Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill

Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs.

Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and the Minister for Home Affairs, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

Sir, Singapore's scams situation has improved since 2025. After consecutive years of increases, both scam cases and losses fell in 2025. This improvement continued into the first half of 2026, where reported scam cases fell by 14.4% to about 16,800 cases, while losses fell by 17.9% to about $411 million, compared to the same period last year.

This progress is a result of our strong public-private collaboration, robust enforcement and legal framework, and the adoption of technology. I would like to thank Members of this House for your strong support in our anti-scam efforts, and your personal contributions to spreading anti-scam public education to your constituents.

Our fight, however, is far from over. We still receive on average about 90 reported scam cases, involving about $2 million lost, every day. Globally, the scam situation continues to worsen, as syndicates evade international enforcement action. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that scam losses in East and Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand approximately tripled between 2023 and 2025. Scammers are also using increasingly sophisticated technologies to deceive victims.

Singapore's wealth density makes us an extremely lucrative target and scam syndicates spare no effort in adapting and attempting to overcome our safeguards. This is why addressing scams remains a top priority for the Government. This Bill advances our fight against scams in three ways: one, it supports information exchange between the Police and various service providers for scam disruption; second, it enhances the Government's legal levers to combat scams on online platforms; and third, it strengthens the Police's ability to disrupt the supply of scam accounts and conduct anti-scam operations.

Sir, I will first touch on amendments supporting information exchange.

Scammers rely on enablers, such as phone lines, online accounts and bank accounts, to reach victims and carry out their schemes. These enablers are provided by different service providers, including banks, digital payment token service providers, telecommunications companies and online service providers. When scammers register for or use these enablers, they leave behind digital footprints that can serve as scam signals. These signals allow us to identify and disrupt other parts of the scam infrastructure. For example, a phone number detected by a telecommunications company as being used for scams, may also be linked to a bank account used to receive scam proceeds.

Today, scam signals are not being shared widely or quickly enough to disrupt scams effectively. To overcome technical limitations on this front, I announced during the Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA's) Committee of Supply debate earlier this year, that the Police and the Home Team Science and Technology Agency (HTX), are developing the National Scams List (NSL).

The NSL is a platform to facilitate the exchange of information on suspicious scam accounts between the Government and service providers at speed and at scale. This Bill, in turn, provides the legal powers to enable and safeguard such information exchange on NSL and other information-sharing platforms. Information-sharing platforms, like the NSL, allow the Police to disrupt scam accounts early and facilitate information disclosure. To empower the Police to operationalise such platforms, clause 7 introduces new orders into the Protection from Scams Act 2025.

First, we will introduce Account Disabling Orders (ADOs). ADOs will empower the Police to direct a service provider to disable an account, if the Police suspect or have reason to believe that the account has been or will be used preparatory to or in furtherance of a scam-related offence. This threshold is lower than the existing threshold for disruption under the Criminal Procedure Code. This is necessary for the Police to proactively disable the account even before the scam takes place. This allows a shift in approach from reactive to proactive. The Order may identify the specific account to be disabled or specify conditions for identifying suspicious accounts that should be disabled.

Accounts may be disabled under ADOs for up to 30 days, with one possible extension of up to another 30 days. Clauses 8 and 9 amend the Protection from Scams Act to allow persons affected by ADOs to appeal to the Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner may designate an officer not below the rank of Superintendent, or its equivalent, to hear and determine the appeal. Non-compliance with an ADO will be a criminal offence.

Second, we will introduce Disclosure Orders (DOs). DOs will allow the Police to direct service providers to disclose information relating to an account provided by the service provider. The Police will need to be satisfied that the disclosure is necessary or expedient to prevent the commission of a scam-related offence and believe on reasonable grounds that the service provider is capable of disclosing the information. The wilful and reckless submission of false and misleading information pursuant to a DO, as well as the non-compliance with a DO, will be an offence.

Service providers have raised concerns that participating in information-sharing platforms could expose them to additional liability, especially where they act voluntarily. For example, civil liability could arise from breaches of confidentiality obligations. This Bill balances these considerations by providing immunity from liability, while limiting it to actions taken for the prevention and detection of scam-related offences.

Clause 10 introduces protections for service providers from criminal and civil liability for actions done, or omitted to be done, in good faith and with reasonable care to comply with an ADO or DO. Clause 11 introduces protections for prescribed service providers for voluntarily disclosing information. These service providers may voluntarily disclose information to a specified officer or a prescribed Singapore public service agency. This is despite confidentiality obligations, including under the Personal Data Protection Act and the Banking Act. Certain circumstances need to be met, including: first, the information is disclosed to a specified officer or a prescribed Singapore public sector agency in the prescribed form and manner; second, the information is disclosed for the purpose of preventing a scam-related offence; third, the information disclosed was obtained by the service provider in the course of complying with, or on the basis of information contained in an ADO or DO, that was issued to the service provider; and lastly, the disclosure was done in good faith and with reasonable care.

Clause 11 also introduces protections for service providers from civil liability for voluntarily preventing the use of an account for up to 30 days. Similarly, certain circumstances need to be met, including: first, the service provider suspected or had reason to believe that the account has been or will be used for a scam-related offence; second, this suspicion or belief was wholly or partially based on information shared via an ADO or DO; and third, it was done in good faith and with reasonable care.

To protect the confidentiality of shared information, clause 7 makes it an offence for the unauthorised disclosure or use of information obtained through an ADO or DO. Service providers will also be required to implement safeguards, prescribed through subsidiary legislation, to protect the confidentiality of such information. Failure to do so will be an offence.

Let me now move on to changes to the Online Criminal Harms Act 2023 (OCHA). OCHA was passed in Parliament in July 2023 and since its commencement in February 2024, the Police have used OCHA to fight scams in two main ways.

One, to issue ex-post directions to online service providers to take down scam-related content; and two, to issue ex-ante Codes of Practice or Implementation Directives, to require designated online service providers to impose preventive anti-scam measures on their platforms. Today, the designated online services are WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat, Apple, Google, Carousell, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok.

After two years of operationalisation, MHA is now proposing three amendments to ensure that the law remains an effective tool in our fight against scams.

First, we will empower the Competent Authority to impose financial penalties on designated online service providers for non-compliance with the Codes of Practice or Implementation Directives.

Today, platforms that fail to comply with a Code of Practice requirement may be issued with a Rectification Notice. Non-compliance with a Rectification Notice or Implementation Directive is an offence punishable with a fine not exceeding $1 million, and to a further fine of $100,000 for every day or part of a day during which the offence continues after conviction. These fines are imposed by the Courts upon conviction.

While criminal prosecution remains necessary in serious cases, charging non-compliant platforms in Court may not be an efficient way to deal with less egregious cases. This Bill empowers the Competent Authority to issue an administrative financial penalty to more swiftly address and deter non-compliant behaviour.

Clauses 21, 23 and 27 amend the framework in OCHA for non-compliance with Codes of Practice and Implementation Directives. Going forward, for each instance of non-compliance with the Code of Practice, the Competent Authority may impose a penalty of up to $10 million, or issue a Rectification Notice to rectify the non-compliance with the Code of Practice. Where the non-compliance relates to an Implementation Directive, the Competent Authority may similarly impose a penalty of up to $10 million or issue a compliance order to the Implementation Directive. Failure to comply with a Rectification Notice or compliance order is a criminal offence. The Courts may impose a fine not exceeding $10 million and in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not exceeding $300,000 for every day or part of a day during which the offence continues after conviction.

Let me make two points about these changes.

First, this approach retains criminal prosecution as an option, alongside the new financial penalty regime. The Competent Authority will decide which is appropriate, based on the facts of each case, considering factors which include the nature and severity of scam harm caused by the non-compliance, the culpability of the platform and its antecedent.

Second, we have set the maximum administrative financial penalty and fine that the Competent Authority and the Courts respectively can impose at $10 million. This maximum penalty will be the highest fixed quantum financial penalty in Singapore's statute book.

We do not take this decision lightly. But it is necessary to provide an adequate deterrent against non-compliance by online platforms, commensurate with the scale of the challenge we are facing, and the severity of harm that scams delivered through online platforms can cause. Members will recall that a scam victim lost $4.9 million from a single scam case involving the impersonation of senior Government officials on several online platforms, including WhatsApp. Imagine what the scam losses would be had this modus operandi been executed at scale.

As the new penalty regime will allow the Competent Authority to impose administrative financial penalties directly on designated online service providers without going through the Courts, we will introduce safeguards to ensure due process. Clause 23 will require the Competent Authority to inform the designated online service provider of its intent to impose penalties and to allow the designated online service provider to make written representations explaining why the penalty should not be imposed.

