legitimate interests of owners who wish to move forward. This Bill gives owners of ageing developments a choice. It does not force them to sell. It does not take away their homes. It gives them a better chance to decide their collective future.

For elderly residents, for families and for the many Singaporeans living in ageing developments, this Bill offers something very important – hope, choice and the possibility of a new beginning. I therefore support the Bill.

Assoc Prof Kenneth Goh.

Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. As our private housing stock ages, collective sales can help renew older developments and make better use of scarce land. The Bill retains the existing thresholds for younger developments, but lowers them to 70% for developments aged 40 to 59 years and 65% for those aged 60 years or more. I understand the rationale for treating older developments differently.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

My questions are therefore not about the objective of the amendments, but about their calibration. The consent threshold performs an important balancing function. If it is set too high, redevelopment may remain blocked even where there is substantial owner support and a viable opportunity for renewal. But a lower threshold also means a larger minority of dissenting owners may ultimately be bound by the sale. At a threshold of 70%, up to 30% of owners may not support the sale. At 65%, more than one-third may not support it. That does not mean these thresholds are necessarily too low. But it does mean the Ministry should explain how these thresholds were arrived at.

So, my first question is: how did the Ministry arrive at these thresholds – 70% for a 40-year development and 65% at 60 years? Were alternative thresholds considered? Was there modelling of how many additional developments might be able to proceed under different thresholds? And what evidence gave the Ministry confidence that these particular reductions would materially advance urban renewal?

The Ministry has explained why the regime needs revisiting: more developments are ageing, with rising maintenance pressures. But that does not necessarily tell us why these particular thresholds strike the right balance. Nor can we infer too much simply from where an unsuccessful exercise stopped. A development that reached 75% support may appear to have been blocked by the 80% threshold. But owner consent also depends on the terms offered, including the reserve price. A different reserve price may produce a different level of owner support.

Conversely, for exercises that do reach the consent threshold and proceed to tender, the market provides another test. If bids repeatedly fall short of owners' reserve prices, lowering the consent threshold may have a more modest effect on actual renewal. So, the level of owner consent, the terms of sale and the eventual market response need to be considered together.

In calibrating these amendments, what has the Ministry learnt from previous collective sale exercises about these different points at which they stall? I recognise that each exercise is different and market conditions change. If we are changing the statutory consent threshold, we should understand the role it plays in whether owners and purchasers can arrive at a viable transaction.

Mr Speaker, I also recognise that the Bill strengthens safeguards for non-consenting owners. The threshold required to requisition a meeting to form a CSC will rise to 35%; the period for collecting signatures will be shortened from 12 months to six months; and tighter restrictions will apply following an unsuccessful attempt. I welcome these changes. They should reduce prolonged or repeatedly unsuccessful exercises. And these safeguards should improve the process, but they do not themselves establish why 70% and 65% are the right thresholds.

Finally, I would like to ask about the evidence we will have to evaluate these amendments over time in the future. My understanding is that much of the relevant information is already generated during individual collective sale exercises. The CSA records the reserve price, consent levels are tracked and where an exercise proceeds to tender, the market response is known.

Does the Ministry collect this information centrally, including for exercises that do not ultimately succeed? If not, could it consider bringing together a limited set of this existing information when each exercise concludes? This could include the highest consent achieved, the reserve price and any revisions, the tender outcome and where the exercise ended.

The underlying information may need to be collected exercise by exercise, but it need not be published for each development. Aggregated reporting by age band, consent level and outcome would allow us to see where collective sale exercises still get stuck and whether that changes under the new thresholds. Looking at both would give us a much better basis for assessing whether the new thresholds are helping owners and the market arrive at viable redevelopment outcomes and whether the balance Parliament is being asked to strike today, remains appropriately calibrated over time. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Lee Hong Chuang.

Mr Speaker, I support of the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill.

Let me start with the scale of the issue. Government figures show that around 20,000 private non-landed homes are more than 40 years old, while more than 360,000 are younger. That is only about one in 20 today. The number is still limited. But every year, more developments will cross the 40-year mark. This is not a problem that appears overnight. It grows one year at a time. We are legislating not only for 2026 but for 2040 and beyond.

My first point is that this Bill can help Singapore renew land that is already in use. Where owners support it and planning and site conditions allow, an ageing development may be redeveloped to support more homes. A lower threshold does not guarantee a successful sale. It simply gives owners of ageing developments a more workable option. Some of the homes Singapore will need tomorrow can come from the city we have already built.

My second point is that the Bill takes a balanced approach. The present thresholds remain unchanged for developments below 40 years old – 90% for those who are 10 years and 80% for those between 10 and 39 years. For developments that are 40 to 59 years old, the consent threshold will be 70%. For those that are 60 years or older, it will be 65%. In both cases, the threshold must be met by share value and by the strata area. It is not a simple headcount.