The designated online service provider will have at least seven days to make these representations and the Competent Authority may decide, after assessing the written representation, whether to proceed, vary or withdraw the penalty. If the Competent Authority decides to proceed to impose financial penalties, the designated online service provider may appeal to the Minister for Home Affairs, whose decision is final.

While we fully intend to continue our collaborative approach of consulting and working with designated online service providers, the Government will not hesitate to take firm action against errant online service providers that allow their platforms to be exploited by scammers.

The second key amendment to OCHA is in clause 19, which will allow OCHA directions to be given by the operation of a computer program, including those leveraging AI or machine learning technologies.

Members will be aware that scammers have been using sophisticated technologies, including generative AI, to create highly convincing scam content, faster and at lower cost. To stay ahead, we too must leverage AI more extensively in our scam disruption efforts. We want to use AI not just to assist in human decision-making, but also to issue OCHA directions in situations where scam content has been identified with a high degree of confidence.

To ensure human accountability for the issuance of OCHA directions, clause 19 provides that a direction can be given by a computer program for which the head of the agency using the program is responsible. For example, this could be the Permanent Secretary of a Ministry or the Chief Executive of a Statutory Board.

The existing appeal mechanism for OCHA directions continues to apply. Appellants may apply to a designated officer for reconsideration and thereafter, to an independent Reviewing Tribunal comprising a District Judge or Magistrate.

We will also ensure that AI systems are implemented with the appropriate safeguards, such as human assessment for lower confidence decisions and regular audit checks.

The last key amendment to OCHA will support a more comprehensive approach to scam prevention.

Clause 20 will allow the Competent Authority to impose requirements on designated online service providers, which indirectly counter the commission of scams or malicious cyber activity, such as public education initiatives. This allows the Government to direct the online platforms to work with us on scam education initiatives, which are a vital component of our whole-of-society anti-scam strategy.

Clause 22 makes clear that measures imposed by an Implementation Directive are to be implemented until the Implementation Directive is cancelled or substituted.

Clause 26 makes clear that the Competent Authority can require a designated online service provider to provide information to assess their compliance with any Code of Practice or Implementation Directive, or to assess whether a Code of Practice or Implementation Directive should be issued to the service provider. This allows the Government to evaluate the performance of online service providers vis-à-vis requirements set by the Competent Authority.

Mr Speaker, the amendments I have shared so far focus on legislative amendments that underpin our collaboration with service providers to combat scams. I will now move to amendments directed at those who facilitate scams.

Let me first turn to those who misuse online accounts, such as Carousell or WhatsApp accounts, to facilitate scams. We have observed instances where individuals sell their online accounts to scammers. These accounts may even have been Singpass-verified, and can be very convincing to potential victims, luring them into a false sense of legitimacy. We must take a firm stance against such misuse of online accounts.

Clause 16 introduces new offences against those who misuse accounts from designated online services, to facilitate criminal activity. In particular, under the new sections 39GA and 39GC of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 (or MOA), it will be an offence for a person to supply or offer to supply a designated online account to another person; or provide or offer to provide personal information to another person, or consent or offer to consent to personal information being used by another person for the purpose of opening a designated online account, if the person knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the designated online account will be used for an unlawful purpose.

Like other scam-related offences, such as the misuse of SIM cards and bank accounts, we expect the Police to face evidential difficulties in proving the offender's criminal intent. Scam mules often claim that they acted because they were paid and were unaware of the serious consequences of their actions.

To address this, going forward, a person is presumed to have known that the designated online account will be used for an unlawful purpose in any of the following scenarios: one, the person supplied the designated online account or provided or consented to the use of his or her personal information for any gain; two, the person failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the identity and the physical location of the person receiving the designated online account, or using the personal information to open a designated online account; or three, the person failed to take reasonable steps to find out the recipient's purpose for obtaining the designated online account, or using the personal information to open a designated online account.

Under the new section 39GB of MOA, it will also be an offence for a person to receive or offer to receive a designated online account, or retain control of a designated online account opened using another person's personal information if the person does so with the intention to use or supply the designated online account for an unlawful purpose.

Similarly, a person who receives a designated online account is presumed to have intended to use or supply the account for an unlawful purpose, if the person received the account for any gain. This is intended to address the challenge of proving criminal intent.

The penalties for the new offences for misuse of online accounts will be pegged to the misuse of SIM cards under MOA. Offenders who are individuals will be liable for a fine not exceeding $10,000, or imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both. As for the offences under the new sections 39GA and 39GB regarding supplying designated online accounts, receiving designated online accounts and retaining control of designated online accounts opened using the personal information of others, the prescribed penalty for a second or subsequent conviction in respect of an individual person is a fine not exceeding $20,000, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both.

In addition, discretionary caning of not more than 12 strokes will apply where the individual knew or intended that the designated online account would be used to commit or facilitate any scam offence. All the new offences will also apply to corporations and unincorporated associations. As such entities cannot be subjected to imprisonment or caning, the maximum fines for entities will be double the amount for individuals.

Similar to the offences for the misuse of SIM cards, the offences for the misuse of online accounts will also apply extraterritorially, as long as there is a proven link to harm in Singapore. This is necessary, as most scam syndicates operate from overseas. The offences for the misuse of online accounts will also be arrestable.

To be clear, we do not intend to catch those who use designated online accounts for a lawful purpose. A person who receives, supplies or retains the control of a designated online account or provides personal information to another to open a designated online account will not be liable for an offence, if the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the purpose of the act was to facilitate the use of or access to the designated online account for a lawful purpose.

So, what constitutes such reasonable grounds to believe, would depend on the facts of the case. For example, if a person sets up a WhatsApp account for his or her parent or child thinking that it is solely for their legitimate personal daily use and is able to provide a credible explanation as to why he or she was led to think so, reasonable grounds to believe may be established. On the other hand, if a person does so for a stranger with no questions asked as to the purpose of the stranger, or was paid by the stranger to do so, reasonable grounds to believe would likely not be established. Ultimately, this would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Next, we will empower the Police to impose restrictions on certain individuals' access to services that could be exploited to facilitate scams.

In October 2025, the Singapore Police Force (SPF), the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and the Government Technology Agency of Singapore (GovTech) implemented the Facility Restriction Framework. Under the framework, scam mules who: one, have been warned, issued with composition sums, prosecuted or convicted of mule-related offences; or two, are under investigation for mule-related offences and are assessed to be at risk of further facilitating scams may face targeted restrictions on their access to facilities, and these facilities may include digital banking, card and automated teller machine (ATM) services, the subscription of new telephone lines and the use of Singpass. These restrictions are risk-calibrated and take into account these individuals' basic financial and communications needs.

Service providers, such as banks and telecommunications companies today comply with the restrictions imposed under the Facility Restriction Framework either voluntarily or pursuant to requirements determined by their sectoral regulators. The Police today cannot compel service providers to impose such restrictions on persons.

Clause 7 of the Bill introduces a new set of orders, Service Limitation Orders (SLOs), under the Protection from Scams Act 2025. SLOs empower the Police to require service providers to restrict the provision of services to a person for a period of up to three years. The Police may issue an SLO if the Police suspect, or have reason to believe, that the identified person will use the service specified to commit or facilitate a scam-related offence.

Service providers that do not comply with an SLO will be liable for an offence. Service providers that comply with an SLO in good faith and with reasonable care, will be protected from criminal and civil liability. Individuals subjected to restrictions pursuant to an SLO may appeal to the Commissioner of Police, and the Commissioner of Police may designate an officer not below the rank of Superintendent or equivalent to hear and determine the appeal.

Finally, I will touch on two legislative amendments that will be introduced to support Police operations.

First, with the launch of the Cyber Command in July 2026, SPF will be recruiting civilian talent with the right aptitude and skillsets to the Cyber Command. To support this and the Police's future manpower needs, clause 31 amends the Police Force Act to empower the Minister for Home Affairs to appoint Civilian Specialist Officers (CSOs).

CSOs will be accorded the necessary powers to investigate any suspected offence which appears to him or her to have been committed under any written law. These include the powers to search, arrest, seize and request for documents. SPF may also deploy CSOs to support other Police units, requiring specialist skillsets in the future.

Second, clause 6 amends the Protection from Scams Act 2025 to empower specified officers, including Police Officers, Commercial Affairs Officers and CSOs, to obtain information on persons who must be notified of the issuance of a Restriction Order under the Protection from Scams Act. This is necessary as banks are today unable to provide information necessary for the Police to notify persons affected by the Restriction Order, given the banking confidentiality obligations under the Banking Act.

Mr Speaker, before I conclude, let me say a few words in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, scam cases and losses in Singapore have fallen significantly since last year, but scams continue to pose a serious threat to our people. At present, the Police has received an average of about 90 scam reports every day, with average daily losses amounting to $2 million. Scammers are relentless and their methods are constantly evolving. They constantly exploit new technologies to find new ways to swindle our people out of their hard-earned money. As a highly developed economy, Singapore is naturally an attractive target for scam syndicates.

This Bill will strengthen Singapore’s ability to combat scams in three ways.

First, we will continue to take firm action against money mules and those who facilitate scams. Scammers often misuse other people’s accounts to conceal their identities and move criminal proceeds. We will further strengthen our laws to combat the misuse of online accounts and impose severe penalties on those who sell or hand over their accounts to others. I urge everyone not to provide others with your online accounts, passwords or personal information. What may appear to be a small favour or an easy way to earn money could cause immense harm to others and expose you to serious legal consequences.

Second, we will enhance our capabilities to disrupt scam networks more swiftly and proactively. Scammers rely on networks of various accounts and services to perpetrate scams. This Bill will help the Police and service providers exchange scam-related information more quickly, identify suspicious accounts and take steps to disrupt them before more people fall victim. By intervening early, we can reduce the number of victims and, we hope, the losses suffered. At the same time, we will put in place robust safeguards and appeal and review mechanisms to ensure that enforcement powers are exercised carefully and fairly.

Third, we will require online platforms to shoulder greater responsibility. Online platforms remain the main channel through which scammers reach victims. In the first half of this year, about 90% of scam cases involved online platforms. The Government will therefore increase the penalties for designated online service providers that fail to fulfil their anti-scam obligations. For platforms that breach a Code of Practice or Implementation Directive under the OCHA, the maximum penalty for each instance of non-compliance will be raised to S$10 million.

Everyone has a part to play in combating scams. Government agencies, businesses, families and individuals all have important roles. By not selling our accounts, heeding anti-scam warnings and proactively sharing anti-scam advice with our seniors, each of us can contribute to scam prevention.

Scammers do not just take away money. They can destroy years of savings, erode trust between individuals and rob our seniors of their peace of mind. The Government will continue to strengthen our relevant laws and enhance our capabilities to combat scams so that Singapore remains a safe, secure and trusted home to live and work in.

(In English): Mr Speaker, Sir, every scam is more than a statistic. Each case involves a victim who may have lost his hard-earned life savings, destroyed his confidence in digital transactions, or demolished his trust in the people around him. Scams strike not only at individual victims, but at the very trust underpinning our digital economy and our way of life.

The measures in this Bill are firm, but they are also calibrated. They preserve accountability, provide safeguards and appeal mechanisms, and support constructive collaboration with service providers. This balance is important – we must act decisively against scammers and their enablers, while maintaining public confidence that powers will be exercised carefully and fairly.

The improvement in our scam situation shows that our efforts can make a tangible difference. But scammers will continue to adapt and so must we. Our response must be sustained, coordinated and always forward-looking. The Government will continue to review our laws and strengthen our operational capabilities against scams, so that Singapore remains a trusted, safe and secure place to live, work and transact. Sir, I beg to move.

Question proposed.

Ms Jessica Tan.

Mr Speaker, scams today are not just crimes of deception. They are crimes of exploitation. They target people at their most vulnerable. Seniors who struggle with digital interfaces, young people navigating online spaces, migrant workers far from home, families who simply want to trust that the messages they receive are safe and even digitally literate individuals who fall prey because the scam looks legitimate or because they are caught off guard in a moment of urgency or distraction. These are ordinary people going about their daily lives.

And scammers exploit not just digital gaps, but human moments – trust, fatigue, routine and instinct. The Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill is fundamentally about protecting these groups. It strengthens our ability to detect scams early, disrupt them quickly and hold accountable those who enable them, whether individuals or large online platforms.

So, why is this Bill necessary? Scam losses have risen sharply in recent years. Behind every statistic is a person who has lost savings, confidence and often, dignity. Many victims tell us they feel ashamed, even though they did nothing wrong. They were simply targeted at a moment of vulnerability.

Scammers today operate across multiple platforms – bank accounts, e-wallets, SIM cards, social media, messaging apps. They exploit gaps between systems and the Bill closes these gaps. It gives the Police practical tools to act faster: (a) the DO that compel banks, telcos and platforms to share information quickly when an account is suspected to be involved in scams; (b) ADOs that allow the Police to temporarily disable scam linked accounts for up to 30 days, extendable once; and (c) SLOs that limit access to digital services for individuals assessed to be enabling scams.

These powers are designed for speed. They allow intervention at the earliest signs of suspicious activity, before more victims are drawn in. While this Bill is necessarily reactive, it comes into play when scam activity has already surfaced, but it is still essential because frauds continue to occur despite preventive safeguards and we need swift powers to minimise harm once they are detected.

For many scams, timing is everything. Once a fraudulent account or phone line is identified, every hour that passes means more people may be deceived. The Bill's new Orders, especially the ADOs, allow the Police to act within hours, not days. This is crucial for seniors who may not recognise scam patterns until it is too late and for families who may respond instinctively to urgent messages.

We should also look at how advanced artificial intelligence (AI)-driven and multi-layered protection can stop scam activity and financial fraud before it reaches businesses and users. Instead of relying only on rigid, reactive, rule-based systems, many technology companies today are already using global threat intelligence and machine learning models to deliver real time, proactive risk assessment at scale. I hope that our Government agencies will continue working closely with industry players to tap these capabilities for faster detection, quicker escalation and rapid takedowns.

I also urge us to pay closer attention to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). SMEs often do not have the same resources as large corporations to invest in sophisticated cyber defences, fraud monitoring tools or dedicated response teams. As scammers increasingly target weaker links in the ecosystem, helping SMEs strengthen their safeguards is not only important for business continuity, it also protects consumers, employees and the wider supply chain.

Many vulnerable groups rely heavily on trust – trust in banks, trust in Government messages and trust in online platforms. By raising penalties for non-compliant platforms from $1 million to $10 million, the Bill compels platforms to invest in better verification, clearer warnings and faster takedowns of scam content. This is especially important for those who may not know how to distinguish between legitimate messages from fraudulent ones.

Reducing the shame and stigma of being scammed. When the system responds quickly and visibly, victims feel supported rather than blamed. The Bill signals that responsibility does not fall solely on individuals, it is shared across institutions, platforms and regulators.

The criminalisation of online account mule activity is a significant step. We know that youths are increasingly targeted to sell or to lend their online accounts, often without understanding the consequences. This Bill sends a clear message: online accounts are gateways to harm and misuse will be taken seriously. But it also allows early intervention before young people are drawn deeper into criminal networks.

With stronger powers must come stronger safeguards. The Bill provides avenues for appeals, limits the duration of account restrictions and requires clear evidence before orders are issued. For vulnerable individuals who may be wrongly flagged, these safeguards are essential. They ensure that the enforcement is firm but fair and that trust in the system is maintained.

But could this Bill have gone further in enabling faster disruption?

Mr Speaker, the Bill makes meaningful progress. But as scams evolve, we must ask whether more can be done to act faster. There are three areas where enhancements could be considered.

One, real time cross platform alerting. Today, DOs allow information sharing when the Police initiate action. A future step could be automated, real time alerts between banks, telcos and platforms when suspicious behaviour is detected, without waiting for a formal order. This would mirror how fraud detection works in financial institutions and could stop scams within minutes.

Pre-emptive restrictions for high-risk accounts. Some accounts show repeated patterns of suspicious behaviour but do not yet meet the threshold for disabling. A tiered system of preventive friction, such as temporary limits or mandatory identity re-verification could prevent losses while investigations continue.

Third, mandatory rapid response protocols for platforms. This Bill increases penalties for non-compliance, but it does not yet specify response time standards. Setting clear expectations, for example, requiring platforms to act within a defined number of hours within notification of scam content, could significantly reduce exposure time for victims. These are areas for future consideration and I raise them because vulnerable groups benefit most when intervention is not just strong, but swift.

Ultimately, this Bill is not just about enforcement. It is about building a digital environment where people, especially those who are vulnerable, feel safe to participate, transact and communicate. It strengthens coordination across agencies. It compels platforms to step up and it gives the Police the tools they need to act decisively.

Scams and fraud must also be tackled collectively, both domestically and internationally, because the infrastructure of deception rarely respects national boundaries. I hope we continue to deepen partnerships with industry and overseas counterparts, including through global signal exchange, priority flagging and rapid takedown arrangements for phishing sites, impersonation accounts and other scam enablers.

But legislation alone is not enough. We must continue investing in public education, in community outreach and in digital literacy programmes. Vulnerable groups need not just protection, but empowerment.