At the same time, the request to call the meeting that forms a CSC will need signatures representing at least 35% by share value and by number of owners. The period to collect signatures will be six months instead of 12. After a failed attempt, the restriction period will be three years instead of two and any fresh attempt during that period will need a higher level of support.

I support this combination. The lower final threshold gives ageing developments a more realistic route to renewal. The higher starting threshold and the longer restriction period make repeated attempts with weak support less likely. The Bill does not simply make en bloc easier. It makes an attempt with weak support harder to start and harder to repeat.

Mr Speaker, I have three questions for the Minister.

First, the six months signature period. A shorter period can reduce prolonged pressure on owners who do not wish to sell. But a very large and mixed-use development, six months may still be difficult. It may take more time to reach owners who live overseas and to explain a more complex sale. Could the Minister explain how the six months period were assessed, especially for very large or mixed-use developments and whether the Ministry will review how it works after the new framework has operated for some time?

Second, I welcome the stronger safeguards for owners who do not consent. But we should also be ready for serious hardship that cannot be measured only in dollars. At the 65% threshold, a sale may still bind owners who did not consent. A majority consent system cannot give every owner an absolute veto. But there is a real difference between an owner saying, "The price is not good enough" and an elderly owner saying, "I have lived here for 40 years. I am frail and I do not know where I can move to."

I am not asking for an absolute veto or an open-ended delay. But could the Ministry consider an early and neutral advisory channel for elderly or vulnerable households, so that they can better understand the timeline and available options before the matter reaches the formal objection stages?

Third, this Bill does not affect homes alone. As drafted, the new age-based thresholds also apply to strata-titled commercial and mixed-use developments. Older developments may contain small owner-operated shops and long-standing tenants. For a home owner, en bloc means finding another home. For a small business, it means rebuilding the business and losing a shopfront, a location and a customer base. A shop unit can be an asset on paper and a livelihood in real life.

I recognise that existing law preserves a tenant's rights to compensation from the unit owner, but many small businesses may still not know what this means in practice.

Could there be clearer guidance on what happens to an existing lease, when the premises must be handed over, how compensation may be pursued and how much time the business will have to move? This would help small owner occupiers who may be outvoted and tenants who have no vote but may still lose the location on which their business depends on. Mr Speaker, now I will continue my speech in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, I wish to make three points from the residents' perspective.

First, before signing, owners should not only work out the figures but also think through future steps. When discussing a collective sale or en bloc, the question most often asked is: “How much can it be sold for?” But for a family, the more practical questions should be – after repaying the loan, calculating CPF refunds and related costs, how much cash will remain? Will it be enough to buy the next home? When do I have to move? Will I need to rent in the interim?

I suggest that, in addition to the existing legal documents, a simple, standardised and easy-to-understand checklist could be provided so that every household can work through its loan, CPF refund, transaction costs, relocation timeline and possible interim rental arrangements, item by item.

This is not about the Government deciding for owners whether to sell. It is about enabling owners to understand clearly the decision they are making. Property is often a family’s largest asset. Such a decision should not be based only on an expected sale price or on information passed among neighbours. The clearer the information, the more confidently owners can make their judgement.

Second, older owners should know earlier what their next steps are. An older development does not mean that every resident is elderly. However, many owners who have lived in such developments for years are retired or nearing retirement. For them, moving is not simply a change of address. They may worry about whether medical care will remain accessible, where their children live, whether shopping and getting around will be convenient, whether there are lifts and barrier-free facilities, and whether long-standing neighbourhood ties can be maintained.

Therefore, I hope that older persons, persons with mobility issues and families with caregiving needs can receive clear guidance earlier from a neutral channel on when decisions must be made, when they may need to move, how finances should be arranged and where they can seek help if difficulties arise.

This does not mean that the Government must take care of everything, nor does it necessarily require new subsidies. The key is to give residents time to prepare, rather than leaving them scrambling at the last moment. Completing a collective sale is a legal and commercial process. Completing a smooth and reassuring move is a process that affects a family’s daily life. Land can be redeveloped, but lives cannot be restarted at the touch of a button.

Third, we should not view en bloc solely as a transaction. It also concerns how Singapore invigorates a mature city.

As buildings age, owners should have more choices – not have choices made for them. Some developments are suitable for redevelopment. Others can continue to serve for many years after repairs, facility replacement, accessibility improvements and energy-efficiency upgrades. Therefore, before owners invest substantial time and money, three matters should be explained separately and clearly: what existing planning parameters currently allow; which matters still require separate approval; and which figures are merely consultants' estimates based on market conditions.

This is not intended to push owners to sell. It is to ensure that owners who support or oppose en bloc make their decisions based on the same facts. If redevelopment is ultimately chosen, we should not ask only how many more units have been built or how much land value has increased. We should also ask: is the new development more suitable for older persons? Is it easier to move around? Is it more energy-efficient and better able to cope with extreme heat and heavy rain? Does it make the whole community a better place to live?