At the same time, these measures should not lead citizens to become over-reliant on Government's safeguards. Protection must go hand in hand with personal vigilance, sound judgement and responsibility for the choices we make online, including the accounts we lend, the links we click and the information we share.

Mr Speaker, scams erode trust, trust in institutions, trust in technology, and trust in one another. This Bill helps rebuild that trust. It protects those who are most at risk, holds accountable those who enable harm and strengthens Singapore's resilience against evolving digital threats. I support the Bill.

Ms He Ting Ru.

Mr Speaker, scams are a scourge on our society. There has been progress made in public education efforts, but an unfortunate situation has arisen where most of us know someone who refuses to answer phone calls from unknown numbers or decide against using Internet banking services out of an abundance of mistrust for fear being scammed.

This is against a decline in the number of reported scam cases and amounts lost to scams, breaking the upward trend recorded from 2021 to 2024.

SPF's 2025 Scams and Cybercrime Brief reported a 27.6% drop in scams compared with 2024 and an approximately 17.92% decrease in the total amount lost to scams within that same period. Yet, the problem is still sizeable.

As Second Minister for Home Affairs Sim Ann pointed out during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Offences) Bill last year, between 2020 and the first half of 2025, scams comprised approximately 60%, an outright majority of all crimes reported to the Police.

The scam mitigation and enforcement efforts set out in this Bill are important. But we have to ensure, at the same time, that we tackle the problem on all fronts and that the measures enacted, especially those which involve law enforcement intervention are fair, transparent and understandable to the public. Crucially, our anti-scam efforts should do more to target dismantling the networks and systems that fuel such crimes, providing restitution to victims, and ensuring that communities are well-equipped to guard themselves against scams.

This Bill strengthens the Government's arsenal of anti-scam enforcement tools.

Clause 7 introduces two new orders which law enforcement can issue to service providers, whether they are banks, payment services, telecommunications companies, or online service providers. An ADO requires service providers to disable specific accounts for anti-scam purposes, while a SLO, which builds on the provision set out in the facility restriction framework, mandate service providers, restrict a specific user from using a scam enabling service.

At the same time, clause 19 of the Bill allows a responsible officer to use computer programs to issue a Part 2 directive under OCHA. Such programs may also involve the usage of artificial intelligence (AI) to flag suspicious accounts.

This matches the call in the Workers' Party's 2025 manifesto, which specifically asked for AI to be used to detect suspicious transactions. The idea is that such programs increase efficiency in combating scammers who themselves turn to technology to perpetuate their crimes, and it is one which should be supported.

Such identification of potential cybercrime, enabling accounts via AI tools can aid authorities in their fight to limit or prevent damage being dealt, but necessary guardrails and ultimately, human oversight must be put in place.

Any usage of AI tools, especially within law enforcement contexts, must be done in cognisance of the potential for unfair bias against marginalised groups, an issue that I previously raised when debating the Motion on Singapore's AI transition. Such AI-enabled tools are also known to throw up false positives. For instance, the New York Times reported in July this year that when Meta deployed AI tools to detect accounts flouting its terms of service, many accounts belonging to small business owners and even non-profits were wrongfully banned, and some deleted with their appeals turned down. This affected livelihoods and operations, with Meta eventually acknowledging that mistakes were made and restored some accounts after the times inquired after the incidents.

This example highlights a potential pitfall of purely using AI to enforce any rule or regulation, especially when it appears that no human oversight was available to appeal against decisions that those affected claimed were erroneous.

In the case of clause 19, although it is explicitly noted that responsibility for the results and actions taken by the computer program would be borne by a responsible officer, could the Senior Minister of State elaborate on the processes in place to ensure that the deployment of such computer programs would be fair and accurate? And also clarify about how human oversight and review plays into the operations of such decisions.

The powers granted to law enforcement, while having the well-intentioned aim of tackling scams and cybercrime, should also be open to independent scrutiny by both Parliament and members of the public. In this vein, would the Government release a report annually detailing key metrics and indicators, such as total numbers of SLOs, ADOs and DOs issued, as well as the error rates of automated directives, appeal volumes and the average resolution timelines for false positives, for citizens to better understand the action and efforts behind our efforts against scams?

Clause 6 of the Bill expands on the provisions of the Protection from Scams Act by granting law enforcement the ability to order banks to furnish information, such as the name, contact details and residential addresses of users whose accounts are subject to a restriction order, something that was previously disallowed under the Banking Act.

The new subsection 5(ac) also allows for the disclosure of any other prescribed information. Could the Senior Minister of State clarify what other information is envisioned by this catch or flip clause, and more generally, how does this new power balance against our wider financial ecosystem, in particular, the principle of banking secrecy?

Moving to enforcement and the new powers under clause 7, introducing SLOs and ADOs to the Protection from Scams Act, even as we assume that executive powers would be exercised carefully and responsibly, these orders imposed on an innocent party or unwitting mule would at least be a mild inconvenience and at worst, debilitating to daily life.

Individuals who have their accounts frozen might end up unable to receive salaries or to foot the cost of their daily necessities and medical bills, if their sole bank account or e-wallet account is completely frozen. In the case of businesses, especially smaller proprietors, this might cause business operations to grind to a halt and result in the non-payment of employees.

On this specific concern, a Parliamentary reply from September last year noted that persons whose accounts are blocked under the facility restriction framework could still have access to basic banking services, receive payments, such as their salary and government benefits, as well as withdraw and deposit money at physical bank branches. Would this principle be retained with the enactment of this Bill into law?

The Minister also stated in another Parliamentary reply this year that graduated restrictions are not being prioritised due to the need for significant system upgrades and changes. The same reply noted that banks expeditiously review and facilitate each request by holders of accounts subject to a restriction order to withdraw funds and that the Police approved all requests made to withdraw money for daily use.

Could the Senior Minister of State shed light on the average processing time for approved requests to withdraw funds from bank accounts subject to a restriction order, and how would the Government work with banks towards eventually developing a system that allows for graduated restrictions?

Our anti-scam efforts should also be more victim-centred. For instance, the current Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF) requires banks and telecommunications companies to bear the full cost of losses arising from a scam, should they fail to carry out their responsibilities according to the framework, else the costs would be fully borne by the victim.

This is not considered enough, that other parties within the ecosystem, such as social media and messaging service companies, also play a very crucial part in stamping out scams. SPF's brief on scams and cybercrime noted that social media and messaging services were the highest and second highest methods of contact adopted by scammers.

While the Code of Practice governing social media and messaging services was recently updated, this Bill raises the penalties for service providers who fail to comply. We can and should do more to hold social media and messaging services responsible for their action or inaction in our fight against scams. Additionally, the SRF also needs to be more sensitive to the needs of the consumer, who is likely to be in a far weaker position should they have to bear losses arising from the scam.

In a multi-pronged approach, jurisdictions worldwide are looking to victim reimbursement systems. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) has mandated that payment service providers refund banks up to £85,000 if a victim reported that they were subject to a scam unless the victim was grossly negligent or did not provide the payment service provider with all the information required for the investigations. The victim might also have to foot a £100 excess, depending on which provider they came from.

Australia is also planning to implement a similar scheme with a lower cap of AUD3,000, and with responsibility shared equally between the banks, telecommunications companies and social media platforms. Such an approach seems to be working.

An independent study of the UK system found a decrease in the number of fraud cases and the total amount lost to fraud involving faster payment or fast equivalent transfers. This also forced banks to step up their anti-scam measures by hitting them directly in the wallet.

Therefore, I would like to repeat the call contained in the Workers' Party's 2025 manifesto to have an insurance scheme to cover losses from scams with a consumer liability cap of up to $500 and to look into a scam victim restitution fund financed by recovered funds.

Mr Speaker, while the provisions under this Bill are largely centred around mules, we must dedicate more of our energy and resources towards dismantling the vast money laundering infrastructure that enables scams to flourish.

According to the latest Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mutual evaluation report on Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering (AML) efforts, domestic low ranking money mules comprise the majority of Singapore's AML investigations and convictions, despite other stakeholders within the wider ecosystem facilitating and benefiting from such ill-gotten gains, such as professional enablers and the masterminds playing a significant role in such operations.

I believe this is best summed up by a young money mule who was apprehended back in 2021 when he was just 17 years old. He noted that, "I am just a pawn, but there is always a queen and a king. They are never going to get caught because they are going to have people before them that will get caught." I could not have put this better myself.

It is also concerning that the task force report noted that sanctions against natural persons convicted on money laundering, consisting of either a fine of up to $500,000, 10 years jail time, or both, while proportionate, were deemed neither effective nor dissuasive. I hope that this will be addressed when the Government studies the implementation of the FATF's recommendations.

Another recommendation prescribed by the report is for the authorities to diversify sources of false scam detection. The report notes that 82% of Singapore's money laundering investigations arose from Police reports filed by victims of cyber-enabled fraud, a stark contrast to the 2% from financial and other intelligence sources.

In view of this, can the Senior Minister of State clarify how our law enforcement agencies intend to step up their proactive identification of money laundering offences via financial intelligence?

We can also work towards strengthening our financial intelligence sharing capabilities, especially amongst banks. Since its inception in 2024, the Collaborative Sharing of Money Laundering/TF Information and Cases (COSMIC), the Monetary Authority of Singapore's (MAS') customer information sharing platform aimed at curbing financial crime, has helped in closing over 1,000 suspicious customer accounts, with suspicious transaction reports filed for up to $1.6 billion in aggregate fund flows, according to a response to a Parliamentary Question I filed just last month.

As we look to expand COSMIC, participation in the programme by all financial institutions should eventually be mandatory rather than voluntary, thus strengthening our corpus of financial intelligence.

Finally, beyond enforcement our anti-scam efforts should also target segments of the population such as those who are less digitally savvy. Despite accounting for about 14.8% of victims in 2025, elderly scam victims lost an average of approximately $42,347 from scams during the first half of 2026, up from $35,374 over the same period in 2025, leaving them in a financially precarious state.

The Minister in May this year noted that approximately 40% of senior scam victims fell victim to impersonation scams where scammers posed as Government officials and prominent figures to extort money from victims. In one instance, over S$6.1 million was lost to scammers impersonating the Immigrations and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) or Chinese officials, while another case involved a scammer extorting around $600,000 by posing as Elon Musk.

Given this, could the Minister clarify how the Government is reviewing anti-scam efforts such as SG Cyber Safe Seniors Programme to ensure that it is up to date with the latest developments and to maximise its reach amongst the elderly in particular.

In conclusion, as we step up our anti-scam enforcement efforts, the expansion and use of these law enforcement powers, while helpful, should be made clear to the public. We must look beyond mules, target the complex money laundering infrastructure that sustains scams and adopt a multi-pronged approach towards tackling scams beyond enforcement.

Members of the public rely on law enforcement to defend and take action against scams. Knowing and understanding how these powers are used will only bolster public confidence in our law enforcement and go towards addressing the many concerns that the public has about the scams that currently plague our society. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Mr Abdul Muhaimin Abdul Malik.

Mr Speaker, Sir, scams are no longer a small problem in Singapore. They are the most prevalent type of crime in Singapore and account for greater losses than all physical crime combined. The mid-year statistics released on 26 August show some hard won progress, but they also point to a stubborn reality.

Losses fell to about $410.6 million in the first half of 2026, down some 18% from $500.2 million lost in the same period a year before. And the number of cases fell too. That is real progress and it reflects the combined effort of the Government, the industry and the community. But in the same breath, the Police told us that about around eight in 10 victims still handed their money over voluntarily, meaning they were manipulated, not hacked.

Since 2019, Singaporeans have lost more than $4 billion to scams. So, while the trend line is encouraging, no one in this House should mistake it for victory.

Sir, behind every one of those figures is a person. Our older residents in particular are being targeted and the losses they suffer are severe. Statistics from the police show that the average amount lost per elderly victim rose from about $35,000 in the first half of 2025, to over $42,000 in the same period this year. What should trouble us most is that so many of these victims are not hacked but manipulated. They were befriended by strangers with ill intentions and subsequently coaxed and deceived into transferring their own savings. In some cases, they continue paying even after they begin to suspect that something is wrong.

This is not a story about foolish people. These are our parents and grandparents. It is a story about how sophisticated the manipulation has become.

This Bill tackles that framework from several directions at once, amending five separate statutes, the Protection from Scams Act, the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, the OCHA, the Police Force Act and the Banking Act.

I will confine my remarks to a few provisions where I believe the powers are welcome, but where the House should press for safeguards. The SLOs and ADOs under the new Part 2(A) are, I believe, powers that most Singaporeans will welcome. The logic is sound if we can freeze an account or cut off the line the moment there is reason to believe it is being used to move scam proceeds, we interrupt the crime while the money is still in reach.

The condition-based account disabling order, which lets an officer disable a whole class of accounts meeting specified criteria, is a sensible response to syndicates that operate at scale through networks of mule accounts.

But I must raise one concern that I suspect every Member will recognise from our Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS). My concern is not with the freezing of accounts. It is with how quickly they are unfrozen when the account holder turns out to be innocent and in particular, with the longer suspensions that fall outside the 30-day limit this Bill sets.

Sir, we must remember that innocent people can be caught in the middle of these schemes through no fault of their own. A person may find funds transferred into their account by a scammer or may have unwittingly dealt with someone who turned out to be a fraudster and suddenly find their own account frozen.

For a working person, losing access to the account is not a minor inconvenience. The impact can be disproportionately high on lower-income earners. It can mean rent going unpaid, installments being missed and real strain on the family.

So, my questions to the Minister are these: first, how was the 30-day period for an account disabling order arrived at? And is there a scope to make it shorter still?

I welcome that this new order carries a hard limit of 30 days, extendable once, because a defined cap is itself a safeguard, and it disciplines the exercise of the power. But that welcome cap prompts a larger question. The hardship my residents bring to our MPS rarely comes from a 30-day freeze. It comes from accounts suspended for many months under banks' own processes or during ongoing investigations where no equivalent statutory limit applies. That is where the strain is felt most keenly.

So, I will ask the Minister what service standards govern the lifting of these longer suspensions once an innocent party is cleared and what records does that person have to have their account restored sooner?

I say candidly to this House with these powers, we should expect more MPS cases from residents whose accounts have been frozen, asking us to help appeal for the orders to be lifted. When that happens, they should be able to get a swift response and a fair process.

Sir, one of the most significant features of this Bill, to my reading, is the creation of civilian specialist officers under the new sections in the Police Force Act. These officers will be granted police grade powers of investigation and arrest. To my understanding, these powers would be comparable to those of officers of the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), with an initial focus on cyber-crime.

I have two questions. First, where will this new body sit? The powers mirror those of a CAD officer, but the Bill does not make clear whether these officers will operate under CAD, under some new unit or elsewhere within the force. I would like some clarity on the command structure and importantly, who will be accountable for these powers.

Second, I put this plain plainly. The Bill states that it will not involve the Government in any extra financial expenditure. If that is so, I will ask the Minister from where is the manpower for this civilian specialist officers to be drawn? Are they to come from existing SPF, MHA, or wider Public Service establishments?

If we are asking existing officers to take on this work, we should also be clear about what may have to give elsewhere. We need to be confident that we are not stretching our enforcement capacity too thin, especially when we are asking more of it.

Sir, I want to flag clause 19, which allows a Part 2 direction, which may include a direction to take down an online location. This direction could be issued by the operation of a computer program with a responsible officer accountable for it.

If I read this correct correctly, this is among the first times that our enforcement framework, expressly contemplates an automated system making such a decision. I understand entirely why. Malicious websites are spun up faster than any human team can act. In the first half of this year alone, the Police disrupted tens of thousands of scam-related mobile lines, WhatsApp lines and malicious websites.

Automation is how we keep pace, but precisely because this is a novel step, I will ask the Minister to set out the safeguards. What human oversight sits behind the responsible officer? What audit and review mechanisms will apply? And what records exist where a legitimate site is caught by mistake? Speed and due process need not be in tension, but we must design for both.

Sir, the Bill introduces caning for those who traffic in the tools of scams, those who sell, buy or supply designated online accounts or hand over their personal particulars to open them knowing they will be used for scams. I expect it will be hard for any Member to speak against this, and I do not intend to.

Scams have imposed a heavy toll on affected Singaporean households. Savings have been wiped out and victims left with nothing but the shame and embarrassment they will have to endure. Given the toll, I believe most Singaporeans will support firmer deterrence against those who knowingly enable this trade.

I will only observe that the Bill wisely targets the knowing enabler, with evidential presumptions that a person who does this for any gain, or who fails to check who they are handling their credentials to, is presumed to have known.

We saw recently how this trade operates in practice. A young man charged with buying e-wallets from work permit holders, paying them around $50 each, through which nearly $10,000 in scam proceeds flowed. The $50 seller and the syndicate buyer are both links in the chain and it is the right that the law reaches both.

I will ask the Minister only to confirm that our enforcement and our public education will continue to distinguish clearly between the syndicate operative and the naive and desperate individual who is themselves being exploited.