Mr Speaker, as Singapore has developed to where it is today, the landscape has continued to change. The memories of our communities and people’s sense of belonging are equally worth cherishing. In the decades ahead, we must enable a mature city to continue moving forward while preserving its human touch through renewal.

Good urban renewal is not simply about replacing old buildings with new ones. It should also give owners the information to make decisions, help older residents transition with peace of mind, ensure that small businesses are not overlooked and make redeveloped communities more liveable than before.

We should, of course, realise greater long-term value from our limited land. But as we renew the land, we must also care for the people who live on it. The ability to renew reflects a city’s capability, giving people confidence in renewal reflects a society's resilience.

(In English): Notwithstanding all the above, I support the Bill.

Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I grew up in the Tiong Bahru and Outram area. As a kid, I remembered that above the neighbourhood stood Pearl Bank Apartments, an iconic horseshoe shaped tower that seemed permanently part of the skyline. Completed in 1976, Pearl Bank became an architectural landmark. But buildings age differently from memories.

By its later years, residents faced broken lifts, leaking sewage pipes, peeling panes and rat infestations. Maintaining it had become increasingly difficult. The owners tried to sell it in 2007, 2008 and 2011. Three attempts, three failures. On the fourth attempt in 2018, Pearl Bank was sold collectively for $728 million.

Pearl Bank captures the balance at the heart of this Bill. Where I live today, I too, have experienced an en bloc discussion entering an estate. I know the uncertainty it creates, the division between neighbours and whether a familiar home must give way.

Ageing developments need a pathway to renewal. Deteriorating infrastructure may require redevelopments, and collective sale thresholds may need to fall as buildings age. That is why I support the Bill's central reform, lowering the threshold to 70% for developments aged at least 40, but below 60 years, and to 65% for developments aged 60 years or more.

I also support section 84FC, which extends the framework to certain developments where registered flat lessees do not own the underlying land, well protecting the affected landowners. But numbers cannot capture everything a home means. At 65%, a substantial minority may still disagree – elderly residents intending to age in place, families living near schools, caregivers close to ageing parents and people whose lives are rooted in that neighbourhood.

I support renewal, but my support rests on one central conviction. If Parliament lowers the threshold for renewal, Parliament must raise the standard of fairness.

Three principles should therefore guide this framework. Renewal must rest on durable consent. Compensation must preserve real choices and speed must not outrun fairness.

First, Mr Speaker, Sir, a collective sale attempt affects residents even when it fails. Residents wonder whether to renovate, whether they will be uprooted and where they will go. A household cannot plan confidently while its home remains under a recurring question mark.

The cost is not merely financial. A resident may desperately want to stay while a long-time neighbour actively pushes to sell. That disagreement enters corridors, lifts, WhatsApp groups and friendships. A failed bid may end the legal process, but it does not end the human consequences. This comes close to home in Yio Chu Kang. A CSC was formed at Far Horizon Gardens in 2018 to unlock value from an ageing estate. After earlier unsuccessful efforts, residents have again confronted collective sale. For them, en bloc fatigue is not abstract.

I, therefore, welcome the Bill's safeguards. The threshold for requisitioning a meeting to constitute a CSC rises to 35%. After a relevant unsuccessful event, another attempt will generally be restricted for three years unless stronger support is shown: 50% for the first early requisition and subsequently, the age-based threshold. A CSC will also be dissolved if important milestones are missed. Put simply, the Bill makes renewal easier where support is real, but harder for failed campaigns to be reopened repeatedly without broader support. Renewal should reflect durable support, not consent manufactured through exhaustion.

I ask the Government to review these safeguards after three years, measuring whether repeated attempts, disputes and uncertainty have declined, not merely whether sales succeeded. Good safeguards must work in people's lives, not merely read well on paper. Residents will trust lower thresholds only if the law measures the age of their developments fairly. Under section 84FE, the age of a development if completed in phases will generally be determined by the latest relevant completion date among its buildings. This is clear administratively but may be unfair.

If most blocks are over 40 but a small block was completed later, the entire estate may be treated as younger. Yet legal classifications cannot erase leaking pipes, breakdown-prone lifts and heavy maintenance burdens. I ask the Government to assess such anomalies and consider a narrow, independently assessed review where the later phase is minor and objective evidence shows that the development overwhelmingly reflects its older buildings.

Clause 26 also warrants scrutiny. It concerns registration of a strata title plan, not consent to a collective sale. Even so, under section 127(3A), agreement by just 25% of flat lessees can result in the remaining 75% being legally deemed to agree to that registration.

I understand the intention to overcome deadlock. But because the legal effect extends to every lessee, the Minister should explain why 25% is sufficient, what notice the others will receive and what recourse will be available where the application or its terms are disputed. Consent should empower residents, not be presumed through technical fine print.