Sir, if I may broaden the lens for a moment, part of protecting Singaporeans is being clear about what these numbers include and what they leave out. In an earlier Sitting. I ask how the police classify a case as a scam, where a seller fails to complete a transaction and multiple buyers lose money, and what distinguishes such cases from ordinary civil or commercial disputes.

The Minister's answer was instructive. Where a seller deceives buyers into paying with no intention of ever delivering, that may amount to cheating under the Penal Code, but where a seller simply fails to deliver without fraudulent intent, no cheating offence is disclosed, and the buyer's recourse is a civil one. The Police assess each case on its facts, for instance, where the seller impersonated a legitimate shop or become uncontactable the moment payment was received.

I raise this not to quarrel with the distinction, which is legally correct, but to make a point about the resident's experience. To a buyer who is out of pocket, the line between scam and civil disputes feels academic. The money is gone either way and a civil claim for a few hundred dollars is rarely worth pursuing.

As we build this formidable apparatus against scams, I will ask the Government not to lose sight of these residents who fell into the gap. Those cheated of smaller sums or left to the civil courts for whom our new powers offer little. Consumer protection and accessible redress for small value e-commerce disputes must advance alongside our anti-scam enforcement, not lag behind it. Mr Speaker, in Malay, please.

(In Malay): Mr Speaker, scam cases are no longer a minor problem in Singapore. They are the most prevalent form of crime and have resulted in greater losses than all other physical crimes combined.

I welcome the new enforcement orders under Part 2A. However, there are several issues I would like to raise, based on feedback from MPS. Prolonged account freezes often affect scam victims adversely. I would like to ask the Minister to consider putting in place regulatory processes and the right to appeal for the lifting of freezing orders for those who have been proven not to be involved in the scam.

The establishment of CSOs under a new section in the Police Force Act gives them investigative and arrest powers equivalent to those of police officers of the same grade. I would like to ask the Minister where this new organisation will be located, and where the manpower for these new officers will come from.

I would like to draw attention to clause 19, which allows an order to take down a website or online location to be issued directly by a computer program under a “responsible officer”. Will there be human oversight in this process, and will there be audit and review procedures?

I strongly support the introduction of caning as punishment for those who traffic in scam equipment. However, I would like to ask the Minister to look at scam cases and distinguish enforcement between syndicate masterminds and individuals who may be desperate or may themselves be victims.

We need to be mindful of the distinction between something that is considered a “scam” and a “civil dispute”. Consumer protection and easy access to channels for seeking compensation for small-value e-commerce claims must develop alongside our anti-scam enforcement efforts.

(In English): Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill grants the authorities broad and in places sweeping powers and it mandates firmer punishments. Given what scams have done to this country, that is not surprising, and on balance, I support it.

Powerful tools are warranted against a threat of this scale, but powerful tools demand equally serious safeguards. The measure of this Bill will not only be how many syndicate accounts we freeze. It will be how quickly we free the innocent ones we freeze by mistake, how transparently our new officers and our new automated system are held to account and whether residents who loses their money in the grey zone still finds a door open somewhere in Government.

I hope the Minister can address the concerns I have raised on the lifting of orders on the manpower, the placement of CSOs  and on the oversight of automated decisions. Sir, notwithstanding the questions and clarification I have raised, I support the Bill.

Mr Jackson Lam.

Mr Speaker, Sir, last year, for the first time in several years, the number of scam cases in Singapore fell by almost a quarter, to under 38,000. That is encouraging.

But Singaporeans still lost $913 million to scams in 2025. That is about $29 lost every second. And while there were fewer cases, the median loss increased from $1,389 to $1,644. So, the scam threat remains serious. This is the backdrop against which we consider the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill.

Scams have also changed. In the past, it could be a phone call followed by a request for money. Today, scams operate through bank accounts, payment accounts, digital tokens, telephone lines, online accounts and digital platforms. Our laws must keep up.

Last year, the costliest scams were not random. Investment scams, Government official impersonation scams, job scams, phishing and business email compromise accounted for the bulk of the money lost. These are not simple tricks. They are well-organised operations that study how Singaporeans think and behave.

I would like to raise three points.

The first point, we must disrupt scams earlier and faster. I welcome the expansion of our anti-scam powers beyond banks. The Bill allows authorities to restrict services and disable all related accounts and platforms that may be used for scam-related offences. This is important because when it comes to scams, speed matters. Once money has moved through several accounts, recovering it becomes much harder. Our approach should therefore be: "Detect early. Disrupt quickly. Stop the scam before the victim loses his or her money."

I would like to ask the Minister: once the Police flag a suspicious account, telephone line or online account, how quickly will service providers be expected to act? And will there be common response standards across banks, telcos and online platforms?

A strong power is only useful if we can act quickly enough. I would also like to raise the cross-border nature of this problem. Between March and May this year, Operation FRONTIER+ III saw Singapore and nine other jurisdictions arrest more than 3,000 people and freeze more than $200 million in scam-linked funds across the region. Singapore's own Anti-Scam Centre accounted for $35 million of that total. This tells us that many of the people behind these scams sit beyond the reach of our domestic laws alone. I would also want to ask the Minister whether this Bill strengthens our ability to cooperate with regional partners and whether Singaporeans can expect more joint operations of this kind.

Second point, we must protect innocent users. I understand why we need strong powers to disable accounts. But there may be situations where an account is wrongly identified. For an individual, losing access to a bank account could affect his daily needs. For a business, it could affect payments and operations. Many small businesses and SMEs operate on a single account. They do not have the reserves or the alternative banking relationships that larger companies do. A few days of being locked out could mean not paying suppliers and being unable to pay staff on time.

The Bill provides an appeal mechanism to the Commissioner of Police, which I welcome. But could we also have a fast review process for genuine cases where an account has been wrongly disabled? There should be a clear channel for affected persons to provide evidence quickly and have their accounts reviewed. The principle should be simple: act fast against scammers, but correct mistakes just as fast when innocent people are affected.

I would also ask whether the Ministry will track the number of accounts disabled, the number of appeals and how many orders are subsequently changed or overturned. This will help us understand how accurate the system is.

My last point, online platforms must do more. The Bill creates new offences relating to the misuse of designated online accounts, including supplying such accounts where there is knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe they will be used for criminal activity. I support this. We have tackled money mules and SIM-card misuse. But online accounts are increasingly another tool used by scammers.

A single social media or messaging account can potentially reach thousands of victims. However, we should not only go after the individuals providing these accounts. The platforms themselves must also take responsibility. The amendments to OCHA allow significant financial penalties against designated providers that fail to comply with certain requirements. For large global technology companies, the penalties must be meaningful enough to change behaviour.

More importantly, we should focus on outcomes. Are scam advertisements being removed faster? Are fake and impersonation accounts being detected earlier? Are suspicious accounts being stopped before they reach Singaporeans? These are the outcomes that matter to Singaporeans.

I would also ask how this framework deals with content generated using AI. Scam advertisements and fake profiles can now be produced automatically and in large numbers, making them harder to distinguish from genuine content. I would ask whether platforms will be required to detect AI-generated scam material specifically and whether the codes of practice under OCHA will be updated as this technology develops.

The Bill also allows certain directions under the OCHA to be issued through a computer program. I understand the need for this. Scammers operate at speed and scale, and technology can help us respond faster.

But I would ask the Minister: what human oversight will there be? How will false positives be identified? And how will we ensure these automated systems remain accurate? Technology can help us move faster, but accountability must still rest with our people.

Finally, the Bill allows for the appointment of CSOs with significant investigative powers. This makes sense as cybercrime becomes more specialised. But I would also like to ask how these officers will be selected, trained and supervised, given the powers they will exercise.

I would also suggest that the Government consider a statutory review of this Bill, perhaps after three to five years, to assess whether these powers remain proportionate and effective as scam tactics continue to evolve.

Mr Speaker, Sir, scammers will continue to adapt. When we close one channel, they will look for another. Our laws, therefore, cannot stand still. I support this Bill because it allows us to go beyond targeting individual scammers and disrupt the wider infrastructure that enables scams. As we implement these stronger powers, three principles should guide us: speed in stopping scams; safeguards for innocent users; and accountability from Government and service providers.

Every dollar lost to scams represents someone's savings, salary or retirement funds. If we can stop the money before it reaches the scammers, we would have protected not just someone's money, but often years of hard work and savings. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Fadli Fawzi.

Mr Speaker, last year, Singaporeans lost $913.1 million, down from more than $1.1 billion the year before. The Police, the Anti-Scam Centre and our banks have made real progress against an adversary that adapts faster than most of our institutions can. I would like to acknowledge the recent formation of the cyber command by the SPF as another important step towards combating scams and other cybercrimes.