Second, Mr Speaker, Sir, if an owner is required to leave, can that owner realistically replace the home that has been lost? The Bill strengthens protection for objectors by raising from 0.25% to 0.5% of sale proceeds, the aggregate limit the High Court must consider when adjusting distribution. It also clarifies when an owner is regarded as suffering financial loss. I support these protections.

But financial loss and relocation fairness are not the same. An elderly resident may receive more than the original purchase price yet be unable to remain near children, a familiar doctor, a place of worship or a support network. The law may find no financial loss. The resident may still lose the practical ability to remain near family, care and community.

We should also distinguish genuine home owners from speculative risk. Contrast a family that bought near a school or ageing parents and unexpectedly faces an en bloc attempt with a purchaser who entered after formal disclosure and paid a price reflecting that prospect. Minority safeguards should prevent injustice, not create a one-way bet in which a purchaser retains the upside while transferring the downside to every other owner.

Under the Bill, purchase price remains relevant unless an owner bought after the CSC signed the sale and purchase agreement. That may be too late. Speculative expectations can arise earlier. The framework should consider an earlier, objectively verifiable milestone, such as formal disclosure that the process has begun together with the purchaser's written acknowledgment. This avoids attempting to read a buyer's motives while ensuring that known risks are not shifted to neighbours.

That is why owners need a realistic relocation picture before signing, not after the sale is secured. They need to know what comparable homes nearby cost, what they will pay in stamp duty, moving and other transaction expenses, and how long they will have to relocate.

I, therefore, ask that owners' information packages include indicative prices for comparable nearby homes, major relocation costs and the expected timeline and timetable. This would not guarantee replacement. But it would reveal the real cost of starting again. Renewal should unlock land value without destroying social value.

Third, Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill shortens the CSA execution period from 12 months to six. I understand why campaigns should not drag on. But older estates naturally have older owners. An owner may pass away, a family may await probate or letters of administration, or a co-owner may be ill or overseas. In developments 40, 50 or 60 years old, these are ordinary facts of life.

I welcome section 84FD, which clarifies that a co-owned unit does not count unless all co-owners agree. Yet practical hurdles remain. If an elderly owner passes away during the signature collection, the children may support the sale, yet nobody can sign until an executor or administrator is empowered. The unit cannot count, not because the family objects, but because estate administration does not follow an en bloc timetable.

I ask the Government to permit a tightly controlled extension where an objective impediment, such as pending probate, is documented. Retain the discipline of the six-month period and impose a clear maximum extension to prevent abuse. Families should not lose the opportunity to participate merely because legal processes take time.

Fairness is not only about having enough time. It is also about having the capacity to exercise one's rights. At 65%, a substantial minority may be required to sell without agreeing. Elderly residents, persons with disabilities and those less financially or legally confident may struggle with property law, valuations and Court procedures. They must understand their rights independently of those promoting the sale. The Government should provide a neutral guide and access to independent legal or financial advice, separate from CSC, marketing agent and purchaser. A faster process must not become a less fair process.

Finally, I welcome the transitional pathway for qualifying developments aged at least 40 years already in the process. Some have incurred costs for valuations, lawyers, agents and meetings. Early guidance should specify which steps must be repeated so residents do not bear unnecessary duplicated expense.

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, Sir, let me return to Pearl Bank. It was demolished and One Pearl Bank rose on the site. Yet, the story has one final chapter.

When One Pearl Bank was launched in 2019, dozens of former residents returned as prospective buyers. After seeking a sale for some years, some wanted to come home. One was 77 years old. His former 1,324 square-foot apartment yielded about $1.8 million. A roughly comparable new three-bedroom unit cost more than $2.5 million. The law might not regard that as financial loss, yet he could no longer afford to return home. The building had been renewed. Coming home had become harder.

The former Head of the Civil Service, Mr Lim Siong Guan, put this national aspiration memorably, "Singapore is the best place in the world for you to have the opportunity to become the best you can be according to your talents and abilities. By all means, study and work anywhere, but always come home, where your hopes live and your memories are made." A home is where hopes live and memories are made. These are not obstacles to renewal. They are the human interests that fair renewal must carry forward.

I think, too, of the private estates I represent in Yio Chu Kang: Far Horizon Gardens, Bullion Park, Seasons Park, Castle Green, Nuovo and The Calrose. At Far Horizon Gardens, these questions have arrived. The others are at different stages, but every estate ages, and today's rules shape tomorrow's choices.

Pearl Bank shows what renewal can achieve. Far Horizon Gardens shows what prolonged uncertainty can exact. Across Yio Chu Kang, today's decisions will reach into Singaporeans' homes for years. We cannot preserve every building or resist every change. But if Parliament lowers the threshold for renewal, Parliament must raise the standard of fairness. Renewal must rest on durable consent. Compensation must preserve real choices. Speed must not outrun fairness.

Whether in Tiong Bahru and Outram, where I grew up, or in Yio Chu Kang, which I represent today, our responsibility is the same. We must make room for tomorrow without being careless with yesterday. We must renew buildings without uprooting belonging. We must renew our city without diminishing the dignity of those who make way. Then Singapore can keep changing, keep renewing and still feel like home. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Minister Edwin Tong.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Members who have spoken and for all the Members who have spoken, I thank you for your unanimous support for the Bill. Let me just quickly jump into the questions that have been raised and I grouped them into different categories.

The first group of questions relate to how we arrived at the revised thresholds and also the timelines in the Bill. Prof Kenneth Goh, Mr Lee Hong Chuang, Mr Yip Hon Weng, Mr Fadli Fawzi, Mr Andre Low, amongst others, raised questions on this.

First, let me talk about the calibration of the consent thresholds. Members would remember that I said at the start, the idea is to have a differentiated gradient. So, the older it is, we lower the threshold. I must say that we took into account the views expressed at consultations, as I expressed earlier but really, there is no science to it. It is a question of just it being a lower threshold than a younger development.

Let me also add that the success and failure of a collective sale, any collective sale, depends on many factors apart from the threshold levels alone. These include the site's specific location issues, the development potential, the terms of the sale offer and market conditions at that time, what is negotiated or capable of being negotiated between owners and developers and there really is a significant variation across developments.

I have explained the importance of facilitating the timely rejuvenation of older developments and that, at the end of the day, remains the primary consideration behind what we are doing in this Bill. This Bill seeks to strike a balance between differentiating the consent thresholds to ease the requirements for collective sales as developments age whilst at the same time preserving a meaningful level of majority support even for the oldest developments that this Bill caters for before any sale may proceed.

So, that, in short, is the logic behind the differentiated levels and as I said, there is really no science to it. It is a question of judgement and how we differentiate the different tiers of the age of the developments.

Second, Members also asked about the signature collection period, lowered from 12 months to six months. Let me elaborate on the point a bit more and explain our thinking behind this.

This period of time, as I said at the start, is usually the most difficult and, perhaps, the most polarising phase of a collective sale exercise for all owners. There will be sustained uncertainty and pressure, in some cases, persistent lobbying.

In one example, we received feedback that information on units that had not or refused to sign the CSA were then named on social media, on WhatsApp chatgroups, other communication groups, to try and pressure these owners into agreeing to the sale. I know it does not happen to everyone, does not happen across developments but by and large, the longer a period there is, the more likely it is that you find such practices.

At the same time, the uncertainty of whether or not a sale will go through also means that the MCST and the residents are, perhaps, less inclined to make investments into items that might require maintenance. For example, if you have a lift shaft, the example I cited earlier, that needs to be replaced, you have a number of lift shafts across different blocks, you might ask yourself: "Should I refrain from doing it whilst there is uncertainty given that we have an open period for signatures to be collected?"

So, these are among some of the considerations behind why we felt that a more focused period of time – six months – will drive parties to help to focus their minds on a collective sale decision and avoid the process from being too protracted.

It also, at the same time, enables earlier certainty on whether there will be sufficient support. And by doing that, reduces the exposure to market fluctuations between the start of the signature collection and the eventual launch of the sale. Otherwise, you could have a 12-month, if not, more period between when you first commit to the CSA on a certain fixed price and when you actually launched the development for sale.

We had considered the merits of a differentiated signature collection period, which some Members have suggested, based on criteria, such as the size of the development. But in the end, we decided not to do so because size really not necessarily the only indicator of complexity in the context of an en bloc sale.

And in fact, earlier on, I was listening carefully to the speeches. Mr Fadli Fawzi talked about size. So, he says maybe 300, maybe 500. Actually, that itself represents quite a big distinction – how big is big? Mr Yip Hon Weng then talks about maybe the older developments have older owners and that might need more time. So, where do you draw the line on complexity? What do you recognise? I think, yet, other Members talked about development having mixed units – residential and commercial – itself being more complicated and more complex.

So, if you start recognising each of these different characteristics, you will find that the general rule of six months or any timeframe that we want to enforce, will then get whittled away. And having a differentiated approach with different criteria itself then leads to even more complexity and inherently more uncertainty for the collective sale scheme. Likewise, as I said, it is also not practical to cater to all types of situations where individual owners might face impediments to getting signatures.

At the same time, let me assure Members of this House that before we decided on the timeframe here, we looked at past cases, cases that had been successful in the past.

The six-month period is supported by data collected from recent successful collective sale exercises. Data involving larger developments of more than a hundred units show that the rate of signature collection is seldom linear. In fact, it is non-linear during the collection period. A significant majority of signatures are typically gathered within the first four months or within a concentrated window of one to two months during the signature collection period.

We looked at several large developments as well and they were able to reach the 70% threshold within the six-month period. So, we use this data to inform, ultimately, how we saw the revisions. Collective sale exercises really have a better chance of succeeding when there is strong owner support and prior preparation by those driving the exercise.