Nevertheless, I want to direct our attention to clauses 7 and 8 of the Bill, which introduces the ADOs that allow the Police to disable bank accounts that may be facilitating scam-related offences. An ADO will be kept at 30 days, extendable once and no further, while clause 8 gives the user of a disabled account a right of appeal. I welcome this procedural protection for those affected by account disabling orders.

I also understand that these account disabling orders are primarily targeted at accounts implicated in scam-related offences. However, can the Minister clarify how the Police will use these orders in cases where the bank accounts belong to vulnerable individuals, for example, the elderly, the young adults or migrant workers who may have been manipulated by criminal syndicates into allowing their accounts to be used for money laundering?

It is my hope that the Police and banks will always be circumspect and judicious when exercising their powers to freeze the bank accounts of individuals, whether under the provisions of today's Bill or otherwise. The freezing of bank accounts, and bank restrictions more generally, can cause considerable difficulties and hardship for individuals affected, especially given the pervasiveness of digital banking and e-payment services in our society.

Sir, I acknowledge that in terms of banking restrictions, the introduction of ADOs is not new. There are many other circumstances in which an individual's bank account may get frozen. For instance, this House passed the Protection from Scams Act last year, which empowers the Police to step in and issue restriction orders to banks if there is reasonable belief that account holders will be making transfers to scammers. However, such account holders are still permitted access to funds for essential daily living expenses and bills.

n response to the Parliamentary Question from my hon friend, Mr Kenneth Tiong, MHA revealed that as of February 2026, only 12 restriction orders have been issued under the Protection from Scams Act. The Police approved withdrawals for daily expenses in 10 of the 12 cases, while no requests for withdrawal were made in the remaining two cases.

And beyond the powers conferred in today's Bill and the Protection from Scams Act, section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) allows an officer of, or above, the rank of inspector to direct a bank to allow no dealings with an account, and I quote, "for such period as may be specified in the Order".

Unlike restriction orders and account disabling orders, section 35 of the CPC contains no maximum period, no automatic review and no duty to give reasons. Moreover, accounts frozen under section 35 have no mechanism for appeal at all. Instead, affected individuals have to make an application to Court, to release the money for, and in the words of the statute, "foodstuffs, rent, the discharge of a mortgage, medicine, medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges."

In November 2025, my hon friend Mr Dennis Tan asked whether restrictions would remain on a person the Courts had acquitted and whether there was any recourse where a restriction had harmed the livelihood. The hon Member Mr Cai Yinzhou also asked how many of those investigated had unknowingly lost the control of their accounts and what interim support they would be given.

In response, the Minister pointed to his reply of 15 October 2025, where he said that restrictions are lifted when they are no longer required or when where a person is acquitted in Court. In that reply, the Minister also added that individuals subject to banking restrictions will still have access to basic banking facilities and can continue to receive incoming payments, including salaries and Government benefits.

I recognise that today's Bill does not seek to amend section 35 of the CPC but rather introduces a different form of banking restriction to address bank accounts involved in scams. In light of this, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether the Police intends to continue using the section 35 of the CPC against bank accounts that may be facilitating scam-related offences or if the Police would consider issuing ADOs against these bank accounts instead as a first resort once the Bill is passed.

Sir, I hope the House takes the point that losing access to basic banking facilities, for whatever reason, can cause severe hardship to anyone affected. Hence, if the relevant authorities receive report of cases where individuals subject to banking restrictions report losing their access to basic banking facilities or encounter difficulties as a result, I hope that such reports will be taken seriously and that the claims will be investigated thoroughly.

I also have two specific suggestions in this regard.

One, the Government can consider legislating provisions to simplify the process for modest sums to be released automatically from frozen bank accounts for subsistence so that an ordinary person need not file a Court application or seek Police permission to buy groceries or pay for public utilities.

Two, the Government should also consider extending a guarantee of basic banking to Singapore citizens, permanent residents and all holders of work passes so that no resident is left without an account, he or she can use in the event that their bank account is frozen under the provisions of the Bill or otherwise.

The idea can be modeled after the European Union's Payment Account Directive, which guarantees residents with the right to access to a basic payment account since 2014. Banks are given 10 working days to reach a decision and must provide written reasons if they want to refuse a customer.

On a related note, Mr Speaker, I hope the Government can share more details about how many bank accounts have been frozen and on what basis. I understand that the Anti-Scam Command froze more than 15,000 accounts last year and more than 16,700 accounts were frozen in 2022. Can the Senior Minister of State provide a breakdown of the number of bank accounts that have been frozen, including for non-scam related reasons. In each of the past two years, under which statutory provision and the average and median duration that these accounts were frozen?

Finally, Mr Speaker, section 6A of the Bill will let the Police limit a person's access to financial and telecommunications services for up to three years. This may be well justified for those who sell their identities to syndicates, but I hope that hardship will not be caused to anyone unknowingly or wrongly caught up by these provisions.

Can the Senior Minister of State reassure the public that such an SLO will be levied sparingly and carefully. Also, can the Senior Minister of State clarify how the Police will ensure that such orders will only be issued against those who are truly deserving of such a punishment?

Mr Speaker, I am fully supportive of the Police being equipped with every tool necessary to protect Singaporeans from scams. However, I hope that the Government can also consider the suggestions that I have offered to strengthen the procedural safeguards for those whose accounts are frozen under the provisions of this Bill or otherwise. Thank you, Mr Speaker, and I await the Minister's clarifications.

Mr Gabriel Lam.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in May this year, a Singaporean businessman received a WhatsApp message from someone claiming to be a Cabinet Secretary. He was invited to a Zoom call with the Prime Minister. The call looked real. Prime Minister Wong appeared on screen, so did the President and a Minister. They spoke about an urgent request for funds linked to the Strait of Hormuz. But what the businessman saw on that call had been fabricated using deepfake AI technology. By the time the businessman realised what had happened, he had transferred at least $4.9 million.

This happened this year, here in Singapore, to someone who had every reason to believe he was being careful. It shows us how quickly technology is changing. Scammers are now able to make something look and sound real enough to fool even people who are cautious.

Scams cost victims in Singapore $913.1 million last year. That figure is already known to this House. What I want to focus on today is not just the amount of money lost, but how we can respond better.

I think this Bill is an important step forward. The Bill gives the Police stronger powers to act earlier. DOs will allow the Police to require service providers to provide information linked to specified accounts and scam-related activities. ADOs will allow accounts suspected of facilitating scam-related offences to be disabled for up to 30 days, with one possible extension of up to another 30 days. SLOs will allow scam-enabling services to be restricted for identified persons for up to three years.

The Bill also creates four new offences to deter the misuse, supply and receipt of online accounts for criminal activity on designated platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat, TikTok, Carousell, Google and Apple.

Scammers have not given up on SIM cards. That is why Parliament tightened the rules on the misuse of local SIM cards, after losses involving local mobile lines used in scams and other cybercrimes nearly tripled between 2021 and 2023, reaching $384 million.

But scammers have also moved beyond SIM cards. They are using chat apps, social media, shopping accounts and other online services. The number of scams perpetrated on TikTok rose by 37.8% last year. Losses from cryptocurrency scams now account for about one-fifth of all scam losses. So, even when we close one door, scammers will look for another.

That is why I think this Bill is the next step in how we deal with scams. The Protection from Scams Act gave the Police powers to intervene when a victim remains deeply at risk of transferring money to a scammer. As of 15 February 2026, 12 Restriction Orders (ROs) had been issued. One had been lifted, two had ended after reaching the statutory limit and nine remained in effect. Ten of the 12 recipients had also asked for withdrawals for daily expenses, which the Police approved.

This Bill allows us to step in even earlier. Instead of waiting until a victim is targeted, the Police can act against the accounts and services that scammers rely on. I think that is the right direction. But as we give the Police stronger powers, we should also make sure that innocent people are protected.

I have three points.

First, open data. The Ministry has already been providing regular updates on ROs under the Protection from Scams Act. I would ask that similar information be provided for the new powers under this Bill. For example, how many DOs, ADOs and SLOs are issued? How many are challenged or withdrawn? How long do these orders usually remain in place? This information will help us understand whether these powers are being used properly and whether they are working as intended. If we are giving the Police stronger powers, we should also give the public confidence that these powers are being used properly.

Second, speed for innocent users. There is another side to this. Some of the accounts affected by these new orders may belong to innocent people. They could be victims whose accounts have been hacked. They could be people whose identities have been stolen. They could also be accounts wrongly linked to scam activity.