Let me finally also add that in relation to the six-month timeframe. It does not just start when the window for signature collection opens up. In fact, there is a prior preparatory period. As you are convening the CSC, there would have been general meetings. You would have had to discuss how you deal with the sale proceeds, what is the pricing like, what are the terms and conditions. All that happens before you start to collect signatures. And of course, at that period of time, owners would already began to exercise their minds on whether they would be prepared, in principle, to a collective sale.

So, it is not just the six-month period where this becomes live. In this preparatory period, owners would have already started to think about and consider their position on the collective sale.

Having a focused, shorter period will mean that the CSC should ensure that the necessary information can be gathered up and shared with all relevant parties, including, as some Members mentioned, overseas owners and owners who are not residing in their properties. And this and other preparatory steps can be done ahead of the formal six-month signature collection period.

Overall, in our view, a single clear six-month timeframe will minimise disruption to owners in developments where there is insufficient support, as well as reduce the period where other important decisions, such as the maintenance and upkeep of the development, are put on hold pending the outcome of the collective sale process. We will, of course, as some Members have suggested, continue to monitor this regime closely, including if this Bill is passed, the new regime, taking in feedback from stakeholders after the amendments come into effect.

The next set of comments from Members relate to the strengthening of the existing safeguards. Let me address them in turn.

Starting with Mr Alex Yeo and Dr Wan Rizal's questions on whether stamp duty exemptions can be granted to owners involved in a collective sale. Sir, the current provisions already provide meaningful and targeted protection for non-consenting owners in relation to stamp duties. I mentioned this in my opening speech earlier.

Under the present rules in the Act today, a collective sale cannot proceed if it results in a financial loss to an objecting owner, and an objecting owner is considered to have incurred a financial loss if, amongst others, the proceeds of sale for their lot, after allowable deductions, are less than the price they originally paid for the unit.

The allowable deductions include stamp duties paid or payable on the sale or purchase of the unit, such as the Seller's Stamp Duty (SSD). Hence, if the proceeds of sale result in a financial loss for an objector, taking into account the SSD, the sale cannot proceed. SSD is designed to discourage short-term holding of residential properties and curb speculative activity. It is quite a different policy rationale from the en bloc collective sale regime that we are introducing in this Bill.

Owners who participate in a collective sale may incur SSD if the sale occurs within the applicable SSD holding period, which ranges from three to four years depending on when the property was acquired. Other allowable deductions include legal fees and other specified costs. And this is found in the Fourth Schedule which remains unchanged by this Bill.

So, therefore, for a collective sale to succeed, the CSA will have to account for any such stamp duties or any other deductibles for that matter, payable by non-consenting owners, when determining the apportionment of sale proceeds. So, as the sale and purchase agreement is negotiated, you have to look at the overall purchase price and on top of that, look at the apportionment to the individual owners, taking into account all of the deductibles allowed by the Fourth Schedule.

Sir, it would not be appropriate to exempt any class of owner completely from stamp duties as this regime, as I mentioned, serves an entirely distinct and different policy purpose.

ABSD, for example, aims to moderate investment demand for residential property to promote a stable and sustainable property market. It may apply to some owners who are purchasing a replacement property following a collective sale. But for a Singapore Citizen who has sold his/her existing property under a collective sale and does not own any other residential property at the time of purchasing a replacement residential unit, that person will not be liable for ABSD for the purchase of the replacement unit.

Second, on why the financial loss safeguard excludes units transacted after the S&P is signed with the purchaser, a point that I think Mr Yip Hon Weng raised, let me explain this.

We have to strike a balance between allowing genuine transactions to continue unhindered and discouraging speculative behaviour, which I think is the point that Mr Yip was raising. The current milestone, which is tied to the signing of the sale and purchase agreement, is the point at which the purchase price for the development has been formally agreed, crystalised, with the purchaser. That is the fixed price as agreed in the sale and purchase agreement. This means that at that time, the sale proceeds that each unit will receive becomes clear and the buyers can then take that into account when transacting. Prior to that, you might have an indicated price or you might have a potential market price, but nothing is fixed.

At earlier milestones in this process, another of Mr Yip's suggestions, if you go earlier than the sales and purchase agreement, such as when the CSA is opened for signature, at that juncture, it is not certain whether the collective sale will even proceed and if so, at what final price it will be. The negotiations are still going on and it will still be impacted by market conditions. And at the same time, setting the milestones earlier could then also disadvantage genuine buyers of the development purchasing the property for non-speculative reasons.

Third, on the requirement, which is existing for the lawyers appointed for the collective sale to be present, when an owner signs the CSA in Singapore, a point Mr Ang Wei Neng raised, let me just say that this is not just a matter of witnessing or a formal evidential requirement. We introduced the requirement for the physical presence of a lawyer in 2007 to address concerns that some owners were pressed to sign the CSA under duress or misrepresentation. It is a substantive safeguard.

Earlier, Ms He Ting Ru and Mr Andre Low also asked about whether there could be recourse to owners, information that they might seek. This is why we introduced the presence of a lawyer. If you go back to the Hansard and look at why we said it would be useful to have a lawyer introduced into the process, we said it would be useful to have a lawyer present as this offers owners an opportunity to ask lawyers to explain the legal terms, liabilities, what is outstanding on a mortgage, what they might have to incur by way of costs, address any doubts that they might have. And so, this was the logic behind the 2007 amendments that remains today.

This requirement, as I said, gives the opportunity for owners to ask lawyers to explain the legal terms, explain the liabilities and address their doubts. For example, it might be on the matter of apportionment, what are deductibles and how would the apportionment exercise take into account the deductibles and what amounts would be left as their sale proceeds.

Retaining this physical requirement therefore will better ensure that this safeguard is not weakened. If needed or necessary, CSC can already work with the appointed lawyers, to make special arrangements to accommodate signing by individuals in Singapore, who may face mobility issues or might, for some reasons, require additional assistance. I would add that the requirement of a physical presence of a lawyer only applies where the CSA is signed in Singapore, not when it is signed overseas.

Fourth, Members have suggested introducing further safeguards to mandate that certain support or information be provided to owners. Again, Mr Yip raised it; Mr Lee Hong Chuang, Mr Alex Yeo, Dr Wan Rizal and I think Mr Andre Low as well.

I would say that much of this information and support already exists in this framework but we will be happy to consider whether any additional support might be necessary. But let me just broadly sketch out what is now available.

Information is available on the collective sale process on the website of the STB. Owners can also tap into legal support resources available to members of the public generally, including from Pro Bono SG's Community Legal Clinics. And we will work with the STB to enhance the relevant information after these amendments are introduced as well as the guides that are available on the collective sale process, so that those who are affected by collective sales will be better informed.

In addition, the Act, the Land Titles (Strata) Act, also already requires that individuals standing for election as a member of a CSC has to declare their own position, potential conflicts of interests at the general meeting convened for the election of these members. The terms and conditions of the CSA and the apportionment of sale proceeds are to be approved by owners at such a general meeting.

CSCs are also to provide a preface to the CSA, which states the clause numbers and page numbers where key information can be found, including the apportionment method for the proceeds of sale. That perhaps is the most important information for a seller, as well as the fees payable to parties involved in handling the collective sale, such as lawyers, professional agents and the like.

Beyond this, we do not see a need for the law to be prescriptive on what exactly you provide, by who and at what juncture, because each set of owners within each development will have different considerations.

For some of these matters, such as more administrative; and maybe convenience matters, such as relocation arrangements, these are terms that can be negotiated directly with the purchaser. Some might need more of it if you have more elderly, more senior members. Some might not need them. And so, we decided not to prescribe what exactly you need to do or cater for in the statute itself.

We often find that appointed marketing agents step in to help, because at the end of the day, they want to facilitate the sale, they want to see whether or not they are able to assist the non-consenting owners with some of their concerns, and they step in. So, we would rather leave the market to decide and negotiate and handle these specific concerns.

There is sufficient time between the signing of a CSA and the eventual legal completion of a sale. So, it does not happen in quick succession, there is a timeframe for this. For example, even after the collective sale threshold is reached, owners then have up to 12 months to find a prospective buyer and make submissions to the STB, and this is also time to review their applications. Should an order be issued for the sale, there are further downstream steps before legal completion will be undertaken and before the units need to be vacated.

So, my point is that, there is a timeframe and it will not be overnight upon the signing of the CSA, or upon finding a buyer with a sale and purchase agreement, that parties then have to quickly move and vacate.

Lastly, enquiries on planning parameters can already be made today as part of a collective sale exercise. So, for example, a CSC can make an application for outline planning permission to the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) during the collective sale process to test proposals for future users of the site. Ultimately, it is in the interest of the CSC and owners to clarify the development potential of the site, as it reduces misalignment with potential buyers, and also improves the prospects of a successful sale and purchase agreement being concluded.

Let me also assure Members who have raised the issue of continual reviews that we will do so, as we do with every piece of legislation and all the Bills that we introduce. We will review the collective sale framework, taking into account feedback from all stakeholders and the suggestions given by various Members today.

Let me say that today, information is already collected for a successful collective sale exercise when the sale application is filed with the STB. Of course, there is no requirement in legislation for such information to be provided when the collective sale exercise fails. We are working with the relevant agencies, such as MND and URA, to explore other ways of collecting more information, which can then better inform future policy reviews.

But we stopped short of introducing such a requirement in legislation as it would likely be onerous and it could then lead to legal disputes between owners if parties fail to comply with reporting requirements, particularly if penalties are introduced for late or non-submission.