Under the Protection from Scams Act, 10 of the 12 people placed under ROs had asked the Police for permission to withdraw money for their daily needs, and these requests were approved. This shows that there is already a process to help people who are affected. I would ask the Ministry to explain how the existing appeal mechanisms for the new orders will work in practice, and whether additional safeguards are needed.

Where an innocent person can show that an account has been wrongly affected, the process to review the case should be clear and fast. Once it is clear that there is no longer a risk, access should be restored in hours, not days. This is important because for an innocent person, being locked out of an account can itself cause real harm.

Third, shared responsibility. The Police have an important role, but preventing scams cannot be the responsibility of the Police alone. Banks, telcos and online platforms are also part of the system through which these scams take place. In fact, the Bill's definition of service providers already covers financial institutions, telecommunications service providers and providers of online services.

This Bill also provides for financial penalties of up to $10 million for each instance of non-compliance by designated online service providers. Where a direction to rectify the breach is not complied with, there can also be a further fine of up to $300,000 for every day or part of a day that the offence continues after conviction.

I would ask the Ministry to say more about how these powers will be used. I would also ask whether the Government intends to set different duties or standards for the different types of service providers covered by the Bill, given that a bank, a telco and an online platform may see different parts of the same scam.

If one part of the system can see that something is wrong, should it have a duty to step in? I think this is something we should continue to look at. This does not mean shifting all responsibility away from individuals. Public education will remain important. Singaporeans will still need to be careful about the links they click, the people they speak to online and the money they transfer.

But scams are becoming more convincing. When a fake Prime Minister can appear on a video call, we cannot simply tell people to be more careful and leave it at that. We also need to make it harder for scammers to operate.

Mr Speaker, I began with the businessman who lost at least $4.9 million after receiving a fake Zoom call. Law alone may not have been able to show him that the person on his screen was not real. But the law can help us disrupt the accounts, phone lines and online services that scammers use. And the earlier we can step in, the more victims we may be able to prevent. This is especially important for our seniors, who last year suffered the highest average loss per scam victim among all age groups, at $37,053 each.

Education will continue to matter. But education alone is not enough. We need to act earlier, protect innocent users and make sure that everyone in the scam system plays a part in stopping scams.

Overall, I think that this Bill is a step in the right direction and I hope the Ministry will continue to strengthen our approach, especially in the areas of open data, protection for innocent users and shared responsibility. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Mr Speaker, scams continued to inflict immense financial and emotional distress on Singaporeans, and I welcome the Government taking actions to strengthen our legislative toolkit. I am heartened to see that the Scam (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill reflects key principles I advocated for during the Second Reading of the Protection from Scams Bill in January 2025.

To begin with, I had previously highlighted the need for a centralised mechanism to share threat intelligence and disrupt scam vectors across sectors.

The Bill moves in this direction by establishing statutory powers for DOs, enabling crucial information sharing across banks, telcos and digital platforms to facilitate cross-sector fraud prevention.

I had urged the Government to prioritise real-time intervention before stolen funds vanish. This Bill tackles these high-speed scenarios by empowering specified officers to issue swift ADOs and service limitation orders to freeze suspect bank accounts, crypto wallets and communication channels. We have already seen the value of proactive real time action in the recent joint Police operation with crypto exchanges, which successfully foiled almost $9 million in scam losses through rapid detection and data sharing.

I stress the importance of greater accountability from digital platforms and service providers. This Bill strengthens the deterrence by increasing maximum administrative financial penalties for non-compliant online providers to $10 million, alongside targeted measures to crack down on money mules who surrender their credentials.

However, there are several critical areas that require further strengthening to build a more comprehensive framework.

First, the Government should establish a clear statutory victim compensation framework that holds financial institutions, telcos and digital platforms accountable when their anti-scam measures failed to protect customers.

Second, a dedicated independent investigative body should be set up to handle claims under the SRF. Under the current SRF guidelines, the financial institution acts as the overall point of contact and conducts the initial assessment to determine whether it met its duties. While these are internal investigation teams independent of business units, this remains an internal process operated by the bank itself, presenting an inherent conflict of interest as the bank acts as both the investigator and the interested party with the financial incentive to deny liability.

Furthermore, while dissatisfied customers can escalate disputes to the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (FIDReC), FIDReC is a dispute resolution and mediation body, rather than a dedicated investigative agency with direct statutory powers to extract system logs, fraud detection records or independently audit technical records.

Third, MAS and IMDA should introduce a standardised public rating system to regularly assess and publish the anti-scam performance of financial institutions, telcos and online platforms. These public ratings need not disclose specific technical vulnerabilities. Rather, clear and standardised ratings would serve as a powerful incentive for entities to continuously improve their anti-scam measures. Public transparency enables consumers to make informed choices and vote with their wallets, creating healthy market forces that drive a race to the top.

Fourth, regulators should build upon the account disabling powers in this Bill by mandating real time fraud monitoring for digital wallet transactions after setup, as well as expanding algorithmic anomaly detection across retail stock brokerages and flag messaging channels. Scammers routinely exploit social engineering to trick victims into approving initial digital wallet set-ups on services, like Apple Pay or Google Pay, after which subsequent draining transactions can proceed without triggering multi-factor authentication.

Similarly, in stock ramp and dump schemes, scammers lure victims through chat groups to buy foreign microcap stocks on licensed exchanges, requiring real-time patent monitoring, such as flagging sudden coordinated retail buy orders or reported scam invitation links, will better ensure proactive intervention before funds are lost.

Fifth, a dedicated scam victim restitution fund should be established. As I raised in a Parliamentary Question on 28 February 2025, such a fund could be financed by confiscated assets so that local scam victims can receive a portion of recovered proceeds. While I acknowledge the operational complexities raised, establishing a structured fund would demonstrate tangible solidarity with victims who currently face low fund recovery rates.

During that exchange, then-Minister of State Sun Xueling mentioned that various proposals were being considered to see how best to return recovered scam proceeds to victims. Could the Senior Minister of State update this house on what proposals are currently being considered or implemented?

Mr Speaker, while this Bill provides vital emergency breaks, we can build greater resilience against scams by incorporating these structural safeguards. I urge the Government to address these proposals in future legislation and regulations to better ensure protection and recourse for Singaporeans who are victims of scams. Notwithstanding these concerns, I support the Bill.

Prof Kenneth Poon.

Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. Scams have become increasingly sophisticated and the harm they cause can be devastating. I, therefore, support the stronger powers in this Bill to disrupt the services and accounts through which scams are facilitated. These are significant powers. SLOs can restrict access to scam-enabling services for up to three years, while ADOs can restrict the use of bank and payment accounts, telephone lines and online accounts.

I would like to raise one consideration about their implementation: how we protect people from harm while preserving their agency as far as possible.

Mr Speaker, we often think about scams in terms of two groups: the scammer and the victim. But human behaviour can be more complicated. A person whose bank or online account is being used to facilitate a scam may knowingly participating in criminal activity. However, there may, as highlighted by other Members this evening, also be individuals who themselves have been manipulated into facilitating a scam.

Some people may have cognitive limitations that make it more difficult to recognise deception, understand the consequences of their actions, or disengage once they have become involved. People with intellectual and developmental disabilities are one group whom this may be relevant, although there may be others who, because of their circumstances, are especially susceptible to manipulation.

I am not suggesting that such individuals constitute a significant population of persons affected by these provisions. I would like, however, to raise a broader principle, that the person through whom a scam operates may sometimes also be a person who has been manipulated by the scammer.

Our implementation framework needs to be capable of recognising this possibility. I therefore ask the Minister how proportionality and individual vulnerability will be considered when these powers are exercised.

Where someone presents a genuine risk of facilitating further scams, intervention is clearly warranted. However, where the risk can be adequately managed through a more limited intervention, I hope that we will preserve as much of the person's agency as possible.

The Bill already provides some flexibility. An ADO may be varied to permit particular transactions, subject to appropriate limits or conditions. This could be especially important for a cognitively vulnerable person who has been manipulated into allowing an account to be used by another. Restricting the account may be necessary to prevent further harm, but that person may depend on it to receive wages or benefits or meet ordinary living expenses. Could the Senior Minister of State elaborate on how such circumstances will be assessed and how continued access to essential services will be addressed for persons with particular vulnerabilities?

More broadly, will operational guidance help officers distinguish, between someone deliberately facilitating a scam and someone whose involvement reflects manipulation or significant cognitive vulnerability?

Mr Speaker, protection and agency need not be opposing principles. Good protective systems should and can intervene decisively, when necessary, while preserving a person's ability to conduct their ordinary life wherever that can safely be done. It is thus that I hope that the implementation of this Bill will combine strong protection against harm with sensitivity to vulnerability, proportionality and individual agency. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Senior Minister of State Goh.