Next, let me turn to the series of technical queries raised by some Members – Mr Yip Hon Weng, Mr Alex Yeo, in particular. First, on the age of the development and how we compute the age, which are completed in phases. I heard Mr Yip's speech earlier. He comes from the perspective of why not allow a development to be counted as older, even if some parts of the development might be newer. I think that is the nub of Mr Yip's speech. What we have done is: we take reference from the date of completion of the latest building and this ensures that the newest unit in the development will then still be subject to the respective consent thresholds for at least the prescribed minimum period of time.

So, if you buy into a unit, you are the last block of the development to complete, you will be able to avail yourself of the consent thresholds at the higher levels, at 80%, 90%, before you go into the older thresholds, and it is for this reason that we felt it was fairer, because you then measure it based on the youngest unit, youngest development, rather than the oldest one. This is fairer to the owner of the newest unit.

There was also a query on section 127 of the Land Titles (Strata) Act, I think again from Mr Yip. This applies where there are subsisting flat leases registered under the Registration of Deeds Act and the land in the development is vested in the flat lessees as tenants in common in the shares shown in the share register. It is a technical amendment.

Currently, section 127 provides for a strata title application to be lodged with the Registrar by flat lessees who, altogether, own at least 25% of the total number of flats. Our amendments do not change this. The new proposed 127(3A) is a clarification amendment, which inserts a deeming provision that the agreement of this 25% of flat lessees will bind the remaining flat lessees and cause the strata title application to be registered, on par with the existing sections 125(6) and 126(5). The flat lessees who are not part of the 25% will not be disadvantaged by this strata title plan application under section 127, because under the new strata title plan, they will still own their flats as well as their share of the underlying land, so there is no prejudice to these owners.

Mr Alex Yeo asks about a private land owner's reversionary interest in the land. He says that the unit owners in such developments question about the valuation. The response is: the unit owners in such developments can today already trigger a collective sale of their leasehold development, based on the consent thresholds in the Act today. There is a limited number of such developments. If there is a need for the unit owners or developer to acquire an interest in the underlying land from another party to facilitate redevelopment, this needs to be mutually agreed by all parties involved.

Mr Ang asked about the issuance of notional shares. We agree. We try, as far as we can, not to inconvenience the owners, and it is not always the case that a fresh survey will be required. Owners can submit existing official records that are sufficiently verified, and it is only if additional information or documentation that might be needed to work out the shares that the Registrar will follow up with the owners concerned on a case-by-case basis.

Mr Yeo, I think, asked about the sinking funds. This review is overseen by MND and I understand that BCA has completed a round of public consultation on the proposed areas of review of the Building (Strata Management) Act and will provide an update when ready.

Finally, a few Members have asked about VERS – Ms Cassandra Lee, Mr Fadli Fawzi, Mr Andre Low – a number have talked about it. But as Ms He Ting Ru says, the issue of VERS goes beyond the scope of this Bill. This Bill deals with private strata developments, and it deals with a situation where parties, owners come together by majority and decide on what to do in effecting a sale, and it deals with altering the thresholds for these private strata developments. VERS is for HDB. HDB, in contrast, maintains and upgrades the HDB flats through its own programmes. So, it is quite a different platform.

Having said that, I accept what Ms Cassandra Lee says about there being learning points between both the public as well as the private market, and these are factors that will be taken into account, and at the appropriate time, the relevant Ministry will come back with VERS. And I want to assure Members as well that when we put up a programme, whether it is a Bill like this to amend the collective sale framework, or eventually, when VERS is brought to this House, it will have the support of the Government. MND will talk to MinLaw, we will share our experiences on the collective sale regime and the learning points will be shared across the different agencies.

While I am on this point, I just want to, on a related note, comment on Mr Andre Low and Mr Fadli Fawzi's comment. I think it is also not relevant to this Bill, but there was a comment that, oh, if we can do en bloc collective sale regimes like this, why not consider doing this, in place of having to use Maju or Gillman Barracks for developments?

Let me just say that this is both too simplistic, as well as unrealistic. And it also betrays a lack of understanding of both frameworks. In the context of this Bill, as I said, we are facilitating the options for older developments to undertake an en bloc. Whether it happens, we have no control. When it happens, we have no control. It might be a big development. It might be a small development. Again, we have no control.

In contrast, HDB plans its housing estates many years in advance. It is simply not possible to decide to plan for an HDB housing estate based on the fact that we might have a collective sale. And so, I hope the Members understand that the two issues are not to be conflated, and to try and do so, I think, represents a too simplistic and as I said, an unrealistic approach.

Sir, to conclude, let me thank the Members again for their unanimous support for this Bill, as well as for their thoughtful feedback and suggestions. We will take all this on board. We will continue to make the necessary improvements to the regime, to ensure that it continues to be fit for purpose, meets Singapore's objectives and allows us the ultimate objective of rejuvenation and renewal in land-scarce Singapore. Sir, with that, I seek to move. [Applause.]

Before I ask Members for clarifications. Leader, would you like to move the Exempted Business Motion?